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Abstract 
 
The Legitimacy of Global Legal Governance: Institutional Power and Human Rights Bias in 
International Criminal Justice 
by 
Martin J. Burke 
 
Advisor: Thomas G. Weiss 
 
As global legal governance institutions exercise increasing coercive power, including through the 
prosecution and incarceration of individuals, such institutions require greater legitimacy. An 
essential but often overlooked source is the right of the accused in mass-atrocity trials to 
effective legal protection, which constitutes a “legal legitimacy” based on liberal norms of 
criminal justice. The two most important sources of legal legitimacy are: “legality,” that is, the 
non-retroactive enforcement of crimes and punishment; and “defense parity,” institutional and 
procedural guarantees of substantive equality between the defense and prosecution before and 
during trial. The dissertation argues that the implementation of defendant rights and the quality 
of fairness thereby achieved by trials are weakened by the effect of two political features of 
international criminal justice: institutional power and human rights bias towards prosecution. 
First, institutional power is exercised by states and intergovernmental organizations through the 
creation and modification of the structural and procedural rules that shape the legal interaction 
between the major participants in trials—judges, prosecutors, and defendants and their counsel. 
 
 
 
 
v 
Second, these political actors demonstrate a bias towards successful prosecution, as a projection 
of the victim-focus of the international human rights protection regime into criminal justice. 
These issues are explored through case studies of the Yugoslavia tribunal and the International 
Criminal Court. The effect of these factors on the pre-trial and trial dynamic between the 
prosecution and defense is to generate significant weaknesses in the ability of defense counsel to 
adequately represent their clients. International criminal trials are as a consequence significantly 
less fair and legitimate than is commonly presumed. 
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1 
Introduction 
Global governance1 “continues to become a salient, albeit contested, political concept,”2 with 
international institutions exercising significant influence over decision-making in policy areas as 
varied as security, finance, the environment, and criminal justice. These processes have 
substantial normative implications. This is especially the case for that subset of global legal 
governance institutions related to criminal justice. International tribunals potentially exercise 
enormous power over individuals—provided with the authority to remove the liberty of 
defendants for decades. The dissertation argues that assessing the legitimacy of such institutions 
requires an examination of the substantive and procedural law which underpins the fairness 
towards defendants that is the hallmark of liberal legal standards of criminal justice. This 
constitutes a “legal legitimacy:” the legitimacy inherent to the operation of a legal system 
through the implementation of liberal legal norms. 
In exploring legal legitimacy, the research demonstrates that the criminal law processes 
utilized to determine guilt or innocence within international courts are not isolated from political 
interference from the states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) which create them and 
whose cooperation such courts require for their operation. This lack of separation between legal 
process and the political goals and preferences of state and IGO actors influences the trial and 
                                                
1 Global governance is “the maintenance of collective order, the achievement of collective goals, and the 
collective processes of rule through which order and goals are sought.” See James N. Rosenau, “Change, 
Complexity, and Governance in a Globalizing Space,” in Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and 
Democracy, ed. Jon Pierre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 175. 
2 Richard Higgott and Eva Erman, “Deliberative Global Governance and the Question of Legitimacy: 
What Can We Learn from the WTO?” GARNET Working Paper No: 53/08, August 2008, 
www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/csgr/garnet/workingpapers/5308.pdf. 
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pre-trial dynamics between the prosecution and defense, potentially undermining the validity of 
trial outcomes and the legitimacy of the process of determining guilt or innocence. 
High standards of legal justice, free from political influence, are necessary for maintaining 
the integrity of the fundamental principle of genuine trials: the presumption of innocence of the 
defendant. Trials operating without effective legal guarantees risk descending into political show 
trials. Nevertheless, the states, IGOs, and international human rights organizations involved in 
international criminal justice tend to advocate successful prosecution while paying inadequate 
attention to the legal rights of defendants.  
This ultimately undermines some of the primary objectives of prosecution within the 
international human rights regime: deterrence, recognition of victim suffering, and transitional 
justice. Trials which experience political influence run the risk of undermining the search for 
truth and accountability that is at the heart of criminal justice, and may find innocent people 
guilty.  
In determining the significance of research on legal fairness in international prosecutions, an 
important question is whether the weaknesses in legal legitimacy explored in this research have 
led to miscarriages of justice. The answer is twofold. First, in the sense that justice is 
conceptualized in the research, the answer is “yes:” whenever standards of fairness fall 
significantly below those examined here, and the accused has not been given adequate 
opportunities to defend him- or herself, justice has not been served. As stated by European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR), procedural inequalities themselves constitute violations of legal 
justice.3 Requiring evidence of actual prejudice undermines the value of these rights—a violation 
                                                
3 ECtHR, Lanz v. Austria, no. 24430/94, January 31, 2002, 58. 
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is the wrong itself. Wrongful conviction would be a further—moral—violation stemming from 
the normative rights violation. 
Second, in the more substantive meaning of miscarriage of justice as actual harm or wrongful 
conviction, the answer remains “yes.” In many instances it is difficult to determine the extent to 
which violations of rights have led to wrongful conviction. An external appeals process provides 
one of the strongest avenues for determining this, yet appeals processes at international courts 
are heard by chambers sitting within the structure of the original convicting court (the chamber 
of first instance) and are subject to the same procedural limitations and political influences as 
those chambers. Determining wrongful conviction also ideally requires assessing the impact of 
evidence on the judges hearing a case. This is also very difficult to assess.  
Nevertheless, weaknesses in legal legitimacy at international courts have on occasion 
demonstrably affected the outcomes of trials. A prominent example, discussed in Chapter 4, 
involves the conviction of General Tihomir Blaškić of Croatia by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The Croatian government refused to hand over 
potentially exculpatory evidence to the general’s defense team, being reluctant to cooperate with 
the court for fear of legitimizing its prosecution of one of the commanders in the country’s war 
of independence from Yugoslavia. Within days of his conviction in March 2000, the 
government, realizing that its political stance had backfired, released thousands of pages of 
documents to the court,4 some of which were utilized in his appeal. The ICTY appeals chamber 
subsequently determined that Blaškić had been wrongfully convicted on 16 of the 19 charges, 
reducing his sentence from 45 years to nine. 
                                                
4 Gregory S. Gordon, “Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process Aspirations and 
Limitations,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 45, no. 3 (2007): 678-9. 
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Despite these issues, scholarship within international relations (IR) has tended to overlook 
the importance of criminal procedure to assessments of the legitimacy of global legal 
governance. Partly responsible is an underappreciation of how legal theory, or jurisprudence, can 
contribute towards a better conceptualization of how legal processes shape the legitimacy of 
legal institutions. The dissertation utilizes a jurisprudence that facilitates our understanding of 
legitimacy within criminal justice institutions by placing legal procedure and the role of the 
defendant at its heart—with the defendant and their counsel conceptualized not as passive agents 
but as central actors in criminal justice. 
 
Examining the role of politics in shaping legal processes 
The role of power in shaping the nature, trajectory, and legitimacy of global governance is 
increasingly explored within IR.5 Meanwhile the effect of power on the legitimacy of trials 
through defendant rights at international tribunals remains underexplored. The dissertation 
addresses these lacunae in IR’s understanding of criminal law and procedure, the role of the 
defendant, and the effects of power on legitimacy.  
                                                
5 See especially the contributions to Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, eds., Power in Global 
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). See also the contributors to Jennifer Clapp 
and Doris Fuchs, eds., Corporate Power in Global Agrifood Governance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
2009); Molly Ruhlman, Who Participates in Global Governance? States, Bureaucracies, and NGOs in 
the United Nations (London: Routledge, 2014); Rita Abrahamsen, “The Power of Partnerships in Global 
Governance, Third World Quarterly 25, no. 8 (2004): 1,453-67; and Andrew Hurrell, “Power and 
Legitimacy in Global Governance,” paper at workshop on global governance, Princeton, February 2006, 
www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/normative/papers/Session4_Hurrell.pdf. 
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The research demonstrates that the states that create and maintain international courts wield 
“institutional power”6 in relation to criminal defendants which shapes the legitimacy of trials. 
This is power exercised through the creation and modification of the structural and procedural 
rules that shape the legal interaction between the major participants in trials—judges, 
prosecutors, and defendants and their counsel—including what charges can be brought against an 
accused, and how investigations and trials can be conducted. The effect of this power over the 
ability of defendants to gain a fair trial is shaped by the self-interested decision-making processes 
of states, interstate bargaining during treaty negotiations, and states’ conceptualization of 
international justice. There is an overemphasis in international criminal justice on the justice of 
prosecutions, rather than that of the fairness of trials. This leads to success being perceived in 
terms of the number of convictions, not by the strength of structural and procedural protections 
for defendants from the power imbalance criminal courts create between the defense and 
prosecution. The, largely powerful and Western, states which have been most responsible for 
creating international tribunals tend to perceive international criminal justice as an extension of 
the international human rights regime, which has led to a laudable focus on victims—on 
recognition and justice for them—which has had the effect of weakening protections for 
defendants. 
Other relevant factors are the massive scope of international trials (especially those of top 
leaders), driven by the need to satisfy victim groups and for narrative construction purposes; the 
tribunal rule changes adopted to respond to UN and state pressure to speed up trial proceedings; 
                                                
6 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, 
no. 1 (2005): 39-75, and “Power in Global Governance,” in Power in Global Governance, ed. Barnett and 
Duvall, 15-17. 
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the incoherent hybrid nature of procedures; and lack of concern with the defense function by the 
creators of the court, partly due to a lack of understanding of the role of the defense. The 
dissertation demonstrates that the exercise of institutional power and systematic human rights 
bias towards successful prosecution have generated a level of legitimacy through fairness 
towards defendants in international criminal justice that is less robust than is generally claimed 
within the academic literature. 
The limited appreciation of the role of defendants and their legal rights is responsible for the 
common narrative among historians and political scientists of the development of international 
criminal justice as one of a good but flawed start followed by immense progress in terms of 
fairness towards defendants and thereby justice served, to a state of genuine fairness today. The 
trial origins of international criminal justice at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at 
Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) at Tokyo are 
assumed or claimed to demonstrate morally acceptable levels of trial fairness towards 
defendants, but institutional and judicial process issues of fairness towards defendants are rarely 
discussed.7 When problems with these tribunals’ fairness are analyzed, the focus is largely on 
selectivity of defendants chosen to stand trial (the “victor’s justice” argument), and the 
prohibition on defendants discussing alleged Allied crimes.  
The retroactive enforcement of crimes against peace and crimes against humanity at these 
courts has also been explored,8 but rarely the institutional and procedural fair trial rights of 
                                                
7 E.g. Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2011), 533-5; 
Arieh J. Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); and Robert E. Conot, Justice At Nuremberg 
(New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1983). 
8 E.g. Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law 
Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 36-47. Legal scholars, however, have addressed 
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defendants.9 The only judicial fairness issues frequently raised are the lack of an appeals process, 
and the partiality of the judges.10 In the end, it is commonly accepted that despite the tribunals’ 
faults the Allies eventually chose the legal justice of genuine criminal trials over the political 
justice alternatives proposed at the time for the Nazi and Japanese leadership—show trials or 
firing squads.11  
High levels of fairness are presumed to characterize the re-awakening of international 
criminal justice after the Cold War, with the creation of international and hybrid (international–
domestic) courts such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).12 It is 
generally accepted that the fair judicial processes which are assumed to operate in liberal 
democratic states also do so fully within international courts, and the latter’s guilty verdicts 
therefore represent international justice served.13 
                                                                                                                                                       
the trial fairness at Nuremberg, including, Tonya, J. Boller, “The International Criminal Court: Better 
than Nuremberg?” Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 14, no. 1 (2003): 279-314. 
9 An exception is Dan Plesch, Human Rights After Hitler (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, forthcoming), which more extensively discusses issues of fairness towards defendants, and 
concludes that standards were reasonable. 
10 Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 83-4. IMTFE judges William Web and Delfin Jaranilla had participated 
in the Australian War Crimes Commission investigations into Japanese atrocities, and had been a prisoner 
of war on the infamous Bataan Death March in the Philippines in 1942, respectively. 
11 E.g. Richard Goldstone and Adam Smith, International Judicial Institutions: The Architecture of 
International Justice at Home and Abroad (London: Routledge, 2009), 40-64 (even though legal 
professionals, their analysis follows the standard narrative and has little to say about trial fairness); Dan 
Plesch, America, Hitler and the UN (London: I.B. Taurus, 2011), 101-11; and Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay 
the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000), 147-205. 
12 E.g. David J. Scheffer, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); and Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Worse Than War: Genocide, 
Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009). 
13 E.g. Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, 2nd ed. (New 
York: The New Press, 2002), 391-2; David P. Forsythe, “‘Political Trials’?: The UN Security Council and 
the Development of International Criminal Law,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to International 
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In contrast, the dissertation challenges not only this narrative, but the assumption that global 
legal governance institutions are able to perform broader human rights and political functions 
while maintaining sufficient standards of fairness. Arguably the concern with victim rights 
manifested by international prosecution has swung the pendulum too far towards ensuring 
successful prosecution, undermining the rights of defendants. The political goal of historical 
narrative construction may also weaken those rights, especially in the case of high-profile 
accused, such as Slobodan Milošević and Radovan Karadžić, where Western states and 
international prosecutors may be keen to present a particular political narrative which 
delegitimizes the defendants’ actions while legitimizing those of their international political 
rivals. 
 
The research’s contribution to IR scholarship 
In challenging the narrative of fairness within the evolution of international criminal justice, the 
research does not propose a new answer to an old question, but rather poses a new question in IR 
scholarship: How does the legal power dynamic between the individual—in this case 
defendants—and global legal governance institutions and their creators shape the legitimacy of 
international criminal courts? Other institutional and procedural input and output criteria 
discussed in Chapter 2—including autonomy, representativeness, and accountability—are also 
                                                                                                                                                       
Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives, ed. William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, and Niamh Hayes 
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 492; M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The Perennial Conflict Between International 
Criminal Justice and Realpolitik,” Georgia State University Law Review 22, no. 3 (2006): 557; and 
Richard Goldstone, “The Crime Prevention Potential of the International Criminal Court Depends Upon 
its Credibility and the Support it Receives from Governments and Especially those of States Parties to the 
Rome Treaty,” in Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, ed. Richard H. 
Steinberg (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2016), 213-19. 
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acknowledged to be important sources of legitimacy, but legal fairness towards defendants is an 
overlooked source.  
The dissertation contributes to IR research by utilizing legal theory to address two specific 
lacunae in the literature on the legitimacy of global legal governance: the manner in which law 
itself generates legitimacy as a distinct social structure and process, leading to a focus on legal 
principles and criminal procedure; and the importance of analyzing the role of the principal 
individual in criminal trials, the defendant. The project also contributes to the literature on 
institutional power by exploring the political effects on defendant rights of the decision-making 
power of states and IGOs in the establishment and modification of the rules of international 
criminal tribunals.14 
To address these weaknesses, the dissertation analyzes the intrinsic qualities of liberal legal 
practice which generate fairness towards legal subjects through their effect on the trial process. 
These qualities are argued to be a necessary but not sufficient source of legitimacy. In terms 
utilized by José Alvarez to describe approaches to the democratic legitimacy of global 
governance, the argument in the dissertation—legal legitimacy through liberal norms—is 
institutional, vertical, and liberal:15 the dissertation focuses on global governance institutions and 
their relationship to individuals, and it takes a substantive and procedural human rights-based 
approach to the source of legitimacy. Utilizing legal theory, the dissertation argues that law 
                                                
14 The literature on institutional power includes examinations of international criminal justice, but not of 
the impact of rule-making power on legal fairness. For other research on institutional power and tribunals, 
see, e.g., L. Rush Atkinson, “Knights of the Court: The State Coalition Behind the International Criminal 
Court,” Journal of International Law and International Relations 7 (2011): 66-103. 
15 José E. Alvarez, “Introducing the Themes: Introduction to Symposium on Democratic Theory and 
International Law,” Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 38 (2007): 159-74. Instead of 
institutional, approaches can be sociological; instead of vertical, horizontal (relationship with other 
institutions); and instead of liberal, based on representativeness or participation. See the first section of 
Chapter 2 of the dissertation for a more detailed discussion of these terms. 
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embodies a distinct social structure and process, whose impact on criminal defendants is central 
to a determination of the legitimacy of courts. The research utilizes legal theory to identify and 
examine the most important features of a criminal justice system to its legitimacy through fair 
trials: these features, which constitute the research’s dependent variables, are “legality” and 
“defense parity.”  
Legality is the extent to which the standards enforced by a court have achieved the status of 
law. This involves determining to what extent laws are being enforced retroactively, and the 
level of clarity and specificity in a law that enables it to effectively communicate to individuals 
what specific behavior is prohibited. Legality is concerned with the substance of crimes, in this 
case the mass atrocity crimes of international criminal justice—genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. The international laws prohibiting these crimes were largely 
developed by states over the course of the twentieth century, due to a concern with the protection 
of the rights of all individuals, and especially victims. 
Defense parity consists of the level of structural and procedural protections provided to 
defendants before and during trial, in order to ensure a fair trial in the light of the institutional 
advantages enjoyed by legal authorities, exercised through the prosecution, in relation to the 
accused. In contrast to legality, the core protections of defense parity are derived from domestic 
criminal law procedure, are concerned solely with the rights of the accused, and underwent far 
less international legal evolution during the Cold War. Such protections have instead largely 
been left to post-Cold War international courts to develop in an ad hoc fashion. 
Legality and defense parity are implemented by courts and so enable an exploration of the 
legal power dynamic between individuals, the primary institutions of global legal governance, 
and the states and IGOs which create their rules and shape criminal investigations. They also 
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enable an examination of the two primary components of international criminal law: legality is a 
principal feature of substantive criminal law, and defense parity of criminal procedure. 
The project explores these criteria of legal fairness in relation to two case studies of 
international courts which represent distinct sources of authority and political context: the ICTY 
and the ICC. The ICTY has jurisdiction over a single conflict and was created by the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, while the ICC has potentially global 
jurisdiction and was created by states through a treaty process. The research demonstrates that 
the practice of courts in relation to defendants is characterized by continuing significant—and in 
some aspects worsening—weaknesses in terms of institutional and procedural fairness towards 
defendants. These problems are significantly due to the institutional power of states as exercised 
through the creation of the structural and procedural rules of international tribunals.  
This power influences fairness through the impact on rule-making bargaining of three 
primary political factors. First, the structure and operational rules of international courts creates 
dependence on the support and cooperation of external actors—especially states and IGOs. This 
leaves tribunals vulnerable to manipulation for state ends and to the concerns of states, and 
harms the parity in investigations by the prosecution and defense teams.  
Second, the conflicting dynamic between the major protection focus of the international 
human rights regime (that of victims) and that of criminal justice (defendants) has led to 
insufficient attention by states in the construction and operation of courts to the provision of 
adequate protections for defendants. This has been exacerbated by an insufficient placement of 
importance and understanding of the role of the accused and defense counsel by states, the UN, 
international juridical actors (judges, prosecutors, and court staff), and human rights 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). While a poor understanding of the role of defense is 
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also prevalent at the domestic level, its consequences are exaggerated at the international level 
due to the effect of the political goals and concerns of states in relation to international trials. 
This has weakened both legality and defense parity. 
Third, there has been significant political pressure on courts by their funding states to 
decrease the length and cost of trials. This has led to rule changes that have undermined aspects 
of defense parity. States have tended to privilege legitimacy through the perceived effectiveness 
of speedy trials over the normative legitimacy of legal fairness. The dissertation’s exploration of 
legal protections for defendants complements the extensive and growing body of IR research on 
such normative sources of legitimacy in international law as the content of laws; non-legal 
inputs, such as transparency and accountability; and institutional outputs such as the 
effectiveness of institutional decision-making.16 
 
The importance of research on global legal governance 
Defendant rights constitute a significant component of tribunal legitimacy and of the power 
dynamic within the international system between its traditionally dominant collective actors—
states and IGOs—and individuals. The individual has been increasingly acknowledged and 
incorporated into international law since 1945—especially through the development of 
international human rights and humanitarian law—and global legal governance is recognized as 
a key component of this development.17 
                                                
16 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of these sources of legitimacy within international criminal justice. 
17 See, e.g., Manuel Castells, “The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, 
and Global Governance,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 
(2008): 78-93; Lloyd Axworthy, “Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First,” Global 
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International criminal law is inherently at odds with the rest of public international law in 
several ways. The purpose of the latter is the collective self-regulation of the international 
behavior of states, whereas that of criminal law is shaping the conduct of individuals and 
punishing non-compliance, especially through imprisonment. General public international law 
applies largely to states, with the two primary exceptions being piracy—outlawed for over 200 
years—and rebel groups in armed conflict.18 There has traditionally been little accountability for 
individuals for breaches of international law,19 and state responsibility is civil, not criminal—it 
carries no penalties such as imprisonment for officials, only the duty of reparations. In addition, 
traditionally a state’s obligations under international law are not absolute, but are dependent 
upon similar compliance by other states—this is the principle of “reciprocity” in international 
law. 
In contrast, international criminal law is a mixture of international humanitarian and human 
rights law with domestic criminal law that provides for individual accountability.20 International 
humanitarian law proscribes certain behavior during armed conflict and consists of over 90 
treaties. The post-Nuremberg broadening of international criminal responsibility to include 
actions outside of and during armed conflict against one’s own citizens reflects the incorporation 
                                                                                                                                                       
Governance 7 (2001): 19-23; and Thomas G. Weiss, “Governance, Good Governance and Global 
Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges,” Third World Quarterly 21, no. 5 (2000): 795-814. 
18 The civil war provisions of international humanitarian law—Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol II—apply to all belligerents. The Security Council has applied 
wide-ranging targeted sanctions—e.g., arms and oil embargoes, and travel ban—on such non-state actors 
as the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (1993-8). 
19 The recent and controversial exception is the Security Council’s targeting of individuals—in 
government and non-state groups—with sanctions but without a process to determine wrongdoing. For 
example, it applied wide-ranging targeted sanctions—including arms and oil embargoes, and a travel 
ban—on the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola in resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 
(1997), and 1173 (1998). 
20 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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of international human rights law. This individualization of international law is a profound 
change that broadens the subjects of international law from states, denies immunity to state 
officials for international crimes, and introduces punishment. Furthermore, international criminal 
obligations are an important aspect of the modern international legal movement towards absolute 
community obligations owed to all—international criminal obligations are not dependent upon 
reciprocal behavior by others.21 
The operation of criminal justice within a liberal legal system is inherently concerned with 
protecting the individual against the domestic power of the state. Mediating between that 
protection and the external goals of the state continues to be a struggle in global legal 
governance. Nevertheless, the role of the principal individual in criminal trials, the defendant, is 
little explored in political science research on the legitimacy of courts. In addressing this, the 
study contributes towards understanding the political dynamics behind the process of 
incorporating the individual into the international legal system. 
The research also attempts to deepen our understanding of the dynamics within the 
international human rights regime by exploring how the conflicting legal and political goals of 
international criminal justice harm as well as promote human rights. International prosecution 
advances the rights of the victims of gross human rights abuses—by acknowledging suffering 
and providing accountability, for example. However, the political goals of powerful, especially 
Western, states in creating and cooperating with such courts conflict with the need to maintain 
fair standards for defendants in order to achieve justice for victims through accurately 
determining guilt.  
                                                
21 Antonio Cassese, International Law, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
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The appropriateness of international prosecution for mass atrocity crimes is also questionable 
because it assumes individual criminal responsibility, positing that there is an applicable analogy 
to be made with domestic prosecution for such crimes as murder and rape. However, mass 
atrocity crimes tend to result not merely from individual actions but from social norms, and often 
political and social structures, that are at least permissive, if not encouraging, of attacks on the 
victims, who are frequently from another identity group, which the perpetrators see as an enemy. 
The dissertation questions whether the political goals of international prosecution—individual 
accountability, victim recognition, narrative construction, delegitimizing perpetrators, and 
peacebuilding—make international criminal justice an appropriate vehicle for promoting human 
rights in the wake of mass atrocity crimes.  
 
Organization of the dissertation 
Chapter 1 explains the project’s argument, including the contribution of legal theory to IR, and 
the dissertation’s research design. Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical background to the study by 
exploring the relationship between political science and legal approaches to examining the 
legitimacy of global legal governance. It explores the utility of legal theory to understanding the 
nature of law as a set of distinct social processes and structures. 
Chapter 3 examines the domestic and international development of legality and defense 
parity, and their relationship to the evolution of criminal justice. First it examines how legality 
and defense parity developed as core components of criminal justice at both the domestic and 
international levels. It then explores the evolution of international criminal justice, including the 
changing role and protections for defendants. The final section analyzes defense protections at 
the first modern international criminal tribunal, the IMT at Nuremberg, in more detail in the light 
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of these developments. This provides an overview of indicators of defendant protections and the 
influence of institutional power in order to enable a comparison to the standards of current courts 
in the case studies, and to critically analyze the narrative of international criminal justice in 
relation to the empowered role of the defendant. 
Chapter 4 examines legality and defense parity at the first post-Cold War international 
criminal tribunal, the ICTY. It begins with an overview of its origins and the political and legal 
reasons to establish an international court after a hiatus of almost 50 years, and how these issues 
influenced the initial decisions relating to the project’s fairness criteria. These issues are then 
examined as the court has developed, as trials have proceeded and as state and UN political 
concerns have come to bear on the court’s operation. The chapter analyzes the ways in which the 
dynamic between the prosecution and defense at the tribunal have been shaped by the 
institutional power of states and the UN Security Council. 
Chapter 5 approaches the issues explored in Chapter 4 in relation to the first permanent court, 
the ICC. It has been in existence for nine years fewer than the ICTY, and as of October 2016 has 
completed six trials. The chapter demonstrates how the institutional power of states in 
establishing the court, and its distinct relationship with state members, have impacted the defense 
protections the ICC provides, and how these protections have been shaped by the legacy of the 
ICTY. 
The conclusion, Chapter 6, illustrates the disconnect between the general narrative of fairness 
in international criminal justice and the research indictors of legal legitimacy as demonstrated in 
the dissertation. It summarizes the case findings as to where legality and defense parity have 
been most problematic, and the political influences on courts that are responsible, and how these 
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influences differ due to the distinct political and historical contexts and interactions associated 
with each court. 
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1 The Legal Fairness Legitimacy of Global Legal Governance and 
the Influence of Institutional Power 
IR research on the legitimacy of global legal governance has to date little studied the legal rights 
and procedures that underpin trial fairness, or the role of defendants in the criminal justice 
system. It has also thereby not adequately accounted for how political actors influence fairness 
towards defendants. Sources of political influence include the institutional power of states in 
agenda-setting through the creation of the rules that structure international criminal tribunals; the 
state goal of delegitimizing enemies and rivals through the stigma of crime; the huge scope of 
international trials, especially those of high-profile leaders due to pressure to satisfy victim 
groups and to construct a conflict narrative; the methods adopted to respond to pressure by states 
and the United Nations (UN) to speed up trial proceedings; and a lack of apparent concern with 
the defense function by the creators of the court, due to poor understanding of the role of the 
accused and defense counsel in criminal trials. 
The dissertation utilizes legal theory to structure an examination of the legal rights and 
procedures that shape the fairness of international trials towards criminal defendants. It 
demonstrates that in creating and modifying the rules which shape the operation of international 
criminal tribunals, states exercise what Michael Barnett and Raymond Duval have labeled 
“institutional power” over defendants—the socially diffuse power of spatially and temporally 
distant political actors to influence those operating within international institutions through 
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setting the rules of the game which structure the environment within which they must act.1 In 
bargaining over the creation of structural and procedural rules states attempt to “lock in” their 
conceptions of justice and fairness2 to the functioning of a court. This conception tends to 
privilege the role of victims to the detriment of that of the accused, particularly through 
inadequate attention to the structural and procedural balance between the prosecution and 
defense that is required for fair trials.  
The attitude of tribunal actors towards the accused also shapes trial fairness. Prosecutors are 
an arm of the international criminal justice system, tasked with finding justice, not simply 
proving the accused guilty, and yet their utilization of the political advantages of their position 
leads to further imbalances in the courtroom dynamic between prosecution and defense. These 
advantages include access to diplomats and to IGOs such as the UN Security Council. The dual 
role of prosecutors exacerbates the shortcomings in states’ conceptions of justice as the latter 
provide pre-trial support to the prosecution that is far less frequently available to defense 
counsel. The powerful state and IGOs actors that are involved in the creation of courts, and 
support their operation, also demonstrate a bias towards aid to the prosecution and a resistance to 
aiding the defense. Examples include the United States, France, and the United Kingdom within 
the Security Council in relation to the ICTY; and the European Union in relation to the ICC. 
These power dynamics all shape the ability of the accused to gain a fair trial.  
                                                
1 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, 
no. 1 (2005): 39-75, and “Power in Global Governance,” in Power in Global Governance, ed. Michael 
Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 15-17. 
2 Ethan B. Kapstein, “Power, Fairness, and the Global Economy,” in Power in Global Governance, ed. 
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 82. 
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Approaches by legal scholars that focus on the distinctive properties of law have “no 
counterpart among political scientists, who have shown little interest in the legitimacy of 
international law as such.”3 In IR, the legitimacy of law is largely explained as stemming from 
generic characteristics of institutions;4 the substance of laws;5 democratic input criteria such as 
accountability and transparency;6 or managerial output criteria such as effective problem-
solving.7 The dissertation essays a remedy to this situation through an analysis of the role that 
distinctly legal processes play in understanding the legitimacy of global legal governance.  
Also undervalued in IR is the importance of understanding the role of criminal defendants to 
the legitimacy of international courts through the fairness of their trials. Human rights 
approaches to international criminal justice focus on the role of victims and tend to neglect that 
of defendants, or effectively write them off as war criminals. The protection of the basic rights of 
individuals against bodily harm is one of the primary functions of criminal justice in a liberal 
legal system. However, when crimes occur it is often overlooked that such systems have a 
normative and legal obligation to protect the human rights of all legal subjects—not just those of 
ordinary citizens and the victims of crime, but, importantly, those of criminal defendants too. 
The latter are commonly conceptualized in international human rights discourse as criminals 
                                                
3 Daniel Bodansky, “Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations,” in Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, ed. Jeffrey L. Dunoff 
and Mark A. Pollack (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 324. 
4 Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
5 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917. 
6 Jan Wouters and Nicolas Hachez, “Transitional Societies and the Rule of Law: A Benchmarks 
Approach,” Working Paper No. 47, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Catholic University 
Leuven, March 2010. 
7 Jason Ralph, “Anarchy is What Criminal Lawyers and Other Actors Make of It: International Criminal 
Justice as an Institution of International and World Society,” in Governance, Order, and the International 
Criminal Court: Between Realpolitik and a Cosmopolitan Court, ed. Steven C. Roach (New York: 
Oxford University Press), 133-53. 
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whose impunity needs to end. The importance of the accused and their counsel to the legitimacy 
of criminal justice is insufficiently recognized. As acknowledged by Judge Patricia Wald of the 
ICTY: “A vigorous, un-intimidated, knowledgeable defense is the sine qua non of a fair trial.”8 
IR scholars, even those trained as lawyers, rarely have expertise in criminal law and 
procedure, and thereby lack an adequate understanding of the role of the accused during criminal 
trials and the function of defense counsel. For the legitimacy of global legal governance to be 
better understood, research requires a conceptualization of law that adequately takes into account 
the role of liberal legal norms, and the roles of lawmakers and legal subjects in legal governance. 
The dissertation assesses legitimacy by analyzing institutional and procedural issues that 
contribute towards fairness for defendants by providing them with protections from arbitrary 
enforcement of law, and opportunities to prepare and conduct a trial. It also explores how this 
fairness is shaped by the relationship between the accused (and defense counsel) and various 
juridical actors (prosecutors, judges, and court staff) and political actors (states and IGOs). In 
relation to the latter, according to Theodor Meron courts require greater autonomy for their 
legitimacy than other types of IGO,9 and this applies not just to the sort of institutional autonomy 
already explored from IR and comparative politics perspectives,10 but independence from 
political inference in the role of courts in protecting the rights of the accused. 
                                                
8 Patricia M. Wald, “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some 
Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an international Court,” Journal of Law and Policy 87 (2001): 
102, quoted in Colleen M. Rohan, “Protecting the Rights of the Accused in International Criminal 
Proceedings: Lip Service or Affirmative Action?” in The Ashgate Research Companion to International 
Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives, ed. William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, and Niamh Hayes 
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 289. 
9 Theodor Meron, “Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal Tribunals,” The 
American Journal of International Law 99, no. 2 (2005): 259-69. 
10 Jonas Tallberg, “The Anatomy of Autonomy: An Institutional Account of Variation in Supranational 
Influence,” Journal of Common Market Studies 38, no. 5 (2000): 843-64; and John Merrills, 
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The research utilizes the “political jurisprudence” of American jurist Lon Fuller to assess 
legal fairness.11 This approach conceptualizes the nature of law in the political context of a 
liberal democratic legal system,12 rather than being an “analytical jurisprudence”—much more 
common in legal philosophy—which claims that political context is irrelevant to the nature of 
law.13 Fuller’s understanding of law provides a valuable theoretical foundation for the analysis of 
legal sources of legitimacy within global legal governance. 
Fuller developed an approach to explaining the legitimacy of liberal legal systems that relies 
upon the distinctive qualities of fair legal process—fair in the sense of equitable in process and 
likely to generate fair outcomes, especially through diminishing arbitrariness. His insights, which 
the project applies to global legal governance, include: a social and political conception of law, 
especially the relationship between law, morality, and law’s cosmopolitan aims of respect and 
inclusion; and his criteria of fair legal process and their embodiment of the human rights aspects 
of the criminal rule of law.  
Based on this understanding, discussed further below and in Chapter 2, the research 
examines the extent to which the laws enforced by international criminal tribunals conform to the 
two core aspects of legal legitimacy: the “principle of legality,” and the institutional and 
                                                                                                                                                       
“International Adjudication and Autonomy,” in International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy: 
Institutional Independence in the International Legal Order, ed. Richard Collins and Nigel Defense 
White (London: Routledge, 2011), 160-77. 
11 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969). Other relevant 
works by Fuller include “A Reply to Professors Cohen and Dworkin,” Villanova Law Review 10, no. 4 
(1965): 655-66; Anatomy of the Law (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1968); “Law and Human Interaction,” 
Sociological Inquiry 47, nos. 3-4 (1977): 59-89; and, with Kenneth I. Winston, “The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication,” Harvard Law Review 92, no. 2 (1978): 353-409. 
12 Dan Priel, “Lon Fuller’s Political Jurisprudence of Freedom,” Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, part 
of a symposium on “The Morality of Law at 50,” Osgoode CLPE Research Paper No. 55/2013 (2014): 1-
27. 
13 For an especially prominent example of analytical jurisprudence see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961). 
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procedural requirements for attaining a balance between the powers of the prosecution and the 
defense in the pre-trial and trial phases—here called “defense parity.” Legality requires that laws 
are not enforced retroactively in order to justify prosecution and punishment for an act that was 
not illegal at the time of its alleged commission. According to legal scholar Cherif Bassiouni, 
legality has several purposes central to the achievement of the normative and legal goals of 
criminal justice: “to enhance the certainty of the law, provide justice and fairness for the accused, 
achieve the effective fulfillment of the deterrent function of the criminal sanction, prevent abuse 
of power, and strengthen the application of the rule of law.”14 Defense parity requires that the 
accused be provided with institutional support and procedural guarantees to enable sufficient 
opportunities for argumentation to ensure an adequate defense—that is, a reasonable chance to 
refute the prosecution’s case. Parity is an essential component of the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial through achieving adequate opportunities for legal representation. 
These two core aspects of legitimacy through legal fairness are central to the emergence of 
the doctrine of the protection of the individual (favor rei, in favor of the accused), which 
challenged the dominant approach to criminal law in Medieval Europe as a form of community 
retribution—favoring society over protecting the individual (favor societatis).15 In this sense, the 
justice for defendants of which legality and parity are central elements developed in conflict with 
the substantive justice of identifying and punishing alleged perpetrators—criminal courts 
originally developed as institutionalized mechanisms for legitimizing an arbitrary or politicized 
                                                
14 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 300. 
15 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 38. 
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determination of guilt. In liberal democratic states today, in contrast, legal fairness for defendants 
is indispensible to a legitimate realizing of substantive justice. 
The core features of legal fairness also provide practical guarantees for the two primary 
protection functions of criminal justice characterized by liberal legal norms: fair notice of what is 
prohibited (legality) and fair adjudication of presumed breaches of law (defense parity).16 They 
also aid in exploring the power dynamic between individuals (the accused) and global legal 
governance institutions. Furthermore, legality is an important aspect of the dynamic between the 
accused and those who create and interpret laws—states, IGOs, and judges—while defense 
parity is an aspect of the interaction between the accused and the prosecution (and also involves 
states and other non-judicial actors). 
The dissertation does not claim to provide a holistic explanation of the sources of legitimacy 
within global legal governance. The research acknowledges that there are other procedural (or 
input) sources of legitimacy—including aspects of democratic process such as transparency and 
accountability, and institutional sources such as judicial autonomy. There are also numerous 
substantive (output) sources of legitimacy, including the number of individuals tried, the 
deterrence value of prosecutions and their impact on transitional justice. The argument here 
focuses on the distinctive qualities of legal procedure that generate legitimacy. This is a 
particularly understudied area in international relations and legal scholarship.17  
                                                
16 Paul H. Robinson “Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality,” University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 154, no. 2 (2005): 335-98. 
17 Even though legality has come to “form an increasingly entrenched part of international discourse as a 
standard of legitimacy.” See Bruce Broomhall, International Justice & The International Criminal Court: 
Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 189. 
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The chapter begins by explaining the relationship between fairness towards defendants and 
legitimacy, and the central role of legality and defense parity as indicators of legitimacy. The 
first section also argues that the institutional power of states in creating tribunal rules is a vehicle 
for their political goals to shape defendant rights. In the second and third sections, the chapter 
explains the variables and indicators of legal fairness utilized in the research, and those relating 
to institutional power and the role of political influences on legal fairness. Finally, the reasoning 
behind the choice of the research’s case studies is explained. 
 
The argument: Legal principles as a fundamental source of legitimacy 
This section argues that a utilization of legal theory will enable IR scholars to more effectively 
understand legitimacy within international institutions. In the research, the approach of jurist Lon 
Fuller provides the normative basis for identifying certain features of law as fundamental to the 
legitimacy of global legal governance. There are two primary ways in which Fuller’s theory has 
previously not been well understood, and has therefore been underappreciated, both by 
international legal and international relations scholars. The first is that it does not constitute a 
purely legal theory, as common supposed, but a “political jurisprudence” because it aims to 
conceptualize the nature of law and its effects in a particular political context—that of a liberal 
democratic legal system.18 This makes it distinct from dominant approaches to theorizing 
international law, which claim to conceptualize the operation of law regardless of the nature of 
                                                
18 Two exceptions, both from legal scholars who have identified the political nature of Fuller’s 
jurisprudence, are Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon Fuller (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2012); and Dan Priel, “Lon Fuller’s Political Jurisprudence of Freedom,” Jerusalem 
Review of Legal Studies, part of a symposium on “The Morality of Law at 50,” Osgoode CLPE Research 
Paper No. 55/2013 (2014): 1-27. 
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the polity a legal system is embedded within.19 This contextualization enables the use of Fuller’s 
approach to explore how the practice of law within global legal governance institutions 
contributes towards their legitimacy.  
The second area of misunderstanding is to assume that his legal principles are simply a 
checklist of how to establish and sustain a legal system—that they constitute the requirements of 
the rule of law.20 The approach instead has a broader aim: to understand how the operation of 
law in a liberal legal system is characterized by a reciprocal relationship between legal 
authorities and legal subjects. Subjects’ obligation to obey the law is matched with legal 
authorities’ obligation to adhere to principles of liberal legal practice. 
 
The distinct relationship between law and legitimacy 
A normative standard of legitimacy is one with a moral basis that enables a principled critique of 
authoritative institutions and structures, as opposed to a descriptive legitimacy approach, which 
is based on breadth of consent or acceptance.21 The normative standard argued for here is based 
on legal principles that protect individual liberty in relation to the coercive power of criminal 
justice institutions. 
Assessments of the legitimacy of international institutions, including courts, tend to focus on 
general institutional criteria, especially autonomy, accountability, transparency, and 
                                                
19 See especially the legal positivism of H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1961); and Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans. Max Knight (Berkeley, Calif.: University of 
California Press, 1967). 
20 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 91-2. 
21 Robert A. Dahl, “Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View,” in Democracy’s 
Edge, ed. Ian Shapiro and Casino Hacker-Cordón (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 19-
36; and Clark, Legitimacy in International Society. 
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inclusiveness or participation.22 Missing from such assessments is an examination of the features 
of law as a distinct social structure and process, which is largely because IR and international 
law scholars tend to consider themselves involved in distinct and separate endeavors, with their 
own theoretical approaches and methods—and so the former tend not to analyze the components 
of law qua law. The relative dearth of research by IR scholars into international law was 
examined in recent research on interdisciplinary by Adam Irish, Charlotte Ku, and Paul Diehl, 
who found that of almost 300 articles published in seven prominent political science journals 
between 1990 and 2010, fewer than five percent involved research on legal issues. They also 
found no upward trend towards cross-pollination over this period.23  
One consequence of this disciplinary distance is an understanding of international law by IR 
scholars primarily as a form of institutionalization of rules.24 Rationalists, such as structural 
realists and institutionalists, tend especially to adopt an “external perspective” of determining 
law by what states do—which risks conflating law and its effects on state behavior.25 Legal 
scholars are generally far more likely than those in IR to adopt an “internal perspective” on how 
                                                
22 E.g., Marlies Glasius, “Do International Criminal Courts Require Democratic Legitimacy?” The 
European Journal of International Law 23, no. 1 (2012): 43-66; and Daniel C. Esty, “Good Governance 
at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law,” Yale Law Journal 115, no. 7 (2006): 1490-
1562. 
23 Adam Irish, Charlotte Ku, and Paul F. Diehl, “Bridging the International Law-International Relations 
Divide: Taking Stock of Progress,” Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 41, no. 2 
(2013): 359, 374-5. 
24 This applies to both rationalist-oriented work, for example, Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew 
Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal, “The Concept of Legalization,” International 
Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 401-19; and such constructivist work as Finnemore and Sikkink, 
“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” 
25 Bodansky, “Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations,” 321-41. 
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international law’s subjects see themselves bound.26 However, even legal scholars rarely apply 
jurisprudence consciously to an examination of international legal issues.27 
As global governance institutions and structures increase in terms of their number, influence, 
and impact on individuals’ lives, the need for them to be legitimate—for their power to be 
authoritative and generate a sense of obligation—is of growing importance, as is the need to 
understand the sources of that legitimacy.28 This is especially true for criminal justice institutions 
and processes, as they have the authority to exert the most coercive influence over individuals of 
any governance institution in peacetime. 
The individualization of international law is a profound change that broadens its subjects 
from states, denies immunity to state officials for international crimes, and introduces 
punishment. In beginning to directly address individuals as subjects, and to impose coercive 
sanctions on them, the international legal order is starting to take on some of the primary 
characteristics of a domestic legal system, something it had not done before 1945. This makes 
the application of jurisprudence developed to examine domestic law even more relevant and 
potentially valuable in understanding the nature of the international legal order and its 
legitimacy. 
                                                
26 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), and The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990); and Harold Hongju Koh, “The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational Legal Process,” 
Nebraska Law Review 75 (1996): 181-207. 
27 A notable exception is Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International 
Law: An Interactional Account (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), who rely on Lon Fuller’s 
work. 
28 Michael Zürn, “Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems,” Government and Opposition 39, no. 2 
(2004): 260-87; Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance 
Institutions,” Ethics & International Affairs 20, no. 4 (2006): 405-37; and Andreas Føllesdal, Johan 
Karlsson Schaffer, and Geir Ulfstein, The Legitimacy of International Human Rights Regimes: Legal, 
Political and Philosophical Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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To understand the legal legitimacy of global legal governance, it is essential to apply a 
conceptualization of the nature and operation of law that is distinct to a liberal political context, 
as opposed to an “analytical” jurisprudence, which claims to understand law in any political 
context. As stated by Andrew Hurrell: “legitimacy is a political concept and like all political 
concepts it is quite literally meaningless outside of a particular historical context and outside of a 
particular set of linguistic conventions and justificatory structures. To paraphrase Ronald 
Dworkin, legitimacy has no DNA.”29 
 
The principles underlying legal legitimacy 
Fuller provides a structural approach to law—one that focuses on the form that law takes in a 
liberal legal system: authoritative general rules.30 His approach encapsulates “the morality of the 
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules”—a description which 
captures the relationship between the interaction of legal authorities and legal subjects, and 
legitimacy.31 
The implementation of rules in a liberal legal system requires certain procedural and 
structural principles that constrain legal authorities.32 These principles demonstrate respect for 
the autonomy and agency of legal subjects by authorities, and thereby generate a distinctly legal 
                                                
29 Andrew Hurrell, “Legitimacy and the Use of Force,” Review of International Studies 31, special issue 
(December 2005): 29. 
30 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); Anatomy of the 
Law (New York: Mentor Books, 1968); and The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L. 
Fuller, ed. Kenneth Winston (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1981). 
31 David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 102. 
Fuller was concerned with law as a political and social endeavor—the practice of law—rather than law as 
an abstract concept, as legal philosophers tend approach it. The issue of practice tends to be ignored by 
most contemporary approaches to law. See Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the 
Jurisprudence of Lon Fuller (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), 96. 
32 Fuller, Morality of Law. 
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source of legitimacy.33 Without these principles, law devolves into the mere imposition of orders 
in a hierarchy—and is no longer governance through general rules. The principles constitute an 
“ethos” for legal authorities—that is, they are a normative duty required by the form of law. 
Their value to the legal subject is a moral one by making consistent and coherent, and thereby 
fair, demands that enable freedom of social interaction through stable expectations.34 
There are eight such principles, which Fuller labels promulgation, clarity, consistency, 
feasibility, constancy, generality, non-retroactivity, and congruence. They are all concerned with 
law-making and legal interpretation, except for congruence, which concerns the administration 
of law.35 They are not conceived of in binary terms, but can be examined along a spectrum of 
adherence by authorities. No liberal legal system is expected to completely satisfy all the criteria; 
indeed Fuller called any such ideal-type system a “utopia of legality.”36 
The first five are necessary to the effective and legitimate functioning of a liberal legal 
system, but also contribute towards the effectiveness of giving orders in a hierarchy. 
Promulgation, or publicity, requires that the contents of a law be made available to those subject 
to it, so that they can adapt their behavior accordingly, and so that there is opportunity for public 
                                                
33 Fuller’s approach, Benedict Kingsbury argues, invokes “legality,” which is to make a particular claim 
to legitimacy, one that depends on adherence by legal authorities to principles of democratic legal 
practice. Benedict Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law,” The European 
Journal of International Law 20, no. 1 (2009): 39. 
34 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 136. These principles reflect and enable efficiency in implementation of a 
government’s policies (i.e. they enable law to be effective)—as positivists such as Hart and Joseph Raz 
argue; see Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979). However, by enabling the treatment of legal subjects as responsible agents they also embody 
fairness towards them, and so are inherently normative, constituting an “inner morality of law.” 
35 David Luban argues that most of Fuller’s criteria—including non-retroactivity—are not procedural but 
substantive, in that they are “content-based conditions” for law. See Luban, “The Rule of Law and 
Human Dignity,” 5. While Luban is right that Fuller’s criteria have direct content implications, they are 
constraints or minimum requirements for the processes of the creation, interpretation, and application of 
law, and as such are procedural in nature. 
36 Fuller, Morality of Law, 41. 
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scrutiny and criticism.37 Clarity requires that a law’s substantive prohibitions avoid ambiguity, so 
as to more effectively communicate the intent of legislators.38 Consistency requires that a law 
avoid conflicting provisions and contradicting prior law.39 Feasibility requires that a law is 
realistic, not asking the impossible of its subjects—further enabling the law to act as an effective 
guide to conduct. Likewise, constancy through time requires that a law not change its 
prohibitions so frequently that its subjects have insufficient ability to adjust their behavior. 
The other three principles—generality, non-retroactivity, and congruence—are not necessary 
to giving and obeying orders in a hierarchy, do not improve its efficacy, and cannot be expected 
by subordinates in such a relationship. These principles are distinct to the creation and operation 
of law, and are an essential source of law’s normative value to legal subjects.40 First, laws should 
be general, that is, written to apply to a class of people—they are not bills of attainder aimed at 
                                                
37 Promulgation is considered a “constitutional principle” by the highest British court, for example. See R. 
(Anufrijeva) v. Home Secretary (2004), Lord Stern of the House of Lords, quoted in Denise Meyerson, 
Understanding Jurisprudence (New York: Routledge, 2007), 38. Promulgation operates under the legal 
fiction that all citizens are aware of the contents of all published laws: in practice, fair notice instead 
requires “constructive notice,” whereby the information is public and it is the responsibility of its subjects 
to inform themselves of its existence (ignorance is not an excuse before the law). See David Luban, 
“Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law,” in The 
Philosophy of International Law, ed. Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 569-88. 
38 Clarity is also a core attribute of fairness: indeterminate rules cannot guide behavior and may lead to 
juridical abuse. 
39 This is related to clarity, and for full effectiveness requires judicial review—the ability of a high court 
to invalidate a legislative act as unconstitutional—and the existence of a legal system with a hierarchy of 
court jurisdiction where higher courts can strike down a lower court’s ruling. 
40 These three principles are sources of legitimacy for law strictly within a context of democratic 
governance. First, generality is not a requirement when giving orders to a subordinate, as an order-giver 
may need to depart from a general order to provide a subordinate with specific guidance in a particular 
situation. Second, non-retroactivity is irrelevant to giving orders as it makes no sense to give a 
subordinate an order to do something in the past. Congruence, again, it is not relevant that superiors 
comply with the rules that have been created, as a superior has no necessary requirement to comply with 
the orders they give their subordinates. See Fuller, Morality of Law, 208. 
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criminalizing the prior acts of specific individuals or groups. “Generality” is not a feature of 
contention in international criminal law and so is not examined in the dissertation.  
Non-retroactivity and congruence are explored in more detail below as these are the central 
characteristics of legal fairness relied upon to construct the research’s dependent variables of 
legality and defense parity, respectively. Non-retroactivity is a requirement that a law not be 
enforced in relation to conduct that occurred before the law was created. Non-retroactivity 
applies constraints on law-making and prosecution which limit three means of legal control over 
an individual in relation to when a prosecuted act was committed. It prohibits: i) prosecution for 
an act committed before the law was created, ii) punishment greater than allowed in law at the 
time of commission of the act, and iii) a court’s jurisdiction over an individual for courts 
established after commission of the prosecuted act. Non-retroactivity is the core of what is 
known as the “principle of legality” in criminal law, which is “a requirement that the specific 
crimes, punishments, and courts be established legally—within the prevailing legal system.”41  
The purposes of the principle of legality are: protecting individual human rights; promoting 
the legitimacy of governance; protecting the structure of liberal governance—the separation of 
powers—by delineating the lawmaking authority of relevant institutions; and encouraging 
effectiveness in the purposes of criminalization (especially retribution, incapacitation, and 
deterrence).42 Retrospective legal enforcement does not enable law to act as a guide to conduct, 
                                                
41 Kenneth S. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 15. 
42 Fuller intended his criteria to apply broadly across areas of law. This is a weak argument, however, in 
relation to some areas: for example tax laws may gain legitimacy from retroactively redressing a 
perceived wrong. See Charles Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 147-56. As Benjamin Zipursky maintains, Fuller’s criteria provide an effective 
understanding of criminal law but not various areas of civil law, such as tort law. See Zipursky, “The 
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and therefore does not respect the agency of legal subjects, capable of adapting to established 
rules.43 Such enforcement can be used by governments to persecute rivals through the court 
system. Non-retroactivity also generates legitimacy for law by protecting the separation of 
powers by restricting avenues of authoritative rule creation by the executive and judiciary. 
The last principle, congruence, “the most complex of all,”44 requires that legal authorities’ 
actions be consistent with—not in breach of—already existing law. Congruence is the most 
important principle or constraint to maintaining the “existence of a relatively stable reciprocity of 
expectations between lawgiver and subject” that is the basis of legal legitimacy.45 Congruence 
embodies constraints on authorities’ administration of the legal system, by which authorities act 
to maintain the credibility of the system that is constructed through their adherence to the other 
seven principles. Various procedural and institutional constraints constitute aspects of 
congruence, especially in relation to the functioning and practice of courts, such as judicial 
review, and due process trial protections for defendants. Congruence is explored in the research 
through the lens of “defense parity,” which incorporates core due process protections as well as 
structural issues that shape the ability of the accused to gain an adequate defense. 
The application of these two fundamental principles of liberal legal practice enables the 
application of law to embody the fundamental values of human rights: freedom, through self-
                                                                                                                                                       
Inner Morality of Private Law.” The constraints on lawmakers are given moral meaning in the context of 
the ability of legal authorities to impose harsh penalties on citizens, including imprisonment. 
43 It should be noted that deviations from non-retroactivity that privilege subjects do not diminish the 
legitimacy of the legal system: for example, abolishing the death penalty and applying the law to all 
prisoners still alive that had been sentenced to death. 
44 Fuller, Morality of Law, 81. 
45 Ibid., 209. 
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imposed constraint on arbitrary treatment by legal authorities, and equality of treatment.46 The 
dissertation argues that this approach can be applied at the international level to assess the 
legitimacy of global legal governance by exploring the extent to which international criminal 
tribunals demonstrate this reciprocal relationship towards subjects—specifically criminal 
defendants—through adherence to these principles. 
 
Research variables 
The following section explains the normative and empirical basis for examining legality and 
defense parity in the case studies as the key components of legal legitimacy through the 
protection of defendants. It then explains the reliance in the research on the concept of 
institutional power to encapsulate political influences on legal fairness. 
  
                                                
46 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), December 10, 
1948, article 1.  
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Dependent variable 1: Legality 
The principle of legality is arguably the most essential and basic tenet of law; in liberal legal 
systems it is “the most fundamental requirement of natural justice.”47 Legality contains three 
main requirements: that there is no retroactive criminal enforcement, no retroactive punishment, 
and no retroactive jurisdiction created for courts.48 First, non-retroactivity of crimes requires that 
lawmakers do not enforce a law in relation to a situation that occurred before the law came into 
effect (no ex post facto application),49 and therefore do not prosecute individuals retroactively.50 
Second, non-retroactivity of punishment requires that no one be penalized more harshly than the 
law allowed at the time of the prosecuted act.51 Third, non-retroactivity of court jurisdiction 
requires that a court prosecuting an individual was endowed with this legal authority before the 
occurrence of a prosecuted act, thus prohibiting the construction of special courts for the purpose 
of trying specific crimes or expanding an existing court’s jurisdiction for that purpose. The 
                                                
47 Luban, “Fairness to Rightness,” 581. 
48 The principle of legality also contains other, secondary, requirements, including that laws should be 
consistently applied and a ban on criminalization by analogy to similar laws. See Gallant, Principle of 
Legality, 11-45. These issues are not explored in the research in order to enable a more clear and more 
easily comparable determination of non-retroactivity.  
49 Kai Ambos, “Remarks on the General Part of International Criminal Law,” Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 4, no. 4 (2006): 660-73. 
50 It should be noted that retrospective enforcement does not always constitute a breach of fair process 
rights. For example, laws which are beneficial to an individual or tax laws whose purpose is to close 
loopholes exploited by the rich are often uncontroversial and may not be considered to contravene basic 
rights. However, retrospective criminal legislation which is to the detriment of the accused is a 
fundamental infringement of basic legal rights. See Charles Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of 
Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
51 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights), November 4, 1950, article 7. Non-retroactivity of punishment is commonly described as 
nulla poena sine lege, “no punishment without law.” 
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normative justifications for the significance to legitimacy of non-retroactivity of crimes and 
punishment are explained below: these are the aspects of legality explored in the research.52 
Non-retroactivity of crimes is a core requirement in distinguishing criminal law from mere 
retribution: law is essentially that which has been previously prohibited by a source of governing 
authority. It is also an indicator of legal legitimacy through its role in the protection of 
individuals (legal subjects). Non-retroactivity is not only a central requirement of criminal law, 
but without it there is no law, per se, only retribution: “[T]he essence of legality is that a person 
should reasonably be able to tell what laws will be applied to her or him, and the rest of society 
should be able to determine if such laws are being applied arbitrarily to her or him.”53 While the 
legitimacy of the prohibitions contained within international laws can be questioned, as such 
laws are not created by directly representative legislative bodies (except the European 
Parliament), the variable of legality captures the liberal features of predictability and consistent 
constraint on lawmaking, and does not judge the legitimacy of the content of laws per se. 
The two primary functions of non-retroactivity of crimes in relation to protecting the 
individual are that it provides fair notice to legal subjects of what is prohibited, and acts as a 
constraint on government abuse of power. Fair notice requires that laws are publically 
promulgated when passed so that the prohibitions they contain provide a reasonable expectation 
of what behavior is legal.54 This justification is driven by one of the primary functions of 
                                                
52 Non-retroactivity of court jurisdiction is a more contentious source of normative force as there are 
plausible arguments that defendants should not expect international impunity when they are accused of 
illegal acts. Author conversation with legal scholar Charles Sampford, St Andrews, Scotland, March 22, 
2013. 
53 Kenneth S. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 408. 
54 Fair notice through the promulgation of laws is effectively “constructive notice”—the legal fiction that 
subjects know of a law because it has been publically announced by a governance institution, and 
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criminal law: to act as an authoritative guide to socially acceptable conduct.55 The non-
retroactive enforcement of law also enables all legal subjects to observe that those prosecuted 
knew their conduct was forbidden by law.56 
Non-retroactivity of crimes also acts as a constraint on government abuse, by inhibiting 
exploitative and arbitrary action by the state. This is especially important as the coercive power 
of the state is directly implicated in criminal law, which exercises its authority in this area with 
the highest sanctions—imprisonment and, in many jurisdictions, execution. Non-retroactivity of 
crimes also helps maintain a separation of powers. By ensuring that laws must be created by a 
body with legislative authority, rather than an executive or the judiciary, it helps limit the ability 
of these other authorities to usurp legislative power. In a liberal political system this function 
takes on added significance, as the legislature is the only body (in which at least one chamber is) 
always directly elected, and thereby directly representative.57 In this sense, non-retroactivity of 
crimes also promotes the maintenance of individual freedom. 
                                                                                                                                                       
therefore ignorance is no excuse before the law. Many domestic jurisdictions take the approach that the 
graver the act the greater the presumption of awareness of the prohibition: for example, see United States 
v. Int’l. Minerals & Chemical Corp. (1971), 402 US 558, 565. The issue of fair notice through 
promulgation becomes more problematic in relation to customary international law, which is the basis of 
crimes against humanity and some war crimes. It is difficult to claim that the subjects of international 
criminal law—potentially all individuals globally—have been put on, even constructive, notice when 
customary law is determined by judicial process and not legislation. 
55 Robinson “Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication.” 
56 John Calvin Jeffries Jr., “Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes,” Virginia Law 
Review 71, no. 2 (1985): 205-10. 
57 In parliamentary democratic systems the executive is not directly elected but chosen by the legislature. 
In some democratic political systems one chamber of a bicameral legislature is not directly elected: e.g. 
the upper chamber of the British Houses of Parliament, the House of Lords, is currently filled by life 
peers chosen by government and crown; and in the German Bundestag (federal parliament), the upper 
chamber, the Bundesrat, represents the federal states, or Länder, whose regional governments designate 
individuals to fill the seats. See Torbjörn Bergman, Wolfgang C. Müller, Kaare Strøm, and Magnus 
Blomgren, “Democratic Delegation and Accountability: Cross-national Patterns,” in Delegation and 
Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, ed. Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, Torbjörn Bergman 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 109-20. 
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Non-retroactivity of punishment, like that of crimes, is not just a negative right, preventing 
certain state action. It also encourages positive rights, including consistency of punishment and 
thereby equitable treatment before the law, and respect for the autonomy of the individual by 
limiting excessive punishment. Until a few decades ago, non-retroactivity of punishment was 
often overlooked as a source of significant individual rights, on the basis that individuals should 
only be protected by non-retroactivity while they are deemed innocent. Once they have been 
found guilty, protection in determining sentencing was thought less important—it “affects only 
proven criminals.”58 Consequently non-retroactivity of punishment, or “nulla poena” in legal 
terms, has often been seen in domestic legal systems as “the poor cousin of nullum crimin [non-
retroactivity of crimes].”59 This has changed over the last half century, as, especially Western, 
states have come to view nulla poena not merely as a negative right of freedom from arbitrary 
government coercion, but as a requirement of “positive justice,” in that it promotes consistency 
in criminal sentencing, helps to protect judicial autonomy (as it guards the judiciary from 
political pressure to determine the sentence of individuals of executive concern), and thereby 
protects the integrity of the legal system and the public perception of justice.60 Without nulla 
poena, criminal punishment would risk becoming totally individualized, diminishing the 
protection of individuals before the law and likely leading to broad inconsistency in sentencing.61 
David Luban claims that the arguments in favor of the centrality of non-retroactivity of 
crimes and punishment to the legitimacy of criminal justice given above do not apply at the 
                                                
58 Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, 2005), 
55. 
59 Shahram Dana, “Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice: A Theory on the Principle of Legality in 
International Criminal Sentencing,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 99, no. 4 (2009): 857. 
60 Ibid.: 860, 864. 
61 Jerome Hall, “Nulla Poena Sine Lege,” The Yale Law Journal 47, no. 2 (1937): 183. 
 
 
 
 
39 
international level.62 Fair notice is argued not to reasonably apply to such outrageous acts as 
genocide—that is, those that may be considered intrinsically wrong due to their egregious nature 
(crimes that are mala in se, or “wrong in themselves,” such as murder). Society does not require 
these acts to be formally criminalized with specific penalties for individuals to realize that they 
are wrong: that is, they are not mala prohibita acts, those that are considered wrong only because 
they have been criminalized (such as, arguably, consuming marijuana). In addition, some 
extreme atrocity circumstances may not be foreseeable and yet may occur in such a way as to 
make non-retroactive prosecution under international criminal law impossible, and therefore 
non-retroactivity undesirable. Both of these arguments were used to justify the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo prosecutions for crimes against humanity by the lawyers and politicians who constructed 
the courts.63 
It is argued here that, to the contrary, at the international level as at the domestic, non-
retroactivity of crimes and punishment are essential to the realization of individual human rights 
and to limit the coercive authority of governance institutions. Fair notice and constraint on 
government abuse of power are relatively minimalist criteria of legal fairness in that, while they 
provide human rights protections, these are procedural rather than substantive. In addition, while 
they originate with liberal conceptions of the rights of individuals, they rely on an unambitious 
ideal of fairness in the treatment of individuals: protecting criminal defendants from arbitrary 
and exploitative action by the coercive power of authoritative institutions.64 
                                                
62 Luban, “Fairness to Rightness.” 
63 Arieh J. Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 138-71. 
64 Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 109. 
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By providing fair notice at any level of governance, non-retroactivity of crimes exhibits 
respect for the worth and autonomy of the individual—the core of international human rights 
law. It also ensures community awareness that only those responsible for an atrocity (including 
co-conspirators and those with command responsibility), will be held criminally accountable—
that is, that there will be no collective punishment. In addition to providing notice of legal 
prohibitions to individuals, non-retroactivity of crimes provides notice to states of their duty 
under treaty and customary international law to prosecute or extradite for prosecution those 
individuals in their territory accused of relevant crimes, and to prevent those crimes from 
occurring. This applies, for example, to states that have ratified the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,65 and the 1984 Convention Against 
Torture.66 
Nevertheless, non-retroactivity has been a contentious source of legitimacy. The individual 
legal justice of which it constitutes part is in tension with the collective societal and political 
justice desire for vengeance that occurs in many post-conflict environments. Legal justice may 
appear to value procedural protections for criminal defendants above the moral drive to punish 
offenders. Non-retroactivity in fact is central to the concept and practice of legal justice—to its 
privileging of adjudication by law above vengeance by the state or community. Before the 
modern advent of international criminal justice, retributive justice after international conflict 
took the form of political or social justice—vengeance against the leaders, and often whole 
                                                
65 Adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and Text of 
the Convention, UN doc. A/RES/260 (III), December 9, 1948, articles 4-6. Hereafter referred to as the 
Genocide Convention. 
66 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN doc. 
A/RES/39 (46), December 10, 1984, articles 4-9. 
 
 
 
 
41 
population, of the losing side. Such collective punishment by victors has run the spectrum from 
perhaps the most infamous early documented occurrence of genocide—the destruction of the 
Phoenician civilization at Carthage after its defeat by Rome in the Third Punic War (149-
146BC)67—to the economically crippling reparations imposed on Germany after World War I by 
the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. 
The argument that non-retroactivity is a barrier to punishing atrocities invokes a continuation 
of the community justice challenge to legal justice. Political and legal justice are distinct in 
various ways, including that political justice is legitimized purely by the outcome—have the 
losers been punished for perceived wrongdoing against the winners, and punished severely 
enough to satisfy the emotional outrage of the winners and victims? In contrast, while successful 
prosecutions are important, legal justice is also crucially dependent for its legitimacy on the 
fairness of its procedures. Procedural protections for individuals at the state and international 
levels constitute a core aspect of the replacement of collective punishment through private 
vengeance with the individualization of punishment through public prosecution—the substitution 
of public for private justice. 
Nevertheless, the idea that non-retroactivity is not, or should not be, a principle of global 
legal governance “remains popular today among supporters of international criminal law as a 
means to control and punish the worst of the worst in human behavior.”68 By failing to 
distinguish adequately between legal and political justice, defenders of the former ignore not 
                                                
67 Jones, Genocide, 29. The author also argues that the destruction of Carthage is an example of 
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only that which makes legal justice distinct from mere vengeance, but also undermine a key 
source of the legitimacy of global legal governance institutions for criminal justice. 
In terms of the government abuse argument for non-retroactivity at the international level, the 
weakness of the institutions that constitute international criminal justice mean that such abuse is 
widely seen as much less likely. However, as with political authority at the state level, global 
governance institutions exercise one of their greatest coercive powers over individuals within the 
realm of criminal justice. For example, the first international criminal tribunals of the modern 
era, the IMT at Nuremberg and the IMTFE at Tokyo, sentenced 12 and 7 defendants to death, 
respectively. And while there is no death penalty at current international tribunals, they can still 
impose substantial custodial sentences.69 Adherence to the non-retroactivity of crimes makes it 
more difficult for international courts, and the states and international organizations that 
authorize them, to use legal means to legitimize their desire for political retribution. On a related 
note to the governance abuse issue, non-retroactivity also helps to maintain a separation of 
powers at the international level by ensuring that international courts do not exceed their 
authority by creating new crimes under their jurisdiction and that the crimes they do prosecute 
have broad state support.70 
Arguments in favor of adherence to the non-retroactivity of punishment at the international 
level rely on similar arguments. Punishment, according to Emile Durkheim, is central to the 
                                                
69 For example, at the ICTY the maximum sentence is life imprisonment, and at the ICC 30 years 
(although, according to the ICC, “in extreme cases, the Court may impose a term of life imprisonment”). 
See ICTY website, Judgements and Sentencing, www.icty.org/en/about/chambers/judgements-and-
sentencing; and ICC website, What Penalties May Be Imposed by the Court?, www.icc-cpi.int. 
70 Ward N. Ferdinandusse, Direct Application of International Criminal Law in National Courts (The 
Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2006), 222-3. 
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construction and maintenance of norms within society,71 and institutions of international law can 
perform similar functions within international society.72 Non-retroactivity of punishment protects 
individuals from the arbitrary, inconsistent, and abusive exercise of coercive authority by global 
legal governance institutions. Inconsistent sentencing also diminishes the normative value of 
prosecuting a crime: those with lesser punishments appear to have escaped full justice, those 
with greater may appear to have been treated unjustly, and inconsistency increases the perception 
that political considerations have tainted the legal process. 
All told, non-retroactivity provides important protections for privileging the individual under 
international law. This is a profound shift from the traditional era of international law, where the 
individual was purely subordinated to the state. Indeed until the post-1945 era, under 
international law the individual had no legal personality, which is “a prerequisite for the capacity 
to bear rights and obligations,” according to José Alvarez.73 This change is indicative of a shift 
from purely community to individual rights in the international system, challenging the 
preeminence of the community at the international level—including in terms of standards of 
justice. 
Antonio Cassese, first president of the ICTY (1993-7) and of the hybrid (domestic-
international) Special Tribunal for Lebanon (2009-11), has acknowledged that legal fairness 
through non-retroactivity of crimes (nullum crimen sine lege) is now seen as more important in 
                                                
71 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, trans. George Simpson (New York: Macmillan, 
1933 [1893]). 
72 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002). 
73 José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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international criminal justice than the political vengeance of trials with weak protections for the 
accused, which featured so heavily at Nuremberg and Tokyo: 
In ICL [international criminal law], for many years courts have applied nullum crimen as a 
doctrine of substantive justice, that is, a doctrine whereby the legal order must primarily 
aim at prohibiting and punishing any conduct that is socially harmful or causes danger to 
society, whether or not that conduct has already been legally criminalized at the moment an 
act took place. The paramount interest is defending society against any deviant behavior 
likely to cause damage or jeopardize the social and legal system. Hence this doctrine favors 
society over the individual. Only in recent years has this doctrine been replaced by nullum 
crimen sine lege as a doctrine of strict legality.74 
 
Dependent variable 2: Defense parity 
This section explains the primary components of defense parity and why it is an essential source 
of legitimacy for global legal governance institutions for criminal justice. Protecting criminal 
defendants during prosecution at its most fundamental requires applying the core criminal law 
principles of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof lying with the prosecution. 
Their implementation requires rights to ensure the defense has adequate opportunities to attempt 
to refute the prosecution’s case. It is argued here that institutional parity and procedural 
guarantees for defendants, collectively termed “defense parity,” constitute the fundamental rights 
to ensure adequate opportunities to respond to the prosecution’s case. This acknowledges the 
essential role of defense counsel in criminal trials. As stated in relation to the US system: counsel 
                                                
74 Antonio Cassese, The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, ed. Antonio Cassese, s.v. 
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“serve as the necessary advocates of defendants’ rights. By fulfilling that role, they vindicate 
limits the Constitution imposes upon government power, and assure that the adversary justice 
system functions correctly.”75 
The two primary aspects of the rule of law are procedural due process and defense 
“opportunities for argumentation.”76 Both directly address the rights of criminal defendants and 
constitute components of Fuller’s principle of congruence. In the context of a criminal trial, the 
purpose of due process and opportunities to argue is to attempt to equalize the resource and 
structural advantages of the prosecution, in order to enable the accused to present an adequate 
defense. The prosecution is supported by the authority and financial and legal resources of the 
state, which provide enormous advantages in pre-trial investigations—gathering evidence and 
locating witnesses, for example—and during the conduct of a trial. Defendants require 
counterbalancing advantages and procedural protections. 
Prosecutors at international courts maintain many of these institutional advantages, including 
greater financial resources,77 usually greater access to state territory to investigate crimes, and 
much greater cooperation in gathering evidence from state authorities, IGOs such as the UN, and 
human rights NGOs. In addition, when states are hesitant to cooperate with an international 
criminal investigation, such intransigence tends to benefit the prosecutor and so provides a 
further hurdle to mounting an effective defense.78  
                                                
75 Morgan Cloud, “Forfeiting Defense Attorneys’ Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory to 
Individual Constitutional Rights,” Wisconsin Law Review (January/February 1987): 7. 
76 Jeremy Waldron, “The Concept and the Rule of Law,” Georgia Law Review 43, no. 1 (2008): 1-61. 
77 Except for personally-funded defendants—as opposed to court-supported defense counsel. However, 
the former group has constituted only around 10 percent of defendants at the ICTY, for example. 
Interview with a close legal observer of the ICTY, The Hague, October 2015. 
78 Charles Chernor Jalloh and Amy DiBella, “Equality of Arms in International Criminal Law: 
Continuing Challenges,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical 
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“Equality of arms” is a fundamental legal principle whose purpose is to address these 
advantages of the prosecution as an arm of legal authority. As criminal law is practiced in the 
globally dominant common and civil law systems—the legal basis for all purely international 
tribunals79—equality of arms does not encompass the right to substantive equality between 
defense and prosecution, but instead a right to confront the prosecution on equal terms.80 This 
requires courts to provide institutional and financial resources to the defense, such as immunities 
and privileges to facilitate investigation, and public provision of counsel. It also requires two 
primary evidentiary procedural guarantees: prosecution disclosure of evidence to the defense 
before trial (including exculpatory material), and the “right of confrontation”—that is, the right 
to cross-examine prosecution witnesses.81  
There is also one area where parity between prosecution and defense could arguably make a 
significant difference to trial fairness, but tends to be overlooked in analyses of defense 
protections, and is not typically considered as aspect of equality of arms: the institutional 
structure of a judicial system.82 Structural parity within the institutional framework of a legal 
system between prosecution and defense addresses distinctions in power between legal 
governance institutions—and their agents, in this case prosecutors—and their legal subjects. The 
concept of structural parity also acknowledges the co-equal function of defense counsel in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Perspectives, ed. William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, and Niamh Hayes (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 
2013), 279-82. 
79 As opposed to hybrid courts, which are based on a combination of international law and the domestic 
law of the territory where the criminal situation occurred, and so may include elements not found in the 
civil and common law systems. 
80 Cassese, International Criminal Law, 384-6. 
81 Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 81-
116, 208-339. 
82 A prominent exception is Masha Fedorova, The Principle of Equality of Arms in International Criminal 
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administration of justice, as stated by the American Bar Association: “A court properly 
constituted to hear a criminal case must be viewed as a tripartite entity consisting of the judge 
(and jury, where appropriate), counsel for the prosecution, and counsel for the accused.”83  
The practice of civil and common law domestic legal systems has been to establish an office 
of the prosecutor as an official court body. In many such system, including that of the United 
States at the federal and state levels, court systems have also established an office to represent 
defense counsel within the legal system’s institutional structure. In most US jurisdictions this is a 
public defenders’ office, which is responsible for allocating and paying for legal representation 
for defense, as well as representing defendants’ interests within the court system. All 
contemporary international courts have followed this practice with regard to prosecutors—all 
have an office of the prosecutor—but they have been far more inconsistent in regards to defense 
counsel, as explained in the case studies. 
The term “defense parity” is used in the research rather than “equality of arms” to distinguish 
the standards that are applied in the dissertation and those associated with the latter term. In 
omitting structural issues, equality of arms is too narrow to provide defendants at international 
tribunals with reasonable opportunities for argumentation. Structural parity is important in 
shaping the dynamic between prosecution and defense in decision-making forums within 
international courts, including in relation to such important areas for a fair trial as budgetary and 
procedural change. Defense parity in the research does include more typical equality of arms 
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procedural standards in relation to the gathering and presentation of evidence at trial: disclosure 
of prosecution evidence and cross-examination of prosecution witnesses.  
However, the research also recognizes that the prosecution has a different task than the 
defense, and in some ways a more difficult one: to conduct forensic and other investigations in 
order to justify an indictment and to construct a case against the accused at trial. Absent the 
support provided to domestic prosecutors by police and allied investigatory structures, personnel, 
and resources, prosecutors at international courts require additional resources in relation to 
defense to carry out this task. Therefore resource issues are not explored in the research, and the 
term “defense parity” is not meant to indicate that broad equality is expected between the parties 
in all areas to demonstrate fairness. The term expresses the requirement specifically for structural 
parity and evidentiary procedural guarantees. 
In contrast to the position taken here, Richard Goldstone, the first chief prosecutor of the 
ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), when asked by the author 
about equality of arms, argued that it can never be achieved in a criminal trial, whether domestic 
or international, due to the numerous resource and institutional advantages held by the 
prosecution. Instead of equality he believes that courts should strive to achieve “adequate 
representation.”84 This position is problematic because while strict equality is not achievable—
nor desirable, due to the need for resources for international prosecutors to enable them to 
investigate crimes, for example—defense parity and adequate representation are not mutually 
exclusive, or different points along a spectrum of fairness to the defense, with the latter 
presenting a lower standard that courts can more easily be expected to achieve. The dissertation 
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argues that adequate representation cannot be achieved unless there is pre-trial and trial parity for 
the defense in terms of institutional support and procedural guarantees to balance the inherent 
institutional advantages enjoyed by the prosecution. The specific elements of defense parity 
explored in the research are delineated in the indicators section below. 
Defendant parity is an essential source of the legitimacy of a liberal criminal justice system 
because it contributes towards four of such systems’ primary normative, practical, and political 
purposes: truth determination, moral retribution, a fundamental human right, and constraining the 
coercive power of public authorities over individuals. First, the primary practical function of a 
trial is to determine the truth in relation to an apparent breach of law, in order to establish the 
facts of a potentially criminal act and the criminal culpability of the defendant. This function 
cannot be achieved if the defendant has inadequate protections from the power of the state as 
exercised before and during a trial, as, without a reasonable opportunity to refute the 
prosecution’s case, the defendant is much more likely to be erroneously found guilty. Second, 
moral retribution is severely inhibited by restricting defendants from presenting a sufficient 
defense. There is no moral or social justice in finding an innocent individual guilty through trial 
standards that undermine the determination of truth. 
Third, defendant rights are justified as inalienable legal rights in a cosmopolitan 
understanding of universal human rights.85 Elements of a “constitutionalization” of the 
international system can be seen in the international right to a fair trial, as an expression of the 
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growing role of the individual as a global citizen.86 Fourth, defense parity has distinctly political 
implications, acting as a limitation on the power of the coercive authority of legal governance 
institutions. Without a serious attempt to achieve and maintain defense parity, trials can be—and 
are constantly—misused at the domestic level by political authorities worldwide to delegitimize 
political rivals and enemies. 
For these reasons defense parity is central to the modern concept of legal justice, as opposed 
to the retributive justice of punishment of perceived offenders in order to satisfy popular and 
state outrage at the commission of egregious acts. Reasonable protections for the accused before 
and during trial distinguish criminal justice from community vengeance. Similarly, at the 
international level, the trial right of defendants to institutional and procedural parity is central to 
the legitimacy of criminal justice. International criminal justice and its legitimacy tend to be 
centered on the trials that courts conduct.87 Its underlying international human rights and 
humanitarian norms “build their legitimacy from the bottom up, by the fairness of their 
proceedings and the moral power they project.”88 Therefore protecting the accused from the 
arbitrary exercise of power by legal governance institutions is the most fundamental aspect of 
ensuring a fair trial consistent with the liberal legal principle of congruence with the rule of law, 
and with the dignity and human rights of the individual.  
Such concern is only heightened by the inherently political context within which 
international courts operate. Rather than being created by legislative bodies, as is usual in the 
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87 Luban, “Fairness to Rightness.” 
88 Ibid., 588. 
 
 
 
 
51 
domestic democratic context, they are established by the representatives of state executives: by a 
single state (e.g. the IMTFE), groups of states (the IMT and the ICC), or IGOs (the ICTY and 
ICTR). Therefore at the international level, defense protections assume the extra burden of 
counterbalancing the potential perception of political bias by significantly inhibiting the ability 
of authorities to use the judicial processes to delegitimize opposing states by prosecuting their 
leaders. This is especially important to provide the judicial process with broad international 
legitimacy in a post-conflict environment in which a court is primarily prosecuting individuals 
from one group—such as Nazis at Nuremberg and Hutus at the ICTR.89 
 
The independent variable: Institutional power 
The dissertation argues that the institutional power of states has significantly shaped defense 
protections. Following Barnett and Duval, power is defined in the research as “the production, in 
and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own 
circumstances and fate.”90 Institutional power involves the socially diffuse or indirect use of 
power by political actors to control others through authority to establish and modify the 
resources, and structural and procedural rules within which global governance institutions 
operate. As described by Barnett and Duval, “the conceptual focus [of institutional power] is on 
the formal and informal institutions that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the 
rules and procedures that define those institutions, guides, steers, and constrains the actions (or 
non-actions) and conditions of existence of others, sometimes even unknowingly.”91 The 
                                                
89 Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes, 191-231. 
90 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 8. 
91 Ibid., 15. 
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dynamic operates through spatially and temporally diffuse relations of power whereby A (in the 
dissertation largely states) establishes the conditions within which B (criminal defendants and 
their counsel) operate.92 
Not all actors exercise power equally, with more powerful states tending to be more 
influential in generating rules consistent with their material interests and normative values. The 
institutions created therefore tend to reflect the preferences of the most powerful states within the 
bargaining forum that create them. However, such institutions are not epiphenomenal as the 
bargaining processes resulting in rules usually reflect a compromise between multiple actors,93 
and such issues as asymmetries of information between agents (international institutions) and 
principals (rule creators, largely states) create opportunities for autonomous action.94  
Principal-agent theory’s explanation of how agent autonomy is enabled by asymmetries of 
information and differing interests between agents and the principals that delegate authority to 
them95 may appear to provide a productive avenue for exploring the effect on judicial actors of 
rule-making for international tribunals by states. However, the dissertation does not focus on the 
autonomy of judicial actors per se—an area already well-explored in the literature on 
international criminal justice.96 Instead the lens of institutional power is a more appropriate tool 
                                                
92 Ibid., 16. 
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for the purposes of the dissertation, which examines the effect of rule-making on the 
implementation of the rights of certain judicial actors (defendants and counsel), rather than the 
extent and effects of tribunal autonomy. 
The dissertation argues that the manner in which institutional power relations operate within 
global legal governance, between the states that create tribunals and actors within them, weaken 
the tribunals’ legitimacy by impairing the ability of the accused to gain an adequate defense. 
States have enormous influence on the operation of international courts, and the fairness they 
afford to defendants, through the negotiating processes that lead to the establishment and 
maintenance of courts. States’ institutional power has been exercised through decision-making in 
various legal environments, including: temporary alliances, such as that which created the 
London Charter of the IMT; the UN Security Council, creating the ICTY in resolution 827; and 
within treaty-negotiating forums such as the Rome Conference that created the statute of the 
ICC.  
States have also created rules of procedure and evidence for some courts, and other 
subsidiary rules documents, such as definitions of crimes. They have also been responsible for 
changes to the rules of some courts. The extent to which powerful states have been able to 
exercise an unequal role in shaping rules has varied by forum. At the London Conference after 
World War II, for example, only powerful states had a direct role in constructing the IMT’s 
rules. The rules for the ICTY established by the Security Council were especially influenced by 
the legal preferences of the United States as a powerful permanent member willing to devote 
significant resources for this exercise, including in terms of legal expertise. The ICC statute was 
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also substantially influenced by US preferences out of concern by other participants to ensure the 
US delegation signed the statute at the end of the Rome Conference. However, subsequent rule 
changes have not been shaped by the United States, or other such powerful global actors as 
Russia and China, as they have not ratified the statute and are therefore not members of the 
forum responsible for rule changes, the Assembly of States Parties. 
The role of institutional power in shaping defense protections is a result of states’ material 
and normative interests, including their concern to limit the power of courts, and to delegitimize 
other political actors. Also relevant to state decision-making in constructing courts is their 
particular conception of justice. This tends to privilege the political justice of prosecution over 
the legal justice of protecting defendant rights, and is influenced by the non-legal goals of 
international criminal justice, such as transitional justice and historical narrative construction.97 
Especially the international trials of high-profile military and political leaders can tend to 
constitute “political theatre,” primarily concerned with political goals rather than punishment, 
which is “almost an afterthought.”98 This focus partly stems from the normative issue of the 
inability of any punishment for perpetrators to fit the enormity of their mass atrocity crimes, and 
therefore the trial process rather than the punishment must bear the burden of providing justice to 
victims. The political functions of international trials, and their potentially distorting impact on 
the legal dynamic, means that there is even more pressure than in the domestic context on the 
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fairness towards defendants to carry the burden of the international criminal justice system’s 
legitimacy.99  
Three goals and concerns of states in relation to international trials are explored in the 
research as explanations of state decision-making in relation to the establishment and 
modification of court rules; all of which tend to be much weaker or absent within liberal legal 
governance at the domestic level. First, the goal of transitional justice through ending impunity 
and protecting victim groups leads to conflict between the primary protection focuses on 
international criminal justice: protecting victims and criminal defendants.  
Second, since Nuremberg international courts have self-consciously possessed a historical 
narrative creation function,100 whose methods of gathering and presenting historical material it is 
argued sometimes diverge from the standards for evidentiary procedures necessary for fairness 
towards defendants. Third, state and UN concern with the cost and length of international trials 
has led to pressure on courts to reduce both in ways that disproportionately affect the defense. 
These problems are exacerbated by a weak understanding of the nature of the role of defense in 
criminal trials—by states, IGOs, juridical actors, and NGOs.  
These issues all lead to insufficient attention on the role of the accused and defense counsel 
during the construction and maintenance of international courts, and in the cooperation afforded 
by such actors to evidence gathering by legal teams. Defendants tend to be conceived of by all 
these actors as passive agents, acted upon by the international system to determine their guilt, 
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and they are often socially and politically condemned before their legal culpability is established 
by trial. Each factor is explained in more detail below.  
First, in terms of transitional justice, there is a conflict between the protection regimes of 
international criminal justice due to the distinct focus of the two primary elements of criminal 
law: the substantive law that delineates what is prohibited or required, and criminal procedure, 
which determines how the law is applied in relation to prosecutions. Substantive law is underlain 
by the responsibility of the state to protect citizens, and the concept of personal responsibility—
individuals can be held criminally responsible for breaching their legal obligations. Criminal 
procedure, on the other hand, is governed by the need to protect the human rights of individuals 
in relation to state action—in this case, primarily defendants, rather than protecting the victims, 
which is the focus of substantive law.101 
These conflicting protection goals similarly play out in the international context, through the 
disparate emphases of international human rights and humanitarian law vs. international criminal 
law and justice. The former are focused on protecting all people from abuses—and providing 
justice to victims. This leads, in the context of prosecution, to the goal of ending impunity and 
measuring success through the number of alleged perpetrators convicted—especially when they 
are high-profile political actors. Liberal criminal justice, on the other hand, aims at protecting the 
rights of defendants to ensure a fair, legitimate trial, through the principle of the presumption of 
innocence and the rights and obligations stemming from the principle of the equality of arms. It 
is by no means clear that political and legal conceptualizations of justice have compatible goals, 
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despite the attempt by international criminal justice to utilize legal justice to achieve political 
justice.102 
The human rights focus of international criminal justice leads to an under-emphasis on the 
importance of protecting defendant rights. There is significant resistance to enhancing 
protections for defendants among states and within the UN, as this is implicitly perceived as 
diminishing the ability to achieve justice through the conviction of “war criminals.” The 
quotation marks are used here to indicate the labels used among states, at the UN, by human 
rights NGOs, and in international media to socially condemn individuals that have not been 
legally convicted in court.103 The public discourse by international media and many governments 
tends towards the construction of a “narrative of guilt and innocence.”104 As Hannah Arendt and 
others have argued, trials themselves may constitute a formalization through public theater of 
this social and political narrative.105  
Within such an international political environment, a genuinely fair trial encounters 
significant obstacles absent or much weaker at the domestic level. These include an often much 
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greater level of cooperation by international actors—states, the UN, and human rights NGOs—
with international prosecutors than with defense counsel, despite the necessary reliance of both 
on aid beyond the power of the court to grant directly. Pre-trial narratives may undermine a 
defendant’s ability to gain a fair trial via diminished international cooperation with defense 
counsel in conducting investigations and accessing evidence.  
The reliance by international criminal tribunals on external political actors exacerbates these 
problems for defendants. International judicial authorities are reliant on external political, human 
rights, and legal actors for support, including: states for financing, arresting suspects, and 
providing evidence; the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) to issue arrest 
warrants; and human rights NGOs to provide evidence. The dissertation demonstrates that this 
dependency has tended to be more problematic for the defense’s ability to adequately prepare for 
trial than for the prosecution. 
Another important consequence of the conflict between human rights and criminal justice 
approaches is the increasing focus on, and participation by, victims in international court 
proceedings. Victim participation, especially at the ICC, including the establishment of an Office 
of Public Counsel for the Victims (OPCV), has arguably added to the burden upon the defense, 
distorting the judicial dynamic between prosecution and defense by introducing a third party 
with rights against the defense.106 While the human rights focus on ending impunity for mass 
atrocities may not appear incompatible with generating fair trials, in practice the criminal justice 
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www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/documents/12-2007_Victim_Participation_Before_the_ICC.pdf. 
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that has resulted from the hybrid of substantial international law and domestic criminal 
procedure exhibits a bias towards the rights of victims as an outgrowth of the political functions 
of international courts.  
The impairment of defendant rights through differential treatment of defense and prosecution 
by external actors is exacerbated by the use of international courts by states—those that create 
them and those that are state parties—to delegitimize or stigmatize enemy states and rebel 
groups,107 and their leaders through prosecution and conviction.108 This has negatively impacted 
defense protections by making states reluctant to cooperate with investigations by defense 
counsel. The heinousness of the crimes exacerbates this problem, as states and IGOs do not wish 
to be perceived as aiding war criminals.109 Stigmatizing media coverage of suspects and 
defendants with a presumption of guilt is a further discouragement. A related issue is the use of 
indictments by prosecutors to stigmatize suspects, especially if they are thought unlikely to be 
caught or successfully prosecuted—that is, a pre-trial legal device is used to condemn suspects 
rather than a guilty trial verdict.110 
Second, the function of international courts in constructing a historical narrative is explored 
as a political issue shaping defense protections.111 The role of courts in illuminating the “truth” 
                                                
107 Frédéric Mégret, “Practices of Stigmatization,” Law and Contemporary Problems 76 (2014): 287-318. 
108 A major problem generated by the goal of delegitimization is prosecutorial selectivity: while the IMT 
and IMTFE notoriously consisted of the winners of World War II solely prosecuting the mass atrocities of 
the losers, the ICTY has focused primarily on Serb atrocities, the ICTR has virtually ignored alleged Tutsi 
crimes, and most active situations at the ICC stem from referrals to the court by members of the court’s 
Assembly of State Parties (ASP) the actions of rebel groups which challenge these states’ authority. 
Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes. 
109 Neil Vidmar, “Generic Prejudice and the Presumption of Guilt in Sex Abuse Trials,” Law and Human 
Behavior 21, no. 1 (1997): 5-25. 
110 Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance, 223. 
111 Daniel Joyce, “The Historical Function of International Criminal Trials: Re-thinking International 
Criminal Law,” Nordic Journal of International Law 73 (2004): 461-84. See, for example, comments by 
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of mass atrocity acts committed and thereby make denial more difficult has been highlighted by 
internal legal and external political actors.112 The research demonstrates Arendt’s contention that 
courts’ political function in constructing history risks undermining the legitimacy of trials by 
diminishing the rights of defendants,113 including by limiting the ability of high-profile political 
defendants to speak—such as Herman Göring at the IMT and Slobodan Milošević at the 
ICTY.114 Courts fear trials becoming political theater, but this is almost inevitable with high-
profile public and inherently politicized trials. As Martti Koskenniemi notes, they risk ultimately 
becoming show trials.115 
Third, the length and cost of trials has been an issue for international courts ever since the 
IMT and IMTFE, with states and IGOs concerned to complete trials and contain costs,116 and 
commentators claiming that long, expensive trials diminish the legitimacy of international courts 
through inefficiency.117 This has led to pressure by states to accelerate trials and contain costs, 
especially at the ICTY; an agenda which has negatively impacted defense parity through 
procedural changes that weaken defense counsel’s opportunities for argumentation. Procedural 
                                                                                                                                                       
an ICTY prosecutor in Nikolić, Trial Chamber, doc. no. IT-94-2-R61, transcript of October 9, 1995, 
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112 Richard Ashby Wilson, “Judging History: The Historical Record of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2005): 908-42.  
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Historiography (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), 199-236. 
115 Martti Koskenniemi, “Between Impunity and Show Trials,” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
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116 Otto Kranzbühler, “Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterwards,” DePaul Law Review 14, no. 2 (1965): 
346; and Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 104-10. 
117 Richard J. Goldstone, “International Criminal Court and Ad Hoc Tribunals,” in The Oxford Handbook 
on the United Nations, ed. Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
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changes at the ICTY are particularly significant as it is perceived by other international courts, 
including the ICC, as a model to guide their functioning. There is a trade-off between types of 
legitimacy here, with fairness diminished by the attempt to improve efficiency. 
The influence of these human rights and political concerns on legal proceedings tends to lead 
to an at least implicit bias against defendants by states, and by IGOs such as the UN and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As the cases demonstrate, this results in problems 
for defense parity, including a weak or nonexistent structural emphasis—when creating and 
maintaining courts—on establishing an effective defense office to balance the power of the 
office of the prosecutor; an imbalance in the international cooperation afforded to the defense 
during pre-trial investigation; and inadequate attention on effective procedural guarantees for the 
defense, during courts’ creation and their later development.  
The impact of these influences on defense protections is intensified by a poor understanding 
of the role of defense counsel in criminal justice by states and human rights NGOs, and even 
international judicial actors (judges, prosecutors, and court staff) and defendants themselves. The 
roles of defense counsel are as advocate for their clients, and arguably as an officer of the court 
and minister of justice.118 It is commonly assumed, if not always articulated, that a successful 
defense requires merely “targeting holes” in the prosecution case, requiring “less time and fewer 
witnesses,” as stated in a 2005 ICTY appeals chamber judgment.119  
A related issue is the impact upon the defendant of the two roles of criminal prosecutors: they 
are tasked with winning their side of the case as well as expected to be administrators of 
                                                
118 Roberta K. Flowers, The Role of the Defense Attorney: Not Just an Advocate,” Ohio State Journal of 
Criminal Law 7, no. 2 (2010): 647-52. 
119 Orić, ICTY, Appeals Judgment, “Interlocutory Decision on Length of Defence Case,” case no. IT-03-
68, doc. no. IT-03-68-AR73.2, July 20, 2005. 
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justice.120 These tasks are arguably in conflict and create an unequal dynamic with defendants, as 
prosecutors’ institutional advantages, which aid in winning their case, stem from their role as an 
arm of criminal justice.121  
The attitude expressed in the 2005 ICTY appeals judgment above underestimates the 
difficulties for counsel in constructing a defense in the face of the institutional advantages of the 
prosecution. This poor understanding also applies in the domestic criminal justice context,122 but 
its effect is magnified at the international level due to the impact on defense protections of the 
political goals and concerns described above.123 It is often insufficiently recognized that defense 
counsel and their function are integral to achieving the trial goals of truth and legal justice. This 
also explains why international court structures rarely provide defense with parity to the 
prosecution, why pre-trial and trial procedures are inadequate to balance out prosecution 
advantages, and why counsel tend to be provided with inadequate institutional support for 
defending their clients. 
This argument challenges the assumption that there are common norms and knowledge held 
in epistemic communities.124 Such communities, or knowledge authority groups, are argued to 
                                                
120 Rory K. Little, “‘It’s Not My Problem?’ Wrong: Prosecutors Have an Important Ethical Role to Play,” 
Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 7, no. 2 (2010): 685-738. 
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accept the “same cause-and-effect relationships, truth tests to assess them, and share common 
values.” They also share “acceptance of a common body of facts,” and a “common interpretive 
framework.”125 In relation to international criminal justice, such communities are argued to 
consist variously of practicing international criminal lawyers126 or international law scholars.127 
However, the position of other commentators is that lawyers do not constitute such 
communities in relation to criminal justice.128 This position, which is that taken in the 
dissertation in relation to international criminal justice, is that:  
[I]t is not easy to apply the model of epistemic communities to international legal experts. As 
epistemic communities require shared principled beliefs and a common effort to affect 
policy, they cannot be equated with disciplines or professions as a whole, such as the 
community of international law professionals. Moreover, one can doubt whether more 
specific groups of international lawyers can count as epistemic communities at all, given the 
need for shared causal beliefs derived from methods and techniques accepted in the 
discipline or profession they practice.129 
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As argued in the dissertation, there is no juridical epistemic community sharing norms and 
values in relation to international criminal trials. The inherently competitive and confrontational 
nature of criminal justice—especially as international courts utilize an adversarial common law 
trial structure—is partially responsible; as is the tension between the political protection goals of 
international criminal justice (victims) and legal protection focus (defendants). 
 
Research indicators 
The section below details the indicators of the dependent variables, legality and defense parity, 
and of the independent variable, institutional power, and related political dynamics, along with 
the sources of data examined. Measuring legal indicators requires not just examining them as 
formal attributes of law but also their implementation to assess the extent to which principles 
actually operate in practice to constrain the power of international courts and provide protections 
for defendants.130 
 
Indicators of legality 
The two primary features of legality are explored in the research: non-retroactivity of crimes and 
of punishment.131 The former necessitates that no one is prosecuted for an act which was not a 
                                                
130 The individual indicators are not aggregated into a single indicator of democratic legal legitimacy, as 
this “consists of many dimensions, many of which are also multifaceted (e.g., judicial independence or 
fair trials). It is unclear whether anything can be gained by aggregating the various aspects into a single 
broad indicator. Looking at the components individually also has the advantage of making unnecessary 
any sort of aggregation rule that—absent a complete and generally accepted theory—would necessarily 
be arbitrary.” See research by Stefan Voigt on rule of law indicators: Stefan Voigt, “How to Measure the 
Rule of Law,” Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics by the universities of Aachen, Gießen, 
Göttingen Kassel, Marburg, and Siegen, No. 38-2009, 2009, 10-11. 
131 There appear to be no indicators of non-retroactivity established in legal or political research on 
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crime when committed. The contrary is indicated when laws “alter the future legal consequences 
of past actions and events to the detriment of their subjects.”132 Determining breaches of the 
legality of crimes requires assessing, as stated by the US Supreme Court in Weaver v. Graham: 
“whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.”133  
Non-retroactivity is examined by comparing the substantive law of each crime before the 
court—with its effective date being the date the statute came into force—with the substantive 
law as understood to exist internationally at the time of the commission of acts before each court. 
This in turn requires assessing the nature and extent of prohibitions contained in operative 
treaties and customary international law as determined by courts and legal scholars. The sources 
examined are courts’ statutes and associated legal documents,134 and existing law as determined 
from the assessment of contemporary treaty and customary law, and legal scholarship. The 
legality of interpretation135 of crimes by judges at each court is then examined through 
assessment of international criminal tribunals’ case law, including the legal reasoning of courts, 
dissenting judicial opinions, and scholarly analysis. 
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Compliance with the legality of crimes by courts also has secondary requirements: the clarity 
and specificity of legal prohibitions.136 Their evaluation involves a qualitative and subjective 
analysis of the level of ambiguity and vagueness contained in the language used to describe 
prohibitions, and thereby whether they permit excessive judicial discretion. Their exploration in 
the case studies relies on the assessments of international legal scholars and an examination of 
the case law of each court to determine the effect of the level of clarity and specificity of each 
law on their application and interpretation by the chambers. An international court can be 
considered to be clarifying existing law in conformity with the principle of legality as long as “it 
is a measured clarification or interpretation and the result is consistent with the essence of the 
offense and could be reasonably foreseeable…[I]t should not permit judges the freedom to create 
law aimed at correcting lacunae of international criminal law.”137 
Legality has usually been assessed by legal authorities, including the US Supreme Court, in 
binary terms: a law and its application in a particular case are either retrospective or 
prospective.138 This approach does not take into account the complexities of determining legality 
from its various components and requirements, and so the dissertation’s assessment provides an 
assessment along a spectrum with a total breach of legality and complete conformity at the 
extremes. To illustrate the inherently subjective nature of the assessment of legality through legal 
                                                
136 These indicators have also been applied by other theories to explain the legitimacy of and compliance 
with international law: see Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), where clarity and specificity are called “determinacy;” and Kenneth 
Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal, “The Concept 
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137 Michael G. Karnavas, “Is the Emerging Jurisprudence on Complicity in Genocide before the Ad Hoc 
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interpretation, there was dispute over the legal basis of the decision by the appeals chamber of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone to reject a defense challenge to the court’s jurisdiction in 
relation to their conviction for the recruitment of child soldiers. The challenge claimed that there 
was no international law prohibiting this action at the time of its commission—that is, before 
recruitment was included in the ICC Rome Statute’s definition of war crimes, which the Sierra 
Leone court relied upon. The court determined that recruitment had already been outlawed in 
customary law before Rome, but one judge dissented, in agreement with the position of the UN 
secretary-general.139 
Non-retroactivity is examined in relation to the three crimes that have been prosecuted by 
contemporary international tribunals:140 war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.141 
                                                
139 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 4th ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 140-1. 
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been completed yet at the STL (see STL website, Cases, www.specialtribunalforlebanon.com/en/the-
cases). See Fiona de Londras, “Terrorism as an International Crime,” in Routledge Handbook of 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
This enables a comparison between the ICTY and ICC case studies, in Chapters 4 and 5, 
respectively, with the origins of the international criminal justice system at the IMT at 
Nuremberg, analyzed at the end of Chapter 3. War crimes142 are currently conceived of as grave 
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions143 and 1977 Additional Protocols,144 and what are 
known as “the laws and customs of war”—largely the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.145 
War crimes depend for their determination upon the context of an international or civil conflict, 
and consist of violations committed against different groups—those not or no longer taking part 
in hostilities (civilians, POWs, and medical personal, etc.) or enemy combatants—and using 
prohibited means or methods of warfare. Prohibited means of warfare include, for example, 
poison gases, and prohibited methods include targeting civilians, excessive use of force, and 
extreme damage to the environment.146 
                                                                                                                                                       
International Criminal Law, ed. William Schabas and Nadia Bernaz (New York: Routledge, 2013), 169-
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Not codified by treaty, the definition of crimes against humanity is largely determined by the 
statutes and case law of international tribunals, and customary law, and has varied over time. 
Consistent in customary understandings of crimes against humanity has been the existence of 
various underlying offenses—including murder, torture, and rape—that must be committed 
against civilians. Elements currently also include that these offenses must be committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, and that the perpetrator is 
aware of this fact.147 
Genocide is codified in the Genocide Convention as having occurred when underlying acts—
including murder and preventing births—are committed against certain protected groups (on the 
basis of ethnicity, nationality, or religion) with the intent to destroy that group.148 In this sense, 
the substantive law of genocide is similar to that of crimes against humanity and war crimes: its 
determination requires underlying offenses committed within a particular context. A major 
difference, however, is that the context for genocide requires that the attack on a protected group 
is intended to destroy that group. This is known as “special intent.”149 All international crimes 
contain both a physical aspect (the act committed) and a mental element (the intent to cause the 
harm committed). Determination of genocide therefore requires two kinds of intent in its mental 
element: that to cause the underlying offenses and to ultimately attempt to destroy a protected 
group through these acts—a particularly high bar in terms proving criminal culpability.150 
                                                
147 See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, article 7. 
148 Genocide Convention, article 2. 
149 See Katherine Goldsmith, “The Issue of Intent in the Genocide Convention and Its Effect on the 
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Studies and Prevention 5, no. 3 (2010): 238-57. 
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Assessing the second primary indicator of legality, the level of non-retroactivity of 
punishment, requires examining the sentencing guidelines in the relevant international law—
including the operative court statute, secondary rules, and case law—and relevant domestic 
law—if the statute requires this—and comparing these to the actual sentences handed down by 
each court. Guidelines include sentencing ranges for years of imprisonment, and a delineation of 
the manner and extent to which mitigating and aggravating factors may be taken into account. 
An important secondary indicator of the legality of punishments is consistency in sentencing. 
It is also an indicator of legal fairness through equality of treatment before the law:151 “[o]ne of 
the fundamental principles of justice is consistency—like cases should be treated alike.”152 As 
international legal scholar Mark Drumbl argues, “erratic sentencing practice [can] also affect the 
coherence and legitimacy of the punishing institutions and even…bring the law into 
contempt.”153 Consistency of sentences for convictions for similar crimes is therefore examined 
within each case study by comparing sentences with the crimes for which individuals were 
convicted. Also taken into account was the consistency with which judges exercised sentencing 
discretion by incorporating such factors as mitigating and aggravating circumstances into their 
decision-making to determine the extent to which the courts have demonstrated a “coherent 
judicial approach” to sentencing.154 The sources utilized to examine legality of punishment were 
court documents, and secondary legal sources that have analyzed internal consistency within a 
court, and that between state and international sentencing. 
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Indicators of defense parity 
The dissertation focuses on the two most important areas of defense parity that reflect the nature 
of the official dynamic between defense and prosecution, and that enable a comparison between 
courts: institutional support and evidentiary procedural guarantees. The research excludes such 
resource indicators of parity as court provided financing for defense counsel. The prosecution 
requires far more resources than the defense at the international level in order to conduct 
investigations, as they cannot rely on a police force for this, as would normally occur within a 
domestic jurisdiction.155 Therefore financial resources are a less illuminating aspect of parity to 
examine at the international level.  
The analysis assesses the tendency of each indicator to influence the ability of defendants to 
gain a fair trial, which ultimately depends on the relative ability of defense and prosecution 
attorneys to utilize the material at their disposal within the courtroom to persuade the judges of 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. This is therefore a subjective task. The research provides 
examples to illustrate their significance in particular cases.156 It is in the practice of courts that 
their fairness is ultimately expressed. As stated by Justice Robert Jackson in arguing for a court 
at Nuremberg that would conduct fair trials: “Courts try cases, but cases also try courts.”157 
                                                
155 Virtually all prosecutors and a significant number of defense attorneys interviewed agreed on this 
issue. 
156 A determination of defense parity weaknesses does not, however, endeavor to demonstrate harm to the 
defense through a negative impact on trial outcomes. Harm is caused through breaches of parity, 
regardless of their ultimate impact. See Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, 98. 
157 Robert Jackson, “The Rule of Law Among Nations,” speech to the American Society of International 
Law, Washington, DC, April 13, 1945, 15, www.roberthjackson.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/Rule_of_Law_Among_Nations.pdf. 
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The normative standards of fairness utilized to assess the indicators of defense parity are 
those stemming from the international case law. The primary sources analyzed are the main 
bodies that have established case law in relation to the related issue of equality of arms:158 the 
European Commission on Human Rights (1954-98), the European Court of Human Rights 
(which allowed individual direct access only from 1998), and the UN Human Rights Committee 
(which assesses implementation of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights).  
The approach to examining institutional support is described below, then evidentiary 
procedural issues. Two primary indicators of institutional support to defendants are analyzed in 
the research: structural parity between prosecution and defense in the institutional framework of 
a court, and court facilitation of pre-trial investigation by legal teams. Structural parity is a strong 
indicator of the ability of the defense to gain an equal voice in court negotiations over rule 
changes and allocation of budgetary resources, and therefore also affects the resource and 
procedural dynamic with the prosecution. Structural parity refers to the formal position within 
the court system of official representation for the prosecution—usually the office of the 
prosecutor—and the defense—an office of defense counsel or representation for defense by 
another body within the court structure. 
Structural parity was assessed by examining the de jure status of the defense office relative to 
that of the prosecutor’s office, as delineated in each court’s statute and other operative legal 
documents. Then, how the structural dynamic has shaped the defense voice in negotiations vis-à-
                                                
158 As discussed earlier, equality of arms includes the procedural issues analyzed under “defense parity” 
in the research, but not most of the institutional issues. 
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vis prosecution was explored through public institutional documents and interviews with 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other close court observers. 
The second aspect of institutional support explored is court facilitation of pre-trial 
investigations, including through providing immunities and privileges. Courts may also 
encourage cooperation with states and compel witnesses to attend, through applying pressure on 
states through public criticism, for example, and issuing subpoenas to witnesses. Known as the 
right to compulsory process, court aid in securing evidence for defendants has become an 
important feature of criminal justice fairness.159 Compulsory process issues are explored in the 
research to determine the extent of institutional support for the prosecution and defense in 
conducting pre-trial investigations.160 The examination also explores the cooperation of states 
with prosecution and defense teams, the impact this has on trial fairness, and the mechanisms 
courts utilize to address obstacles to state cooperation. Data utilized include court documents 
(e.g. statutes, motions, and judgments), state and UN Security Council documents (e.g. 
resolutions), media reports, memoires of political and legal actors such as state diplomats and 
international court prosecutors, secondary historical sources, and interviews with court 
observers. 
Evidentiary procedural guarantees are examined during the pre-trial and trial phases of 
proceedings against a criminal defendant. The pre-trial phase is explored from the time an 
                                                
159 In the US context it is one of the core criminal justice rights found within the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution. See US Constitution, Amendment VI. The Compulsory Process Clause, as it is known, is 
the phrase “to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,” referring to the accused. 
160 Other resource-related issues include financing to enable indigent accused to pay for counsel before 
and during trial, and to enable the defense team to construct a defense, including through paying for 
administrative costs, investigating in the field, communicating with defendants, bringing witnesses, and 
examining evidence. These are not addressed directly in the research as they have proved more difficult to 
compare between courts and much information is not publically available. 
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accused is provided with counsel. The need for strict evidentiary procedures results from 
distinctions between the ability of defense counsel and prosecution to investigate, and the need to 
provide the defense with reasonable opportunities to rebut the prosecution’s case.  
Two evidence-related procedural guarantees for defendants are examined in the research: 
disclosure of prosecution evidence, and the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. 
Disclosure is an evidence-access balancing procedure found in common law domestic legal 
systems which requires the prosecution to provide the defense, before trial, with all the evidence 
(including witness lists) that the prosecution will rely on during trial. It also requires the 
prosecution to hand over not only incriminating but also exculpatory evidence in their 
possession. Disclosure is especially important for parity in international trials because of their 
mixture of common law procedure (an adversarial trial) with civil law rules of evidence. The 
latter are far more relaxed than in a common law system, with hearsay and other more 
questionable material allowed. Pre-trial disclosure to the defense therefore enables counsel to 
respond to the much broader range of disputable evidence that will likely be used against their 
clients.161 Prosecutorial disclosure also aids in balancing the disadvantage the defense suffers in 
terms of investigative resources: financial, legal, and support from such external actors as states, 
IGOs, and human rights NGOs.162 It is considered fundamental to the right to a fair trial by the 
European Court of Human Rights.163 
                                                
161 Colleen M. Rohan, “Protecting the Rights of the Accused in International Criminal Proceedings: Lip 
Service or Affirmative Action?” in The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: 
Critical Perspectives, ed. William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, and Niamh Hayes (Farnham, UK: 
Ashgate, 2013), 292. 
162 Jalloh and DiBella, “Equality of Arms in International Criminal Law,” in ibid., 252. 
163 ECtHR, Natunen v. Finland, Judgment, application no. 210022/04, March 31, 2009, para. 39. See 
Legal Aid Reformers Network (LARN), ECtHR case summary Natunen v. Finland (31/03/2009), May 11, 
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The comprehensiveness and timeliness of disclosure are assessed in the research. Data on 
disclosure are not available in a broad and systematic fashion for international courts. Instead the 
analysis constructs a picture of disclosure through reliance on court documents, including 
censure mentions against prosecutors; secondary sources discussing the issue; and interviews. 
The ability to cross-examine prosecution witnesses is a protection procedure provided to not 
only balance the prosecution’s ability to cross-examine defense witnesses, but to enable 
defendants to face their accusers—a core principle of liberal criminal justice—and to challenge 
the evidence being used to attempt to convict them. Assessing opportunities for cross-
examination involved exploring the proportion of witnesses that defense counsel were able to 
cross-examine in person, and trends over time. Sources of data examined include court statutes 
and rules of procedure and evidence, judgments and other official court documents, secondary 
academic materials, and interviews with court observers. 
 
Indicators of institutional power 
Institutional power was primarily explored by examining the role of states and IGOs in 
establishing and modifying the structural and procedural rules of international criminal tribunals. 
This involved analyzing the decision-making processes that generated the rules, and interpreting 
the reasoning behind state and IGO decisions as an outcome of political bargaining. Factors 
explored to assess the extent to which political influences shaped rule-making include references 
to actors’ conceptualizations of justice and its requirements—such as privileging the prosecution, 
and delegitimizing rivals and enemies—and references to the importance that rules reflect the 
                                                                                                                                                       
2011, www.legalaidreform.org/european-court-of-human-rights/item/203-ecthr-case-summary-natunen-v-
finland-31/03/2009. 
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requirements of such political goals as transitional justice and narrative construction. The role of 
judicial actors (primarily the prosecution and judges) was also examined to assess: their role in 
establishing, interpreting, and implementing rules; the manner in which the rules shaped their 
interaction with the defense; and the extent to which the rules structure permitted political 
influences on judicial actors to shape their interaction with the defense. 
Sources examined include official documents delineating decision-making debates, drafts of 
statutes and subsidiary rules documents, court legal and administrative documents, IGO 
documents, the memoirs of participants, interviews, and secondary literature analyzing rule-
making bargaining by participants and scholars. 
Political issues explored as possible influences on the extent of defense protections afforded 
by international tribunals are: transitional justice through ending impunity and protecting victim 
groups (and the related issue of the delegitimization or stigmatization of enemies); the 
construction of a historical narrative; and the length and cost of trials. Their negative effect on 
defense protections is examined through an exploration of the cooperation with courts provided 
by states, IGOs, and human rights NGOs with pre-trials investigations. Sources include court 
documents; media reports; the memoires of political and legal figures; secondary historical, 
legal, and political material; and interviews.  
Also examined was discourse by court and external actors on the trial process, including pre-
verdict references to the guilt of defendants to determine whether there was an effective 
presumption of innocence among external supporters of each court, and the acknowledgment of 
the importance of defense protections to trial legitimacy through a focus by external actors on the 
fairness of the court process. Sources analyzed include political and media debates on trials, and 
secondary historical material. The exploration of non-legal concerns demonstrates the continuing 
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role of external actors in diminishing the legitimacy of global legal governance through 
weakening the power of the defendant. 
 
Case studies 
The two cases of international tribunals explored in the research are the ICTY (from its creation 
in 1993 to 2016), and the ICC (from its establishment in 2002 until 2016). For a critical 
comparison of contemporary legal fairness legitimacy with that at the origins of international 
criminal justice, Chapter 3 also includes an examination of the research indicators at the IMT at 
Nuremberg (1945-6). 
The case study method advantage of case comparability is balanced by the disadvantage of 
the potential lack of representativeness of the cases for the larger set of units—in this case 
international criminal tribunals.164 Where there are few cases examined, as here, there is also a 
greater potential likelihood of selection bias, in this case by choosing courts with a particularly 
high or low level of legality and defense parity. In the environment of global legal governance, 
few criminal tribunals have ever existed, and this study attempts to compensate for the 
constraints of selection bias by choosing cases where there is significant variation in the potential 
causes and influences upon the dependent variables, including the source and context of the 
courts’ creation, and the legal basis of their establishment and maintenance.  
The ICTY, the first case, was the first international criminal tribunal established since the 
IMT and IMTFE, and has been the model for the later ad hoc, permanent, and hybrid criminal 
courts. As such, the ICTY has had enormous influence on the development of the post-Cold War 
                                                
164 John Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?” American Political Science Review 98, 
no. 2 (2004): 341-54. 
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international criminal justice system, and the level of legitimacy the system has been able to 
achieve through legality and defense parity. The tribunal also has the most comprehensive 
historical record for assessment of any international court. It is nearing the completion of its 
mandate, having finished most of its own prosecutions and transferring other cases to local 
courts, as part of its official Completion Strategy.165 As of October 2016, it has completed 102 
trials, compared to 75 for the Rwanda tribunal, nine for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and 
five for the ICC. Because of the length of time the tribunal has been in existence, and because 
various attorneys have already left (and have tended to be therefore more willing to speak 
openly), I was able to interview a significant number in relation to the ICTY. 
The ICC, the second case, is broadly perceived as exemplifying the future of global legal 
governance in relation to criminal justice.166 This is partly due to its permanent status—it is the 
first and to date the only international criminal tribunal that was not established to try suspects in 
relation to a single territorially- and/or temporally-bound conflict.167 It also enjoys a broad level 
of state support, although significantly less so in Africa, and virtually universal jurisdiction 
(literally universal in the sense that any situation can be legally referred to the court by the UN 
                                                
165 See, e.g., UN Security Council Resolution 1503, August 28, 2003, which split the prosecutorial duties 
for the ICTY and ICTR, and called on the prosecutors to end investigations and trials within a certain 
time-line; and Security Council Resolution 1534, March 26, 2004, which called on the ICTY and ICTR 
prosecutors to decide on transferring cases to “competent national jurisdictions” (para. 4). 
166 David J. Scheffer, “The International Criminal Court,” in Routledge Handbook of International 
Criminal Law, ed. William Schabas and Nadia Bernaz (London: Routledge, 2013), 67-84; Steven Ratner, 
Jason S. Abrams, and James L. Bischoff, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International 
Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 230-45; and 
Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, 2nd ed. (New York: The 
New Press, 2002), 346-92. 
167 For several years the African Union has moved towards establishing a criminal chamber within the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which is seen by some as a challenge to the authority of the 
ICC in Africa. See Chacha Bhoke Murungu, “Towards a Criminal Chamber in the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 9, no. 5 (2011): 1067-88. 
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Security Council). The ICC has only tried a handful of cases to date, meaning that its 
examination in the research perforce is able to rely less on case documents and other evidence of 
trial practice and the interaction of prosecution and defense attorneys with state and other outside 
agencies. This is especially true in comparison to the ICTY case. Nevertheless, the court was 
chosen because of its prominence in debates on the legitimacy and future of global legal 
governance. Defendant protections at the ICC have also been shaped considerably by the 
precedent of the creation and operation of the ICTY, and so its inclusion enables an exploration 
of the dynamic between courts on this issue. Fewer individuals were interviewed in relation to 
the ICC than the ICTY, partly due to the greater number of current and former legal staff 
members at the ICTY, creating a larger pool of potential interviewees, but also due to greater 
reluctance of ICC staff to be interviewed. 
An assessment of the research indicators in relation to the IMT is also included in Chapter 3 
in order to provide historical context for the more extensive assessment of the ICTY and ICC in 
Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. This enables a critical appraisal of the narrative of the progress of 
international criminal justice in terms of defense standards, and a sense of the continuity of the 
political concerns that continue to influence these standards, as well as to assess the impact of 
different contexts—political, legal, and historical—on these standards within international 
courts. The IMT is the first modern international criminal tribunal, and is attributed with creating 
international criminal justice, including through the establishment of major mass atrocity crimes 
(crimes against humanity and, effectively, genocide), and setting a precedent for the international 
prosecution of high-level suspected mass atrocity perpetrators. 
In the standard narrative of the development of international criminal justice, the IMT is 
claimed to have provided a flawed start with regards to trial fairness. Since the early 1990s, when 
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international courts were again created, this problem has been assumed to have largely 
disappeared, with contemporary courts characterized as legitimate in terms of trial fairness. 
However, the research demonstrates that, while enjoying far greater standards of defense 
protection than Nuremberg, current courts still exhibit some challenges with regard to legality, 
and especially significant problems with defense parity, and therefore are far weaker in terms of 
legitimacy through protection of defendants than is acknowledged within IR.  
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2 The state of research on the legitimacy of global legal governance 
This chapter explores the theoretical background to an analysis of the legitimacy of global legal 
governance institutions. The first section describes the normative need for such institutions to be 
legally legitimate; provides a critique of the international relations and international legal 
scholarship on the subject; and explains the place of the dissertation’s argument within it. In 
terms utilized by José Alvarez to describe approaches to the legitimacy of global governance, the 
argument is: institutional (focused on the effects of the structures, and associated processes, of 
international criminal courts), vertical (concerned with institutions’ relationship to individuals), 
and liberal (based on assessing the impact of institutions on procedural and substantive rights).1 
The chapter’s second section explains the limitations of the IR literature in understanding 
international law resulting from the literature’s jurisprudential underpinnings—primarily legal 
positivism and natural law. The section moves on to demonstrate the value to understanding 
international law’s legitimacy of a legal theory which: focuses on what makes law (and thereby 
legal norms) distinct from other forms of social ordering; and is contextualized to liberal legal 
systems. This approach is utilized in the research, as discussed in Chapter 1. The third section of 
Chapter 2 explores the value to the dissertation of literature on institutional power, and the goals 
and concerns of political actors in relation to international criminal justice that may impact the 
indicators of legitimacy explored in the research. 
The legitimacy of global governance 
                                                
1 José E. Alvarez, “Introducing the Themes: Introduction to Symposium on Democratic Theory and 
International Law,” Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 38 (2007): 159-74. 
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Especially since 1945, intergovernmental organizations, international laws, and their associated 
regimes2 have been developed by states in order to overcome practical cross-border problems of 
interstate cooperation, such as generating increased trade, smoothing financial transactions, and 
dealing with air and water pollution.3 States have also coordinated to create institutions and laws 
to generate social justice outcomes, such as improved civil and political human rights.4 This 
agglomeration of institutions, legal regimes, and processes has come to be called “global 
governance,” with governance understood in James Rosenau’s terms as “the maintenance of 
collective order, the achievement of collective goals, and the collective processes of rule through 
which order and goals are sought.”5  
Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson conceptualize “international institutions” as 
“merely one specific, historically contingent element” of global governance6—international law 
constitutes the other major structural component. The institutions, agents, and processes of 
global governance are seen in formal, treaty-based, international institutions, laws, and 
regimes—in the case of trade, for example, including the World Trade Organization and the 
                                                
2 Stephen Krasner defines international regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of 
behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for 
action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective 
choice.” See Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 186. 
3 Thomas G. Weiss, Global Governance: What? Why? Whither? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 8-26. 
Some have argued that global governance arrangements began to emerge as early as the fifteenth century: 
see e.g. Craig N. Murphy, “Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood,” International 
Affairs 76, no. 4 (2000): 789-90. 
4 Margot Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
5 James N. Rosenau, “Change, Complexity, and Governance in a Globalizing Space,” in Debating 
Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy, ed. Jon Pierre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 175. 
6 Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, “Global Governance to the Rescue: Saving International 
Relations?” Global Governance 20 (2014): 30. 
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).7 Global 
governance also consists of informal arrangements such as the Basel Committee,8 which 
provides a forum for international banking supervision by the heads of the central banks of 
various states.9 
Despite the dominance of states and IGOs, the individual has increasingly been addressed by 
global governance arrangements since 1945.10 This includes via international humanitarian and 
human rights legal protections,11 the ability to bring litigation against an individual’s government 
                                                
7 TRIPS constitutes Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, 15 April 1994. See the World Trade Organization, Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm. 
8 See Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs. 
9 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative 
Law,” Law and Contemporary Problems 68, no. 3 (2005): 15-62. 
10 Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann, and Matthias Goldmann, “Developing the Publicness of Public 
International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities,” in The Exercise of 
Public Authority by International Institutions: Advancing International Institutional Law, ed. Armin von 
Bogdandy, Rudiger Wolfrum, Jochen von Bernstorff, Philipp Dann, and Matthias Goldmann (New York: 
Springer, 2010), 3-32; Manuel Castells, “The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication 
Networks, and Global Governance,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 616 (2008): 78-93; Lloyd Axworthy, “Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People 
First,” Global Governance 7 (2001): 19-23; and Thomas G. Weiss, “Governance, Good Governance and 
Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges,” Third World Quarterly 21, no. 5 (2000): 795-
814. 
11 E.g. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, December 9, 1948; 
Geneva Conventions I-IV, August 12, 1949; Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, 
June 8, 1977; and Convention on the Rights of the Child, November 20, 1989. 
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for breach of rights,12 and prosecution for mass atrocity crimes through international criminal 
justice.13  
The term “global governance” is an “analytical tool” for understanding political change,14 
and this dissertation analyzes an underexplored source of the legitimacy of global legal 
governance—liberal legal principles—in order to further our understanding of the role of the 
individual in international relations since 1945. International criminal tribunals, as the primary 
institutions of international criminal justice, and a significant component of global legal 
governance, impinge upon most of the features of governance mentioned in Rosenau’s definition 
above: by pursuing the goals of order and justice by attempting to achieve punishment and 
deterrence through the processes of domestic criminal justice projected at the global level. The 
dramatic coercive implications for the individual of prosecution within global legal 
governance—incarceration, possibly for decades—require a basis of legitimacy that is distinct 
among global governance institutions.  
 
Legitimacy within IR 
Legitimacy as a concept in political science generally refers to the acceptance of the rules of 
institutions such that they are obeyed, or that they have the right to exercise authority. IR 
research on the legitimacy of institutions and law can be broadly divided into that which focuses 
                                                
12 E.g. individuals and other contracting states can pursue legal action against a government member of 
the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights which also accepts the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights. See European Court of Human Rights, “How the Court works,” 
www.echr.coe.int. 
13 Through prosecution for violations of international criminal law at international and “hybrid” 
(international-domestic) tribunals. See Richard J. Goldstone and Adam M. Smith, International Judicial 
Institutions: The Architecture of International Justice at Home and Abroad (London: Routledge, 2009). 
14 Weiss and Wilkinson, “Global Governance to the Rescue:” 29. 
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on normative standards15—whether an institution has the right to govern, or a law or legal system 
ought to be followed—and a descriptive, or sociological, approach16—whether that authority is 
accepted by its subjects or others. Normative and descriptive legitimacy are conceptually distinct 
but are often conceived of as coinciding, such as in the following definition of legitimacy from 
criminal psychology: “[people] believe that the decisions made and rules enacted by others are in 
some way right or proper and ought to be followed.”17 At other times the distinction in IR 
scholarship is clearer: “When people disagree over whether the WTO is legitimate, their 
disagreements are typically normative. They are not disagreeing about whether they or others 
believe that this institution has the right to rule; they are disagreeing about whether it has the 
right to rule.”18 In large part, “the concept of legitimacy, mercurial as it is, has remained under-
scrutinised, leading to confusion and misuse.”19 
A methodological weakness within much IR research on descriptive legitimacy is that it 
tends to be defined in terms of rule compliance: in which case legitimacy is conflated with 
                                                
15 E.g. Robert A. Dahl, “Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View,” in 
Democracy’s Edge, ed. Ian Shapiro and Casino Hacker-Cordón (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 19-36; and Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
16 E.g. Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” International Organization 53, no. 
2 (1999): 379-408; and Christian Reus-Smit, “International Crises of Legitimacy,” International Politics 
44, nos. 2-3 (2007): 157-74. 
17 Tom R. Tyler, “Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation,” Annual Review of 
Psychology 57 (2006): 376. 
18 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,” Ethics 
& International Affairs 20, no. 4 (2006): 405. Italics in original. 
19 C.A. Thomas, “The Concept of Legitimacy and International Law,” LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Papers 12/2013, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2013, 1 
www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2013-12_Thomas.pdf. Italics in original. 
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compliance, rather than generating it.20 Normative accounts used to rely purely on state consent 
as providing a legitimacy based on international legality, but it is now generally agreed that this 
provides an inadequate explanation.21 Normative accounts tend now to be broader, and either 
input-based—focusing on the principles expressed through processes,22 especially democratic 
value, such as accountability and transparency23—or output-based—relying on whether 
outcomes are, say, efficient, effective, or fair in distributive terms,24 or in problem-solving.25 
In social science, the most prominent analyst of legitimacy remains Max Weber, who 
described the basis of the authority of the modern state as rational-legal—stemming from the 
effectiveness and efficiency of impersonal rule-making bodies.26 While Weber thereby linked 
legitimacy with institutional processes, IR research on legal, political, and bureaucratic processes 
has tended to conceive of their legitimacy as stemming solely from that of the institutions that 
generate them. Such approaches tend to conflate the legitimacy of institutions with that of the 
procedures themselves, ignoring potential sources of legitimacy generated by the specific 
                                                
20 Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law, International Relations and Compliance,” 
in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons 
(London: Sage, 2002), 538-58. 
21 Daniel Bodansky, “Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations,” in Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, ed. Jeffrey L. Dunoff 
and Mark A. Pollack (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 333. 
22 E.g. Jens Steffek, “The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach,” European 
Journal of International Relations 9, no. 2 (2003): 249-75. 
23 E.g. Jan Wouters and Nicolas Hachez, “Transitional Societies and the Rule of Law: A Benchmarks 
Approach,” Working Paper No. 47, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Catholic University 
Leuven, March 2010. 
24 E.g. Daniel C. Esty, “Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law,” 
Yale Law Journal 115, no. 7 (2006): 1490-1562. 
25 E.g. Jason Ralph, “Anarchy is What Criminal Lawyers and Other Actors Make of It: International 
Criminal Justice as an Institution of International and World Society,” in Governance, Order, and the 
International Criminal Court: Between Realpolitik and a Cosmopolitan Court, ed. Steven C. Roach (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 133-53. 
26 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline in Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus 
Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 
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characteristics of these processes. Ian Clark, for example, in a book-length study of international 
legitimacy, demonstrates this conflation of institutional and procedural legitimacy when he 
defines procedural legitimacy as where “rules may be deemed appropriate…because they 
emanate from a ‘rightful source of authority.’”27 
 
The “legal legitimacy” of global legal governance 
This section identifies the dissertation’s approach to analyzing the legitimacy of global legal 
governance as one characterized by a focus on the relationship between institutions and 
individuals, as mediated by liberal individual rights. States increasingly transfer decision-making 
power to global governance institutions. This potentially weakens the quality of liberal 
democratic norms at the state level by removing the ability of citizens to shape policies as well as 
weakening such aspects of liberal democratic oversight as transparency and accountability.28 
This transfer also poses questions about the liberal quality of decision-making at the interstate 
level.29  
The justifications for the transfer of authority to global governance institutions and decision-
making to international legal forums has tended to revolve around issues of practical problem-
solving, largely ignoring issues of legitimacy. Yet—or perhaps because of this—Andrew 
Moravcsik claims that the extent of a deficit of liberal democratic norms in global governance “is 
emerging as one of the central questions—perhaps the central question—in contemporary world 
                                                
27 Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 18. 
28 David Held, “Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan Perspective,” 
in Global Governance and Public Accountability, ed. David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 
(Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 240-67. 
29 Michael Zürn, “Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems,” Government and Opposition 39, no. 2 
(2004): 260-87. 
 
 
 
 
88 
politics.”30 He argues, however, that there is no such deficit in global governance, and claims 
that those who argue otherwise are relying on an ideal of how liberal norms operate at the 
domestic level rather than how they work in practice.31 
Giandomenico Majone similarly argues that delegation of governance functions to IGOs that 
operate on the basis of expertise, such as the European Central Bank, do not suffer from a 
democratic deficit as such institutions even at the domestic level are expected to operate 
autonomously from liberal democratic control, and are more effective precisely because they are 
insulated from political influence over decision-making.32 Their legitimacy stems from technical 
expertise, not criteria of liberal norms. In a similar vein, Jens Steffek argues that, as global 
governance arrangements currently do not have the same level of policy-making and policy-
implementing authority as states, they do not need to be judged on a strict standard of democratic 
legitimacy.33  
This dissertation argues, in contrast, that as global legal governance institutions with criminal 
law jurisdiction exercise enormous power over individuals—with the potential to remove their 
liberty for decades—to acquire legitimacy such coercive capability requires justification through 
the operation of legal norms typically characteristic of liberal democratic states. Democratic 
deficit theorists identify two main types of weakness within global governance arrangements: 
                                                
30 Andrew Moravcsik, “Is There a ‘Democratic Deficit’ in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis,” 
Government and Opposition 39, no. 2 (2004): 336. This is evident, for example, in critiques of institutions 
for unequal power between states in the UN Security Council, the similar issue of lack of voting parity 
between member states of the IMF, and the weak accountability of the European Central Bank. 
31 Ibid: 336-63. 
32 Giandomenico Majone, “Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity,” European Law Journal 
8, no. 3 (2002): 319-39. 
33 Steffek, “The Legitimation of International Governance.” 
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sociological34 and institutional. The dissertation’s argument explores the latter, which concerns 
the democratic basis, or origin, of an institution—whether it was created through a democratic 
process (e.g. popular elections)—or whether it operates through democratic processes,35 
especially accountability, transparency, and engagement.36 José Alvarez identifies three main 
types of institutional arguments: ideological,37 horizontal,38 and vertical.39 The dissertation’s 
argument falls into the third category, which is explored below. 
                                                
34 Sociological approaches stem from several normative perspectives. First, “communitarian” approaches 
conceive of democracy as an expression of the general will. See Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness 
and Communicative Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, trans. 1990 [1983]); and James Bohman, 
Democracy across Borders: From Dêmos to Dêmoi (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007). Second, 
“liberal” approaches argue that legitimacy stems from a respect for fundamental human rights. See Johan 
Karlsson Schaffer, Andreas Føllesdal, and Geir Ulfstein, “International Human Rights and the Challenge 
of Legitimacy,” in The Legitimacy of International Human Rights Regimes: Legal, Political and 
Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Andreas Føllesdal, Johan Karlsson Schaffer, and Geir Ulfstein (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1-31. Third, “republican” approaches conceive of political 
legitimacy stemming from institutional arrangements that diminish domination. See the various 
contributions to Samantha Besson and José Luis Martí, eds., Legal Republicanism: National and 
International Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
35 E.g. Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
36 E.g. Glasius, “Do International Criminal Courts Require Democratic Legitimacy?” 
37 The ideological critique argues that the substantive goals pursued largely reflect the normative 
preferences of dominant states. See Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, 
Democracy, and The Critique of Ideology (Oxford University Press: New York, 2003). Such goals 
include free trade, the “Washington Consensus” approach of low government intervention in the domestic 
economy, and the promotion of equal civil and political rights above economic. 
38 Horizontal issues relate to the inequality between states in international decision-making fora. In 
addition to the privileged status of the P5 in the UN Security Council, Alvarez mentions the outsized 
decision-making role of wealthy shareholder states in powerful financial institutions such as the IMF and 
World Bank. However, Steve Charonovitz warns that it is inappropriate to project the idea of “one person, 
one vote” to the interstate level: states are collectivities which represent vastly different numbers of 
individuals and so providing an equal role in decision-making to China, with over one billion people, and 
one of the many states with under one million inhabitants is not democratic. See Steve Charnovitz, “The 
Emergence of Democratic Participation in Global Governance,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
10, no. 1 (2003): 45-77. According to Joseph Weiler, the consent of states to decisions which affect 
them—such as agreeing to treaties—which stems from the sovereign equality of states, the foundation 
stone of international politics, is at odds with the functioning of the democratic concept of “one person, 
one vote” in most democratic states, where decisions are made by some form of majority vote yet are 
binding on all citizens. See J.H.H. Weiler, “The Geology of International Law—Governance, Democracy 
and Legitimacy,” ZaöRV (Heidelberg Journal of International Law) 64 (2004): 547-62. 
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Vertical issues are concerned with the relationship between individuals and the governance 
arrangements that shape their lives. There are three main vertical democratic deficit arguments: 
in relation to representativeness,40 participation,41 and liberal. The latter, which Alvarez calls 
“substantive rights,”42 characterizes the nature of the dissertation’s argument. The liberal 
approach argues that the value of democracy is in its ability to protect fundamental substantive 
and procedural rights. These include due process rights for individuals accused of wrong-doing: 
for example, a prohibition on retroactive prosecution or punishment without legal protection for 
defendants. Note that while Alvarez calls this third vertical deficit a “substantive, not 
procedural”43 issue, some of the examples of rights he provides, including legality or non-
retroactivity (a core issue explored in the dissertation), arguably involve procedural rights as 
much as substantive ones. 
The place of criminal justice in liberal democracy has been little studied in recent democratic 
theory, which Melissa Williams states “is surprising insofar as much of the theory of democracy 
                                                                                                                                                       
39 José E. Alvarez, “Introducing the Themes: Introduction to Symposium on Democratic Theory and 
International Law,” Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 38 (2007): 159-74. Alvarez also notes 
that some problems with global governance may be attributable to all three forms of critique, such as 
some actions of the Security Council, which Craig Forcese argues constitute “hegemonic federalism.” See 
Craig Forcese, “Hegemonic Federalism: The Democratic Implications of the UN Security Council’s 
‘Legislative Phase,’” Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 38, no. 2 (2007): 175-97. 
40 Non-democratically elected institutions make significant decisions, including passing laws. Daniel Esty 
identifies these as issues of legitimate policy-making or “right process” in the administrative law context, 
known at the international level as “good governance,” including transparency and accountability. See 
Daniel C. Esty, “Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law,” Yale 
Law Journal 115, no. 7 (2006): 1490-1562. 
41 Citizens are not involved in deliberative decision-making processes, and so they lack transparency and 
public participation. John McGinnis, “Foreign to Our Constitution,” Northwestern University Law Review 
100, no. 1 (2006): 303-29; and Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, “The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law.” Note that lack of participation is identified by Esty as a lack of electoral 
representativeness. 
42 Natasha Affolder, “Democratising or Demonising the World Heritage Convention,” Victoria University 
of Wellington Law Review 38, no. 2 (2007): 341-61; and Forcese, “Hegemonic Federalism.” 
43 Alvarez, “Introducing the Themes:” 161. 
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concerns how shared norms become binding law, and where are shared norms more forcefully 
expressed or enforced than in the domain of criminal law?”44 She suggests the answers may lie in 
disagreement among democratic societies over the purposes of criminal justice: whether it is 
primarily punitive, restorative (for the victims), about creating order and stability, and/or 
rehabilitating offenders.45 
There is a significant and longstanding literature on the sources of legitimacy for criminal 
justice at the state level that can be applied to understanding international criminal justice, 
including the community justice approach associated with Emile Durkheim,46 and Max Weber’s 
formal-rational justice.47 Legal scholar Aaron Fichtelberg argues for taking an institutional, 
vertical, and liberal approach to understanding the legitimacy of the ICC, along the lines taken in 
the dissertation.48 The legitimacy value of liberal norms lies primarily in their ability to protect 
substantive and procedural rights, rather than in the nature of international courts’ establishment 
and consent,49 or the process for establishing a court’s jurisdiction over people.50 Fichtelberg 
                                                
44 Melissa S. Williams, “Criminal Justice, Democratic Fairness, and Cultural Pluralism: The Case of 
Aboriginal Peoples in Canada,” Buffalo Criminal Law Review 5, no. 2 (2002): 451. 
45 Ibid: 451-95. 
46 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, trans. George Simpson (New York: Macmillan, 
1933 [1893]). It argues that traditional penal justice represents “collective consciousness” and so requires 
a “demos” or culturally self-identifying community. Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick expand on 
Durkheim’s approach by arguing that law develops in three stages in society, characterized by elite 
coercion as well as the general will. See Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, Law & Society in Transition: 
Toward Responsive Law (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001 [1978]). 
47 Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Roth and Wittich. 
48 Fichtelberg, “Democratic Legitimacy and the International Criminal Court.” 
49 E.g. Glasius, “Do International Criminal Courts Require Democratic Legitimacy?” 44. 
50 E.g. Morris, “The Democratic Dilemma of the International Criminal Court.” 
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does not pursue this approach empirically,51 however, and does not identify specific rights that 
should be analyzed.  
 
The value of jurisprudence to understanding the legitimacy of law 
This section demonstrates the value of jurisprudence in examining the rights of defendants as an 
aspect of the legal legitimacy of international tribunals. First it highlights the drawbacks of the 
dominant approaches—natural law and especially legal positivism—for such a task. It then 
argues for the utility of an alternative jurisprudence, the legal-principles-based jurisprudence of 
Lon Fuller. 
Ronald Dworkin states that “[l]aw is a political concept…and…political concepts are 
concepts of value”—that is, law can only be constructed by reference to values.52 The 
jurisprudence that attempts to explain the value of legality, he argues, lies within three main 
schools, those based around the political values of “accuracy,” “efficiency,” and “fairness.”53 
First, natural law approaches perceive accuracy in law to the extent that its content conforms 
to previously established (religious or secular) standards of morality.54 Second, and in contrast, 
those in the legal positivist school argue, inter alia, that law promotes efficiency in the 
accomplishment of governments’ wishes, by enabling legal subjects to foresee government 
                                                
51 As Fichtelberg notes, at the time he was writing, no prosecutions had yet been completed at the ICC. 
Fichtelberg, “Democratic Legitimacy and the International Criminal Court:” 781. 
52 Ronald Dworkin, “Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy,” Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 24, no. 1 (2004): 19, 23. 
53 Ibid: 26. While not exclusively focusing on a single value, the three schools represent a core focus on a 
value as predominant in their understanding of law. 
54 Prominent examples of such natural law approaches include John Finnis, Natural Law & Natural 
Rights, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis 
(On the Law of War and Peace), trans. Francis W. Kelsey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925 [1625]). 
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demands and to adapt their behavior to it. According to positivist approaches, law is thereby 
conceptually distinct from morality—the law is solely what a sovereign decrees,55 or is 
determined by a constitutional rule established by ruling authorities.56 
Third, fairness as a value of legality refers to the role of law in securing political equality and 
a lack of arbitrariness in the exercise of coercive authority through adequate notice of the law’s 
requirements, consistency in applying legal standards, and equal treatment before the law. 
Dworkin argues that this approach describes his own theory of “law as integrity:” moral 
reasoning is intrinsic to the law—unlike in positivism—and is determined through principles of 
fairness in application of the law—unlike natural law, where the morality of law is determined 
by substance. Law includes not only substantive rules but “the principles that provide the best 
moral justification for those enacted rules,” which Dworkin calls “structuring fairness 
principles.”57 
Dworkin’s interpretivist approach shares a similarity of outlook with that of legal philosopher 
Lon Fuller. Both argue that moral reasoning is inherent to the law, is determined through 
principles of fair procedure—in the case of Fuller—and procedure and substantive morality—
Dworkin—and that these principles are justified by respect for, and the need to provide equal 
treatment for, all individuals. Fundamentally, they both conceive of the legal subject as 
occupying a privileged place in a legal system.58 
                                                
55 See especially Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government, ed. Ross Harrison (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, [1776] 1988); and John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1955 [1832]). 
56 Most prominently, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961). 
57 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 402, 411. 
58 According to Kristen Rundle, Fuller is distinguished from Dworkin in his emphasis on how the form 
that law takes, that of general rules, generates the reciprocal relationships that the morality of a legal 
system rests on. The generality of rules presupposes a conception of the legal subject as a responsible 
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However, Fuller’s approach differs from all three categories described by Dworkin. The 
value of legality, according to Fuller, lies partly in efficiency for legal authorities (as positivists 
claim) and that of moral value for legal subjects (as natural law claims). Unlike natural law 
approaches, however, Fuller argues that the morality of law stems not from legal outcomes, but 
from the dignity that legal subjects are afforded by their treatment as responsible agents by legal 
authorities (e.g. legislators, judges, and prosecutors). Fuller does not accept positivism’s 
conceptual separation of law and morality, and finds fault with its underappreciation of the role 
played by subjects within a legal system—they are active participants, not mere passive receivers 
of legal commands. 
Despite its flaws in terms of understanding the bases of law’s legitimacy, the jurisprudence in 
Dworkin’s first category, legal positivism, underlies much IR analysis of international law, 
especially neoliberal institutionalist approaches.59 The following sections explore the nature and 
limitations of positivism and natural law for exploring the legitimacy of international law in 
order to move the discussion to Fuller’s jurisprudence, which the dissertation argues is far more 
useful for exploring legitimacy in relation to global legal governance.  
                                                                                                                                                       
agent by the authorities that create and enforce the law, and not merely a passive receiver of legal 
commands. See Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon Fuller (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2012), 180, 189. The value of law as stemming, in Fuller’s conception, from the 
conception of legal subjects as inherently requiring treatment as responsible agents “is prior to Dworkin’s 
value of political integrity, or equality before the law, because Fuller’s speaks to the shape, content and 
presuppositions of law’s distinctive form in a way that Dworkin’s does not.” Also, “Fuller’s 
understanding of the value of legality can also be distinguished from Dworkin’s in how it directly 
addresses a question that Dworkin’s jurisprudence neglects; namely, the question of what makes law 
distinctive, that sets it apart, from other modes of social ordering.” See Rundle, Forms Liberate, 181. 
Italics in original. 
59 Martha Finnemore and Stephen Toope, “Alternatives to ‘Legalization’: Richer Views of Law and 
Politics,” International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001): 743-58. Neoliberal institutionalist approaches in 
IR tend to explain norms and law as rational solutions to collective action problems. See e.g. Robert 
Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Joseph Nye, “Nuclear 
Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes,” International Organization 41 (1987): 371-402. 
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Natural law 
Natural law60 has a long intellectual history, originating in ancient Greece,61 but had been largely 
discredited in Anglo-American legal circles by the nineteenth century, though it still informs the 
approach to international law of some constructivist and “English school” research in IR.62 Law 
is understood to be defined by its moral content. Obligation to obey human-made laws, and their 
legitimacy, stem from the extent to which the content of that law (generating substantive 
legitimacy) and the justice of a particular outcome (distributive fairness legitimacy) conform to 
the dictates of “natural” law. The latter derive from the idea that there is a higher law to human-
made laws, which contains moral standards discoverable through rational thought and that 
originate in the inherent nature of humans or in a deity.  
Natural law approaches argue, in their most extreme form, not only that law and values 
cannot be separated, but that rules are legal only when their content exhibits society’s, or 
universal, moral values. Theorist John Finnis argues more moderately that natural law acts as a 
                                                
60 Natural law was later incorporated into Christian thought by theologians such as Augustine of Hippo 
(354-430) and especially Thomas Aquinas (1225-74). From the seventeenth century onwards, however, 
natural law in European thought obtained an increasingly secular cast and is associated with the 
development of natural or human rights as the requirement of respect for the dignity of people as humans 
as self-evident truths—as stated in the 1776 American Declaration of Independence—and originates 
largely with the thought of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and the European Enlightenment. See Hugo 
Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace (Whitefish, Mont.: Kessinger Publishing, 2004 [1625]); and 
Denise Meyerson, Understanding Jurisprudence (New York: Routledge, 2007), 33. 
61 See, for example, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, Ind.: 
Hackett, 1999); Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Lander, Wyo.: The Aquinas Institute, 2012); and 
Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. David J. Hill (Rockville, Md.: Wildside Press: 2011). 
62 E.g. Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? 
English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004). See also Hedley Bull, “Natural Law and International Relations,” British Journal of 
International Studies 5, no. 2 (1979): 171-81. 
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guide to the justness of human-made laws.63 Contemporary approaches tend to understand 
certain aspects of international law, especially international humanitarian and human rights law, 
as embodying the values of the international society of states.64 Natural law also arguably 
provides the most effective legal justification for the posited existence of jus cogens international 
legal standards.65 
Natural law’s focus on the legitimacy-generating quality of the substantive content of 
international law is useful in relation to understanding human rights and humanitarian law, but is 
largely limited to areas with significant broad agreement on the value of the underlying rights. 
There is very little global agreement, for example, on many individual civil and political rights, 
as they conflict with local values and interests.  
 
Legal positivism 
While little concern with legitimacy was demonstrated in IR research during the Cold War, since 
then “there has been an explosion of interest, both among international lawyers and international 
relations scholars, in the legitimacy of international institutions.”66 However, less studied is what 
is distinctive about the law itself, which is arguably a result of a conflation of the legitimacy of 
law with that of institutions, and an underappreciation of the contribution of legal philosophers to 
understanding the nature of law and a legal system as a distinctive form of rule structure. 
                                                
63 John Finnis, Natural Law & Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
64 E.g. Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 11. 
Cassese sees these values expressed in such legal documents as the 1945 UN Charter, the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1970 UN Declaration on Friendly 
Relations. 
65 Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 35-9. 
66 Bodansky, “Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations,” 321-2. 
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Partly due to the Cold War dominance of structural realism in IR, which views international 
law as epiphenomenal, there has traditionally been an underappreciation in IR scholarship of the 
utility of jurisprudence to understanding international law.67 This is partly due to the long-term 
pre-eminence in international jurisprudence of the school of legal positivism, which defines law 
in terms of the form that a rule takes (e.g. a general order issued by a recognized legal authority), 
and contends that there is a complete conceptual separation between law and morality. This is 
not to state that positivists perceive no connection between law and morality—they acknowledge 
many. They argue that there is no necessary link—law and morality are distinct subjects, and law 
does not inherently generate legitimacy. 
In its original version, positivism claimed that rules are only law to the extent that they are 
backed by the coercive enforcement of a sovereign.68 The centrality of sovereign enforcement 
made legal positivism a poor approach to understanding international law, which is far more 
disparate than domestic law in its sources of creation and enforcement.69 However, a more 
sophisticated, mid-twentieth-century restatement of positivism by legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart 
has become prevalent among Anglo-American legal scholars.70 Hart views governments not as 
unbounded sovereigns, but as constrained by a “rule of recognition,” such as a constitution, that 
                                                
67 Ibid., 324. 
68 Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 [1776]); 
John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1955 [1832]); 
and Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Hackett, 1994 [1651]). The primary normative concern is the 
maintenance of internal order, and the source of obligation to obey is external to the legal subject—the 
threat of negative material consequences. 
69 This situation was not changed by the prominence—at least in Europe—of Hans Kelsen’s Continental 
school version of positivism, which relies on the presupposition that a “Grundnorm” or higher legal norm, 
such as a constitution, provides validity to and thereby an obligation to obey law. See Hans Kelsen, Pure 
Theory of Law, trans. Max Knight (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1967).  
70 Brian Leiter, “Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered,” Ethics 111 (2001): 278-301. See 
especially, Hart, The Concept of Law, and Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1983). 
 
 
 
 
98 
delineates the authority that legal institutions may exercise.71 Law is a system of rules, consisting 
of primary rules, which impose duties on their subjects, and secondary rules, which provide the 
procedures for the former’s creation, interpretation, and implementation.72 
A significant problem with applying legal positivism to understanding international law is 
that the former is an “analytical” approach, not dependent upon a particular social or historical 
context.73 Hart’s positivism embodies a “pretention to universality…a model purportedly 
applicable to legal phenomena whenever and wherever they arise.”74 He effectively makes a 
false analogy to natural science, claiming to establish a theory that applies broadly across 
political, social, and historical contexts in scientific-law-like ways, exhibiting the “neglect of 
history and…relentless presentism” of which Andrew Hurrell has accused rationalist IR.75  
                                                
71 The existence of secondary rules distinguishes a legal system from what Hart called “primitive” legal 
communities, which only have primary, constraining, norms, without rules to determine which norms 
generate a legal obligation and which are purely social. 
72 The source of obligation to the law in this account is not sanction—the previous positivist view—but 
subjects’ “internal point of view” towards the law, which generates duty to obey the law based on their 
acceptance of the rule of recognition. The theory of obligation here is thereby sociological, rather than 
based on attitudes towards political authority. The weakness here is in Hart’s vague and fluctuating 
explanation of the reason for the internal point of view to generate obligation. He variously mentions that 
it can be tradition, self-interest, and socialization, but there is no actual theory of how this—especially 
self-interest—generates obligation. Hart also originally states that citizens in general accept the internal 
point of view, but later claimed it was only legal officials, especially judges. This later move is built on 
the claimed institutional legitimacy of courts, which conflates the legitimacy of law with that of 
institutions. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 88-
91, 100-123; Kenneth I. Winston, “Three Models for the Study of Law,” in Rediscovering Fuller, ed. 
Willem J. Witteveen and Wilbren van der Burg (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999), 60-1 
and 65; and “Introduction,” in Lon L. Fuller, The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L. 
Fuller, ed. Kenneth Winston (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1981), 21. 
73 Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd ed., 239. 
74 Nicola Lacey, “Philosophy, Political Morality, and History: Explaining the Enduring Resonance of the 
Hart-Fuller Debate,” New York University Law Review 83 (2008): 1078. 
75 Andrew Hurrell, “Foreword to the Third Edition,” in The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in 
World Politics, Hedley Bull (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), xiii. 
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In addition, constructing such a purely conceptual, or analytical, jurisprudence of law is a 
futile task as it ignores the inherently normative dimension of law.76 The conceptual separation 
of law and morality demonstrates a confusion about the nature of law, as understanding law and 
its implementation by courts requires interpretation with reference to the purposes of legislators. 
Therefore understanding the “is” of law requires an incorporation of the “ought”: “Facts cannot 
be divorced from values.”77  
Nevertheless, Hart’s positivism is accepted by most Western international lawyers, who 
extrapolate a legal sources doctrine that relies upon formal validity—a rule is law if it is created 
by states through agreed formal processes.78 The best-known attempt to meld Hart’s positivism 
with IR institutionalism is the “legalization” approach of Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, 
Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal.79 Legalization is posited as the 
institutional development of a norm along three dimensions: obligation (the extent to which a 
rule creates binding commitments); precision (the level of clarity and specificity); and delegation 
(the extent to which authority has been granted to credible third parties to interpret, implement, 
or enforce). An increase along any dimension indicates a “hardening,” or bindingness, of law. 
                                                
76 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 2-10. 
77 Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 228. 
This attitude towards law originates in the United States with eminent federal judge Learned Hand, who 
stated that “judges…must engage in the purposive interpretation of legal rules.” See Edward H. Levi, An 
Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 104. 
78 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional 
Account (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10. 
79 Kenneth Abbot et al., “The Concept of Legalization,” International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 401-
19.  
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Legalization has been significant in “communicat[ing] the message that international legal 
phenomena were worthy of sustained scholarly attention by political scientists.”80  
Legalization is limited, however, by its socially-weak positivist understanding of law as 
determined purely by form: it ignores the centrality of the social dynamic between legal 
authorities and subjects in constituting law. Legalization also undervalues customary law and the 
practice of IGOs, focuses on law as outcome to the neglect of process, and provides an 
inaccurate characterization of the elements of international law. While the legalization dimension 
of precision is a useful indicator of law, obligation—indicated in the research by treaty 
language—conflates state consent with a felt sense of obligation (legitimacy), and delegation 
conflates institutional with legal authority.81 
The legal positivist emphasis on state consent marries well with the core assumptions of 
institutionalist and rational choice approaches to IR, which view international law as resulting 
from interest-based bargaining by states.82 By claiming that compliance results from instrumental 
calculations—a logic of consequences83—and not a felt sense of obligation, rationalist IR 
approaches, however, do not distinguish what is distinctive about legalized rules: they perceive 
little or no effective difference in the international system between social and legal norms. They 
                                                
80 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, “International Law and International Relations: Introducing 
an Interdisciplinary Dialogue,” in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International 
Relations: The State of the Art, ed. Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 9. 
81 Finnemore and Toope, “Alternatives to ‘Legalization.’” 
82 E.g. George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, “Is the Good News about Compliance Good 
News about Cooperation?” International Organization 50, no. 3 (1996): 379-406. 
83 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “Rules and the Institutionalization of Action,” in Rediscovering 
Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, ed. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (New York: 
Free Press, 1989), 21-38. 
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also tend to conflate law with institutions, generally assuming that law is irrelevant without 
enforcement.84 
The following subsection explains how an alternative approach to understanding law—that 
of Lon Fuller—can provide greater insight than the dominant jurisprudence into the legitimacy 
of global legal governance. The rest of the current section explains Fuller’s critique of legal 
positivism. Fuller was involved in the 1950s and 1960s in a pubic debate with Hart over how 
best to understand law.85 The former argued that the enterprise of analytical jurisprudence is 
futile, as law is always constructed within a particular social and political environment that 
shapes its purposes and functioning.86 
Contemporary positivism, Fuller claimed, also disregards the issue of the abuse of law, 
ignores the reciprocities (between legal authorities and subjects) necessary to maintain a 
functioning legal system, and fails to achieve its aim—of moving positivism away from the 
conceptualization of law as rules imposed through coercive enforcement. Without significant 
limitations on the power of legal authorities, law is still merely a “one-way projection of 
authority”87—the position of positivism since its origins. There is no “suggestion that the 
citizen’s voluntary cooperation in obeying law…must be ‘matched by the corresponding 
cooperative effort on the part of government.’”88 Within positivist conceptions of law, only the 
                                                
84 Finnemore and Toope, “Alternatives to ‘Legalization.’” 
85 H.L.A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harvard Law Review 71, no. 4 
(1958): 593-629; Lon L. Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart,” Harvard 
Law Review 71, no. 4 (1958): 630-72. See also Lacey, “Philosophy, Political Morality, and History”; and 
the various contributions to Peter Cane, ed., The Hart-Fuller Debate in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2010). 
86 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 95-151. 
87 Ibid., 215-6. 
88 Rundle, Forms Liberate, also quoting Fuller, Morality of Law, 216. 
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attitudes of legal authorities towards the law are significant to the functioning of a legal 
system—the attitudes of legal subjects are irrelevant.89 
This overemphasis on legal authorities is due to a focus on law to the neglect of its purpose—
arguing that laws and the goals of legislators in creating them can be distinguished without 
negatively affecting our understanding of the nature of law. In contrast, Fuller defined law as 
“the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules,”90 which captures his 
emphasis on both the purpose and practice of law. This understanding of the inherent normative 
quality of law adds a missing dimension to existing conceptions of the legitimacy of legal 
institutions as a form of social ordering:91 the interaction between legal participants—legal 
authorities and subjects—is a component of the law itself.  
 
Lon Fuller: A political jurisprudence of democracy 
Fuller is the initiator and most well-known advocate of the American school of “process” 
jurisprudence.92 This attempts to understand legal decision-making not as a result of deductive 
logic or the attitudes of legal officials, as previous approaches in American jurisprudence had 
                                                
89 Indeed Hart claims that subjects may be “deplorably sheeplike” in their attitude towards obedience to 
the legal system. See Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd ed., 117. 
90 Fuller, Morality of Law, 106. 
91 Kenneth I. Winston, “Introduction,” in Lon L. Fuller, The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays 
of Lon L. Fuller, ed. Kenneth I. Winston (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1981), 23. In contrast 
natural law’s focus is on the normative quality of the substance of laws, not legal process. 
92 Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 205-
99. The school’s intellectual foundations are in the work of prominent early twentieth-century jurists John 
Chipman Gray, Roscoe Pound, Benjamin Cardozo, and John Dickinson. See John Chipman Gray, The 
Nature and Sources of the Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916 [1909]); Roscoe Pound, An 
introduction to the Philosophy of Law (London: Yale University Press, 1922); Benjamin N. Cardozo, The 
Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1921); and John Dickinson, 
Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1927). 
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done, but as a result of properties inherent to law itself. Fuller is considered “one of the most 
influential thinkers on jurisprudence outside America,”93 but his jurisprudence has received 
relatively little attention in his own country—where he is known in law schools for his work on 
contracts law, and more recently as an “intellectual father” of the alternative dispute resolution 
field.94  
Fuller rejects the positivist position that law is conceptually distinct from morality, arguing 
that adherence to certain principles of legality embodies moral value in restricting the arbitrary 
and abusive exercise of power; and in thereby making morally good outcomes—such as the 
protection of human rights—more likely.95 These principles of legality are those usually 
associated with a “thin” or formal conception of the rule of law.96 Indeed, Fuller is frequently 
cited within such research as the identifier of the quintessential requirements of the rule of law, 
such as clear, unambiguous laws which cannot be applied retroactively.97  
However, to function effectively, the rule of law requires, according to Fuller, a “cooperative 
effort,”98 characterized by the “interlocking role expectations”99 of legal-subject compliance with 
                                                
93 Willem J. Witteveen, “Rediscovering Fuller: An Introduction,” in Rediscovering Fuller, ed. Witteveen 
and Van der Burg, 21. 
94 Helen H.L. Cheng, “Beyond Forms, Functions and Limits: The Interactionism of Lon L. Fuller and Its 
Implications for Alternative Dispute Resolution,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 26, no. 2 
(2013): 257. 
95 Philosopher John Rawls also argues that such procedural constraints are central to a just society. John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambidge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 238. 
96 Amichai Magen, “The Rule of Law and Its Promotion Abroad: Three Problems of Scope,” Stanford 
Journal of International Law 45, no. 1 (2009): 51-115; and Thomas Carothers, “The Rule of Law 
Revival,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 2 (1998): 95-106. 
97 David Dyzenhaus, “Aspiring to the Rule of Law,” in Protecting Human Rights: Instruments and 
Institutions, ed. Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy, and Adrienne Stone (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 195-209; Evan Fox-Decent, “Is the Rule of Law Really Indifferent to Human Rights?” Law 
and Philosophy 27, no. 6 (2008): 533-81; and Lacey, “Philosophy, Political Morality, and History.” 
98 Fuller, Morality of Law, 219. 
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legal prohibitions, matched by authorities’ compliance with constraining legal principles.100 
Therefore his approach is far more than a mere checklist of rule of law criteria, as it has often 
been perceived, as implicit within these principles is a certain conception of the legal subject—as 
a responsible agent, treated with dignity by legal authorities.101 
To the extent that legal principles exhibit procedural fairness, they generate a “legal 
morality,” which Fuller described as “that special morality that attaches to the office of law-giver 
and law-applier, that keeps the occupants of that office, not from murdering people, but from 
undermining the integrity of the law itself.”102 This argument was underappreciated at the time of 
writing partly due to the author’s own limited exploration of the broader underlying legal theory 
in most of his work. In a book of essays published shortly after his death, The Principles of 
Social Order, Fuller laid out his theory in more detail,103 and a few legal scholars have attempted 
to clarify his arguments.104  
                                                                                                                                                       
99 This combines the phrases “interlocking expectations” and “role expectations,” in Fuller, Morality of 
Law, 217, 218. 
100 A common misunderstanding of Fuller involves perceiving his principles of legality as a mere 
checklist for identifying law or the rule of law. This overlooks the far more important issue, which is that 
these principles exist and are adhered to by lawmakers (to the extent that they are) because of “the 
distinctive kind of relationship between power and those subject to it” that constitutes a democratic legal 
system.” Rundle, Forms Liberate, 10. 
101 Ibid., 92. 
102 Lon L. Fuller, “A Reply to Professors Cohen and Dworkin,” Villanova Law Review 10, no. 4 (1965): 
660. This type of approach goes back to sixth-century religious scholar Bishop Isidore of Seville. See 
Witteveen, “Rediscovering Fuller,” 29; and Robert Henle, “Principles of Legality: Qualities of Law—Lon 
Fuller, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Isidore of Seville,” American Journal of Jurisprudence 39, no. 1 (1994): 
47-70. It has also increasingly been explored from a social psychology perspective in relation to the 
American criminal justice system since the late 1980s. See especially the foundational work of Tom R. 
Tyler, including What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal 
Procedures (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1987), Why People Obey the Law (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), and Tom R. Tyler ed., Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International 
Perspectives (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007). 
103 Fuller, Principles of Social Order. 
104 See Rundle, Forms Liberate; Jeremy Waldron, “Why Law—Efficacy, Freedom, or Fidelity?” Law and 
Philosophy 13, no. 3 (1994): 259-84, and the other contributors to this Special Issue on Lon Fuller; 
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While institutions are necessary for the creation, implementation, and enforcement of law, 
legal positivists, and rationalist IR scholars, fail to address what is distinct about legal 
institutions—as a result of the particular nature and qualities of law. Legal obligation, in Fuller’s 
account, is owed not to legal institutions per se, but to the legal system, stemming from the 
extent to which the institutions conform to procedural fairness standards. Legal institutions are 
conceived of as the social agencies of legal procedure.105 
In this approach, being a subject in a liberal legal system means being “a subject of law,” not 
being “subject to the direction of another.”106 Legal subjects are conceptualized by the system as 
possessing “agency”: the ability to adapt to general rules, which create a “relatively stable 
reciprocity of expectations” between subjects, as long as authorities adhere to legal principles 
which generate and sustain that stability.107 This presents a similar conceptualization of the legal 
subject to that of natural law philosopher John Finnis when he states, quoting the 1779 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, “Individuals can only be selves—i.e. have the ‘dignity’ of 
being ‘responsible agents’—if they are not made to live their lives for the convenience of others 
but are allowed and assisted to create a subsisting identity across a ‘lifetime.’”108 
Fuller’s approach therefore provides a more valuable conceptual vehicle for exploring the 
legitimacy of global legal governance than traditional approaches to law. It argues that law is 
distinct from a simple exercise of hierarchical power, for three main reasons: law’s structure as 
                                                                                                                                                       
Willem J. Witteveen and Wilbren van der Burg, eds., Rediscovering Fuller (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 1999); and David Luban, “The Rule of Law and Human Dignity: Reexamining Fuller’s 
Canons,” Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 10-29, May 2010. 
105 Lon L. Fuller, “Freedom: A Suggested Analysis,” Harvard Law Review 68, no. 8 (1955): 1312. 
106 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 134. Italics in original. 
107 Fuller, Morality of Law, 209. 
108 John Finnis, Natural Law & Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 272. 
Italics in original. A similar approach is also presented in Nigel Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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general rules in a liberal legal system; the relationship between lawmakers and legal subjects that 
law’s structure requires; and the centrality of legal practice and constraints on lawmaking power 
to the legitimacy of a legal system. The third issue is the basis of the argument in Chapter 1, and 
is explained there. The first two issues are explored below as they relate to understanding a legal 
system’s legitimacy. 
First, the political nature of Fuller’s jurisprudence has been largely ignored by legal 
scholars.109 Yet it is central to his conception of law, which argues that legal practice can be an 
important source of legitimacy in a liberal legal system. This contextualization, and taking into 
account the purpose of law in such a system, are essential to understanding the legitimacy of law. 
That purpose is to provide the freedom that enables subjects to interact effectively. This 
approach relies on a positive conception of liberty as “freedom to” achieve a purpose, as opposed 
to the more limited “freedom from” interference in one’s choices that John Stuart Mill 
advocated.110 The latter provides a poor understanding of the freedom that matters to most 
people because it is an individualistic and asocial idea of freedom as personal autonomy, 
whereas a broader, more realistic understanding of freedom as a component of the liberal quality 
of global legal governance is that which embodies social interaction—which requires public 
institutions to sustain.  
                                                
109 Dan Priel, “Lon Fuller’s Political Jurisprudence of Freedom,” Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, part 
of a symposium on “The Morality of Law at 50,” Osgoode CLPE Research Paper No. 55/2013 (2014): 1-
27. 
110 Fuller, “Freedom: A Suggested Analysis.” See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York, Pearson, 
[1859] 2006). 
 
 
 
 
107 
The purpose of public institutions, including those that constitute the legal system, is to 
generate the conditions for a social form of freedom.111 The purpose of law is to “provid[e] the 
citizenry with a sound and stable framework for their interactions with one another, the role of 
government being that of standing as a guardian of the integrity of this system.”112 The purpose 
of law is not—as argued by positivists—to direct “other persons how to accomplish tasks set by 
a superior.”113 
In Fuller’s understanding, the structure or form that law takes in order to fulfill this purpose 
is that of “governance through general rules.”114 The property of generality indicates that law 
permits or prohibits a type of conduct, rather than applying solely to a particular case. The 
generality of law means that it provides legal subjects with a “baseline for self-directed action”—
law is not a set of detailed instructions by authorities directing subjects in order to achieve 
specific goals.115  
This moves the analysis to the second feature of Fuller’s approach: the reciprocity between 
authorities and subjects which characterizes liberal legal practice. Reciprocity, along with 
generality, mediates the power of legal authorities by requiring a relationship with subjects that 
acknowledges their agency and dignity as free individuals. While the understanding of law’s 
                                                
111 Fuller goes on to state: “When we discuss freedom as a problem of law, or politics, or economics, or 
ethics, we are really addressing ourselves to the question: How can the freedom of human beings be 
affected or advanced by social arrangements, that is, by laws, customs, institutions, or other forms of 
social order that can be changed or preserved by purposive human actions?” Ibid.: 1309. 
112 Fuller, Morality of Law, 210. This has been ignored by positivist critics of Fuller, who tend not to be 
interested in issues of the practice of law and roles. See Rundle, Forms Liberate, 107-8. 
113 Fuller, Morality of Law, 210. 
114 Ibid. The phrase is from David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 110, who concisely captures Fuller’s idea. 
115 Fuller, Morality of Law, 210. 
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structure as general rules is widely accepted in jurisprudence,116 one of Fuller’s key original 
claims is that generality distinguishes law from other forms of social interaction and control—
such as the orders of a superior to a subordinate in a hierarchical authority relationship.  
Law in a system of liberal democratic governance is portrayed by legal positivists as 
emphasizing the role of “superiors” to the neglect of “subordinates”—terms which apply to 
giving orders, but not to legal process. To be effective, general rules instead require a reciprocal 
relationship between legal authorities and subjects due to the onus law places on subjects to 
understand its requirements: “law is a kind of governance that works by treating subjects as 
capable of altering their conduct because they grasp that there is a rule with which they are 
expected to comply.”117 Generality in a liberal legal system therefore requires an acceptance by 
authorities that legal subjects have the responsible agency to conform to the requirements of law 
without specific controlling guidance. 
Kristen Rundle describes Fuller’s conception of the legal subject as an agent as “a person 
‘capable of purposive action,’ in possession of her capacities, and who is to be regarded as an 
end in herself. An agent, therefore, is more than someone simply capable of responding to 
direction by legal authorities, even if that direction is entirely favourable to her. She is instead a 
bearer of dignity.”118 Law does not act upon the legal subject as an imposition, but inherently 
requires the subject be conceived of as a dignified agent and requires forbearance on the part of 
legal authorities in the form of certain legal principles that enable general rules to be effective 
while also acknowledging the agency and dignity of legal subjects. To embody liberal legal 
                                                
116 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 9. 
117 Benjamin C. Zipursky, “The Inner Morality of Private Law,” The American Journal of Jurisprudence 
58, no. 1 (2013): 35. 
118 Rundle, Forms Liberate, 10, quoting Fuller, “Freedom:” 1305, 1307. 
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standards, the exercise of legal authority requires an attitude towards legal subjects characterized 
by “a sense of trusteeship,”119 which is “the duty of the lawmaker to show respect for the agency 
of legal subjects.”120 
The relationship between legal participants—authorities and subjects—is fundamental to 
understanding law, and an effective legal theory needs to maintain an equal focus on the role and 
responsibilities of both groups. Law is a social process, generated and sustained by 
communication and interactional expectancies between law-makers and law’s subjects.121 In a 
context of liberal governance lawmakers are constrained in their exercise of power and legal 
subjects are not mere obedient sheep: while subjects are expected to comply with the law, 
authorities are reciprocally expected by subjects to adhere to legal principles that are intrinsic to 
law as a distinct form of social ordering, and that provide a constraint on lawmaking and 
application. A legal system is legitimate to the extent that legal authorities adhere to these 
principles—from which the research dependent variables of legality and defense parity, 
discussed in Chapter 1, are derived. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
119 Fuller, Morality of Law, 42. 
120 Jonathan Crowe, “Between Morality and Efficiency: Reclaiming the Natural Law Theory of Lon 
Fuller,” Jurisprudence 5, no. 1 (2014): 117. 
121 This idea is also associated with eighteenth-century French philosopher Montesquieu, and was later 
taken up by nineteenth-and-twentieth-century German sociologist Georg Simmel, who was a significant 
influence on Fuller. See Charles de Montesquieu, Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold 
Samuel Stone, The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989 [1748]); and Georg 
Simmel, On Individuality and Social Forms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972). 
 
 
 
 
110 
The legal legitimacy of global legal governance 
A few international legal scholars have specifically acknowledged the role of procedural criteria 
of legitimacy that rely on the nature of law itself—most prominently Thomas Franck.122 A 
handful of legal scholars have also begun to utilize Fuller’s approach to understand international 
law.123 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope rely on Fuller’s conceptualization of and criteria of law 
in assessing the legitimacy of international laws relating to climate change, torture, and the use 
of force.124 Nevertheless, the authors apply all of his criteria, without regard to their 
appropriateness for analyzing international law, and in a non-systematic fashion, leading to an 
imprecise and inadequate assessment of legal process legitimacy in the areas they examine. 
There has been little acknowledgment of the relevance of Fuller’s conception of law by IR 
and international law scholars to an understanding of international criminal justice, where it has 
arguably greater salience.125 Two legal philosophers have done so, Larry May and David Luban. 
May has made the normative argument that a more complete adherence to Fuller’s principles 
would provide an ethically minimalist middle ground between legal positivism and natural 
                                                
122 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990). Two of Franck’s criteria of legitimate law-making and -application overlap with Fuller’s. 
“Determinacy” is rule clarity and specificity, generated by legal texts and authoritative, especially 
judicial, interpretations. “Coherence” is the consistency, as opposed to arbitrariness or selective national 
interest, in implementation. Nevertheless, Franck’s understanding of law is positivist, relying largely on 
treaty law, and one of his criteria (“adherence”) relies on Hart’s “rule of recognition,” which is difficult to 
apply at the international level. 
123 E.g. Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law; and Jan Klabbers, 
“Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law,” No Foundations: Journal of Extreme Legal 
Positivism 5 (April 2008): 84-112. Klabbers utilizes Fuller to explore a theory to identify valid sources of 
international law. 
124 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law. They discuss the limitations of the 
dominant jurisprudential underpinnings of IR scholarship and demonstrate that Fuller’s conceptualization 
can be applied to understanding international law. 
125 This is especially curious as Fuller’s criteria apply particularly to criminal law, which, as he stated, is 
“most obviously and directly concerned with shaping and controlling human conduct”—the primary 
purpose of law in the domestic context and arguably of international criminal justice. See Fuller, Morality 
of Law, 59. 
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law.126 Luban has made a brief and nonsystematic attempt at an empirical argument along these 
lines.127 In contrast, in IR research on the legitimacy of international criminal law and justice, the 
focus has been on the output of courts, including via analyses of the number of trials and 
prosecutions, the cost, and expediency of trials, and the broad institutional legitimacy of courts—
that is, non-legal institutional issues such as autonomy.128 There has been little exploration of the 
legitimacy of legal practice within IR research on global legal governance. 
 
The role of power in understanding legal fairness legitimacy  
This section analyzes the literature on the role of politics and political actors in shaping 
international criminal justice. It also describes how the concept of institutional power provides a 
useful analytical tool for assessing the effect of rule-making on the legal fairness of international 
tribunals.  
Juridical actors in liberal polities—especially judges and prosecutors—often claim a position 
known as “legalism:” that their legal decision-making is purely the result of legal considerations, 
                                                
126 Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005); “International Criminal Law and the Inner Morality of Law,” in The Hart-Fuller Debate in 
the Twenty-First Century, ed. Peter Cane (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 79-96; and Global Justice and 
Due Process (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
127 David Luban, “Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International 
Criminal Law,” in The Philosophy of International Law, ed. Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 569-88. 
128 Jason Ralph, “Anarchy is What Criminal Lawyers and Other Actors Make of It: International Criminal 
Justice as an Institution of International and World Society,” in Governance, Order, and the International 
Criminal Court: Between Realpolitik and a Cosmopolitan Court, ed. Steven C. Roach (New York: 
Oxford University Press), 133-53; and Erik Voeten, “International Judicial Independence,” in 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations, ed. Dunoff and Pollack, 
421-44. 
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and not affected by political influences.129 Gary Bass argues that this attitude is also held by 
juridical actors at international trials.130 Rachel Kerr argues that while law and politics influence 
each other at the ICTY, politics does not affect the courtroom131—and thereby does not 
undermine the legal fairness of trials. Kerr, and many legal actors themselves, demonstrate an 
inadequate appreciation that political decisions taken outside the courtroom shape the dynamic 
between the defense and prosecution inside, especially at the international level. 
Realists and neoliberal institutionalists argue that powerful states tend to exert significant 
political influence over international criminal tribunals. Realists claim that such organizations are 
dominated by states in order to facilitate the achievement of their—largely military and security-
related—interests, and that courts enjoy little autonomy.132 Neoliberal institutionalists tend to 
argue that international courts, while not completely controlled by powerful states, are subject to 
the material influence of members and are likely to be sidelined by states when they are 
perceived as not useful in achieving collective goals, such as the delegitimization of rivals.133 
                                                
129 Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1986). 
130 Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 7-8. 
131 At least during the ICTY’s first 8-10 years of operation—the time span of her research. Kerr, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 3.  
132 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 
3 (1994-5): 5-49. They also argue that if they had autonomy international courts would be ineffective. See 
Jack Goldsmith, “The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court,” University of Chicago law Review 
70, no. 1 (2003): 89-104; and John R. Bolton, “The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal 
Court from America’s Perspective,” Law and Contemporary Problems 64, no. 1 (2001): 167-80. 
133 Kenneth Abbot and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 1 (1998): 3-32. 
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According to David Bosco, in discussing the ICC, “this understanding yields two likely patterns 
of major-power behavior towards…court[s]: marginalization and control.”134 
There is little exploration by IR scholars of the issue of political influence on the fairness of 
trials through the lens of the protection of defendants’ legal rights. Nevertheless, research has 
explored more broadly how political goals, such as transitional justice and historical narrative 
construction, have shaped the operation of international tribunals, and this research is relevant to 
the current study. 
First, as a transitional justice mechanism, courts have been argued to aid reconciliation and 
post-conflict peacebuilding.135 Others have been critical of this role, partly because international 
courts mediate between concern with the rights of victims and those of criminal defendants.136 
There is a potential conflict in the protection regime built into the nature of criminal law: the 
function of substantive international criminal law is the protection of the right of all individuals, 
depending upon the context, against certain forms of egregious bodily harm, while that of 
procedural criminal justice is the protection of the rights of defendants.137 This issue is evident at 
the domestic level, but scholars point to exacerbating factors at the international level, such as 
the utilization of trials to stigmatize states’ military and political enemies and rivals, and the 
                                                
134 David Bosco, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics (New 
York: Oxford university Press, 2014), 11. 
135 Payam Akhavan, “Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?” 
The American Journal of International Law 95, no. 1 (2001): 7-31; and Kieran McEvoy, “Beyond 
Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice,” Journal of Law and Society 34, no. 
4 (2007): 411-40. 
136 Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, “Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the 
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation,” Human Rights Quarterly 24, no. 3 (2002): 573-639. 
137 Kenneth S. Gallant, “Politics, Theory and Institutions: Three Reasons Why International Criminal 
Defence is Hard, and What Might be Done about One of Them,” Criminal Law Forum 14 (2003): 324. 
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related concern of states not wishing to be seen to be aiding criminal defendants publically 
stigmatized as war criminals.138 
Second, states and legal actors at international courts, including judges and prosecutors, have 
argued that such courts perform a valuable historical narrative construction function by making 
denial of atrocities more difficult to sustain, and thereby enabling reconciliation on the basis of 
acknowledgment of past wrongs.139 Others have argued that this function interferes with legal 
fairness.140 For example, Hannah Arendt contends that courts’ political function in constructing 
history means they become political theater and risk undermining the legitimacy of trials by 
diminishing the rights of defendants,141 including by limiting the ability of high-profile political 
defendants to speak.142 International trials ultimately risk becoming show trials.143 
Another issue potentially affecting legal fairness for defendants is the lack of consensus over 
what constitutes human rights and how it can be pursued through international criminal justice. 
This has generated multiple narrative frameworks and discourses, including those of universal 
                                                
138 Frédéric Mégret, “Practices of Stigmatization,” Law and Contemporary Problems 76 (2014): 287-318. 
139 Tim Meijers and Marlies Glasius, “Expression of Justice or Political Trial? Discursive Battles in the 
Karadžić Case,” Human Rights Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2013): 720-814; Alan Tieger and Milbert Shin, “Plea 
Agreements in the ICTY: Purpose, Effects and Propriety,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 3, 
no. 3 (2005): 666-79; Richard Ashby Wilson, “Judging History: The Historical Record of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2005): 
908-42; Daniel Joyce, “The Historical Function of International Criminal Trials: Re-thinking International 
Criminal Law,” Nordic Journal of International Law 73 (2004): 461-84; and Devin O. Pendas, “‘Law not 
Vengeance:’ Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and the Claims of Memory in German Holocaust Trials,” in 
Truth Claims: Representation and Human Rights, ed. Mark Philip Bradley and Patrice Petro (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 28. 
140 Björn Elberling, The Defendant in International Criminal Proceedings: Between Law and 
Historiography (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), 199-236; and Daniel Joyce, “The Historical Function of 
International Criminal Trials: Re-thinking International Criminal Law,” Nordic Journal of International 
Law 73 (2004): 461-84. 
141 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin Books, 
1963). 
142 Elberling, The Defendant in International Criminal Proceedings. 
143 Koskenniemi, “Between Impunity and Show Trials.” 
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ideology,144 law,145 entitlements,146 duties,147 and post-colonial power politics.148 The dominant 
framing has increasingly become a fusion of individual criminal law with universal ideology.149 
Nevertheless, international media discussion of atrocities and prosecutions does not demonstrate 
a universal public acceptance of a legalist perspective to criminal trials: instead of a universal, 
neutral concern with truth and justice, and the presumption of innocence, there is also often a 
public assumption of guilt.150 This potentially leads to weaker investigative support offered by 
states, IGOs, and NGOs to defendants than prosecution at international courts, weakening parity 
for the former during proceedings. 
A valuable contribution to conceptualizing the role of power within global governance 
institutions, with implications for the effect of politics on legal rules within international criminal 
justice, has been made by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duval.151 They argue that power is a 
social concept that exists along two dimensions. The first is kinds of social relations, which exist 
                                                
144 Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of Universal Justice 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008). 
145 Tony Evans, “International Human Rights Law as Power/Knowledge,” Human Rights Quarterly 27, 
no. 3 (2005): 1046-68. 
146 Jack Donnelly, “The Social Construction of Human Rights,” in Human Rights in Global Politics, ed. 
Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 71-102. 
147 Makau Mutua, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2002). 
148 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
149 Tony Evans, The Politics of Human Rights: A Global Perspective (London: Pluto Press, 2005); and 
Charlotte Ku, International Law, International Relations, and Global Governance (London: Routledge, 
2012). 
150 Diana Johnstone, Fools’ Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO, and Western Delusions (New York: Monthly 
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in polar terms of interaction (a power relationship between distinct, “pre-constituted” actors) or 
constitution (power between actors whose identities are mutually constituting152). The second 
dimension is the specificity of social relations, along a spectrum from spatially and temporally 
direct and immediate to socially indirect or diffuse (the latter is a relationship meditated at a 
distance through intervening actors or over time through the construction of rules, say). From 
these dimensions the authors generate a fourfold taxonomy of power: compulsory (direct 
interaction), institutional (diffuse interaction), structural (direct and mutual constitution), and 
productive (diffuse constitution).  
The second concept, that of institutional power, provides a valuable conceptual tool for 
analyzing the role of states and IGOs in creating the rules by which international criminal 
tribunals are structured and operate, and how this shapes the interaction of the defense and 
prosecution. As argued by Barnett and Duval, institutional power refers to the role of actors, 
working through formal and informal institutions, in establishing policies which shape and 
constrain the behavior of other actors.153 The institutional power literature has examined agenda-
setting,154 the creation of structural and procedural rules,155 and the effect of institutional 
structures on the ability to shape institutional values and interests.156 The dissertation contributes 
to the literature on institutional power by examining its role within the processes of the creation 
                                                
152 Alexander Wendt, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” Review of International 
Studies 24, no. 1 (1998): 101-17. 
153 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” 15-17. 
154 Mark A. Pollock, Engines of Integration (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Stephen D. 
Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985). 
155 Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000) 
156 Greg Shaffer, “Power, Governance, and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional Approach,” in Power 
in Global Governance, ed. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 130-60. 
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and operation of international criminal tribunals, and by assessing its effect on the legal 
courtroom dynamic between two of the most important actors within that environment—the 
prosecution and defense.157 
 
Conclusion 
Analyses of the legitimacy of global legal governance have tended to ignore what is distinct 
about legal institutions. This partly results from a lack of understanding of the distinctive 
features of law as a system of social norms. It is also a consequence of applying jurisprudence 
that is poorly suited to understanding the legitimacy of international law. The jurisprudence of 
Lon Fuller provides a little-explored approach that is better suited to analyzing legitimacy than 
current natural law and positivist approaches. 
Research on the role of power in shaping the behavior and relationships of actors within 
international tribunals has tended to overlook the dynamic between the prosecution and defense, 
which is essential to understanding such institutions’ fairness and legitimacy. Similarly neglected 
has been the effect of rule-making actors on this dynamic. The concept of institutional power 
provides a useful approach to exploring the relationship between the rule-making authority of 
states and the prosecution-defense dynamic. 
  
                                                
157 The judges are the other indispensible actor. 
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3 Liberal legal norms in the evolution of international criminal 
justice 
This chapter explores the legal and historical development of the research indicators and their 
role in international criminal justice in order to provide context and illuminate the normative, 
political, and historical context to an analysis of the contemporary case studies in Chapters 4 and 
5. This chapter begins by describing the historical development of the dependent variables, 
legality and defense parity, as further explanation of their significance to the legitimacy of 
international criminal courts. Next, the historical development of international criminal justice is 
analyzed, emphasizing how the political context of international courts has shaped fairness 
towards defendants. Finally, the research indicators are explored in relation to the IMT at 
Nuremberg1 in 1945-6 in order to provide a basis of comparison for the case study analysis in 
later chapters, and to enable a critical assessment of the narrative of the progression of fairness in 
the development of international criminal justice. 
 
  
                                                
1 Note that the term “Nuremberg” as used throughout the dissertation refers to the IMT trial, unless stated 
otherwise. There were various other trials in the postwar period held at Nuremberg, and referred to as 
“Nuremberg trials,” including those in the American zone of occupation under Allied Control Council 
Law No. 10. See, e.g., Kevin Heller’s detailed examination of the legal aspects of the US trials: Kevin Jon 
Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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The development of the principle of legality 
This section explains the evolution of the principle of legality in domestic and international law, 
focusing on its core aspects, the prohibition on retroactive enforcement of criminal law and 
punishment. First, legality is analyzed in relation to the evolution of Western common and civil 
law systems, as they constitute the basis of the structure of trials and procedural protections for 
defendants in international criminal justice. Second, legality’s development as a core principle of 
criminal justice in international law is explored. This discussion focuses on underscoring the role 
of legality as a fundamental norm of liberal legal practice—in both domestic and international 
criminal justice. 
 
Domestic development 
Non-retroactive enforcement of law and punishment has been discussed since at least ancient 
Greece: for example by the historian Diodorus and the orator Demosthenes.2 However, it may 
have been lauded more as a means of preserving traditional culture from future change than due 
to any concern with legal fairness.3 Non-retroactivity was arguably first clearly distinguished as a 
core principle of fair legal practice in the Roman Republic and Empire, while the law of 
Medieval European states owes an enormous debt to Roman and Byzantine law.4 A prominent 
early European example is references to legality in the English Magna Carta of 1215, which 
                                                
2 Douglas M. MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 240-56. 
3 Charles Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 9-
10. 
4 Jerome Hall, “Nulla Poena Sine Lege,” The Yale Law Journal 47, no. 2 (1937): 167-8. 
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suggest that non-retroactivity was a legal principle limiting the law-making powers of the 
sovereign.5 
Middle Eastern religious texts provide important, if often vague or ambiguous, references to 
the undesirability of ex post facto legislation. In the New Testament, Saint Paul, in his Epistle to 
the Romans, states that “where there is no law, neither is there any transgression.”6 In the Koran, 
Allah states that “we never punish before I have sent a messenger,”7 but there is no clearer 
reference.8 In the Hadith—the reported sayings and acts of the prophet Muhammad—there are 
references to non-retroactivity of crimes in relation to usury laws.9 
The European Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries led to the 
establishment of non-retroactivity of crimes and punishment as core features of criminal law in 
Western states.10 Their development is deeply connected to the development of democracy 
within European states, as they were conceived of as a protection against executive power: only a 
legislative body—constituted by the people—can define what is illegal and what punishments 
should apply.  
Two of the first distinct references to the undesirability of the retroactive enforcement of law 
in a constitutional document occur in the 1776 Delaware Declaration of Rights and Fundamental 
                                                
5 Ben Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the Common Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), 29. See Magna 
Carta article 39 at the Avalon Project: avalon.law.yale.edu/medieval/magframe.asp. 
6 The New Testament, Romans 4:15. However, Christian scholars often claimed that God’s law was 
“natural law”—that all people had been given advance notice of what is legal by God and were thereby 
fairly liable for disobedience. 
7 Koran, Su’rat 17 (al-Israa), v.15. 
8 Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law, 11-12. 
9 Muhammad Salim al-’Awwa, “The Basis of Islamic Penal Legislation,” in The Islamic Criminal Justice 
System, ed. M. Cherif Bassiouni (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1982), 127-47. 
10 Stefan Glaser, “Nullum Crimen Sine Lege,” Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 
24, no. 1 (1942): 29-37; and Aly Mokhtar, “Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege: Aspects and 
Prospects,” Statute Law Review 26, no. 1 (2005): 41-55. 
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Rules, and the 1780 Massachusetts Bill of Rights.11 Some of the first occurrences at the state 
level are in the 1787 Austrian penal code, and in two documents signed in 1789 that have been 
fundamental to disseminating fair legal practice and defendant protections internationally: the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and the US Bill of Rights.12 
The most dramatic increase in the global incorporation of non-retroactivity into domestic law 
has occurred since the beginning of the Cold War. Of 69 states for which there was information 
in research conducted by the United Nations into state legal systems in 1946-7, 36 percent had a 
strong provision protecting against ex post facto criminal laws, and 32 percent each had a weak 
or no non-retroactivity provision in their constitution or statute.13 I determined a strong provision 
with reference to the necessity for the existence of prior law for prosecution, or specific 
references to retroactivity. A weak version of non-retroactivity was determined as where there 
was mention simply that people can only be prosecuted for a breach of law. 
Extrapolating the level of non-retroactivity from data on state constitutions collected in 2007 
makes clear that, 60 years later, in an international system characterized by almost four times as 
                                                
11 Section 11 and article 3, respectively. 
12 Articles 1, 5 and 8; and Constitutional Amendments 4-9, respectively. See, The Avalon Project: 
Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale Law School, 
avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rights1.asp, and avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ rightsof.asp, 
respectively. The preamble to the current, Fifth, French constitution of 1946 reiterates individual 
entitlement to the rights in the 1789 declaration. 
13 While preparing to draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the UN Commission on 
Human Rights researched UN member states’ constitutions for provisions similar to those of each article 
in the UDHR. The resulting list, gathered by John P. Humphrey, the principal drafter of the UDHR, is 
found in the 1947 International Bill of Rights: Documented Outline: UN Economic and Social Council, 
Commission on Human Rights Drafting Committee, International Bill of Rights: Documented Outline, 
UN doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1, 11 June 1947, articles 25-6, 
www.un.org/depts/dhl/udhr/docs_1947_1st_draftcom.shtml. Complementary to the Documented Outline 
is the 1946 research conducted by the UN on constitutional human rights provisions, as it covers all 
states, not just UN members, and some territories not independent at that time, such as India and 
Transjordan. This information is found in the 1946 UN Yearbook on Human Rights: UN Department of 
Social Affairs, Yearbook on Human Rights 1946 (UNYBHR 1946) (Lake Success, NY: United Nations, 
1948), UN Sales no. 1948.XIV.1 (reproduced by William S. Hein & Co., 1996). 
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many independent states, 91 percent of states have a strong non-retroactivity provision, while 
only 6.5 percent have a weak provision, and 2.5 percent no provision.14 During the period 1947 
to 2007, therefore, the proportion of states with a strong provision increased by 57 percentage 
points, and those with no provision declined by nearly 30 percentage points. It is evident that 
concern that there be strong constitutional or statutory constraint on retroactive criminal law 
enforcement has become almost universal among states and territories. 
It should be noted that there is a major distinction among states in the application of non-
retroactivity: between those with a common law (Anglo-American) legal system and those which 
follow a civil law (continental European) model. The former tend to apply it less rigorously, 
partly due to the existence of common law crimes (crimes not found in written statutes) and the 
greater role of judges in making law.15 This makes the determination of retroactive enforcement 
at the international level more difficult: are judges interpreting existing law (that is, 
“discovering” law, in common law parlance) or creating it ex post facto? This issue has 
generated contention in determining the level of non-retroactivity in the practice of international 
criminal tribunals. 
In present day Islamic, Shari’a, legal systems, non-retroactivity only applies to certain types 
of law.16 All states that utilize this form of legal system have ratified at least one treaty that 
incorporates the principle17—these treaties are discussed in the following section. According to 
                                                
14 Percentages determined by author from data in Kenneth S. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in 
International and Comparative Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 438-539 
(Appendix C). I used the same method of determining categories as in the previous paragraph. 
15 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 36-
8. 
16 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 296. 
17 Gallant, Principle of Legality, 400. 
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Cherif Bassiouni, in current Islamic law, quesas crimes—largely murder and assault—tend to 
adhere to non-retroactivity in most states that enforce this category of crimes. Since 
independence, most Islamic states have incorporated non-retroactivity provisions into their legal 
system—through statute or constitution.18  
 
Recognition in international law 
During the Cold War, the prohibition on non-retroactivity in criminal law became incorporated 
into most major international human rights and humanitarian legal instruments, and thereby 
progressively recognized as a fundamental legal right at the domestic and international levels. 
The drafters of post-Cold War international criminal tribunals, starting with that for Yugoslavia, 
accepted this right as constituting a restriction on their ability to construct new law.  
First, in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) included the non-
retroactivity of crimes and punishment as unrestricted domestic and international rights: “No one 
shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was 
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time 
the penal offence was committed.”19  
The following year, Geneva Conventions III and IV became the first multilateral 
humanitarian legal documents to contain criminal law procedural rights—for prisoners of war 
                                                
18 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Quesas Crimes,” in The Islamic Criminal Justice System, ed. M. Cherif 
Bassiouni (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1982), 203-9. 
19 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN doc. A/RES/217A (III), December 
10, 1948, article 11.2. The UDHR was supported by an overwhelming majority of states, with the initial 
General Assembly vote among the UN’s 56 member states being 48 in favor, none against, and 8 
abstentions. 
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and civilians, respectively—including the right to non-retroactivity of crimes and punishment.20 
They are also the first legally binding instruments, as the UDHR was initially merely expressive 
of the intent of its signatories—although there is a “growing consensus” that all or most of the 
rights contained in the declaration have since attained customary law status, and so are now 
binding on all states.21 Non-retroactivity is also a legal right in the 1966 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—in fact it is one of several provisions that are non-
derogable, even in time of national emergency.22 
Non-retroactivity of crimes and punishment are also among the rights guaranteed to those 
under military occupation in international and civil wars, respectively, in the 1977 Additional 
Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions;23 and non-retroactivity for crimes in the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.24 While Additional Protocol II does not contain a 
provision for non-derogation of non-retroactivity, the document specifically applies to civil 
war—where many rights are routinely suspended under state-of-emergency laws—so its 
                                                
20 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, articles 99 
and 102 (on crimes and punishment, respectively); and Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, articles 65 and 67 (on crimes and 
punishment, respectively). 
21 Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
50. 
22 ICCPR, article 4. The covenant was adopted unanimously by all 104 UN member states. See UN doc. 
A/PV.1496, 16 December 1966, www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/r21_en.shtml. 
23 Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, article 75.4.c; and Protocol Additional (II) to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, article 6.2.c. Non-retroactivity of enforcement and punishment is found 
on both. Protocol I, article 75.4 also includes non-retroactivity of court jurisdiction. 
24 Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN General Assembly doc. 44/25, November 20, 1989, article 
40.2.a.  
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acceptance by more than 160 states is particularly significant as an indicator of the level of state 
support for non-retroactivity as a fundamental right.25 
Non-retroactivity of crimes and punishment are also guaranteed in most major regional 
human rights treaties created during and after the Cold War. This includes the 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights,26 the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights,27 the 1981 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,28 and the 2004 revised Arab Charter on Human 
Rights.29 
The incorporation of non-retroactivity as a legal right in the constitutions and statutes of the 
vast majority of states, described above, is a significant indicator of the acceptance in state 
practice that is required for the determination that a principle has attained international 
customary law status.30 Its incorporation into nearly all major global and regional human rights 
and humanitarian treaties since 1945 is further evidence of the consistency of state acceptance. 
Practice since 1993 by international criminal tribunals has also generally been consistent, 
although there are weaknesses, as explored in Chapters 4 and 5. Overall, non-retroactivity of 
crimes and punishment are broadly argued to have attained customary law, and possibly jus 
                                                
25 Gallant, Principle of Legality, 208. 
26 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November 4, 1950, article 
7.1. Article 7.2 contains a restriction on legality in that a crime is legal as long as it conform to “general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations.” This is a significant weakening of the principle in that 
anything legal under applicable domestic law is not an international breach. 
27 The American Convention on Human Rights, November 22, 1969, article 9. The article also includes 
non-retroactivity of court jurisdiction. 
28 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, article 7.2. 
29 Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights, May 22, 2004, article 15. 
30 The determination of the existence of customary international law, “as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law” (Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 38), requires two components: usus, 
or evidence of consistent and widespread state practice; and opinio juris, that is, evidence that the practice 
derives from a felt sense of legal obligation. See Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 153-69. 
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cogens, status.31 Jus cogens consists of international legal norms that are peremptory over all 
other legal rules (examples include genocide and apartheid). The jus cogens status of non-
retroactivity would introduce procedural norms to the small list of heretofore substantive 
peremptory legal norms.32 
 
The development of concern with defense parity 
This section analyzes the development of defense parity in civil and common law systems. First 
the evolution of fair trial standards more broadly in domestic law is described, before an 
explanation of the place of defense parity within those standards. Finally, the importance of 
defense parity as a principle of criminal justice is explored by analyzing its acceptance within 
international law. The discussion aims to clarify the role of defense parity as a norm of 
international criminal law practice. 
 
Domestic development of fair trial standards 
The institutional and procedural basis of international criminal justice is provided by the two 
most common forms of legal system globally today: common law and civil law. They both 
originated in Medieval Europe, where criminal trials were instituted in the early post-Roman era 
(after c.500AD). In some territories, such as the German states, trials were initially private—not 
directly involving government agents or institutions—and the guilt or innocence of the accused 
                                                
31 Gallant, Principle of Legality, 352-403. 
32 Ibid. 
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was primarily determined by “trial by ordeal”—such as combat or submersion in water.33 This 
effectively presumed the guilt of the accused—if successful in the ordeal they were still punished 
by banishment for example. Over centuries this system changed towards public trials with 
increasing protections for the accused, although some of the defense parity aspects of due 
process—such as institutional support for defense counsel investigations—are of much more 
recent origin, as explained below. 
Most continental states of Western Europe, largely with a developing civil law tradition, 
introduced trial procedures between approximately 900 and 1400, with often a single government 
official performing the primary modern criminal justice roles of investigator, prosecutor, jury, 
and judge. The inquisitorial trial model, introduced in German territories from Italy in the 
sixteenth century, left little room for an active role by the defendant—the accused was reduced to 
one feature in a process of attempting to ascertain the truth and not granted special privileges. 
Defense parity protections consequently were slow to develop.34 
As certain Continental states, such as France, became absolute monarchies from the 
seventeenth century the sovereign became the highest judicial authority.35 This began to change 
in Europe especially during the eighteenth century as the Enlightenment reshaped attitudes 
towards the role of the individual vis-à-vis the state. As citizens legitimizing the existence of the 
state, individuals began to gain protections from government, including from the arbitrary and 
                                                
33 Christoph Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 5-6. 
34 Ken Pennington, “Law, Criminal Procedure,” in Dictionary of the Middle Ages: Supplement 1, ed. 
William Chester Jordan (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons-Thompson-Gale, 2004): 309-20. 
35 Roland E. Mousnier, The Institutions of France under the Absolute Monarchy, 1598-1789, Vol. II: The 
Organs of State and Society, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 
634-73. Previously, the feudal political structure and Catholic Church jurisdiction limited the authority of 
the sovereign over judicial issues. 
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abusive use of coercive authorities involved in the criminal justice system.36 In France, 
Republican ideas brought to prominence by the revolution of 1789 generated such prosecutorial 
changes as public trial, by jury, and via an accusatorial approach, with rights and privileges for 
the accused that had been denied under the prior, inquisitorial, proceedings. The 1789 French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen included trial principles such as the 
presumption of innocence for the accused, and due process provisions such as habeas corpus (no 
imprisonment without legal charge).37 Such legal-principle-related and procedural developments 
are illustrative of the enhancement of defense parity by elevating the position of the defendant in 
institutional proceedings. 
England was more removed from the center of Roman power than the empire’s continental 
western European territories, and Roman institutions were soon eroded by the invasion of 
Germanic peoples after the fifth century.38 Trial for the accused was only introduced after the 
French Norman invasion in 1066, when official prosecution became institutionalized as a means 
of avoiding private vengeance and maintaining public order.39 Even then, there was no 
requirement of an unbiased jury and the accused had no rights under this system.40  
                                                
36 This was encouraged by influential philosophers such as Montesquieu and Voltaire, and led to changes 
including the abolition of torture in Prussia in 1756 and Bavaria in 1806. See Safferling, Towards an 
International Criminal Procedure, 7. 
37 Articles 7 and 9, respectively. See, The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, 
Yale Law School, at: avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp. In Germany, conversely, juries were 
abolished in 1924 and replaced by judges. 
38 Roman processes were replaced with Anglo-Saxon systems of criminal justice, involving, for example, 
a payment—known as “weregild”—to the family of a murder victim by that of the accused. 
39 Edward Augustus Freeman, The History of the Norman Conquest of England: Its Causes and its 
Results, Vol. 5 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1876), 451-2. Local officials, such as justices of the peace, were 
authorized to investigate crimes, collect evidence, and conduct trials, utilizing a “grand jury” of selected 
local people who might have some knowledge of the circumstances of the crime. 
40 While never legal under English law, torture was utilized for confessions in the sixteenth and first half 
of the seventeenth centuries. See Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure, 12. 
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As in civil law states, trial by jury gradually replaced trial by ordeal. However, for centuries 
the accused had no defense parity protections such as the ability to call witnesses and 
prosecutorial disclosure, and they were not allowed legal counsel.41 Only from the seventeenth 
century did prosecutions begin to approximate a fair trial and move towards parity between the 
defense and the prosecution in terms of judicial structures, procedures, and resources. The 
development of criminal due process has paralleled, and constitutes an element of, the 
development of democracy—in England and in Europe more broadly. 
Changes gradually occurred in England over the next two centuries, with the nineteenth 
century in particular seeing a transformation in the rights of the accused. Changes included 
increased autonomy for judges, the right to not incriminate oneself, the right to defense counsel, 
defense presence during witness testimony, and two central defense parity issues analyzed in the 
research: pretrial disclosure of evidence, and the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. 
The creation of a police force in 1829 also removed investigative functions from prosecutors, 
and led to greater impartiality in the judiciary.42 The jury is still out, so to speak, on why the 
common law system in England generally developed protections for the accused earlier than 
Continental civil law systems, and made much less use of torture, but neither system attained 
what are today considered full fair trial protections until the twentieth century. 
In some of the American colonies prior to independence, various fair trial rights developed 
early on, partly in reaction to injustices in the European legal systems which the colonists had 
                                                
41 The jury was also far from independent: jurors could be prosecuted if they returned a verdict different 
from that preferred by the state. See ibid., 11. 
42 Bruce P. Smith, “The Emergence of Public Prosecution in London, 1970-1850,” Yale Journal of Law & 
the Humanities 18, no. 1 (2013): 29-62. 
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fled.43 The tendency towards increasing protections for defendants continued after 
independence—deprivation of trial by jury, for example, was among the list of complaints 
against the English Crown in the 1776 Declaration of Independence. The first constitutional 
document at the state level to contain a substantive listing of due process trial rights is the US 
Bill of Rights of 1789.44 After 1845 the modern division of functions within a trial developed: 
with the jury determining the facts of a case and the judge deciding on the applicable law.45 
Constitutional and statutory trial rights were, however, often breached in practice in the 
United States, especially for slaves and racial minorities, and varied significantly by state. 
Increasingly from the mid-nineteenth century, however, federal court decisions insisting on 
higher standards at the state level led to a significant improvement in fairness standards, 
including the defense parity provisions of disclosure, witness cross-examination, and in the 
1960s institutional support for defense counsel for those who cannot afford one.46 
 
The relationship between trial fairness standards and defense parity 
International criminal law scholar Christoph Safferling describes the principle of a fair criminal 
trial as encompassing “a whole range of different rights and obligations” in relation to defendants 
                                                
43 For example, the 1641 Massachusetts Body of Liberties contained the right to counsel, to an 
expeditious trial, to trial by jury, and a prohibition on repeat prosecution—“double jeopardy”—and on 
torture. See Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure, 14. 
44 These rights constitute four of the ten articles, and include trial by jury; the right to a speedy, public, 
and impartial trial; and no double jeopardy. See the US Constitution, Amendments 5-8, 
avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rights1.asp. 
45 Stephen A. Weiner, “The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction,” California Law Review 54, 
no. 5 (1966): 1867-1938. 
46 On the latter issue, the right was granted in the Supreme court case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 
335 (1963), www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/372/335. The right applies in felony cases only. 
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that have developed in various legal systems over centuries.47 He conceives of these as 
constituting a single right, but one whose components fall within three categories: “institutional 
guarantees,” “moral principles,” and first and second generation human rights (civil and political, 
and economic and social rights, respectively).48 Only the first has received much attention in IR 
research on international courts, while all three are analyzed in the dissertation.  
First, institutional guarantees are addressed primarily to legislators, and include such factors 
as the independence and impartiality of courts.49 Second, moral principles guide implementation 
by authorities within the criminal justice system: for example, the presumption of innocence and 
“equality of arms” between the prosecution and defense. These are legal principles in the sense 
used by Ronald Dworkin, as guides to legal implementation and interpretation.50 Third, first and 
second generation human rights for defendants stem from these moral principles. First generation 
rights for criminal defendants are those to be free of government action that diminishes the 
dignity of the individual, including the right to freedom from torture to extort a confession. 
Second generation rights to be provided with resources by government include that to court-
provided defense counsel.  
In the research, an institutional aspect of defense parity often overlooked is explored: 
institutional parity in a court’s structure. The project also relies on the second issue, moral-legal 
                                                
47 Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure, 30. 
48 Ibid., 30-1. 
49 At the international level, see Erik Voeten, “International Judicial Independence,” in Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, ed. Jeffrey L. Dunoff 
and Mark A. Pollack (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 421-44; and Theodor Meron, 
“Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal Tribunals,” The American Journal of 
International Law 99, no. 2 (2005): 359-69. At the domestic level, see, e.g., the contributions to Steven B. 
Burbank and Barry Friedman, eds., Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary 
Approach (New York: Sage Publications, 2002).  
50 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
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principles, as establishing the underlying normative guidelines delineating the boundaries of a 
fair trial, and the third issue (defendant rights), as laying out the specific legal obligations 
towards defendants stemming from these principles.  
Defendants rights are what may be called “status human rights,” attaching to an individual 
according to their status in the legal proceeding, as contrasted with “pure” human rights, such as 
freedom from torture, which attach to all individuals, regardless of status.51 The primary legal 
status rights and legal principles that defendants require for protection of their dignity and to 
discover their guilt or innocence include: the principle of the burden of proof lying with the 
prosecution; the corollary principle of the presumption of innocence, and from that, 
expeditiousness of trial; the right to counsel; that counsel is adequately prepared—requiring 
sufficient financial and institutional resources and time to prepare a reasonable defense; and such 
procedural due process protections as the right of disclosure of prosecution evidence, and the 
right to present defense witnesses and cross-examine prosecution witnesses.  
Most of these individual rights are encapsulated within the principle of the “equality of arms” 
between the prosecution and defense. In the research—as explained in Chapter 1—the term 
“defense parity” is utilized instead of equality of arms, as the focus is specifically on institutional 
and procedural issues—as opposed to the more resource-oriented understanding of equality of 
arms. This is to enable greater comparability between courts, and provides a more relevant and 
applicable means of exploring the power dynamic between the prosecution and defense counsel 
in the international judicial environment. 
                                                
51 Yvonne McDermott, “Rights in Reverse: A Critical Analysis of Fair Trial Rights under International 
Criminal Law,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical 
Perspectives, ed. William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, and Naimh Hayes (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 
2013), 166. 
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Recognition of fair trial rights and defense parity in international law 
A significant weakness in the development of a coherent system of international criminal justice 
is the ad hoc nature of trial protections for defendants, with each court developing its own 
standards. While substantive law has developed a broad degree of consistency, criminal 
procedure has lagged far behind.52 International humanitarian and human rights law contain 
broad but often unspecified trial protections. Geneva Convention III of 1929 is the first 
multilateral treaty to contain aspects of the right to a fair trial;53 and the UDHR marks the first 
time that trial rights were included in an international human rights legal document.54  
Geneva Convention IV of 1949, relating to the treatment of civilians, contains various fair 
trial rights for defendants.55 Especially significant are: the right to a speedy trial and to be 
informed of charges in a language the accused understands; the right to present evidence, call 
witnesses, and the right to defense counsel (provided by the court if the accused cannot afford 
their own), and the provision of an interpreter if required; and the right of appeal. These 
protections are also included in the ICCPR,56 the Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions,57 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child;58 as well as numerous regional 
agreements, including the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man;59 the European 
                                                
52 Elise Groulx, “Champion of Justice Speech,” National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 30 
July 2004, 165-6. 
53 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, articles 61-6. 
54 UDHR, articles 7-11. 
55 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 
1949, articles 71-6. 
56 ICCPR, article 14. 
57 Additional Protocol I, articles 45, 75, 85; and Additional Protocol II, article 6. 
58 Convention on the Rights of the Child, November 20, 1989, article 40. 
59 American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, article 26. 
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Convention on Human Rights (ECHR);60 the American Convention on Human Rights;61 and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.62 
States have acknowledged the existence of prosecutorial advantages in relation to the defense 
in the conduct of criminal trials through the incorporation of elements of defense parity as core 
criminal justice rights in various international human rights and humanitarian laws. These 
include the Geneva Conventions,63 and their Additional Protocols;64 the ICCPR,65 the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child;66 and the European,67 African,68 and American69 human 
rights conventions.  
However, while most of these documents reference the legal principles of the presumption of 
innocence and one or two specific equality-of-arms issues—such as the right to counsel, paid for 
by the court if necessary—the precise rights defense parity entails for criminal defendants are left 
largely unspecified in international law. This partly accounts for the inconsistency in the 
inclusion of parity rights in the statutes of international tribunals, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 
5. 
In customary law, significantly deriving from international case law, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) has produced by far the most rulings clarifying the human rights of 
criminal defendants, domestically and internationally. Masha Fedorova, in the first book-length 
                                                
60 ECHR, November 4, 1950, articles 6 and 7. 
61 American Convention on Human Rights, November 22, 1969, article 8. 
62 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, article 7. 
63 Geneva Convention IV, article 72. 
64 Additional Protocol I, article 75.4; and Additional Protocol II, article 6.2. 
65 ICCPR, article 14.3. 
66 Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 40.2. 
67 ECHR, article 6.3. 
68 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, article 7.1. 
69 American Convention on Human Rights, article 8.2. 
 
 
 
 
135 
study of equality of arms in international criminal justice, quotes the court as stating that equality 
is “an essential guarantee of the right to defend oneself,”70 which “implies a balance of fairness 
between parties.”71 She includes two fundamental rights that have been incorporated into the 
principle of parity applied in the research: disclosure of prosecution evidence, and cross-
examination of prosecution witnesses.72 
The case law is inconsistent concerning whether a defendant’s right to parity has been 
violated when any of the relevant guarantees have been breached, or whether demonstrating a 
violation requires evidence that the breach has been harmful to their defense.73 Demonstrating 
prejudice to the outcome for a defendant is problematic because it involves the determination of 
a bias introduced to the decision-making of the trial judges, who are themselves making the 
determination of whether a violation has occurred. Perhaps due to the difficulty of proving that a 
violation has prejudiced a defendant, most prosecutors I interviewed claimed that the procedural 
violations which we discussed had not been a problem for defendants in the trials they had 
prosecuted because the breaches did not demonstrably affect the outcome of any trial. The 
dissertation takes the more cautious approach of the ECtHR in Lanz v. Austria—cautious from 
                                                
70 Masha Fedorova, The Principle of Equality of Arms in International Criminal Proceedings 
(Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012), 46, quoting ECtHR, Foucher v. France, app. no. 22209/93, Judgment of 
March 18, 1997.  
71 Ibid., 46, n. 117, quoting ECtHR, Gorrainz Lizzarraga and others v. Spain, app. no. 62543/00, 
Judgment of April 27, 2004, para. 56. 
72 Ibid., 46, quoting ECtHR, Foucher v. France. The judgment also states that parity includes the right to 
counsel and to adequate time and facilities. 
73 E.g., in Lanz v. Austria the ECtHR stated that: “[T]he principle of equality of arms does not depend on 
any further, quantifiable unfairness flowing from a procedural inequality.” Whereas in Kremzow v. 
Austria the court claimed that there was no violation of equality from a procedural breach because “the 
defence was not in any way prejudiced by the difference.” See ECtHR, Lanz v. Austria, no. 24430/94, 
January 31, 2002, 58; and ECtHR, Kremzow v. Austria, Series A, no. 268-B, September 21, 1993, 75. 
Both are quoted in Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 98. 
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the perspective of protecting the rights of defendants—of highlighting breaches of guarantees 
whether or not they have been determined by the court to have prejudiced the defense. 
Additional sources, which the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) considers 
constitute aspects of the customary law of fair trials and defendant protections,74 include the 
1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,75 and the 1991 Draft Code of Crimes against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind by the United Nations’ International Law Commission 
(ILC).76 However, they contain vague references to fairness and add little to treaty or customary 
law. 
  
Defense protections and politics in international criminal justice 
This section explores the development of international criminal justice from the early twentieth 
century to the early post-Cold War period, focusing on the evolution of liberal legal fairness 
standards. This is to provide background to the case study chapters on the ICTY and ICC, and to 
provide context for the later analysis in this chapter of legality and defense parity at the IMT.  
 
Before World War II 
                                                
74 For the list see ICRC, www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule100. 
75 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, August 5, 1990, article 19.e. The declaration was made 
by member states of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (now the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation), www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/cairodeclaration.html. It contains a reference to “all the 
guarantees of defence.” 
76 ILC, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the International 
Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-third 
session, April 29-July 19, 199, UN doc. A/46/10, 1991, article 8(a). The report, with commentaries, is 
available at: legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_4_1996.pdf. The reference is to “a 
fair and public hearing.” 
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There is a medieval European history of courts trying individuals for international crimes, but 
this history has had no discernable impact on twentieth century developments.77 That a political 
consensus was developing towards accountability by the early twentieth century is indicated by 
two attempts to try individuals for crimes committed during World War I involving German and 
Turkish nationals. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles after the war accused the wartime German head 
of state, Kaiser Wilhelm II, of international crimes; and it stated the Allied powers’ intention to 
establish a “special tribunal” to try him, to be composed of judges from each of the victor states. 
It also declared the Allies’ right to establish military tribunals to try German military personnel 
for war crimes.78 The Netherlands, however, where the Kaiser had fled following the war, 
refused to extradite him, arguing that the crimes for which he was wanted did not exist 
internationally, and so would be a breach of legality through the retroactive enforcement of 
law.79 
There were also Allied demands to prosecute Turkish commanders in charge of the 
deportation of the Armenian Christian minority from Turkey between 1915 and 1917. Some 2 
                                                
77 One of the first domestic trials was in 1268, when the 16-year-old Duke of Swabia, Conradin von 
Hohenstaufen, was tried and executed by a court of the Count of Anjou for the crime of aggression 
(unjust war). The first arguably international trial took place in 1474. The Burgundian knight Peter von 
Hagenbach was put on trial in the city of Breisach for mass atrocities—“crimes against the laws of nature 
and man”—and convicted, by a court of the Holy Roman Empire, for acts committed during the sack of 
the city while governing parts of Alsace for the Duke of Burgundy during the previous five years. See 
Timothy L.H. McCormack, “From Sun Tzu to the Sixth Committee: The Evolution of an International 
Criminal Law Regime,” in The Law of War Crimes: National and International Approaches, ed. Timothy 
L.H. McCormack and Gerry J. Simpson (The Hague: Kluwer law International, 1997), 38. 
78 The Treaty of Versailles, articles 227 and 228. The former article accused the Kaiser of “a supreme 
offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.” 
79 Germany agreed to try those accused of war crimes, but these domestic trials, held in Leipzig in 1921, 
came to little as the new Weimer government sought to put an end to the harsh domestic criticism the 
trials aroused. Only 12 low-level offenders of the approximately 900 accused by the allies were brought 
to trial. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, “World War I: ‘The War to End all Wars,’” Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 30, no. 2 (2002): 280-1. 
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million Armenians are estimated to have died from systematic brutality during the expulsion,80 
including many documented acts of mass murder, sexual violence, and starvation, in what the US 
ambassador to the Ottoman empire at the time, Henry Morgenthau, described as “race 
extermination”81 and has since been widely labeled as genocide.82 It also spurred the first 
recorded diplomatic use of the phrase “crimes against humanity.”83 While the first peace deal 
between the Allies and the post-Ottoman Turkish government, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, 
declared the right of the Allies to set up courts to try Turks for the Armenian atrocities, it was not 
ratified by any of its signatories and the ultimate settlement, contained in the 1923 Treaty of 
Lausanne, omitted this provision.84 
While the suggestion of prosecuting a head of state for international crimes was radical, none 
of these trials took place. Nevertheless, the situation set an “incomplete precedent” for 
governmental responsibility and for prosecution for “crimes against peace” which were 
implemented less than 30 years later at Nuremberg and Tokyo.85 As stated by the ILC in 1950: 
“After the termination of the First World War, the conviction crystallized in the minds of 
                                                
80 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Worse Than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on 
Humanity (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009), 38. 
81 United States Department of State, Communiqué from Ambassador Morgenthau to the US Secretary of 
State, July 16, 1915, www.armenian-genocide.org/us-7-16-15-text.html. 
82 E.g., Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, 2nd ed. (New 
York: The New Press, 2002), 17; William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of 
Crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 24-6; and Adam Jones, Genocide: A 
Comprehensive Introduction, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2011), 149-87. 
83 This was in an official response by the British, French, and Russian governments to the Turkish 
atrocities, published in dispatch 796 (file no. 867.4016/67), The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the 
Secretary of State, Paris, 28 May 1915, published in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1915, Supplement (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1928), 981. 
84 British pressure did lead to the prosecution of a few low-level offenders by Turkish military tribunals, 
but the most senior accused were prosecuted in absentia, as they had fled to Germany after the war. 
85 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “International Criminal Justice in Historical Perspective: The Tension Between 
States’ Interests and the Pursuit of International Justice,” in The Oxford Companion to International 
Criminal Justice, ed. Antonio Cassese (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 132. 
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thinking people that the horrors of war must be spared to men, that war is a crime against 
humankind and that such a crime must be prevented and punished.”86 The ILC also noted that 
“[p]ublic opinion in favour of the establishment of an international criminal jurisdiction 
continued to manifest itself through the thought and action of official bodies, scientific 
institutions and leading jurists.”87  
At a 1925 Washington DC conference, the Inter-Parliamentary Union explored the idea of a 
legal code to help prosecute for the crime of instigating a war of aggression—with the inclusion 
of the principle of legality. The 1926 Brussels conference of the International Association of 
Penal Law endorsed the idea that the Permanent Court of International Justice88—the first 
international court to adjudicate legal disputes between states—acquire individual criminal 
jurisdiction and that treaties be drawn up—thus avoiding retroactivity.89  
Between World War I and II, two notable attempts were also made to create the world’s first 
permanent international court to try individuals. First, in 1920 the judicial advisory committee 
created prior to the Permanent Court of International Justice recommended that the latter also try 
individuals for international crimes. The League of Nations, to which the new court would be 
                                                
86 International Law Commission, “Report on the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction,” by 
Ricardo J. Alfaro, Special Rapporteur, Extract from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
1950, vol. II, UN doc. A/CN.4/15 and Corr.1, 2, legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_15.pdf. 
87 Ibid., 3.  
88 The court was established in 1922 and ceased to exist in 1945, when it was replaced by the 
International Court of Justice, or World Court, a subsidiary body of the new United Nations, which itself 
replaced the now defunct League of Nations. 
89 International Law Commission, “Report on the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction,” 3-5. It 
also noted international criminal jurisdiction being discussed by the Advisory Committee of Jurists 
appointed by the council of the League of Nations to draw up plans for an International Court of Justice; 
the idea of an international criminal court discussed at the 1922 conference of the International Law 
Association in Buenos Aires; and a draft statute presented at the 1924 Stockholm conference, with the 
organization endorsing the idea of such a court at its 1926 Vienna conference.  
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attached, rejected the proposal due to the almost total lack of political will among states to 
endorse such a expansion of international jurisdiction.90 
Second, on October 9, 1934, King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the French foreign 
minister, Louis Barthou, were assassinated in an attack by a Bulgarian nationalist in Marseilles. 
Later that year the French government made proposals to the League of Nations to prosecute 
terrorism, which led to the drafting of two treaties: one to criminalize terrorism under the 
domestic law of signatories, and one to create a permanent court to prosecute it. The court would 
have in effect have been a “hybrid” tribunal, applying domestic law in an international court.91 
Again there was insufficient political will to move either treaty forward.92 
 
The IMT at Nuremberg and the IMTFE at Tokyo 
Attitudes towards international prosecution began to change in 1942 as the wartime Allies began 
to consider the idea of holding the Axis Powers responsible for atrocities during World War II, 
and the following year, in the Moscow Declaration, they stated their intention to prosecute Axis 
soldiers for war crimes.93 The UN War Crimes Commission (UNWCC), established by 17 Allied 
states in October 1943, provided legal recommendations, which arguably developed the 
                                                
90 The international crimes considered were “a breach of international public order or against the universal 
law of nations.” See Walter George Phillimore, “An International Criminal Court and the resolutions of 
the Committee of Jurists,” British Yearbook of International Law 3, no. 1 (1922-3): 79-86, quote at 80. 
91 Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction: Memorandum Submitted by 
the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly, International Law Commission, 1949 (UN doc. 
A/CN.4/7/Rev.1), 16-18. 
92 L.C. Green, “International Crimes and the Legal Process,” The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 29, no. 4 (1980): 567-584. 
93 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The Perennial Conflict Between International Criminal Justice and Realpolitik,” 
Georgia State University Law Review 22, no. 3 (2006): 553. 
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customary international law of crimes against humanity applied by international and domestic 
war crimes trials after 1945.94  
Nevertheless, at a September 1944 meeting in Québec, British prime minister Winston 
Churchill and US president Franklin D. Roosevelt still agreed that the political solution of 
summary killings was appropriate for the enemy leaders—only ordinary soldiers should be 
prosecuted.95 Soviet premier Joseph Stalin stated that he would prefer prosecution—almost 
certainly a show trial, similar to those he had instigated against his own military officers before 
the war, and German prisoners of war (POWs).96 
At this time, no concern was evident among the Allied leaders that international criminal 
jurisdiction need be exercised over defeated wartime leaders in order to punish them. They 
would in effect be punished retroactively and without recourse to any evidentiary standards—a 
key aspect of defense parity—to determine if they had committed such crimes.97 The Allied 
concerns at this point were purely political—legal principles seem to have been irrelevant to 
Churchill and Roosevelt’s thinking until 1945.98 Churchill did not even seem to grasp the 
                                                
94 For example, Allied representatives at the UNWCC were using the term “crimes against humanity” by 
at least the spring of 1944. The UNWCC from its origins seems to have been concerned to extend war 
crimes prosecutions beyond its traditional boundaries, for actions committed outside of war. See Dan 
Plesch and Shanti Sattler, “Changing the Paradigm of International Criminal Law: Considering the Work 
of the United Nations War Crimes Commission of 1943-1948,” International Community Law Review 15, 
no. 2 (2013): 203-23; and Egon Schwelb, “The Work of the United Nations War Crimes Commission,” in 
The British Year Book of International Law 23 (1946): 373, 
archive.org/stream/britishyearbooko031843mbp/britishyearbooko031843mbp_djvu.txt. 
95 Arieh J. Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 80, 87-9. 
96 Ibid., 66-70. 
97 Gallant, Principle of Legality, 74. 
98 Curiously though, Churchill seems concerned to work within a British legal framework, as his cabinet 
discussions show he attempted to revive the old English legal designation of “outlaw” for the Axis 
leaders, which had been a designation for suspects of serious crimes who did not appear for trial—they 
could be legally killed by anyone who captured them. See Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg, 215. 
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concept of the rule of law internationally beyond the idea of punishing a defeated enemy under 
the guise of legal terminology—he was even prepared for Britain to commit war crimes in direct 
retaliation for German atrocities.99 
The Allies were persuaded to establish actual trials for the Axis leadership by several 
political, normative, and, most weakly, legal factors. On the American side, there was opposition 
within the US cabinet, yet Secretary of State Cordell Hull was persuaded to support trials by 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who argued that they were “consistent with the advance of 
civilization.”100 The death of Roosevelt and his replacement by Vice President Harry S. Truman 
in April 1945 was perhaps the most significant issue leading to the US change of heart: Truman 
had “an idealistic belief in the beneficent power of law and the wisdom of judges.”101 Churchill 
seems to have been concerned about German retaliation against British POWs and by the 
evolving US position.102  
Other reasons include publicizing the evidence of Axis atrocities so as to preclude later 
denials—the political goal of narrative construction—and the related issue of educating the 
citizens of the defeated nations about their leaders’ crimes—delegitimizing the enemy.103 That is, 
the reasons for establishing trials were primarily political, with arguably only Truman among the 
major Allied leaders concerned with the legal legitimacy of criminal justice standards. 
                                                
99 The minutes from a 1942 cabinet meeting note that “The Cabinet discussed the possibility of reprisals 
for the savage cruelties being practised by the Germans in Czechoslovakia. The PM [Prime Minister 
Churchill] suggested wiping out German villages (three for one) by air attack.” See British War Cabinet, 
74th Mtg., 15 June 1942, www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/releases/2006/january/january1/war_crimes.htm. 
100 Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity, 228. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg, 89-90. 
103 Madoka Futamura, War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice: The Tokyo Trial and the 
Nuremburg Legacy (London: Routledge, 2007), 56. 
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The Allies convened the International Conference on Military Trials (the London 
Conference), from June 26 to August 8, 1945, to establish the ground rules for a military tribunal 
for the Axis leaders. One of the most significant impacts of the resulting treaty, the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal104—or London Charter—on the development of international 
criminal justice was that it provided a definition of crimes against humanity. While that 
definition has shifted over time—there is no longer any necessary connection to armed conflict, 
for example—its core features are still discernable today and crimes against humanity has 
become central to international criminal prosecution. The creation of the crime was intended by 
the Allies to enable prosecution for offenses against civilians in occupied territory, especially the 
Holocaust in central and eastern Europe. The retroactive enforcement of this new law 
consequently constituted a major trial fairness weakness at the IMT.  
General issues relating to legal fairness standards for defendants at the IMT and the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) at Tokyo are discussed here, including 
their contribution to the development of international criminal justice. Specific issues relating to 
the research indicators at the IMT, however, are analyzed in detail in the last section of the 
chapter. 
The international humanitarian law upon which international criminal justice is significantly 
based was intended to have a largely preventive function and had not been designed with 
individual punishment as a core feature. So while international criminal law contains significant 
substantive prohibitions it provides little guidance on criminal prosecution. This has enabled 
courts—starting with the IMT—to have a vastly greater role than typically found in an 
                                                
104 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (London Charter), London, August 8, 1945. 
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established domestic legal system in creating the procedural rules that shape the conduct of trials 
and provide them with—or not—the legitimacy of a fair trial with adequate protections for the 
accused.105 
The complete Allied victory in World War II made possible the international prosecution of 
senior war criminals. This established at the outset a connection within international criminal 
justice between the level of coercive state power involved in the establishment of an international 
court, and its effectiveness: this is demonstrated, in particular, by the ease or otherwise for courts 
to obtain suspects and evidence.106 In Europe, the victorious Allied states—the United States, the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France—established the IMT at Nuremberg in 1945 to 
try the Nazi leadership for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The 
trial lasted from November 20, 1945 until final statements were made on August 31, 1946. The 
verdicts were announced on October 1 of the latter year: of the 24 individuals who were initially 
indicted, 19 were convicted,107 three were acquitted, one was found unfit for trial, and one 
committed suicide before the trial began.  
The United States alone created a similar court in Tokyo in 1946, the IMTFE, under the 
control of the supreme Allied commander, General Douglas MacArthur, to try high-level 
Japanese offenders for the same crimes.108 In the end only crimes against peace were prosecuted. 
                                                
105 Rachel Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise in Law, 
Politics, and Diplomacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 94. 
106 Contrast, for example, the relative ease of capturing key surviving suspects for the IMT—e.g. 
Hermann Göring—with the difficulty for the ICTY of securing the top suspects in the Yugoslavia wars, 
Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić. 
107 One of the 19, Martin Bormann, was never captured and was tried in absentia. Bormann was Hitler’s 
private secretary and one of the most powerful individuals in Nazi Germany during the later war period. 
108 The IMT operated from November 1945 to October 1946, and the IMTFE from April 1946 to 
November 1948. In addition to the IMT, the Allies in Germany established other courts to try a larger 
number of lower-level offenders under Control Council Law no. 10, issued by the Allied occupation 
 
 
 
 
 
145 
Eleven judges were appointed, all by MacArthur. The legal basis for the court’s creation was 
very different to that of the IMT: instead of the latter’s multilateral treaty (the London Charter)—
which excluded Germany—the IMTFE’s basis was the 1945 Instrument of Surrender of Japan to 
the United States, and therefore the tribunal arguably possessed the legal consent of the occupied 
state. When the trial came to a close in November 1948, of the 28 accused, all 25 of those who 
had lived until the verdict was presented were convicted.109  
There were also prosecutions held for lower ranking offenders in each of the Allied Zones of 
Occupation, and in East Asia by the United States. Under Control Council Law No. 10 the Allies 
prosecuted German defendants for the same crimes as under the IMT. In the Philippines, Japan, 
and elsewhere the Allies prosecuted around 6,000 Japanese.110 Some of these trials developed 
substantive criminal law, including command responsibility as a mode of criminal liability.111 
For the purposes of the dissertation, the IMT is important for establishing that, as stated in 
the Nuremberg judgment, in international trials defendants are to “receive a fair trial on the facts 
and law,” encapsulating both features of legitimacy explored in the research.112 However, what 
                                                                                                                                                       
authority in Germany. The United States established such trials at Nuremberg and Dachau under US 
domestic jurisdiction. Lower level tribunals in Japan also tried thousands for war crimes. 
109 IMTFE Judgment, November 4, 1948, in Documents on the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal: Charter, 
Indictment and Judgments, ed. Neil Boister and Robert Cryer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
598-626. 
110 Richard Pritchard, “The International Military Tribunal for the Far East and the Allied National War 
Crimes Trials in Asia,” in International Criminal Law, Vol. 1, ed. M. Cherif Bassiouni (Ardsley, NY: 
Transnational Publishers, 1999), 135-6. 
111 Under the liability mode of command, or superior, responsibility, an individual in a position of 
authority is held criminally liable for crimes committed by subordinates even if he or she did not 
authorize those actions. The commander should have known and been in a position to stop them: the 
commander is being held accountable for permitting the crimes. This originates with the US trial of 
General Tomoyuki Yamashita in the Philippines in December 1945. See Antonio Cassese, Guido 
Acquaviva, Mary Fan, and Alex Whiting, International Criminal Law: Cases & Commentary (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 422-31. 
112 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment of October 1, 1946, 444. Italics added. 
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constitutes fairness has been subject to much debate, as discussed below. The London Charter 
established an adversarial trial structure at Nuremberg, with prosecutors attempting to persuade 
the court’s four judges—one appointed by each of the major Allied states—of the guilt of the 
defendants, who had access to legal counsel. The primary concessions to the civil law system 
were trial by judges rather than jury (the former would decide guilt or innocence as well as 
sentence), and very loose rules of evidence (including reliance on hearsay, not typically 
admissible in common law jurisdictions).  
In broad terms, “[e]xcept for guaranteeing a right to counsel…[the IMT and IMTFE] paid 
very little attention to the rights of the accused.”113 Positive aspects of fairness towards 
defendants at the IMT include the right to counsel, to present evidence and cross-examine 
prosecution witnesses, and to be presented with the charges and with a translation.114 Additional 
rights were contained in the court’s Rules of Procedure, including that of the defense to request 
the court’s assistance in locating evidence.115 The trials were also translated into the defendants’ 
own languages, and defendants had access to a detailed indictment. The IMTFE Charter and 
Rules of Evidence established basic defense rights in relation to the indictment, counsel, 
evidence, and translation.116 Despite the similarity of fair trial provisions between the tribunals, 
fairness at the IMTFE was in practice significantly weaker, due to the control over the 
                                                
113 Kenneth S. Gallant, “Politics, Theory and Institutions: Three Reasons Why International Criminal 
Defence is Hard, and What Might be Done about One of Them,” Criminal Law Forum 14 (2003): 318. 
114 London Charter, article 16. 
115 Rules of Procedure (IMT), October 29, 1945. 
116 International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) Charter, Tokyo, January 19, 1946, articles 9-
10; and Rules of Procedure (IMTFE), Tokyo, April 26, 1946, rules 1, 2, 6. 
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proceedings exercised by General MacArthur, who was more concerned with how the trial might 
negatively affect the US occupation of Japan than with the fairness of the trial itself.117  
Fairness weaknesses at both tribunals include limited access to copies of many prosecution 
evidence documents (i.e. poor disclosure); inability of defense counsel to travel abroad to 
conduct investigations; all prosecutors and judges were from Allied states; defense lawyers could 
only come from Germany, and so were unused to the Anglo-American adversarial trial system 
used by the tribunals; there were limited facilities for defense to prepare their cases; and there 
was no appeals process.118 The defendants were also prohibited from using the tu quoque legal 
argument: you have also committed the crimes that I have.119 
The IMTFE trial was characterized by pressure to come to a swift conclusion, with harmful 
effects on defense parity, including evidentiary standards. There was lax judicial oversight of 
evidence the prosecution wished to introduce, in contrast to standard practice in adversarial trial 
proceedings. The judges gave increasingly less scrutiny over time, allowing a great deal of 
dubious documentation to be presented against the defendants, including documents without 
authentication, excerpts, and written statements without the presence of the witness for cross-
examination.120 When it came time for the defense to present its case the judges applied stricter 
                                                
117 Steven Ratner, Jason S. Abrams, and James L. Bischoff, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in 
International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 211. 
118 London Charter, article 3. 
119 This weakened the ability of counsel to construct a reasonable defense: in international customary law, 
establishing that an action was broadly undertaken by states during the same conflict aids in confirming 
its status as a customary practice, and therefore its legality. Of course the practice could still be prohibited 
under treaty law. See Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity, 230.  
120 Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 104-10. 
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standards for evidentiary inclusion—claiming now that the opposite approach for the other side 
would help to speed up the trial.121 
Both tribunals suffered from the partiality of all judges and prosecutors being chosen by the 
Allies, and only the losers being tried, leading to the charge of victor’s justice.122 In addition, 
allegations of bias were aimed at two of the IMTFE judges: William Web, for his participation in 
the Australian War Crimes Commission investigations into Japanese atrocities; and especially 
Delfin Jaranilla, who had been a prisoner of war on the infamous Bataan Death March in the 
Philippines in 1942, on which thousands of Filipino and American POWs died due to their brutal 
treatment at the hands of their Japanese captors.123 Additionally, MacArthur, as mentioned, 
appointed all 11 judges and the prosecutor at the IMTFE.124 
The Nuremberg tribunal has had a greater impact on the development of international 
criminal justice than the Tokyo tribunal partly because of the greater partiality of the latter.125 
The French judge at the IMTFE, Henri Bernard, suggested that the very fact that the Allies had 
not just executed Japan’s leadership out of hand, which it might easily have done, was enough to 
justify the trials. They were conceived of as the best justice the leaders could expect: the legal 
status of the trials was justified on normative grounds, not legal.126 
 
                                                
121 Ibid., 111-14. 
122 Arnold C. Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (New 
York: William Morrow, 1988), 63-71. 
123 Boister and Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal, 83-4. 
124 Jennifer K. Elsea, “Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts,” 
Congressional Research Service—The Library of Congress, Report for Congress RL31262, updated 18 
September 2006, 9. 
125 Ratner, Abrams, and Bischoff, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law, 211. 
126 Separate Opinion of Justice Henri Bernard, 12 November 1948, 2-3, 105 IMTFE Records, cited in 
Gallant, Principle of Legality, 76. 
 
 
 
 
149 
Post-Nuremberg developments 
In the immediate postwar period, the IMT generated interest in substantive law and a possible 
permanent court. However, the UN General Assembly consistently postponed consideration of a 
court, primarily due to disputes about the definition of aggression and the basis for establishing 
jurisdiction. 
The UNWCC had recommended in 1944 that a post-war international criminal tribunal have 
jurisdiction over crimes committed “because of race, nationality, religious or political belief,” 
and regardless of where committed.127 This appears to be the first discussion in an official legal 
context of prosecution for Axis crimes during World War II committed on the basis of the 
identity of the victim. Three of these forms of social identity (all but political beliefs) also found 
their way into the 1948 Genocide Convention. The term “genocide” was first utilized legally at 
the international level in the context of the IMT—the American delegation to the 1945 London 
Conference had even proposed that genocide be prosecuted as a specific crime.128  
                                                
127 UNWCC 20th meeting, 30 May 1944, 1. 
128 Planning Memorandum Distributed to Delegations at Beginning of London Conference, article IV, 
9(a), reprinted in Robert H. Jackson, “Report of Robert H. Jackson United States Representative to the 
International Conference on Military Trials,” London, 1945, 37, 
avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/jackson.asp. In addition to other crimes, the memorandum proposed 
the inclusion in the tribunal’s remit of: “Genocide or destruction of racial minorities and subjugated 
populations by such means and methods as (1) underfeeding; (2) sterilization and castration; (3) depriving 
them of clothing, shelter, fuel, sanitation, medical care; (4) deporting them for forced labor; (5) working 
them in inhumane conditions.” While incorporating the core aspects of Raphael Lemkin’s definition of 
genocide, the memorandum’s definition was far more detailed in relation to the underlying acts 
contributing towards the crime. Elements of the crime as later described in the Genocide Convention were 
already present: that the conduct must be directed against a group, at least partially defined in cultural 
terms, and the listing of specific prohibited acts which could bring about genocide. Later drafts of the 
memorandum, however, did not refer to genocide. See Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 194. The word “persecution” was substituted 
in the Nuremberg Charter—as an underlying offense of crimes against humanity. However, the treaty law 
origins of the crime of genocide lie here, as various components of genocide as later codified in the 1948 
convention are present in the charter’s definition of crimes against humanity. 
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During the Cold War, there were various developments in substantive international criminal 
law, including the creation of the Genocide Convention; and the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
the 1977 Additional Protocols, which developed the elements of war crimes. There were also 
developments of procedural protections for defendants, but no international tribunals were 
created, and so there was no evolution in the practice of legal fairness standards.129 
Over 40 years after the IMTs, the collapse of superpower rivalry generated a major shift in 
the global political environment, which led to improved prospects for cooperation in the UN 
Security Council. The early post-Gulf War euphoria about the possibilities for robust council 
action quickly soured in the wake of the debacle in Somalia in 1993, the inability to end the war 
and atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, and the lack of political will among major powers in the 
Security Council to stop the genocide in Rwanda. Instead of military action, the council created 
tribunals to prosecute those responsible for atrocities in the latter two contexts. 
In resolution 827 in May 1993 the counsel created the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, based in The Hague, Netherlands. In November the following year, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, based in Arusha, Tanzania, was established in 
resolution 955. The legal basis for the tribunals was initially controversial because the UN 
Charter does not explicitly provide the Security Council with the authority to establish judicial 
bodies. The objection that the council was acting ultra vires—beyond its legal authority—was 
raised during negotiations over both tribunals, especially by China and Brazil.130 However, the 
                                                
129 The only significant trial for international crimes during the Cold War was the genocide trial of Adolf 
Eichmann under domestic jurisdiction in Israel in 1961. Eichmann’s defense claimed that genocide was 
being enforced retroactively in his case, but this was dismissed by the court. See Schabas, Genocide in 
International Law, 426-9. 
130 Eric Rosand, “The Security Council As ‘Global Legislator’: Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?” 
Fordham International Law Journal 28, no. 3 (2004): 566. 
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secretary-general’s argument became accepted: that the legal basis for the tribunal lay in the 
council’s Chapter VII authority to respond to threats to international peace and security with 
non-military measures that are binding on all member states.131  
The secretary-general and the Security Council demonstrated far greater concern with 
legality and defense parity than was demonstrated by the Allies in creating the IMT. The 
secretary-general’s report made basic recommendations for guaranteeing the rights of the 
accused,132 and these were included in the court’s statute.133 Specific issues relating to the 
research indicators are analyzed in Chapter 4. 
The establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002 can be traced back to a 
coalition of 16 Caribbean and Latin American states led by Trinidad and Tobago,134 which 
encouraged the General Assembly in 1989 to request the ILC to study the possibility of creating 
a court to combat drug trafficking.135 The ILC continued its research into a draft code of 
international crimes,136 producing a draft court statute in 1994.137 Building on the momentum of 
the initial operations of the ad hoc Security Council tribunals, and learning from their experience, 
                                                
131 UN Secretary-General, “Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993),” UN doc. S/25704, May 3, 1993, Section I. 
132 Ibid., paras. 99-107. 
133 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, UN 
doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1, adopted by the Security Council on May 25, 1993, 
UN Doc. S/RES/827, articles 18-21 and 23-28. 
134 Andrew Novak, The International Criminal Court: An Introduction (Basel: Springer, 2015), 18-19. 
135 General Assembly resolution 44/39, 4 December 1989. 
136 See, for example, International Law Commission, Ninth Report on the draft Code of Crimes against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind, UN doc. A/CN.4/435 and Add.1 & Corr.1., 1991. 
137 International Law Commission, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, adopted at the ILC’s 
46th session, 1994. Appears in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1994, vol. II (Part Two), 
with commentaries, legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_4_1994.pdf. 
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the ILC’s draft became the basis for the founding Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998.138 Legality 
of crimes and punishment in particular were acknowledged explicitly in the statute,139 though 
there are concerns with its implementation, as there are for defense parity.140 
In broad terms, fairness towards defendants has improved significantly since the first 
international criminal tribunal was created in 1945. However, as explained in Chapters 4 and 5, 
when the most important indicators of legal legitimacy are examined, the trajectory towards a 
modern system of international criminal justice with very high levels of defense protection is not 
so clear cut.  
 
The IMT: Institutional power and bias towards prosecution 
This section provides an exploration of the research indicators in relation to the IMT at 
Nuremberg, and the role of institutional power and other political factors in shaping the legal 
dynamic between the prosecution and defense at the tribunal. This enables a comparison to the 
more detailed examination of these indicators at the ICTY and ICC in later chapters. First, the 
legality of crimes and punishment is examined in relation to the two mass atrocity crimes 
                                                
138 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, circulated as doc. A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998. 
Ironically drug-related offenses do not feature in its jurisdiction. 
139 Ibid., articles 22-3. 
140 Due to concerns among Security Council members about the cost of the ad hoc tribunals and the 
council’s time they were absorbing, no purely international tribunals have been established since the 
ICTR. Instead, the UN has opted for “hybrid” courts, staffed by domestic and international judges, 
applying a mixture of international and domestic law, and mostly financed outside of the UN. One type of 
hybrid operates in territories under UN or UN-approved governance: those established in Kosovo (1999), 
East Timor (2000), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2005). Another variation of hybrid, established with UN 
assistance, provides international staff and financing after a request from a post-conflict government. 
Such assistance is designed to compensate for weak domestic judicial capacity and diminish the 
perception of victor’s justice. These consist of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002); the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (2003); and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (2009), 
which is the first international tribunal to solely apply domestic law. 
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prosecuted at Nuremberg: war crimes and crimes against humanity.141 Second, the defense parity 
indicators of institutional support and procedural guarantees are examined. The institutional 
support sub-indicators of court structure and court support for investigation and evidence 
gathering are explored, followed by the procedural guarantee sub-indicators of disclosure and the 
cross-examination of witnesses. The data sources utilized include the London Charter and Rules 
of Procedure, the trial judgment and other IMT documents, UNWCC documents, personal 
memoirs, and secondary historical sources.  
See Table 3.1 below for a summary of defendant information. Some of the defendants and 
their counsel are referred to in the analysis below. Columns three and four, detailing crimes 
charged and sentence, relate to the legality of crimes and punishment, respectively. 
 
Table 3.1 Defendants at the IMT at Nuremberg 
Defendant142 Chief counsel Crimes charged (and 
verdict)143 
Sentence 
Bormann, Martin (in 
absentia) 
NA WC (G), CAH (G) Death 
Dönitz, Karl Otto Kranzbühler WC (G) 10 years 
                                                
141 Genocide was not prosecuted as a separate crime at the IMT, but was effectively incorporated into 
“persecution:” an underlying offense of crimes against humanity in the charter. See London Charter, 
article 6.c: “persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the 
country where perpetrated.” 
142 Two other defendants were originally scheduled to be tried: Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach 
and Robert Ley. The trial of the former was cancelled because of illness, while the latter committed 
suicide before the trial started. 
143 In this column only mass atrocity crimes are stated: WC=war crimes, CAH=crimes against humanity; 
and (G)=guilty, and (NG)=not guilty. Some defendants were also prosecuted for crimes against peace. 
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Frank, Hans Alfred Seidl WC (G), CAH (G) Death 
Frick, Wilhelm Otto Pannenbecker WC (G), CAH (G) Death 
Fritzsche, Hans Heinz Fritz WC (NG) Acquitted 
Funk, Walther Walther Funk WC (G), CAH (G) Life 
Göring, Hermann Otto Stahmer WC (G), CAH (G) Death 
Hess, Rudolf Günther von 
Rohrscheidt 
WC (NG), CAH (NG) Life144 
Jodl, Alfred Franz Exner WC (G), CAH (G) Death 
Kaltenbrunner, Ernst Kurt Kauffmann WC (G), CAH (G) Death 
Keitel, Wilhelm Otto Nelte WC (G), CAH (G) Death 
Neurath, Konstantin 
von 
Otto Freiherr von 
Ludinghausen 
WC (G), CAH (G) 15 years 
Papen, Franz von Egon Kubuschok None Acquitted145 
Raeder, Erich Walter Siemens WC (G) Life 
Ribbentrop, Joachim 
von 
Fritz Sauter WC (G), CAH (G) Death 
Rosenberg, Alfred Alfred Thoma WC (G), CAH (G) Death 
Sauckel, Fritz Robert Servatius WC (G), CAH (G) Death 
Schacht, Hjalmar Herbert Kraus None Acquitted146 
Schirach, Baldur von  Fritz Sauter CAH (G) 20 years 
                                                
144 Hess received his life sentence for guilt in relation to crimes against peace. 
145 Von Papen was tried for crimes against peace and found not guilty. 
146 Like Von Papen, Schacht was tried for crimes against peace and found not guilty. 
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Seyss-Inquart, Arthur Gustav Steinbauer WC (G), CAH (G) Death 
Speer, Albert Hans Flächsner WC (G), CAH (G) 20 years 
Streicher, Julius Hanns Marx CAH (G) Death 
 
Source: Robert E. Conot, Justice At Nuremberg (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1983); Roderick 
Stackelberg, The Routledge Companion to Nazi Germany (New York: Routledge, 2007), 172; Eugene 
Davidson, Trial of the Germans: Account of the Twenty-two Defendants Before the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg (New York: Collier Macmillan, 1969); the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum, “Nuremberg Military Tribunal: The Defendants,” 
www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007070; and various IMT documents at Yale Law 
School, The Avalon Project, “Nuremberg Trial Proceedings,” avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/imt.asp.  
 
Legality indicator 1: Non-retroactivity of crimes 
This section first discusses broad issues of the legality of the crimes prosecuted at the IMT, and 
then specifically in relation to the enforcement of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The 
American, British, and French delegations to the London Conference, which created the IMT 
charter, expressed concern that the offenses they wished to prosecute were not established as 
crimes in international law and so could be challenged within the IMT. In response, the British 
chief representative—and chairman of the conference—David Maxwell Fyfe stated during one 
of the final conference discussions, in regard to the proposed charter: “I want to make it clear in 
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this document what are the things for which the tribunal can punish the defendants…It should 
not be left to the tribunal to say what is or is not a violation of international law.”147  
André Gros, the assistant to the French representative, disagreed—arguing that this 
constituted retroactive lawmaking.148 However, the French delegation came around to accepting 
the British position, and the final charter draft reflected the eventual joint Allied position that the 
tribunal would be unable to challenge the Allied political declaration—as opposed to legal 
determination—of what constituted existing law.149 As Cherif Bassiouni states, this position was 
“clearly tautological and self-serving.”150 The Allied debates in relation to constructing the IMT 
illustrate how the legality of crimes, from the very beginning of international criminal 
prosecution, has been shaped as much by the institutional power of dominant states, bargaining 
over their political preferences within influential decision-making forums, as it has by legal 
determinations. 
In relation to determining the legality of prosecution for war crimes, by the time period of the 
commission of the acts for which the IMT defendants were on trial—the late 1930s to 1945—
some acts by soldiers in war had been outlawed by treaty: in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907, and the Geneva Conventions I to III of 1864, 1906, and 1929, respectively.151 Germany, 
                                                
147 Comment of Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, Minutes of Conference Session of July 23, 1945, in Jackson, 
“Report of Robert H. Jackson,” 328. 
148 Comment of André Gros, in ibid., 335. 
149 London Charter, article 3. 
150 Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 325. 
151 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, July 29, 1899; Hague 
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, October 18, 1907; 
Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, 
Geneva, August 22, 1864; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armies in the Field, Geneva, July 6, 1906; and Geneva Convention (III) relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, July 27, 1929. 
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whose citizens were prosecuted at the IMT, had ratified the 1907 Hague Convention (with 
reservations), though not the 1899 one; and had ratified Geneva Convention III, relating to 
POWs.152 Also various authorities during the war, including Allied state representatives at the 
UNWCC, agreed that individuals could be tried for violations of the laws and customs of war.153 
Nevertheless, the British Foreign Office expressed concern during the war that prosecuting Axis 
leaders for war crimes would be in breach of the principle of legality, as no specific provision for 
prosecution for violations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions was envisaged when they were 
created.154 
However, precedents were set for prosecution for war crimes during the war which have been 
argued to demonstrate that it had attained customary law status by 1945.155 The Soviets were the 
first to prosecute German POWs during the war, at Kharkov in Ukraine.156 The United States 
prosecuted a few Germans captured on American soil, though concern that its own POWs might 
be prosecuted encouraged the United States to lead the German government to believe that it 
would not prosecute German POWs in Europe.157 The British government consistently 
maintained the right to try German POWs throughout the war.158 From the prior existence of war 
crimes law, in treaty and customary form, and the wartime practice of prosecuting German 
                                                
152 Sheldon Glueck, “The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War,” in Perspectives on the Nuremberg 
Trial, ed. Guénaël Mettraux (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2008), 82. 
153 Gallant, Principle of Legality, 70. 
154 Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity, 227-8. 
155 Gallant, Principle of Legality, 70. 
156 Michael J. Bazyler and Frank M. Tuerkheimer, Forgotten Trials of the Holocaust (New York: New 
York University Press, 2014), 16.  
157 Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg, 72-3. 
158 The British concern in relation to its own POWs was when they were punished without trial—the 
government protested this for its soldiers out of uniform (in violation of the laws of war) on special 
operations. Ibid., 71-3. 
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POWs, war crimes are generally agreed to have attained a high level of non-retroactivity of 
enforcement at the IMT. 
In relation to the legality of prosecution for crimes against humanity, some of the atrocities 
committed during World War II had similarities to those during World War I in that they were 
not covered under the existing international law of war crimes. This included acts perpetrated by 
a government or individuals against the state’s own population; persecution on a political or 
racial basis in occupied territory; and attacks on the population of states not formally under 
occupation.159 Providing the IMT with jurisdiction over this new category of crime gave the 
allies a way to prosecute such acts by the German government, including for the atrocities of the 
Holocaust—“genocide” only came into existence as a non-retroactively enforceable crime in its 
own right with the creation of the Genocide Convention in 1948.160  
The UNWCC provided legal and judicial recommendations that developed the customary 
international law of crimes against humanity applied by international and domestic war crimes 
trials after 1945.161 Its Allied representatives were using the term “crimes against humanity” by 
at least the spring of 1944: from its origins the UNWCC seems to have been concerned to extend 
war crimes prosecutions beyond its traditional boundaries into actions committed outside of 
war.162  
                                                
159 The latter category includes Austria and Czechoslovakia, annexed by Germany in 1938 and 1938-9, 
respectively. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 103, n14. 
160 Adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and Text of 
the Convention, UN doc. A/RES/260 (III), December 9, 1948. 
161 Plesch and Sattler, “Changing the Paradigm of International Criminal Law:” 203-23. 
162 Egon Schwelb, “The Work of the United Nations War Crimes Commission,” in The British Year Book 
of International Law 23 (1946): 373. The full text of the 1946 year book is available at: 
archive.org/stream/britishyearbooko031843mbp/britishyearbooko031843mbp_djvu.txt. 
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The lack of agreement and consistency of national positions, however, on whether 
individuals should be prosecuted for crimes against humanity is evident in UNWCC votes on a 
motion for expanding its investigations to include atrocities committed by German citizens 
against Axis citizens, and a motion on whether crimes against humanity “are war crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the UNWCC.” In the former, votes in favor included Czechoslovakia, the 
Netherlands, and the United States, while those against included Greece, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom.163 On the latter, those in favor included the Western states of Australia, 
Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom, and 
Yugoslavia, plus India. While there were no votes against, the following Western states 
abstained: France, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and the United States, plus China.164 
This suggests that there was little agreement on the existence of the crime during the war. 
However, evidence for the legality of enforcement of crimes against humanity is suggested by an 
Allied declaration during World War I in response to reports of systematic attacks on Armenians 
by the Ottoman government: “In view of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and 
civilization, the Allied governments announce publically to the Sublime Porte that they will hold 
personally responsible [for] these crimes all members of the Ottoman Government and those of 
their agents who are implicated in such massacres.”165 This is significant not only for being the 
                                                
163 UNWCC, Complete History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of 
the Laws of War (London: HM Stationery Office, 1948), 175-7. Available at: UN War Crimes Project—
History of the UNWCC, SOAS, www.cisd.soas.ac.uk/documents/un-war-crimes-project-history-of-the-
unwcc,52439517, chapter 9 file. 
164 Plesch and Sattler, “Changing the Paradigm of International Criminal Law,” 214, note 75. 
165 The declaration is published in dispatch 796 (file no. 867.4016/67), The Ambassador in France (Sharp) 
to the Secretary of State, Paris, 28 May 1915, published in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1915, Supplement (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1928), 981. 
Available at: uwdc.library.wisc.edu (The University of Wisconsin Digital Collections). 
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first official use of the term “crimes against humanity,” but also for the claim by major powers 
that individuals should be held criminally accountable.  
After World War I, a commission set up by the allies to investigate war responsibility 
recommended in its report to the Paris Peace Conference, which established the terms of the 
postwar settlement, that an international tribunal be created to try the defeated states for, among 
other crimes, acts “in violation of the elementary laws of humanity” and individuals for 
“offenses against…the laws of humanity.”166 The report lists 32 specific offenses, some of which 
constitute what have become the core underlying offenses of crimes against humanity, including 
murder, rape, and torture. However, due to the objection by US representatives that this would 
require applying law retroactively, crimes against humanity were not included in the proposed 
court’s remit.167 Therefore while there was discussion of prosecution for this nascent offense, 
there was no agreement among states that would constitute the basis for claiming customary law 
status before World War II—partly due to concern about retroactive enforcement. 
Dan Plesch and Shanti Sattler nevertheless argue that crimes against humanity were not 
created retroactively by the London Charter, as they were in the process of becoming customary 
law during the work of the UNWCC, from 1943 to 1948. This is implausible, as many of the 
crimes prosecuted at the IMT were committed before 1943 and it is questionable to claim that a 
customary law had crystalized before that point—i.e. before the commission of the crimes, which 
would be necessary for prosecution to avoid retroactivity. Furthermore, even the UNWCC did 
                                                
166 Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on the Responsibility of the 
Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, in Treaty of Peace with Germany, Hearings before 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Sixty-Sixth Congress, First Session on the 
Treaty of Peace with Germany, Signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, by the President of the United 
States (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 325-7. 
167 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 102-3. 
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not investigate actions other than those constituting war crimes.168 At this stage, there was no 
consensus among Western states on the breadth of scope that international criminal law should 
have going forward beyond the IMT. The legality of the prosecutions for crimes against 
humanity at the IMT and IMTFE was also questioned at the time by such legal notables as 
Supreme Court Justice William Douglas and an Indian judge at the Tokyo tribunal, Rahadbinod 
Pal.169 
Christian Tomuschat argues that non-retroactivity of crimes is not applicable at the 
international level. Its purpose is to protect “legitimate confidence” by legal subjects in the 
legality of their acts: if subjects cannot reasonably be conceived of as being confident that their 
acts were legal then they may be legally prosecuted, whether or not a specific law exists at the 
time of commission: “Nobody should be prosecuted on account of a conduct, the punishable 
character of which he was not aware of, and could not be expected to have been aware of, when 
he practised that conduct.”170 As he goes on to argue in relation to the crime under discussion: 
“crimes against humanity are not only morally objectionable, but deserve to be punished and 
must be punished because of their abhorrent character if peaceful coexistence in human society is 
to be maintained.”171 His argument is entirely normative and political, disregarding the legal 
character of the principle and conflating legal and substantive justice. 
The IMT charter did not include non-retroactivity of crimes as a defendant right. Despite this 
the court considered a defense motion challenging the legality of enforcement for crimes against 
                                                
168 Gallant, Principle of Legality, 71. 
169 John F. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 190. 
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humanity.172 This is significant as “one beginning of a doctrine of international legal personality 
of individuals,” whereby individuals can assert international rights in relation to states and 
IGOs.173 Nevertheless, the Nuremberg judges dismissed the motion, arguing that neither the 
defense nor prosecution had authority under the IMT charter to challenge the court’s substantive 
jurisdiction over crimes.174  
According to Antonio Cassese, the demands of political justice significantly overrode 
pressure for legal justice in terms of non-retroactivity.175 Instead, the IMT judgment in 1946 
makes clear that the tribunal saw political justice—that is, the political goals of the tribunal—as 
supreme over legal justice at the international level: “the maxim ‘nullum crimen sine lege’ [non-
retroactivity of crimes] is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice. 
To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked 
neighbouring States without warning is obviously untrue.”176 The judgment went on to argue 
that: “The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the 
countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of 
these countries to legislate for the occupied territories has been recognized by the civilized 
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world.”177 The judges claimed that political authorities—the Allied states—had the right, or 
jurisdiction, to perform legislative functions and determine what constitutes law—unrestricted by 
any principles of legality that define what constitutes law. 
Thus, crimes against humanity were enforced retroactively at the IMT. Despite some 
disagreement among contemporary lawyers, the court’s dismissal of such a fundamental breach 
of legal protections for criminal defendants was nevertheless largely accepted at that time178—
although it has sustained greater criticism since.179 Contemporary acceptance was partly due, as 
mentioned, to concern with achieving the court’s political goals, and the acknowledgment that its 
justice was the best the defendants could expect—better, that is, than the alternative of extra-
judicial execution. Acceptance was also due to the lack of any international humanitarian or 
human rights legal provision at that time prohibiting retroactive enforcement of crimes.  
Ultimately the IMT decided that while non-retroactivity of crimes was an accepted principle 
of domestic law, and arguably even of international law at that time due to consistency of state 
practice, it was not a limitation of the legal right of the Allies to create law binding on the 
tribunal and its defendants. That is, the judges argued that at that time legality was a binding 
principle in domestic law, and an international normative standard, but not a binding 
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international legal principle.180 The judges privileged substantive justice over legal justice, 
diminishing the legitimacy of the trial. This judgment has been relied upon since 1945 to argue 
that the IMT prosecutions were not in breach of legality.181 Ultimately, however, the dissertation 
agrees with Marko Milanovic, vice-president of the European Society of International Law, who 
argues that such an approach is not “intellectually honest.”182 
 
Legality indicator 2: Non-retroactivity of punishment 
No punishment guidelines for committing war crimes are delineated in the applicable 
international treaty and customary law of war crimes during World War II, and as crimes against 
humanity were not established in either form of law there were, similarly, no punishment 
guidelines for commission of that offense. Therefore, while war crimes were not in breach of the 
retroactivity of crimes, and crimes against humanity were, the enforcement of both crimes at the 
IMT disregarded the principle of legality in regards to punishment.  
An important concern in regards to the legality of punishment was the extent to which 
judicial discretion in determining sentences was guided and restricted by law—thereby 
diminishing the opportunities for judges to apply excessive, and inconsistent, discretion in 
sentencing practice. With no punishments laid out in treaty or customary law at that time for any 
international crime, such guidance can only be found in the London Charter: in regard to all 
crimes prosecuted by the court, it states that “[t]he Tribunal shall have the right to impose upon a 
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Defendant, on conviction, death or such other punishment as shall be determined by it to be 
just.”183  
This is problematic for a breadth and vagueness that provided effectively no judicial 
guidance and allowed for excessive discretion—in addition to the death penalty, absolutely any 
custodial sentence could be applied. Furthermore there was no possibility of appeal, with the 
charter stating: “The judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or the innocence of any Defendant 
shall give the reasons on which it is based, and shall be final and not subject to review.”184 No 
further guidance for judges as to punishment was provided in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. This is especially problematic as, of the 19 defendants convicted at the IMT, 12 were 
sentenced to death. As Table 3.1 shows, the other seven were given custodial sentences: life 
(three defendants), 20 years (two), 15 years (one), and 10 years (one). 
The court’s judgment made little reference to the issue of retroactivity of sentencing, despite 
devoting considerable attention to dismissing the accusation of retroactivity of crimes.185 At this 
time, sentencing issues do not appear to have been considered a significant moral, let alone legal, 
constraint on the powers of international courts. 
Ultimately legality was breached in a more definitive and expansive manner in terms of 
punishment than of crimes. The irony is that the breaches of legality at Nuremberg and Tokyo—
both of crimes and punishment—led to the later determination that prosecution and punishment 
by international courts for breaches of war crimes and crimes against humanity were legal. The 
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breach of legality created the legal precedent relied upon to establish prosecution and 
punishment in the post-Cold War period. 
 
Defense parity indicator 1: Institutional support 
This section first discusses parity in relation to the defense and prosecution’s official positions 
within the IMT’s institutional structure. It then analyzes the support afforded by the court to both 
sides in pre-trial investigations.  
While the IMT prosecutors were given distinct duties in the London Charter, as a whole they 
lacked any official institutional status within the court’s structure. However, the charter did 
establish within the IMT a “committee for the investigation and prosecution of major war 
criminals,” consisting of the four chief prosecutors.186 They were charged with such duties as 
recommending rules of procedure for the trial to the judges, and deciding on the indictment and 
the evidence to be submitted. The prosecution did not possess an official status to enable them to 
formally request procedural decision-making changes. 
Nevertheless, the chief prosecutors were provided with significant influence over the 
proceedings through their function, as stipulated in the charter, of devising the court’s Rules of 
Procedure.187 The rules they created derived mostly from the practice of American military 
commissions, with the emphasis in their construction primarily not on legal fairness standards, 
but “workability and expedition.”188 The rules themselves were inconsistently applied, but the 
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most significant problem lay in their being “so flexible they were open to abuse.”189 The 
prosecution’s central role in constructing the procedural and evidentiary rules of the court 
therefore provided it with an enormous advantage in its courtroom confrontation with defense 
counsel. Counsel had no official institutional status within the court’s structure. It is indicative 
that counsel is only mentioned within three articles of the IMT charter, as opposed to eight for 
the prosecution.190 
Attitudes towards defense counsel at the IMT are arguably an indicator of how the issue of 
the heinousness of international crimes interferes with the presumption of innocence in 
international trials. It illustrates the different dynamic between a court and the prosecution, and 
the court and defense counsel, despite their ostensibly equivalent courtroom roles in competing 
to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused. Defense counsel do not seem to have been 
perceived by the IMT judges and prosecutors as part of a process of pursuing genuine legal 
justice, but merely as an adjunct of the accused. As described by IMT prosecutor Telford Taylor, 
“[s]ocially, the…defense counsel were no part of the war crimes community,”191 which consisted 
of Allied judges, prosecutors, and judicial staff. Taylor acknowledged the distinct way that 
defense counsel were perceived by the prosecution, tainted by atrocities that they had not been 
accused of committing and that had not at that point been legally proven against their clients: 
“the relations between the German lawyers [defense counsel] and ourselves could not be like that 
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of British barristers on circuit, where those who had been at each other’s throats in court that day 
could settle down together that evening for a friendly drink and chat. The appalling organized 
atrocities of the Nazi leaders lay between us.”192  
The discussion now turns to institutional support for investigation and evidence gathering by 
the defense in comparison with the prosecution at the IMT. The same conditions of territorial 
occupation that ultimately led to the accusations of victors’ justice in relation to the IMT, also 
meant that the prosecution had direct access to a vast number documents and witnesses germane 
to making their case.193 The London Charter gave the defense the right to present evidence, but 
did not provide aid to counsel in conducting investigations or gathering evidence. The Rules of 
Procedure stated that the defense might request the court’s assistance in locating evidence, and 
the court could then request states to locate the information.194 States were not required to hand 
over documents, and the court provided no aid in investigating or securing evidence beyond 
making these requests. In practice, Allied states were very reluctant to provide information to 
counsel. 
A dramatic demonstration of the lack of parity in evidence gathering and ultimately 
presentation—and a distinct breach of current standards of access to information—is found in the 
prohibition on defense counsel access to the Allied-controlled German archives in conducting 
their investigations. According to Otto Kranzbühler, defense counsel for Admiral Dönitz, 
                                                
192 Ibid., 232. 
193 On the other hand, most of the documents examined by the defense and prosecution were in written 
German, which hindered the prosecutors as they required translation, but not the defense counsel, who 
were all German. See comment by prosecutor Taylor, in Medical Case Transcript, December 5, 1946, 37, 
available at Harvard Law School Library’s Nuremberg Trials Project: 
nuremberg.law.harvard.edu/NurTranscript/TranscriptPages/37_037.html. 
194 Rules of Procedure (IMT), Rule 4.a-b. 
 
 
 
 
169 
counsel were also barred from all domestic records of the Allies themselves.195 This severely 
restricted the ability of defense counsel to investigate and search for exculpatory or mitigating 
material, and thereby to construct an adequate defense.196 
In making the prosecution’s case against the defendants, the US chief prosecutor at the IMT, 
US Supreme Court justice Robert H. Jackson, decided to rely largely on documentary evidence 
in the trial—primarily gathered within Germany from government archives—as opposed to 
witnesses.197 This was partly due to their perceived ability to aid in the construction of a 
historical narrative—discussed later. It was also because of the availability of a vast trove of 
documents, a result of the German government’s meticulous recordkeeping and its swift collapse 
and the occupation of Germany, putting much of this material in Allied hands.198 For example, 
after Hitler’s death, the new government of Admiral Karl Dönitz left huge quantities of 
government and military records behind when it moved from Flensburg to Mondorf, and German 
air force files were recovered from a salt mine in Bavaria. At Hitler’s retreat in Berchtesgaden 
were found the plans for the invasion of Czechoslovakia and official reports on the killing of half 
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a million Galician Jews. Such records were essential to the prosecution’s case at the IMT in 
relation to war crimes and crimes against humanity.199 
 
 
 
Defense parity indicator 2: Evidentiary procedures 
Dealing with the large volume of documentary evidence during trial proved problematic for the 
prosecution in that it risked slowing down proceedings—something Jackson was keen to 
avoid.200 The prosecution, however, were provided with significant leeway in their presentation 
of evidence. As the charter stated: “The tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of 
evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and nontechnical 
procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems to be of probative value.”201 Perhaps at 
least partly due to his critical attitude towards the IMT’s evidentiary standards, Goldstone, as the 
first chief prosecutor of the ICTY, stated to the author that he thought there was little in the way 
of lessons to be learnt for the ICTY from the practice of the IMT.202 
This wording was constructed to facilitate the introduction of any material even vaguely 
relevant as prosecution evidence without effective legal challenge. Former ICTY chief 
prosecutor Richard Goldstone and Adam Smith argue that the excessive latitude given to the 
prosecution in the London Charter seems to have been intended to calm British concerns that a 
                                                
199 Ibid., 36-7. 
200 Taylor, Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, 43-55. 
201 London Charter, article 19. 
202 Interview with Richard Goldstone, New York, October 17, 2014. 
 
 
 
 
171 
genuinely fair trial would lead to too many acquittals.203 The virtually non-existent rules of 
evidence meant that hearsay evidence—prohibited in most adversarial trial systems—was 
permitted at the IMT. Such evidence is problematic because it may be very indirect and is more 
likely to be in error than even direct witness testimony, which is also often suspect.204 
The presentation of evidence in the IMT prosecution’s case exhibits weaknesses in terms of 
defense parity that seem to stem at least partly from the Allies’ concern that the volume of 
evidence they intended to introduce would lengthen the trial excessively. Justice Jackson stated 
during a prosecutors’ meeting that his staff had introduced 331 documents as evidence against 
the accused within the first four hours of the trial. The presentation of the evidence took the form 
of reading a summary of a brief (that is, a summary of a summary of the original document) 
which largely declared the validity of the originals in making the prosecution case. Prosecutor 
Taylor believed that at such a pace and with such methods of introduction, the defense could not 
follow the case being presented—especially as the briefs were also initially made available to the 
defense only in English.205  
The Allied states which created the tribunal were determined to deal swiftly with the leaders 
of the losing side of the war—and to find them guilty and execute punishment. This is in spite of 
the time that is necessary to conduct criminal trials with comprehensive due process protections 
for defendants at the domestic level in liberal legal systems. The Soviet position at the London 
Conference and during the trial was especially clear: defense protections were never a concern 
for the conference negotiators or for the Russian judges and prosecutors, as it was not 
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domestically. The leader of the Soviet delegation to the London Conference, General Iona 
Timofeevich Nikitchenko, who had been a show trial judge during Stalin’s purges in the late 
1930s, stated this clearly during the conference debates: “The fact that the Nazi leaders are 
criminals has already been established. The task of the tribunal is only to determine the measure 
of guilt of each particular person and mete out the necessary punishment.”206  
However, institutional power bargaining dynamics are frequently characterized by an 
inequality of influence over the final rule-making outcomes. This is evident at the conference, as 
the American and British positions became a far more significant factor in determining the 
evidentiary procedures provided for in the London Charter than those of Russia and France. The 
American and British representatives at the conference—and their chief prosecutors at the 
court—took a far more active role in constructing the tribunal’s investigatory and trial 
procedures. The British government’s earlier decision that—under extrapolation from an old 
English law on the advice of Lord Chancellor Simon—the Nazi leaders should be shot within six 
hours of apprehension as “outlaws,”207 changed only at the eleventh hour due to the new 
American position.  
The British maintained their concern that strong defendant protections would undermine the 
goal of successful prosecutions. Even the Americans—who at one point had been the only major 
Allied government pushing for legal trials (as opposed to purely show trials)—expressed 
misgivings about the wisdom of a fair trial.208 US State Department staff claimed in a 1944 
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memorandum that a fair trial would be dangerous as it might allow the defendants to use the 
platform of such a trial to grandstand—to justify their actions and attack the Allies.209  
In terms of the first evidentiary indicator, the right of defense counsel to disclosure of 
prosecution evidence before the beginning of trial, the “crude but…workable” solution to 
merging Anglo-American and Continental trial approaches involved the prosecution providing 
some evidence to the defense at the indictment stage (before trial), with the right to introduce 
more evidence later.210 This approach went beyond US requirements at the time, but was lower 
than the contemporary Continental requirement of full disclosure of all prosecution evidence in 
the indictment, and the common-law practice as it developed during the Cold War towards full 
disclosure before the start of trial.211  
Provision of evidence to counsel by the prosecution seems to have been inadequate 
throughout the trial. According to a later account by Otto Pannenbecker, defendant Wilhelm 
Frick’s chief counsel, on numerous occasions counsel complained that they had not seen 
evidence before it was presented at trial, clearly leaving little time to adequately respond in 
defense of their clients.212 For example, during the first month of the trial, Judge Geoffrey 
Lawrence criticized prosecutor Robert Storey for providing hundreds of copies of prosecution 
documents to the press, but only about five to counsel—less than one for every four 
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defendants.213  Counsel Carl Haensel details prosecution refusal to provide the defense with 
copies of German documents related to the mass murder of POWs: only indexes were provided, 
listing documents by name.214  
Combined with the fact that many documents were presented in court via a brief rather than 
presenting the documentary evidence directly (the usual practice), these evidentiary access 
problems led the IMT judges to require changes to how evidence could be introduced: 
documents had to be read directly into the record during trial (no brief allowed) and a translation 
typed during the reading and handed to defense at the end of each day. By slowing proceedings 
the judges ameliorated some of the evidence-related problems generated by the prosecution’s 
trial methods. However, this approach only lasted for a few weeks, as Justice Jackson sought 
ways to speed up the pace of the trial again.215 
In an indicative example of the negative effect on disclosure of the prosecution desire for a 
swifter trial, Kranzbühler, Dönitz’s chief counsel, requested a meeting with the judges and 
prosecutors to discuss his demand that documents be made available to the defense—and in the 
original German—before their presentation in court.216 Jackson’s prosecution team had been 
providing documents to the court in English which had not yet been seen by the defense (in 
English or the original German). According to Kranzbühler, during the subsequent in camera 
meeting (in judges’ chambers, and not in the official record) Jackson stated that it would be too 
time-consuming and would conflict with the aims of the trial to have to provide the defense with 
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German copies of all documentary evidence. When pressed by Judge Lawrence on what he saw 
those aims to be, Jackson is claimed to have stated what amounted to political goals of 
delegitimization and historical narrative construction: to prove that German conduct in the war 
was unjustified and illegal, as the United States had claimed all along; and “to make it clear to 
the German people that it deserved severe punishment, and to prepare them for such 
punishment.”217  
The prosecution was also not required to disclose exculpatory material to defense counsel, 
and the latter were given little time to examine what they were given.218 This is especially 
problematic in the context of the IMT because, as mentioned, defense counsel had little ability to 
gather evidence of their own to present at trial because they had no access to information outside 
of Germany and were barred from archives in Allied hands.219 
Many of the evidentiary issues—such as the weight of documentary evidence introduced, its 
availability and disclosure to the defense, and the language of the summaries—result from the 
prosecution being overwhelmed with the size of the task at hand considering the time scale the 
Allies seem to have envisaged, and the consequent desire by Jackson to facilitate the trial by 
cutting procedural corners. The speed of trial was a constant factor for the defense even when its 
direct impact was on the prosecution, by disadvantaging the defense in gaining adequate and 
timely access to the prosecution’s case. 
The problems surrounding the volume of evidence introduced were partly caused by 
Jackson’s desire to use the trial for narrative construction purposes: in order to legitimize the 
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punishment of the losers as well as to construct a historical record.220 The volume of 
documentary evidence introduced by the prosecution was vastly greater than that needed to 
construct its case, and Jackson was hesitant to rely on the testimony of witnesses, whose 
reliability could not be guaranteed and who might be induced by defense counsel, in Jackson’s 
words, “to waver in their statements.”221  
Jackson later described the success of the IMT to President Truman partly in terms of the 
narrative objective: “We have documented from German sources the Nazi aggressions, 
persecutions, and atrocities with such authenticity and in such detail that there can be no 
responsible denial of these crimes in the future.”222 The historical narrative goal of the trial was 
partly responsible for the weaknesses in defense parity resulting from the inability—and 
unwillingness—of the prosecution to enable defense access to the huge volume of documentary 
evidence.  
Jackson was not the only individual involved in the legal process who shaped legal questions 
and procedures surrounding the defendants for political ends. Kim Priemel and Alexa Stiller 
argue that a—largely American and European émigré—epistemic community concerning Nazi 
Germany constructed the knowledge base on Nazi actions which created the legal categories 
pursued at the various Nuremberg trials. This community consisted of lawyers, such as Raphael 
Lemkin and Hersch Lauterpacht, and other relevant experts, such as historian Walter L. Dorn 
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and economist Edward Mason.223 Their goals were partly political and partly legal, but one of 
their greatest influences was over the composition of the indictment and opening statements: “the 
prime documents to phrase the narratives and arguments.”224 
The discussion now turns to the second evidentiary issue—witness cross-examination.225 The 
London Charter provided defendants with the right to present their own witnesses and cross-
examine those of the prosecution.226 The international criminal trial practitioners interviewed for 
this project almost all agreed that one of the most important issues—if not the most—that aids 
the accused in presenting an adequate defense is the quality of counsel. They considered quality 
to reside in significant knowledge of the relevant trial system—adversarial at the IMT (as at all 
later international courts)—and the skills and judgment to respond effectively to the 
prosecution’s case, especially in cross-examining witnesses.227 Cross-examination is “the 
hallmark of party-managed presentation of evidence,” with “party-managed” referring to an 
adversarial structure dominated by prosecution and defense, rather than the judge-dominated 
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highly incomplete if it did not include the number two in the Nazi hierarchy behind Hitler (that is, the 
highest ranking Nazi in Allied hands) and it would be perceived as weakening the cause of promoting 
human rights. Taylor, Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, 186. 
226 London Charter, article 16.e. 
227 Anonymous interviewees in San Francisco, London, and The Hague, August 2015–January 2016. 
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Continental inquisitorial system. In an adversarial system, cross-examination is central to 
defendants’ right to challenge the evidence presented against them.228 
The task of cross-examination is complicated enormously in situations in which defense 
counsel are unfamiliar with the adversarial system. The IMT charter prohibited the accused from 
retaining counsel from any country except Germany.229 Counsel were therefore all experienced 
in an inquisitorial trial system, and consequently unfamiliar with the central function of cross-
examination of prosecution witnesses. In inquisitorial trials, judges rather than the attorneys tend 
to question witnesses and there is no cross-examination, in which witness statements can be 
questioned and they can be specifically asked leading questions (not allowed in questioning 
one’s own witnesses).230  
Given this context, the defense attorneys at the IMT have been said to have performed poorly 
at cross-examining the prosecution’s witnesses. The shortcomings include asking questions that 
had no bearing on defendants’ culpability, and others which led to witnesses confirming the 
accused’s responsibility and so ultimately aiding the prosecution.231 This led to the defense 
calling many more witnesses than the prosecution (61 and 33, respectively), but doing poorly at 
                                                
228 Mirjan Damaška, “Problematic Features of International Criminal Procedure,” in The Oxford 
Companion to International Criminal Justice, ed. Antonio Cassese (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 181. 
229 London Charter, article 23. 
230 Salvatore Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 18.  
231 For example, counsel for Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel (Dr. Otto Nelte) and for Foreign Minister 
Joachim von Ribbentrop (Dr. Fritz Sauter) poorly cross-examined General Erwin Lahousen about 
meetings he attended in 1939 and 1941 where atrocities committed by the Germans had been discussed. 
Taylor, Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, 187-91. 
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utilizing them to address the issues at hand: instead Justice Lawrence warned counsel that their 
questions were not relevant.232 
Cross-examination by the defense, like their access to documentary evidence, was also 
affected by the prosecution’s desire to speed up trial at the expense of defense protections. There 
were also attempts by the prosecution to block counsel from cross-examining witness testimony 
at all, by presenting oral transcripts with no appearance by the witness at trial. When preparing to 
present their case against the German General Staff defendants, Justice Jackson attempted to 
persuade the judges to allow the prosecution to present sworn affidavits by witnesses in court, 
where the witnesses would not need to attend. His justification was that not only did the charter 
not bind the court to “technical rules of evidence” but that cross-examination of witness 
affidavits would slow down the proceedings excessively. The IMT’s rules, however, make no 
mention of the admissibility of a written witness statement in lieu of live testimony. 
The judges largely rejected this maneuver, arguing that, except in very unusual 
circumstances, affidavits could only be introduced as evidence if the witness could be called for 
cross-examination upon the request of the defense.233 As on various other occasions—some 
discussed above—the IMT judges acted as a brake on the prosecution’s attempt to weaken 
procedural defense protections in order to speed up the trial. Nevertheless, the use of written 
testimony at the court was extensive and inconsistent.234 After the trial, Jackson could boast to 
President Truman that “If it were not that the comparison might be deemed invidious, I could 
                                                
232 Douglas, The Memory of Judgment, 15. 
233 Taylor, Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, 240-3. 
234 Megan A. Fairlie, “Due Process Erosion: The Diminution of Live Testimony at the ICTY,” California 
Western International Law Journal 34 (2003): 52-3; and Richard May and Marieke Wierda, “Trends in 
International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague and Arusha,” Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 37 (1999): 749. 
 
 
 
 
180 
cite many anti-trust actions, rate cases, original cases in the United States Supreme Court, and 
other large litigations that have taken much longer to try.”235 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has placed legality and defense parity in historical and legal context at the state and 
international levels to demonstrate their centrality to legitimacy through legal fairness towards 
defendants in international criminal trials. The explanation of the evolution of protections for 
defendants throughout the development of international criminal justice illustrates the role of 
political actors in shaping the fairness standards that they can expect, both through the 
institutional power states exert in the construction of a court, and in their influence over the 
conduct of trials through differential support offered to defendants and prosecution. 
The analysis of the research’s defense protection indicators at the IMT in the final section of 
the chapter demonstrates that the court did not meet the standards found within the domestic law 
of liberal states at the time or international law today, providing little legitimacy through fairness 
towards defendants. The reluctance of Allied states to agree to trials for the Nazi leadership—
when they had much earlier and more easily agreed to prosecute German military personnel—
did not bode well for the attention to fairness in terms of legality or defense parity. 
The major breaches of legality of crimes and punishment at the London Conference provide a 
clear illustration of the political goals of prosecution undermining what were already 
fundamental defense protections at the domestic level in liberal states. Domestic pressure on 
Allied governments as more atrocities came to light led to the broadening of the charges into new 
                                                
235 Jackson, “Report to the President,” avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack63.asp. 
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crimes, which fit conveniently with the Allied desire to delegitimize the Nazi leadership through 
a public exposure of the full extent of their brutality. 
Defense parity issues at the IMT have received less critical attention than legality. This is 
especially the case within IR, where fair trial analyses of Nuremberg have concentrated upon 
such issues as selectivity of prosecution, and the partiality of judges and prosecutors. The chapter 
has demonstrated that institutional support for the defense was extremely weak by contemporary 
domestic and modern international standards, leaving counsel in a far inferior position to the 
prosecution by the beginning of the trial due to an inadequate ability to investigate and prepare a 
defense to the prosecution’s case. The Allies, before and during the London Conference, were 
clear that the primary goals of the trial were retribution and delegitimization of the Nazi 
leadership, and so parity in institutional support was not a relevant issue to their decision-making 
regarding the creation of the IMT. These concerns were reflected in the nature of the London 
Charter, which contained few and vague protections, and left the creation of detailed rules 
regarding procedure in the hands of one of the competing parties—the prosecution.  
In addition, evidentiary procedural standards were harmed by the desire by US chief 
prosecutor Jackson to conclude the trial quickly and with little opportunity for the defense to 
present an adequate rebuttal. Evidence disclosure problems were also generated by the goal of 
historical narrative construction, which shaped the nature and extent of evidence presented by the 
prosecution. A further problematic issue for defense parity was the apparent lack of 
understanding of, or deep concern for, the role of defendants in criminal trials by the Allied 
governments. The criminal trial approaches of the Allies which created the IMT came from two 
distinct systems: the common law adversarial approach of the Americans and British; and 
various forms of civil law inquisitorial approach. Yet, according to prosecutor Taylor, “there is 
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no evidence that either group had given any prior attention to the problem of how, if at all, the 
two systems could be married,” and how this would affect defendants and their counsel.236 This 
lack of understanding, generating confusion between arguably incompatible systems, combined 
with the political goals of various participants, led to very weak defense parity standards.  
It is ironic that the evidence against many of the defendants was so overwhelming that a 
genuinely fair trial in terms of parity would have almost certainly led to a very similar outcome 
while offering the defendants full legal protection from the arbitrary power of international legal 
institutions, and afforded the trial with far higher standards of legal legitimacy, diminishing the 
charges at the time and subsequently of “victor’s justice” in relation to the trial.237 
There are a number of lessons from the IMT case that we will encounter in Chapters 4 and 5. 
As a foreshadowing of themes discussed in those chapters, this chapter will end with a brief 
comparison between the legality and defense parity at the IMT and those at the ICTY and ICC. 
In relation to institutional support features of defense parity, the IMT was much less formally 
structured than post-Cold War courts, which have provided the prosecution with an official 
institutional status. This has enabled the office of the prosecutor at later courts to formally 
request procedural decision-making changes, unlike at the IMT. This elevation of the 
institutional position of the prosecution has not been matched by a similar elevation of the 
defense.  
                                                
236 Taylor, Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, 59. 
237 Nicola Henry, Law, Memory and Justice (New York: Routledge, 2001); Leslie Scheuermann, 
“Comment: Victor’s Justice? The Lessons of Nuremberg Applied to the Trial of Saddam Hussein,” 
Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 15 (2006): 291-310; Futamura, War Crimes 
Tribunals and Transitional Justice; and Danilo Zolo, Victors’ Justice: From Nuremberg to Baghdad, 
trans. M.W. Weir (London: Verso, 2009). 
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Because the Allies occupied Germany, where many of the IMT crimes allegedly occurred, 
the prosecution had direct access to enormous volumes of evidence before trial. In contrast, at 
the ICTY and ICC access to territories for investigation has had to be mediated through domestic 
legal and political authorities. Prosecutors and defense have therefore been reliant on the 
cooperation of external authorities, including states, IGOs such as the UN and NATO, and 
human rights NGOs for authorizing and aiding in investigations and evidence gathering. This has 
arguably put the defense on a more equal footing, but there have been substantial inequalities 
generated by unequal institutional support and state bias. 
In terms of evidentiary procedures, one of the most important factors shaping tribunals’ rules 
and their application has been state concern to contain costs and accelerate trials. Judges have 
been less successful at the ICTY and ICC at resisting attempts to speed up trials at the expense of 
defense parity than they were at Nuremberg. These political influences shaping legality and 
defense parity are analyzed in depth in the following two chapters. 
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4 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
This chapter examines the legal fairness of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY)1 in relation to criminal defendants, and how the adequacy of their legal 
representation has been affected by the institutional power of states, and the political goals of and 
influences on judicial actors at the court by states, IGOs, and NGO actors. It provides an 
assessment of the tribunal’s legal fairness legitimacy between the effective start of the tribunal’s 
operation in July 1994 and July 2016. 
The chapter provides a critique of the common assumption among IR and other social 
science scholars that the ICTY is characterized by fair trials.2 Fairness tends to be assumed from 
a simplistic assessment that basic due process principles are implemented at the tribunal and that 
it was not created as a direct expression of victor’s justice. Few political scientists appear to have 
appreciated the knowledge of legal procedure necessary to understand how legal principles are 
                                                
1 This name and especially “ICTY” are used throughout the chapter to refer to the tribunal. Note that the 
court’s official full name is the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991. 
2 Cherif Bassiouni, for example, in referring to due process at the ICTY and ICTR, mentions the 
“exemplary manner in which these tribunals have proceeded.” See M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The Perennial 
Conflict Between International Criminal Justice and Realpolitik,” Georgia State University Law Review 
22, no. 3 (2006): 557. Other examples include Rachel Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise in Law, Politics, and Diplomacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004); Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); David P. Forsythe, “‘Political Trials’?: The UN Security 
Council and the Development of International Criminal Law,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to 
International Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives, ed. William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, and 
Niamh Hayes (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 492; James Meernik, “Judging and Punishing at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 2 
(2003): 140-62; and Martin Griffiths, Terry O’Callaghan, and Steven C. Roach, International Relations: 
The Key Concepts, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2008), 165. 
 
 
 
 
185 
implemented and therefore the avenues through which political considerations impact trial 
fairness. 
The research argues that a fusion of legal and political functions at the ICTY has distorted the 
role of the prosecutor and moved the tribunal away from the legalist position which claims there 
is complete separation of legal and political decision-making within trials.3 This fusion of 
functions affects the dynamic between prosecution and defense, demonstrating the weakness in 
the position of Rachel Kerr on the separation between law and politics at the ICTY: “Whilst they 
are intertwined, law and politics are not merged: The boundary exists at the doorway to the 
courtroom…[L]aw informed the political decision to establish and politics determined the 
application of legal norms for a political purpose—international peace and security.”4 Kerr does 
not consider that political decisions before the courtroom affect what goes on within—due to 
their effect on the legal dynamic between prosecution and defense. There is no courtroom 
insulation from political interference in the judicial process. 
The chapter begins with an examination of the effect of the nature of the creation of the 
tribunal by the UN on fairness for defendants. Sections two and three analyze the indicators of 
the principle of legality: the level of retroactivity in the mass atrocity crimes within the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction; and its sentencing guidelines and practices. Sections four and five examine 
indicators of the dynamic between the prosecution and defense in the pre-trial and trial stages. 
First, the impact of the court’s structure on this dynamic is analyzed, followed by the impact of 
structure and the external perception of the prosecution and defense on their ability to conduct 
                                                
3 On legalism at the IMT see Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). On legalism in international criminal justice more 
broadly, see Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance, 7-8. 
4 Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 3. 
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investigations and acquire evidence. Second, procedures relating to evidence presentation and 
witnesses are examined in terms of how they impact parity during trial.  
The evidence relied upon in the research includes the ICTY statute5 and Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence (RPE);6 case law, including motions and court judgments; court administrative 
documents and website data; participant memoires; interviews with prosecutors, defense counsel, 
and other close court observers; and secondary legal, political, and historical sources. 
 
Conflation of legal and political justice goals in the creation of the tribunal 
In July 1992, as the Security Council began to address reports of atrocities committed during the 
ongoing armed conflict in the Balkans, it declared that individuals guilty of “grave breaches” of 
the Geneva Conventions in the former Yugoslavia would be held accountable.7 A commission of 
experts established by the secretary-general to examine evidence of violations recommended in 
its first interim report in February 1993 the creation of an ad hoc international tribunal to try 
suspects for gross violations of international humanitarian law.8 The Security Council took the 
                                                
5 Its full title is the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY statute), UN doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1, adopted 
by the Security Council on May 25, 1993, UN doc. S/RES/827. 
6 ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopted February 11, 1994. Revision 50, UN doc. 
IT/32/Rev.50, July 8, 2015, 
www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032Rev50_en.pdf. 
7 Security Council Resolution 764, UN doc. S/RES/764, July 13, 1992, para. 10, 
www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/scres92.htm. 
8 UN Secretary-General, “Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780 (1992),” UN doc. S/25274, February 10, 1993. See also the second interim report, 
UN Secretary-General, “Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780 (1992),” UN doc. S/26545, October 5, 1993, 
digital.case.edu/downloads/83380p575. The commission’s full name was “The Commission of Experts 
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) to Investigate Grave Breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions and other Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia.” 
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commission’s advice and asked the secretary-general to develop specific proposals.9 His report 
included a statute for the ICTY,10 which the council approved in resolution 827 in May 1993.11  
According to Thomas Weiss there was a broad lack of political will by powerful states to 
countenance substantial action in relation to Yugoslavia.12 The council’s reaction was instead 
characterized by rhetoric condemning war crimes, authorizing sanctions and weak protection 
forces,13 and supporting a settlement under plans such as the Vance-Owen process.14 The move 
towards a legal solution was a half-hearted response when the Security Council had resisted 
military approaches which required greater commitment.15 The creation of the ICTY was also 
driven by domestic political and public pressure on US president Bill Clinton to react to the 
atrocities in the Balkans, which were depicted widely in the media in the early 1990s.16  
The stage was set for action by the Security Council in 1992, when it indicated that it was 
willing to consider a broader range of situations to constitute a threat to international peace and 
                                                
9 Security Council resolution 808, February 22, 1993, www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm. 
10 UN Secretary-General, “Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993),” UN doc. S/25704, May 3, 1993 (“secretary-general’s report”), 
www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_re808_1993_en.pdf. Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, annex to UN doc. S/25704, 36-48. 
11 UN doc. S/RES/827, May 25, 1993, preamble, www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm. 
12 Thomas G. Weiss, “UN Responses in the Former Yugoslavia: Moral and Operational Choices,” Ethics 
& International Affairs 8, no. 1 (1994): 1-22. 
13 For example, in resolution 713, September 25, 1991, the Security Council expressed deep concern over 
the fighting, and, in para. 6, authorized an arms embargo on Yugoslavia; and in resolution 764, July 13, 
1992, the council condemned the fighting in Bosnia and, in para. 2, authorized the deployment of a UN 
force to protect the Sarajevo airport and humanitarian aid deliveries. 
14 The 1993 Vance-Owen Plan involved attempting to secure peace in Bosnia while maintaining a unified 
central government, but was not accepted by Bosnian Serbs and was soon defunct. See Steven L. Burg 
and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (New 
York: Routledge, 1999), 189-262. In Security Council resolution 836, June 4, 1993, para. 6, 
www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930604a.htm, the council encouraged the local implementation of the Vance-Owen 
Plan by affirming its importance to peace and stability in the region. 
15 Weiss, “UN Responses in the Former Yugoslavia:” 20. 
16 Forsythe, “‘Political Trials’?” 480. 
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security—the threshold for invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and thereby passing 
resolutions that are legally binding on all UN member states. During the Cold War, in contrast, 
the council interpreted its mandate as almost totally excluding domestic conflicts.17  
In January 1992, a note by the president of the Security Council acknowledged that while the 
end of the Cold War had brought about positive change, it had also generated “new risks for 
stability and security”—including economic and humanitarian situations.18 According to Rachel 
Kerr, “[t]his set the tone for future UN responses and represented a watershed in the 
determination of a threat to international peace and security within the terms of Article 39 of the 
UN Charter. It directly opened the way for the establishment of a Tribunal, since it meant that 
violations of international humanitarian law could be formally determined a threat to 
international peace and security.”19  
According to Paul Tavernier, the creation of the ICTY in 1993, and the ICTR one year later, 
“amounted to allowing the imperative of maintaining peace to take precedence over those of law 
and justice.”20 From the first post-Cold War tribunal an explicit link was made by powerful states 
and the UN that international criminal courts were expected to perform the political goals of 
promoting peace and security as a mechanism of transitional justice. The very decision-making, 
                                                
17 Only in relation to Southern Rhodesia in 1986 (resolution 232) and South Africa in 1977 (resolution 
418) did the council authorize action under Chapter VII in relation to entirely domestic issues during the 
Cold War. 
18 Note by the President of the Security Council, UN doc. S/23500, January 31, 1992, 
www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/PKO%20S%2023500.php. The statement was 
read out by British prime minister John Major, in his capacity as president of the Security Council. See 
UN Department of Political Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Supplement 1989-
1992 (New York: United Nations, 2007), 820, www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/89-
92/Chapter%208/GENERAL%20ISSUES/Item%2028_SC%20respons%20in%20maint%20IPS.pdf. 
19 Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 19. 
20 Paul Tavernier, “The Experience of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
for Rwanda,” International Review of the Red Cross 321 (1997): 612. 
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or lack of political will rather, that led to the creation of the ICTY is characterized by a legal 
mechanism as a substitute for military action and a political solution. The chapter highlights 
throughout the consequences for the legal fairness of the criminal justice meted out by the 
tribunal of attempting to utilize a criminal justice mechanism to ameliorate international political 
problems.  
The commission of experts, created by the Security Council in a unanimous vote in October 
1992,21 was tasked by the secretary-general with investigating violations of international 
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and to explore responses to ongoing atrocities. Gary 
Bass argues that despite their positive votes, both France and the United Kingdom saw legal 
investigations and prosecutions as a possible obstacle to future peace negotiations.22 In addition 
to the difficulty for democratic governments of dealing with war criminals would be the 
presumed disincentive for such individuals to compromise politically.23 
                                                
21 UN Security Council resolution 780, October 6, 1992, www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/scres92.htm. The 
voting record information is from the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISNET), 
unbisnet.un.org. 
22 This attitude is reflective of a long-standing argument that the pursuit of justice for the victims of 
international crimes diminishes the chances for long-term peace, especially when a conflict is ongoing. 
The two sides tend to fall along the lines of politics vs. the law, with political leaders tending to argue that 
the most important concern during a conflict is a swift negotiated settlement, while judges and human 
rights groups maintain that no peace is sustainable without legal justice for the victims and the potential 
deterrent effect and normative value of an end to impunity. On the political justice side see, for example, 
Jack Synder and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of 
International Justice,” International Security 28, no. 3 (2003/04): 5-44. On the legal justice side see 
Human Rights Watch, Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace, doc. no. 1-56432-
508-3, July 2009, www.hrw.org/report/2009/07/07/selling-justice-short/why-accountability-matters-
peace. 
23 Max Boot, “When ‘Justice’ and ‘Peace’ Don’t Mix,” Wall Street Journal, 2 October 2000, in 
International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals, 3rd ed., ed. Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston 
and Ryan Goodman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1332-3; and Bass, Stay the Hand of 
Vengeance, 210-11. 
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The UN Office of Legal Affairs (OLA),24 and especially a British member, Ralph Zacklin, 
obstructed the work of the commission, according to commissioners and ICTY staff.25 The 
commission’s members seem to have been chosen to ensure a slow work pace, “stuffed with 
academic ‘old fogeys’” according to one commissioner, only one full-time member of staff—an 
“elderly retired law professor”—and without the resources to meet frequently or investigate 
effectively. The commission was a “low-budget-scapegoat.”26 According to Cherif Bassiouni, 
who took over leadership of the commission in August 1993, financing issues and investigations 
were characterized by a complete lack of cooperation from the British and French, and in April 
1994 the Secretariat closed the commission. The evidence unearthed implicated political leaders 
which the major powers were negotiating with, and so “it became politically necessary to 
terminate the work of the Commission while attempting to avoid the negative consequences of 
such a direct action.”27  
The commission’s success, despite resistance, is also what led the British to reject the 
nomination of Bassiouni as first chief prosecutor of the tribunal.28 Richard Goldstone, who 
became the first chief prosecutor to officially take up the position, reports that political resistance 
and unwillingness to cooperate were not confined to the UN. Former British prime minister 
Edward Health had asked Goldstone why he had accepted such a “ridiculous job,” saying that it 
                                                
24 As stated on its website, OLA “provides a unified central legal service for the Secretariat and the 
principal and other organs of the United Nations and contribute [sic] to the progressive development and 
codification of international public and trade law,” OLA, “Overview,” legal.un.org/ola/overview.aspx. 
25 Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance, 211. 
26 Ibid. 
27 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a 
Permanent International Criminal Court,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 10, no. 10 (1997): 41. 
28 David P. Forsythe, “Politics and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” Criminal Law 
Forum 5, no. 2-3 (1994): 408. 
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was no concern of the British government if people wanted to kill each other as long as they did 
it outside of Britain.29 
Nevertheless, the ICTY finally became operational in November 1993 when 11 judges began 
their terms of office in The Hague. After a “protracted, politicized fiasco” over the selection of 
the first chief prosecutor of the court,30 Goldstone was approved by the Security Council in July 
1994 and started working in August—marking the true start of the operation of the tribunal.31  
At the final tally the ICTY has indicted 161 individuals for these crimes. As of July 2016, 
cases against nine of them were ongoing: one at trial stage, that of the Bosnian-Serb military 
commander, Ratko Mladić, and eight at the appeals stage. In relation to the cases that have 
closed at the tribunal, 81 individuals were convicted (including the Bosnian-Serb political leader, 
Radovan Karadžić), 19 acquitted, two are to be retried by the Mechanism for International 
Criminal Tribunals (MICT),32 13 had their cases transferred to national jurisdictions, 17 died 
before the start or completion of their trial (including former president of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia Slobodan Milošević),33 and the other 20 had their indictments withdrawn. Karadžić’s 
                                                
29 Richard J. Goldstone, For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Investigator (New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale University Press, 2000), 74. 
30 The first chief prosecutor elected by the Security Council was Ramón Escovar-Salom, the attorney-
general of Venezuela, in October 1993 (Security Council Resolution 877, October 21, 1993). He quit the 
post a few months later, before ever officially taking up his appointment. See Kerr, The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 49-50. 
31 Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance, 217. 
32 In 2010 the Security Counsel created the MICT to help in transferring cases to local courts and act as an 
appeals court for the final ICTY (and ICTR) cases. See Security Council Resolution 1966, December 22, 
2010, www.unmict.org/sites/default/files/documents/101222_sc_res1966_statute_en.pdf. 
33 The most recent defendant to die, closing one of the last two first-instance trials remaining at the court, 
was Goran Hadžić in July 2016. See Jurist.org, “ICTY War Crimes Defendant Goran Hadzic Dies,” July 
14, 2016, www.jurist.org/paperchase/2016/07/icty-war-crimes-defendant-goran-hadzic-dies.php. 
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appeal to his March 2016 conviction will be heard by the MICT, as will that of Mladić if he is 
convicted by the ICTY.34  
 
Legality indicator 1: Non-retroactivity of crimes 
This section provides an assessment of legality at the court by examining the extent and nature of 
retroactive enforcement of crimes. It begins by analyzing the UN debate surrounding legality 
during the process of creating the tribunal. Then the three mass atrocity crimes over which the 
tribunal has jurisdiction are examined: war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. As an 
illustration of the relative numerical importance of these crimes within ICTY prosecutions, in the 
first 19 years of the tribunal’s existence, 56.9 percent of all indicted charges were for war crimes 
(939 counts), 40.6 percent for crimes against humanity (670 counts), and 2.4 percent for 
genocide (40 counts). Of total convictions at the tribunal, war crimes constitute 58.9 percent (201 
counts), crimes against humanity 40.7 percent (139 counts), and genocide less than one percent 
(one count).35 
The analysis explores, where appropriate: first, issues relating to the commission of experts, 
the secretary-general’s report on the creation of the court, and Security Council decision-making; 
second, the ICTY statute and RPE; and third, the practice of the tribunal. In determining the 
extent to which the court has adhered to the principle of legality, the analysis applies the 
admonition quoted in Chapter 1 of the dissertation: conforming case law must involve “a 
measured clarification or interpretation…[I]t should not permit judges the freedom to create law 
                                                
34 ICTY, Key Figures of the Case, www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases; data last updated April 19, 
2016. 
35 Leila Nadya Sadat, “Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age,” The American Journal of 
International Law 107, no. 2 (2013): 342-4. 
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aimed at correcting lacunae of international criminal law.”36 Judicial interpretation may shape 
law without breaching legality,37 but expansion of the law in this manner risks violating the line 
between clarification and correcting lacunae—the latter task is assigned to the legislature in a 
democratic legal system.38 
 
The UN and the legality of the tribunal’s crimes 
The secretary-general’s report directly acknowledged the importance of adhering to the principle 
of legality.39 This is evident in the recognition of the council’s lack of legislative authority in the 
report, with the tribunal not provided with legislative competence beyond the council’s own. 
That is, unlike at the IMT, there would be no establishment of new international crimes.40 The 
report recommended only prosecuting crimes that had attained customary international law 
status, and which would therefore be considered binding on all UN member states.41 As stated in 
the report: “In the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the principle nullum crimen 
sine lege [non-retroactivity of crimes] requires that the international tribunal should apply rules 
of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the 
                                                
36 Michael G. Karnavas, “Is the Emerging Jurisprudence on Complicity in Genocide before the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals a Moving Target in Conflict with the Principle of Legality?” in The Criminal Law of Genocide: 
International, Comparative and Contextual Aspects, ed. Ralph Henham and Paul Behrens (Aldershot, 
UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 100. 
37 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990), 50-66. 
38 In practice, judges, especially those within common law systems, are criticized of “judicial activism” 
for breaching this line. In the United States context, see Archibald Cox, “The Role of the Supreme Court: 
Judicial Activism or Self-Restraint?” Maryland Law Review 47, no. 1 (1987): 118-38. 
39 Secretary-general’s report, paras. 33-49.  
40 Daphna Shraga and Ralph Zacklin, “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” 
European Journal of International Law 5, no. 3 (1994): 363. 
41 Whereas treaties are only binding on states that have ratified them, customary laws are binding on all 
states. See Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 153-82. 
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problem of adherence of some but not all states to specific conventions does not arise.”42 The 
tribunal itself has also expressed concern that it refrain from creating law, stating that “the 
principle of legality demands that the Tribunal shall apply the law which was binding on 
individuals at the time of the acts charged”—that is, customary law.43 
Kenneth Gallant argues that the customary law status of legality as a core principle of 
international criminal justice was in fact established by the UN process surrounding the creation 
of the ICTY. The secretary-general’s report articulates the opinio juris, or juridical 
determination, of the UN Secretariat that the principle of legality is binding on the UN. The 
Security Council’s acceptance of this in creating the court demonstrates the practice of states, 
which forms the other required component for the establishment of the existence of a customary 
international legal obligation. The acceptance of the secretary-general’s report by the council 
also demonstrates the council’s opinio juris on this issue.44 
The secretary-general’s report argued that war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide had attained customary status by 1993. War crimes were customary due to the almost 
universal state acceptance of the 1907 Hague Convention IV and 1949 Geneva Conventions I-
IV; crimes against humanity through the 1945 IMT charter; and genocide through wide state 
ratification of the 1948 Genocide Convention.45  
                                                
42 Secretary-general’s report, para. 34. 
43 Milutinović et al., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, case no. IT-99-37-AR72, May 21, 2003, para. 10, 
www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/00207160-00207178.pdf. 
44 Kenneth S. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 306. 
45 Secretary-general’s report, para. 35. The treaty and customary law referred to consists of the Geneva 
Conventions I-IV (on land and sea warfare, POWs, and civilians, respectively), August 12, 1949; Hague 
Convention IV (land warfare) and annexed regulations, October 18, 1907; the Charter of the International 
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However, the secretary-general’s strategy of relying on customary law in order to avoid 
retroactivity in prosecuting crimes is legally questionable. The principle of legality is founded on 
the normative importance of predictability, and the clarity and specificity of legal prohibitions. 
The unwritten and often imprecise nature of customary international law means that it arguably 
provides a poor fit with the requirements of legality.46 Nevertheless, when defendants have 
challenged the legality of any of the crimes at the court, they have rarely been successful.47 The 
ICTY has determined that it can interpret and clarify the elements of crimes without retroactively 
creating law,48 and can even progressively develop the law, as long as it does not stray into 
creating new law or interpreting the law, as the court stated, “beyond the reasonable limits of 
acceptable clarification.”49 This may well be a fine line, however, as the discussion below in 
relation to each crime illustrates. 
 
War crimes 
During Security Council debates on the laws to be included in the ICTY charter, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and France argued that customary law should not exhaust the 
applicable law of war crimes, but that any humanitarian treaty (in addition to Geneva I-IV and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Military Tribunal (London Charter), August 8, 1945; and the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, December 9, 1948. 
46 Susan Lamb, “Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal Law,” in The Rome 
Statute of International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 1, ed. Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and 
John R.W.D. Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 743. 
47 William A. Schabas, The United Nations International Criminal Tribunals (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 65; and Jonas Nilsson, “The Crime of Persecution in the ICTY Case-law,” in The 
Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ed. Bert Swart, Alexander 
Zahar, and Göran Sluiter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 233. 
48 Aleksovski, Appeals Judgement, case no. IT-95-14/1-A, March 24, 2000, paras. 126-7, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf. 
49 Milutinović et al., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction, para. 38. 
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Hague IV) that was applicable to the former Yugoslavia at the time of an offense could be 
legally enforced by the ICTY,50 including the 1977 Additional Protocols.51 This significantly 
broadens the law prosecutable by the court from the secretary-general’s cautious approach to 
legality. The tribunal itself later accepted this position, thereby expanding the law from its 
statute, but only to be applicable in the territory of a former Yugoslav state which had already 
transposed the treaty provisions into domestic law—an attempt to adhere to legality despite the 
broadening of crimes.52  
In contrast to the Western powers, non-western states on the Security Council, such as 
Venezuela, seemed concerned to limit the court’s jurisdiction over crimes by stating that it 
should only apply customary law—the position of the Secretariat.53 Venezuela also appeared just 
as concerned with ensuring that the court perform political functions as legal ones, especially 
narrative construction: “we suggest that the Prosecutor should not confine himself to bringing 
cases before the Tribunal, but should also present an overall report on all of the violations of 
international humanitarian law that come to his knowledge, which will provide him with an 
historical record of great importance.”54 Even less powerful states concerned about providing 
expansive legal powers to the court saw political functions as key to its purpose. As explained 
later in the chapter, the prosecution’s role in narrative construction—an aspect of the political 
                                                
50 Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3,217th Meeting, UN doc. S/PV.3217, May 25, 
1993, 11, 15, 19, www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/930525-unsc-verbatim-record.pdf. 
51 Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 (relating to international 
and non-international armed conflict, respectively), June 8, 1977. 
52 Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, case no. IT-94-1-
AR72, October 2, 1995, paras. 135 and 143, www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm. 
53 Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3,217th Meeting, 8. 
54 Ibid. 
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objective of encouraging transitional justice through the tribunal—has shaped defendant rights, 
especially in high-profile cases.  
In the statute, customary war crimes are defined in articles 2 and 3 as grave breaches of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws of customs of war, respectively. The latter 
relied largely on the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.55 In the case law, ICTY judges have 
determined a distinct “division of labour” between these aspects of war crimes, with article 3 
encapsulating “all violations of international humanitarian law other than ‘grave breaches’ of the 
four Geneva Conventions falling under Article 2.”56 Article 3 is therefore a broad category, 
whose list of underlying offenses, including plunder and “wanton destruction of cities,” is 
illustrative, not exhaustive.57 
The ICRC, “the world’s leading authority on international humanitarian law,”58 had 
determined in 1993 that “the notion of war crimes is limited to situations of international armed 
conflict.”59 However, in the first case before the tribunal, that of Duško Tadić, a low-level 
Bosnian Serb militia member, the court expanded the application of the customary law of war to 
                                                
55 ICTY statute, articles 2 and 3, respectively. The underlying offenses of the two categories as stated in 
the statute partially overlap, including on the excessive use of force and on targeting civilians. 
56 Delalić et al., Trial Judgement, case no. IT-96-21-T, November 16, 1998, para. 297, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf. In the second quote, the Delalić judgment was 
quoting Tadić, Jurisdiction Decision, para. 87. 
57 According to the statute: “[s]uch violations shall include, but not be limited to…” ICTY statute, article 
3, chapeau. Most definitively, perhaps, the court stated in the Tadić case that “Article 3 thus confers on 
the International Tribunal jurisdiction over any serious offence against international humanitarian law not 
covered by Article 2, 4 or 5.” The court has made it clear from discussion within Tadić that the Security 
Council intended that the tribunal prosecute all violations of international humanitarian law, with article 3 
becoming a catch-all for everything not covered elsewhere in the statute under any of the crimes. See 
Tadić, Jurisdiction Decision, para. 91. Emphasis in original. 
58 Michael P. Scharf, “Have We Really Learned the Lessons of Nuremberg?” conference paper presented 
at “Nuremberg and the Rule of Law: A Fifty-Year Verdict,” The Judge Advocate General’s School, 
United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, November 17-18, 1995, 3, 
www.pegc.us/archive/DoD/docs/Lessons_of_Nuremburg.doc.  
59 ICRC, “Preliminary Remarks of the International Committee of the Red Cross,” February 22, 1993, 
quoted in Ibid. 
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also apply to internal conflict, which has had profound implications for prosecution at the ICTY 
and later international courts.60 Relying partly on the IMT Trial Judgement,61 the ICTY rejected 
Tadić’s defense argument that there is no individual criminal responsibility for war crimes in 
internal conflicts,62 and determined that: 
[T]he distinction between interstate wars and civil wars is losing its value as far as human 
beings are concerned. Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, 
torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as 
well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering when two sovereign States are 
engaged in war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same 
protection when armed violence has erupted ‘only’ within the territory of a sovereign 
State? If international law, while of course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of 
States, must gradually turn to the protection of human beings, it is only natural that the 
aforementioned dichotomy should gradually lose its weight.63 
Grant Niemann, an ICTY prosecutor at the time, argues that this interpretation is legally sound 
because the tribunal and the Security Council which created the ICTY are not signatories to and 
so not bound by the Geneva Conventions. He claims that the ICTY interpretation of 
humanitarian law—that the states which created the humanitarian conventions did not wish them 
to be used to permit other states to intervene in their internal affairs—is legally irrelevant. All 
                                                
60 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, 2nd ed. (New York: 
The New Press, 2002), 312. The court argued that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions still applied 
solely to international conflict. During the appeal process Tadić was found guilty on nine counts of war 
crimes, after being originally acquitted on the grounds that they did not take place during an international 
armed conflict. 
61 IMT, Göring and Others, Judgment and Sentence. 
62 Tadić, Jurisdiction Decision, paras. 128-9. 
63 Ibid., para. 97. 
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that matters is that the UN Charter provides the Security Council the authority, under Chapter 
VII, to intervene in states’ internal affairs.64  
However, the tribunal claimed to be identifying an already existing customary rule, as well as 
to be interpreting the purpose of the creators of the court’s statute—states in the Security 
Council—as requiring an expansion of customary law to effectively implement their political 
goals of security and peace in the Balkans—a conflation of legal and political factors in 
determining law.65 Additionally, this expansion of war crimes was “quite explicitly excluded” by 
the drafters of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977.66 
The dissertation agrees with Michael Scharf’s contention that the court’s approach to war 
crimes constituted a “novel interpretation” that clearly breaches the legality of crimes: “such 
recognition would constitute progressive development of international law, rather than 
acknowledgment of a rule that is beyond doubt entrenched in existing law,” and falls foul of “the 
ex post facto criticism.”67 Scharf fears that such a determination will diminish the legal 
legitimacy of the court: “states will not have faith in the integrity of the Tribunal as a precedent 
for other ad hoc tribunals and for a permanent international criminal court if the Tribunal is 
perceived as prone to expansive interpretations of international law.”68  
From a human rights perspective, in contrast, the expansion of war crimes to internal 
conflicts was “one of the most significant jurisprudential achievements [of the ICTY] as far as 
                                                
64 Grant Niemann, “The Life and Times of a Senior Trial Attorney at the ICTY from 1994 to 2000,” 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 2, no. 2 (2004): 439. 
65 Alexander Grabert, Dynamic Interpretation of International Criminal Law: Striking a Balance between 
Stability and Change (Munich: Herbert Utz Verlag, 2015), 40. 
66 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 4th ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 123. 
67 Scharf, “Have We Really Learned the Lessons of Nuremberg?” 3. 
68 Ibid. 
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war crimes are concerned.”69 This clash between human rights and criminal justice 
interpretations of legal determinations illustrates a trade-off of legitimacy at the tribunal. By 
expanding the enforcement reach of the international humanitarian law of war crimes, the court 
created new criminal jurisdiction, thereby retroactively creating new law. Ultimately the Tadić 
decision is an “example of a dynamic interpretation which is highly desirable from a human-
rights perspective while problematic from the perspective of the principle of legality.”70 
One of most significant developments in the expansion of underlying offenses at the ICTY in 
relation to war crimes has been the inclusion of sexual offenses, over which there was no 
jurisdiction at the IMT. Despite political resistance and lack of support, the commission of 
experts established by the secretary-general was able to do valuable investigative work, 
especially in relation to sexual crimes,71 including by conducting fact-finding missions which 
determined that Bosnian Serb sexual violence was systematic.72 This encouraged NGOs and 
women’s civil society organizations to analyze sexual violence during the war as a “specific, 
gendered war strategy.”73 It also led to their prosecution at the tribunal as underlying offenses of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, so that “[i]n relation to the sexual exploitation of 
                                                
69 Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 132. 
70 Grabert, Dynamic Interpretation of International Criminal Law, 41. 
71 United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) and the Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, “Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: United Nations Response,” in Women2000 (New 
York: DAW, 1998), www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/w2apr98.htm. 
72 UN Secretary-General, “Interim Report” (first report), para. 66.c. For an exploration of the systematic 
nature of the sexual violence during the war, see Amnesty International, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Rape 
and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces,” doc. no. EUR 63/01/93, January 1993. 
73 Tanja Djurić-Kuzmanović, Rada Drezgić, and Dubravka Žarkov, “Gendered War, Gendered Peace: 
Violent Conflicts in the Balkans and their Consequences,” in Gendered Peace: Women's Struggles for 
Post-war Justice and Reconciliation, ed. Donna Pankhurst (New York: Routledge, 2008), 274. 
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women during the course of armed conflict, the ad hoc tribunals have made a significant 
contribution to redressing the injustices of the past.”74 
While Geneva Convention IV does prohibit sexual violence against civilians,75 in Delalić et 
al. the court acknowledged that it is not included in the treaty as a grave breach,76 nor is it found 
in Common Article 3,77 and so the justices argued that it cannot be prosecuted as an underlying 
offense of war crimes in its own right.78 The court has consequently been careful to demonstrate 
that prosecutions for sexual offenses are consistent with legality. In the same case, the court 
identified the prohibitions on rape within the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols to 
determine that rape constitutes an international criminal act—prohibited as an aspect of the 
underlying offense of torture.79 In Furundžija the court carefully laid out other existing sources 
for rape as a war crime,80 including the US Civil War-era military Leiber Code,81 Hague 
Convention IV,82 and the practice of the IMTFE at Tokyo.83 Given the prior existing law and 
practice, the apparent expansion of the application of war crimes to sexual offenses is clearly an 
interpretation that is consistent with the principle of legality and so expands the human rights 
                                                
74 Niemann, “The Life and Times of a Senior Trial Attorney at the ICTY from 1994 to 2000:” 445. 
75 Geneva Convention IV, article 27. 
76 Ibid., article 147. 
77 Article 3 of each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions is identical and lays out minimum treatment 
standards for protected persons during internal armed conflict. 
78 Delalić et al., Trial Judgement, para. 475. 
79 Ibid., para. 476. The list includes Geneva Convention IV, article 27, and Additional Protocol II, article 
4.2. 
80 Furundžija, Trial Judgement, case no. IT-95-17/1-T, December 10, 1998, paras. 165-9, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/fur-tj981210e.pdf. 
81 Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1898 [1863]), article 44, 
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Lieber_Collection/pdf/Instructions-gov-armies.pdf. 
82 Hague Convention IV, annexed regulations article 46. 
83 Admiral Toyoda and General Matsui were convicted for command responsibility for widespread rape 
by their troops. See the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment, November 4, 1948, 
werle.rewi.hu-berlin.de/tokio.pdf. 
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legitimacy of increasing substantive protections for all individuals, while not undermining the 
legal legitimacy of protecting the rights of defendants.  
 
Crimes against humanity 
Cherif Bassiouni drafted the definition of crimes against humanity that was submitted by the 
commission of experts to the secretary-general and subsequently included in the statute by the 
Security Council. He argues that the commission maintained the IMT legal requirement that the 
crime be committed within the context of armed conflict (domestic or international) because of 
concern with breaching the principle of legality.84 While a 1950 report by the International Law 
Commission85 had removed this connection, the commission of experts was concerned that this 
determination did not constitute customary law and would thereby constitute retroactive crime 
expansion by the ICTY.86 
Contrary to the commission of experts’ advice,87 the secretary-general’s report removed the 
armed conflict requirement,88 but it was added back in to the final statute by the Security 
Council.89 According to Bassiouni the council shared the commission’s concern with the legality 
                                                
84 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 342. 
85 ILC, “Report on the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction,” by Ricardo J. Alfaro, Special 
Rapporteur, Extract from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1950, vol. II, UN doc. 
A/CN.4/15 and Corr.1, 2, legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_15.pdf. 
86 Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 342. 
87 Secretary-General, “Interim Report” (first report), para. 14. The commission’s final report, issued a 
year after the secretary-general’s report, maintained the armed conflict requirement: UN Secretary-
General, “Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992),” UN doc. S/1994/674, May, 27, 1994, para. 75, 
www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/un_commission_of_experts_report1994_en.pdf. 
88 Secretary-general’s report, para. 47.  
89 ICTY statute, article 5, chapeau. As a directly related issue, the statute also breaks the requirement 
established at the IMT between the commission of crimes against humanity and war crimes and crimes 
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of removing the armed conflict nexus.90 This represents a greatly improved attitude towards the 
non-retroactivity of crimes against humanity than demonstrated by the Allies and IMT judges 
after World War II, reflecting the growth in acceptance of the applicability of legality to 
international law.  
The legality of crimes against humanity was, however, the most uncertain of the crimes in 
the ICTY statute as it still lacked a treaty foundation. The ILC had spent decades working on the 
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which provided a 
determination of international crimes, including crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, while it 
was adopted by the ILC in 1996,91 it has not been adopted by the General Assembly.  
The court has established what has become a core definition in customary law of the context 
for the commission of the crime. Underlying offenses must have been committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, and the perpetrator must have been 
aware that the offense constituted part of the attack.92 The tribunal also clarified that 
“widespread” refers to the number of civilian victims, and “systematic” to “the organised nature 
of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence.”93 To be “systematic” 
thereby requires planning—effectively a policy which the attacks are designed to implement. 
                                                                                                                                                       
against peace—that is, at Nuremberg the former two crimes were only charged against a defendant who 
had also been indicted for crimes against peace. 
90 Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 185-6. 
91 ILC, “Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with commentaries, 1996,” text 
located within “Report of the International law Commission on the Work of its forty-eighth session,” 17-
56, legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_4_1996.pdf. Until 1987 it was known as the 
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 
92 Limaj et al., Trial Judgment, case no. IT-03-66-T, November 30, 2005, para. 181, 
www.refworld.org/docid/48ac17cc2.html. 
93 Kunarac et al., Appeals Judgement, case nos. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, June 12, 2002, para. 94, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf. 
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The tribunal also determined the intent element of the crime to require that a perpetrator of an 
underlying offense is aware that their acts constitute part of this plan. 
Bassiouni argues that the existence of a plan (of which the attack constitutes part) is inherent 
to what constitutes crimes against humanity as a distinctive crime.94 However, the ICTY has 
largely ignored the existence of a policy as a requirement to establish culpability, following a 
“mistaken” appeals court judgment which determined that the attacks must be either—but are not 
required to be both of—widespread or systematic.95 There is disagreement on this point, 
however. Antonio Cassese, a judge at the ICTY from 1993 to 2000, and its first president, argues 
that the tribunal was correct in necessitating only one of these context requirements rather than 
both.96 Another legal commentator argues that, while some domestic case law supports the 
policy requirement, this constitutes a misunderstanding of national judicial interpretations.97 
So there is dispute over whether the tribunal has diluted the crime’s distinctive nature and 
thereby diminished its legality. Arguably one consequence of the tribunal’s weakening of the 
context requirements has been its ability to prosecute a particularly large number of individuals 
for the crime—as mentioned earlier, 670 counts, constituting 40.6 percent of all indicted 
offenses.98 The ICTY and ICTR could have solely tried individuals for crimes against humanity 
                                                
94 Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 196-7. 
95 Ibid., 194-7. The ICTY’s position was later adopted by the ICTR and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL). There is debate over whether the ICC’s Rome Statute reverts to the position of requiring a 
policy—see the discussion of the legality of crimes against humanity in Chapter 5. 
96 Cassese, International Criminal Law, 98-9. 
97 Guénaël Mettraux, “Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda,” Harvard International Law Journal 43, no. 1 
(2002): 270-1, and International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 170-3. 
98 Sadat, “Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age:” 342-3. 
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with little effect on the number of prosecutions:99 the ad hoc tribunals have for this reason been 
labeled “crimes against humanity courts.”100 
The tribunal has also removed the contextual requirement of a connection to armed conflict, 
a position which the commission of experts and the Security Council believed would be contrary 
to customary law. Bassiouni perceives no conflict with legality here, arguing that as the crime 
has developed in customary law it no longer requires the armed conflict connection.101 The 
policy requirement and the lack of a necessary connection to armed conflict constitute the 
distinctive aspects of crimes against humanity as a mass atrocity crime.102 Therefore the court 
has established one distinctive feature of the crime—no dependence on an armed conflict 
context—while undermining another arguably defining characteristic—its systematic nature. 
The statute lists the underlying offenses of crimes against humanity as murder; 
extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape; “persecutions on political, 
racial and religious grounds;” and “other inhumane acts.”103 Sexual crimes are therefore clearly 
included as an underlying offense.104 However, rape is not found in the IMT charter—the textual 
basis for the crime in the ICTY statute—and therefore this potentially constitutes a beach of 
legality. Rape was included in the statute due to findings by the commission of experts on the use 
                                                
99 Schabas, The United Nations International Criminal Tribunals, 185. 
100 Göran Sluiter, “‘Chapeau Elements’ of Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the UN Ad 
Hoc Tribunals,” in Forging a Convention for Crimes Against Humanity, ed. Leila Nadya Sadat 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 103. 
101 Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 34. The sources he relies on include the 1950 ILC report, the 
1996 ILC draft code, the ICTR statute, and the work of the United Nations Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court. 
102 Hirad Abtahi, “Crimes Against Humanity and the Armed Conflict Nexus: From Nuremberg to the 
ICC,” Conference Paper No. 1/2013, European Society of International Law 2013, 5th Research Forum: 
International Law as a Profession, December 4, 2013. 
103 ICTY statute, articles 5.a-i., respectively. 
104 Ibid., article 5.g. 
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of sexual violence as an aspect of ethnic cleansing,105 a reasoning which would appear a clear 
breach of legality by inventing crimes for the purpose of ex post facto prosecution. However, 
customary law has developed since 1945 to recognize rape as an underlying offense, as it had 
been included implicitly in prior international humanitarian law under such euphemisms as 
“[f]amily honour and rights.”106 As a consequence, in 2001 the ICTY became the first 
international court to convict an individual of rape as a crime against humanity.107 Nevertheless, 
as discussed previously, customary law is a less sure basis for determining legality than treaty. 
Other underlying offenses have also been clarified and further specified by the tribunal.108 
Most significantly, it has addressed the issue of whether the offense of “other inhumane acts”109 
is so vague and broad that it violates legality.110 The trial chamber in Stakić found the defendant 
not guilty of “forcible transfers”111—including the transfer to detention facilities—as a form of 
“other inhumane acts.”112 The court took a firm stance towards protecting legality by not 
                                                
105 International Human Rights Law Group, “No Justice, No Peace: Accountability for Rape and Gender-
Based Violence in the Former Yugoslavia,” Hastings Women’s Law Journal 5, no. 1 (1994): 93-4. 
106 Hague Convention IV, article 46, www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195. See Bassiouni, Crimes Against 
Humanity, 342, 428. 
107 On February 21, 2001, Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovać, and Zoran Vuković were convicted on 19 
counts, including rape and sexual slavery. Andrew Osborn, “Mass Rape Ruled a War Crime,” The 
Guardian, February 22, 2001, www.theguardian.com/world/2001/feb/23/warcrimes (note: the article title, 
but not contents, incorrectly refers to war crimes, not crimes against humanity). See Kunarac et al., Trial 
Judgement, case nos. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, February 22, 2001, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf. 
108 See, for example, Krnojelac, Trail Judgement, 15 March 2002, case no. IT-97-25-T, para. 130 (attacks 
on human dignity), www.icty.org/x/cases/krnojelac/tjug/en/krn-tj020315e.pdf; and Kupreškić et al., Trial 
Judgement, case no. IT-95-16-T, January 14, 2000, paras. 567-636 (persecution), 
www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf. 
109 ICTY statute, articles 5.h. and 5.i., respectively. 
110 Kupreškić et al., Trial Judgement, para. 563. 
111 Stakić, Trial Judgement, case no. IT-97-24-T, July 31, 2003, para. 719, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf. 
112 Some forcible transfers constitute “deportation,” found in article 5.d. of the statute, but some transfers 
fall outside of this category. The court held that “‘[t]he crime of ‘other inhumane acts’ subsumes a 
potentially broad range of criminal behaviour and may well be considered to lack sufficient clarity, 
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permitting the expansion of the law through the development of vague categories of offenses 
which effectively constitute the creation of new criminal offenses.113 
 
Genocide 
The secretary-general’s report included genocide in the statute,114 relying on a 1951 
determination by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the convention had already become 
customary law, primarily on account of the “universal character” of the UN and the unanimous 
adoption of the convention by the members of the General Assembly.115 The Security Council 
accepted the secretary-general’s position. The customary law status of genocide, and thereby the 
legality of prosecuting it at the ICTY, was later affirmed by the ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia,116 and 
                                                                                                                                                       
precision and definiteness that it might violate the fundamental criminal law principle nullum crimen sine 
lege certa [the legality of clearly defined crimes].” Stakić, Trial Judgement, para.719. The trial judgment 
quoted from an earlier decision in relation to the defendant: Stakić, Decision on Rule 98bis Motion for 
Judgement of Acquittal, case no. IT-97-24-T, October 31, 2002, para. 131. Nullum crimen sine lege certa 
is a formulation of the principle of legality of crimes which directly states the need for clarity of 
prohibitions. 
113 On a related issue, the commission of experts argued that “ethnic cleansing” constitutes an underlying 
offense of crimes against humanity. See UN Secretary-General, “Interim Report” (first report), paras. 55-
6. The commission’s position was clarified further in its “Final Report,” paras. 129-50. It was not 
included in the list of offenses for any crime in the statute, but the court later determined that it 
constituted an element of both crimes against humanity and genocide—in the former case under the 
offense of persecution. See Kupreškić et al., Trial Judgement, para. 606. For genocide it was determined 
as an element of generating “conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole 
or in part” (ICTY statute, article4.2.c. See William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The 
Crime of Crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 293. While there was earlier 
inconsistency in the application of persecution and ethnic cleansing, the case law seems to have clarified, 
and they do not appear to breach legality through expansion of law. See Nilsson, “The Crime of 
Persecution in the ICTY Case-law,” 227-33. The same court approach has applied to ethnic cleansing as a 
form of the underlying offense of persecution. 
114 Secretary-general’s report, para. 45. 
115 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ICJ 
Advisory Opinion, May 28, 1951, 21, www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/12/4283.pdf. 
116 ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), February 26, 2007, para. 161, 
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf. 
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by the tribunal itself.117 The ICTY became the first international court to specifically try the 
crime of genocide,118 and so the first to implement the Genocide Convention’s provision calling 
for trials before “such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction.”119 
The statute’s definition of genocide,120 its underlying offenses, and modes of liability are a 
verbatim copy of articles 2 and 3 of the convention. For conviction, these require evidence of the 
physical element of the crime: the accused committed an underlying act against members of a 
protected identity group.121 It also requires two mental elements (of intent): the “ordinary” intent 
to commit an underlying offense,122 and the “dolus specialis” or special genocidal intent to 
destroy the group.123 
Special intent makes genocide particularly difficult to convict for, which has made 
prosecutors reluctant to bring charges for the crime at the tribunal.124 This caution has been borne 
out by acquittals in most attempts to convict at the court.125 The few convictions for genocide 
                                                
117 Krstić, Trial Judgment, case no. IT-98-33, August 2, 2001, para. 541, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf. 
118 At the IMT at Nuremberg, acts that might now be considered genocide were prosecuted as 
“persecution,” an underlying offense of crimes against humanity. See IMT charter, article 6.c. 
119 Genocide Convention, article 6. 
120 ICTY statute, article 4. 
121 Ibid., article 4.2. 
122 Ibid., articles 4.3 and 7.1. 
123 Ibid., article 4.2. 
124 Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 2nd ed., 457. 
125 Radislav Krstić’s conviction was overturned on appeal: Krstić, Appeals Judgement, case no. IT-98-33-
A, April 19, 2004, www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/krs-aj040419e.pdf. The 2005 conviction of 
Vidoje Blagojević for aiding and abetting was also overturned on appeal: Blagojević et al., Appeals 
Judgement, case no. IT-02-60-A, May 9, 2007, www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/acjug/en/blajok-
jud070509.pdf. 
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means that, according to the ICTY itself, “there is little case-law on genocide,”126 allowing for 
more flexibility in the determination of each trial chamber. 
The word “genocide” has a “specific power” as representing the “crime of crimes.”127 This 
has given it a distinct “role in the vicious cycle of competitive victimhood in the Balkans,” as 
stated by Marko Milanovic, vice-president of the European Society of International Law.128 He 
predicts that Karadžić’s 2016 acquittal on one count of genocide, in relation to seven 
municipalities in Bosnia during 1992, will encourage the authorities in the Bosnian Serb 
autonomous region of Republika Srpska in their argument that the political entity is legitimate. 
This is a response to accusations such as those of Bosniak politican and Bosnian presidency 
member Haris Silajdžić, who has called the Republika Srpska a “genocidal creation.”129 
Karadžić’s prosecution for genocide constitutes an important aspect of the clash of historical 
narratives of the war in Bosnia in relation to the creation of Republika Srpska in the 1995 Dayton 
Peace Agreement.130 Genocide has a distinctive place in the historical narrative function of the 
tribunal, especially in the case of high-profile figures such as Karadžić, who, along Slobodan 
                                                
126 ICTY, “Radislav Krstic becomes the First Person to be Convicted of Genocide at the ICTY and is 
Sentenced to 46 Years Imprisonment,” press release, doc. no. OF/P.I.S./6093, August 2, 2001, 
www.icty.org/en/press/radislav-krstic-becomes-first-person-be-convicted-genocide-icty-and-sentenced-
46-years. 
127 William A. Schabas, “Genocide in International Law: A Discussion with William Schabas,” United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum, March 30, 2004, www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/speakers-and-
events/all-speakers-and-events/genocide-in-international-law-a-discussion-with-william-schabas. 
128 Marko Milanovic, “ICTY Convicts Radovan Karadzic,” EJIL: Talk! blog (European Journal of 
International Law), March 25, 2016, www.ejiltalk.org/icty-convicts-radovan-karadzic. 
129 Mark Lowen, “Ethnic Rifts Overshadow Bosnia Election,” BBC News, October 1, 2010, 
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11451644. 
130 See Norman M. Naimark, “Srebrenica in the History of Genocide: A Prologue,” in Memories of Mass 
Repression: Narrating Life Stories in the Aftermath of Atrocity, ed. Nanci Adler, Selma Leydesdorff, 
Mary Chamberlain, and Leyla Neyzi (New Brunswick, NJ: transaction Publishers, 2009), 3-20; and 
Michael Keating, “Territorial Autonomy in Nationally Divided Societies: The Experience of the United 
Kingdom, Spain, and Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Territorial Pluralism: Managing Difference in 
Multinational States, ed. Karlo Basta, John McGarry, and Richard Simeon (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2015), 121-47. 
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Milošević and Ratko Mladić, is the most significant figure prosecuted at the ICTY in relation to 
the Bosnian war. Most convictions for genocide at the tribunal have been for the modes of 
criminal liability of “aiding and abetting,” “complicity,”131 and “joint criminal enterprise.”132 
These modes have largely been utilized by the court to convict individuals without the core 
requirement of special genocidal intent.133 In Krstić134 and Blagojević et al.135 the court held that 
the defendants were guilty of genocide because they had been aware of the intent of the 
perpetrators that they aided, even though they were not proven to share that special intent 
themselves. Knowledge of another’s intent was taken as proof of intent for the defendants, 
contrary to customary legal practice.136  
Consequently, the court’s chambers have been “interpreting the Genocide Convention in a 
broad and contradictory fashion and are diluting the essence of the crime when they apply the 
                                                
131 ICTY statute, articles 7.1. and 4.3.e., respectively. Note that modes of liability (indicating the mental 
element of the crime), including conspiracy, incitement, and complicity, constitute part of the definition 
of genocide in the statute: genocide is the only crime before the court which contains its own modes of 
liability. This generates an overlap, or potentially a conflict, with the modes of liability listed for all the 
crimes, under article 7, which delineates individual criminal responsibility. 
132 In 2001 Radislav Kristić became the first individual convicted directly of genocide. However, this was 
overturned by an appeals chamber, with only the conviction for “aiding and abetting” genocide standing. 
In a joint trial, Vujadin Popović and Ljubiša Beara were found guilty of genocide and conspiracy, and 
Drago Nikolić of aiding and abetting, all through participation in a joint criminal enterprise. These 
convictions were upheld on appeal. Zdravko Tolimir was convicted of genocide and conspiracy in 2012. 
Most significantly, Radovan Karadžić was convicted in 2016 of JCE in relation to genocide. See Krstić, 
Trial Judgment, case no. IT-98-33, August 2, 2001, and Appeals Judgement, case no. IT-98-33-A, April 
19, 2004; Popović et al., Trial Judgement, case no. IT-05-88-T, June 10, 2010; ICTY, “Appeals Chamber 
Upholds Convictions of Five Senior Bosnian Serb Officials for Srebrenica and Žepa Crimes,” press 
release, doc. no. CT/CS/PR1618e, January 30, 2015; Tolimir, Trial Judgement, case no. IT-05-88/2-T, 
December 12, 2012; and Karadžić, Trial Judgement, case no. IT-95-5/18-T, March 24, 2016, respectively.  
133 Karnavas, “Is the Emerging Jurisprudence on Complicity in Genocide before the Ad Hoc Tribunals a 
Moving Target in Conflict with the Principle of Legality?” 97-111. 
134 Krstić, Appeals Judgement, paras. 138-41. 
135 Blagojević et al., Trial Judgement, case no. IT-02-60-T, January 17, 2005, paras. 655-70, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/tjug/en/bla-050117e.pdf. 
136 Karnavas, “The Emerging Jurisprudence on Complicity in Genocide,” 103-5. 
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statutory modes of liability to the crime of genocide.”137 Similarly to Bassiouni’s argument that 
the court has ignored what is distinctive about crimes against humanity—the requirement of a 
policy—the ICTY has insufficiently taken into account the centrality of special intent to the 
crime in convicting defendants for genocide. 
The court determined that Karadžić demonstrated special genocidal intent in relation to a 
joint criminal enterprise (JCE) concerning the massacre at Srebrenica.138 The rationale for JCE, 
according to Cassese, is that “if all those who take part in a common criminal action are aware of 
the purpose and character of the criminal action and share the requisite criminal intent, they must 
perforce share criminal liability, whatever the role and position they may have played in the 
commission of the crime.”139 
However, according to Milanovic, “the Prosecution’s case was essentially circumstantial, 
requiring the Chamber to draw inferences from indirect evidence, which is what it did.”140 These 
were inferences about Karadžić’s intent solely from third party reports of his conversations with 
Miroslav Deronjic, whom Karadžić had appointed as the administrator of Srebrenica. From this 
evidence, genocidal intent on the part of Karadžić is “a reasonable inference…[I]t’s not as clear 
that this is the ONLY such reasonable inference, which is what they [sic] beyond a reasonable 
doubt evidentiary standard requires. For example, the phone conversation with Deronjic could be 
interpreted as Karadžić’s agreement with the forcible removal of the Bosniak males, but not 
necessarily with their extermination.”141 
                                                
137 Ibid., 98. 
138 Karadžić, Trial Judgement, paras. 5,736-830. 
139 Cassese, International Criminal Law, 191. 
140 Milanovic, “ICTY Convicts Radovan Karadzic.” 
141 Ibid. 
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While Karadžić’s conviction for superior responsibility for crimes against humanity is 
reasonable in this context, the conviction for genocide as well is arguably a case of the court 
applying the crime in a legally dubiously manner because of its dramatic rhetorical nature linked 
to its historical narrative importance in relation to Karadžić. Securing a conviction for genocide 
against the individual with ultimate political authority over the Bosnian Serb forces which 
conducted the Srebrenica massacre is an important capstone to the tribunal’s legal history. 
Ultimately genocide has been prosecuted far less frequently at the court than the other crimes, 
but its application suffers from a weakening of the special intent feature, again undermining what 
is distinct about the crime and permitting its prosecution more broadly than merited by the nature 
of the applicable modes of liability. 
 
Legality indicator 2: Non-retroactivity of punishment 
This section analyzes sentencing procedures at the tribunal. First the impact of the UN debate on 
the sentencing guidelines is assessed, as well as the guidelines themselves, as delineated in the 
statute and RPE. Second, the level of coherence and consistency between the sentencing 
guidelines and the tribunal’s practice is analyzed. Finally, punishment in relation to the doctrine 
of command responsibility is explored, as it provides a particularly telling and controversial 
example of sentencing practices. 
 
Sentencing rules: UN and judicial decision-making 
 
 
 
 
213 
The statute does not contain specific penalties for the crimes within its jurisdiction.142 The only 
guidelines for sentencing limit penalties for all crimes to imprisonment, as the death penalty was 
“quite emphatically rejected” in the secretary-general’s report to the Security Council on the 
court’s establishment.143 The statute provides most guidance through its mention that punishment 
“shall” be—suggesting a requirement on the judges—consistent with sentencing practices “in the 
courts of the former Yugoslavia.”144 However, the phrase “have recourse to” national practices 
suggests guidance rather than a requirement.145 The only other reference in the statute is to vague 
guidance in relation to aggravating and mitigating circumstances: to “take into account such 
factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.”146  
Part of the reason for this lack of specificity is that the customary and treaty law upon which 
the definitions of the court’s crimes are based similarly do not specify penalties. The Hague and 
Geneva Conventions, and the Genocide Convention were intended primarily to encourage 
national prosecution, with sentencing left up to each state to approach according to the guidelines 
of their national implementing legislation.147 In light of this, states within the Security Council, 
while debating the creation of the tribunal, seemed concerned to avoid breaching legality of 
punishments through the creation of penalties to fill this gap. The Italian permanent 
                                                
142 The ICTY’s RPE contains effectively no greater clarification and specificity than the statute: it 
delineates life in prison as the maximum sentence (rule 101.A.), and includes similar references to the 
statute in relation to aggravating and mitigating circumstances (rule 101.B.i.-ii.), and national practice 
(rule 101.B.iii.-iv.). 
143 Ralph Zacklin, “Some Major Problems in the Drafting of the ICTY Statute,” Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 2, no. 2 (2004): 365. 
144 ICTY statute, article 24.1. 
145 Shahram Dana, “Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice: A Theory on the Principle of Legality in 
International Criminal Sentencing,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 99, no. 4 (2009): 888. 
146 ICTY statute, article 24.2. 
147 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (Alphen an den 
Rijn, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 125-6. 
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representative stated his government’s opinio juris that to adhere to the legality of punishment, 
an international court would thereby require conformity to national standards existing in the 
territory where the crimes prosecuted were committed: “the need to respect the principle nullum 
crimen, nulla poena sine lege [non-retroactivity of crimes and punishment], the basis of 
fundamental human rights, has induced the [Commission of Italian Jurists] to decide in favor of 
the penalties set forth by the criminal law of the State of the locus commissi delicti [location of 
the crimes].”148 
Similarly, a proposal for a Yugoslav tribunal under the Conference for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE) Moscow Human Dimension Mechanism,149 submitted to the UN, 
argued that a tribunal must avoid retroactivity of punishment, by following Yugoslav domestic 
practice.150 This proposal was contained in one of several reports submitted to the commission of 
experts established by the secretary-general, and was based on a text created by Bassiouni and 
published by the International Association of Penal Law.151 Similar attitudes were voiced during 
                                                
148 UN Secretary-General, Letter from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General, UN doc. S/25300, February 16, 1993, quoted in Dana, “Beyond 
Retroactivity to Realizing Justice:” 875. 
149 The CSCE is now known as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The 
Moscow Human Dimension Mechanism was “a system of fact-finding human rights missions which do 
not require the consent of the state to be visited.” See CSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights, Bulletin 1 (Winter 1992-3): 8, www.osce.org/odihr/17603?download=true. 
150 UN Secretary-General, “Proposal for an International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia,” by rapporteurs Hans Corell, Helmut Türk, and Gro Hillestad Thune (Report of the CSCE 
Rapporteur Mission under the Moscow Human Dimension Mechanism, February 9, 1993), UN doc. 
S/25307, February 18, 1993, 68-9. Reprinted in Virginia Morris and Michael Scharf, An Insider’s Guide 
to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Documentary History and Analysis, 
Vol. 2 (Leiden: Nijhoff, 1995), 262-3. 
151 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Former Yugoslavia: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
and Establishing an International Criminal Tribunal,” Fordham International Law Journal 18, no. 4 
(1994): 1,203. 
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Security Council debates by The Netherlands and Russia.152 Slovenia also expressed concern 
with specificity, but not adherence to customary law, arguing that the statute should include both 
maximum and minimum penalties. The United States, France, and the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference on the other hand expressed no specific concern with avoiding retroactivity 
of punishment.153 
The lack of any specific punishments, and the poor clarity and specificity in the sentencing 
guidelines provided by the statute and RPE, arguably constitute a significant breach of the 
legality of punishment: the authority creating the court had not delineated the specific law of 
penalties it was to implement. Bassiouni in contrast argues that the prior existence of specific 
penalties in the codes of the territories of the former Yugoslavia for crimes within the ICTY’s 
jurisdiction means that the tribunal has not enforced punishments retroactively.154 This argument 
only applies to war crimes and genocide, as crimes against humanity had not been codified in the 
region’s legal systems.  
While arguably not directly breaching the legality of punishment, the court’s guidelines may 
have applied it weakly due to insufficient clarity and specificity. The legal foundation of 
punishment at the court has provided the judges with “large amounts of sentencing discretion and 
is not sufficient to ensure a development of consistent jurisprudence.”155 
 
                                                
152 Dana, “Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice:” 875, referring to Morris and Scharf, An Insider’s 
Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Vol. 2, 443. 
153 William A. Schabas, “Sentencing by International Criminal Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach,” 
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 7, no. 2 (1997): 471-3. Schabas quotes from various 
notes verbale and letters during early 1993 from the permanent representatives of these states to the UN 
secretary-general. 
154 Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 347. 
155 Barbara Holá, “Sentencing of International Crimes at the ICTY and ICTR: Consistency of Sentencing 
Case Law,” Amsterdam Law Forum 4, no. 4 (2012): 5. 
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Sentencing practice 
The tribunal early on exercised its discretion in ways inconsistent with the position of the 
Security Council, deciding that it would not be bound by the statute’s national guidelines 
provision.156 In constructing their own rules on punishment within the RPE, the judges included 
the possibility of life imprisonment,157 despite this penalty not existing in the early 1990s in the 
law of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).158 The republic’s law regarding 
genocide and war crimes provided for a 5-15 year term of imprisonment or the death penalty—
the SFRY code also considered life imprisonment a worse punishment than a death sentence. In 
the early case law, the court also determined that it would not be restricted by national Yugoslav 
practice to sentences of under 16 years.159 This practice has continued, and in the last ten years 
the number of individuals sentenced to over 20 years has increased,160 with little indication the 
tribunal has taken domestic guidelines into account.161 
To determine whether the purposes of punishment have guided the court in determining 
sentencing the statute is of no utility as it does not mention any such purposes. They are, 
however, described in the Security Council resolution that created the court, in primarily political 
rather than solely criminal justice terms: to “put an end to” the perpetration of mass atrocity 
                                                
156 Dana, “Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice:” 888-9. 
157 ICTY RPE, rule 101.A. 
158 Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, art. 34, referred to in Blagojević et al., 
Trial Judgement, para. 829; and Criminal Code of the SFRY, arts. 141-56, 1976, referred to in Dana, 
“Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice:” 889. 
159 Delalić et al., Appeals Judgement, case no. IT-96-21-A, February 20, 2001, para. 814, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf. Quoting the trial judgment, the appeals chamber 
noted that “the view that a higher penalty than that available under the SFRY would violate the principle 
of legality and nulla poena sine lege was ‘erroneous and overly restrictive.’” See Delalić et al., Trial 
Judgement, para. 1,210. 
160 Dana, “Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice:” 900. 
161 Nadia Bernaz, “Sentencing and Penalties,” in Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law, ed. 
William Schabas and Nadia Bernaz (London: Routledge, 2013), 297. 
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crimes, and to “bring to justice,” which would “contribute to the restoration and maintenance of 
peace.”162  
For more clarity in relation to ICTY practice, the beginning of the sentencing portion of trial 
judgments can be examined, as the purposes of the punishment in each conviction is expressed 
here. The tribunal has demonstrated a considerable range of sentencing goals in its trial 
judgments, including: “retribution, justice, deterrence (general and specific), rehabilitation, 
expressivism, reprobation, stigmatisation, affirmative prevention, incapacitation, protection of 
society, social defence and finally restoration/maintenance of peace and reconciliation.”163 In 
2000, the appeals chamber emphasized that while deterrence was one of the most important 
criteria, “[a]n equally important factor is retribution. This is not to be understood as fulfilling a 
desire for revenge but as duly expressing the outrage of the international community at these 
crimes.”164 
Such a broad array of legal, normative, and political aims has combined with lack of 
statutory clarity on penalties to generate weak consistency in sentencing. Patricia Wald, a trial 
judge at the tribunal between 1999 and 2001, was critical of sentencing practices during the first 
decade of its operation: “my ICTY experience led me to conclude there are presently insufficient 
norms or guidelines to control sentencing discretion.”165 The lack of clarity on how the court 
determines sentencing, and the inconsistency of judicial practice, continued in the subsequent 
decade, undermining support for, and the legitimacy of, the court.166 
                                                
162 UN doc. S/RES/827, May 25, 1993, preamble. 
163 Holá, “Sentencing of International Crimes at the ICTY and ICTR:” 6. 
164 Aleksovski, Appeals Judgement, para. 185. 
165 Patricia Wald, “Punishment of War Crimes by International tribunals,” Social Research 69, no. 4 
(2002): 1,132. 
166 Holá, “Sentencing of International Crimes at the ICTY and ICTR:” 24. 
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Especially in the light of the lack of legal guidance, and unwillingness to rely on national 
legislation, sentencing practices have tended to rely heavily on the determination of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances in relation to such issues as level of culpability.167 The chambers 
have themselves justified lack of coherence and their discretion by arguing that this enables them 
to individualize punishments to the circumstances and gravity of the offenses convicted. 
Aggravating factors include the directness of involvement in the crime and the level of 
premeditation; mitigating ones include duress, a guilty plea, and victim-related factors such as 
expressing remorse, and providing assistance to, and attempting redress toward, victims. Two 
other sentencing factors that have also been relevant are the principle of proportionality to the 
gravity of the offense (what harm was done and to how many people),168 and the principle of 
gradation or the significance of the convicted individual’s acts in relation to the broader context 
of violence.169  
In terms of sentencing practice, between May 1997, when the first sentence was handed 
down, and May 2006, there were 49 final (post-appeals) sentences, ranging between 2.5 and 40 
years—no life terms survived appeal.170 These sentences do not reflect a coherent policy of 
effective individualization, but “an erratic quantification of sentence,” that has been further 
exacerbated by “fairly active appellate intervention lead[ing] to additional discretion and 
unpredictability.”171 Research in 2009 claimed to be able to account for 60 percent of the 
variation in ICTY sentencing, concluding that this provided a reasonable degree of predictability 
                                                
167 Marisa R. Bassett, “Defending International Sentencing: Past Criticism to the Promise of the ICC,” 
Human Rights Brief 16, no. 2 (2009): 23. 
168 Kupreškić et al., Trial Judgement, para. 852. 
169 Holá, “Sentencing of International Crimes at the ICTY and ICTR:” 9-10. 
170 Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2007), 56. 
171 Ibid., 59, 66. 
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in sentencing practice, with the other 40 percent accounted for by the individual (mitigating and 
aggravating) circumstances.172 The research also acknowledged, however, that it was “difficult to 
judge the adequacy” of the 60 percent number.173 More recent sentencing practice continues to 
be characterized by a “lack of transparency and clarity.”174 
Another relevant factor in determining the legality of punishments is the doctrine of 
command responsibility: the criminal liability of a superior under international criminal law for 
the illegal acts of their political or military subordinates. This does not require complicity or 
providing direct orders. In the prosecution of General Tomoyuki Yamashita by the US military 
in the Philippines in 1945—the case which led to the “first fully fledged enunciation of the 
doctrine”175—the defendant was found guilty of “unlawfully disregarding and failing to 
discharge his duty as commander to control the acts of members of his command by permitting 
them to commit war crimes.”176 Responsibility for the acts of Yamashita’s subordinates 
ultimately rested with the general, regardless of his intent with regards to these acts.177 
                                                
172 Barbara Holá, Alette Smeulers, and Catrien Bijleveld, “Is ICTY Sentencing Predictable? An Empirical 
Analysis of ICTY Sentencing Practice,” Leiden Journal of International Law 22 (2009): 79-97. 
173 Ibid., 95. 
174 Christine Bishai, “Superior Responsibility, Inferior Sentencing: Sentencing Practice at the 
International Criminal Tribunals,” Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 11, no. 3 (2013): 
107. 
175 Cassese, International Criminal Law, 237. 
176 United States Military Commission, Yamashita, case no. 21, October 8–December 7, 1945, 
lawofwar.org/Yamashita%20Commission.htm. 
177 Peter Robinson, Karadžić’s chief legal advisor, stated in a Guardian interview a week before his trial 
verdict was announced: “We called JCE ‘just convict everyone’ because it was so broad.” Robinson’s 
position on other modes of liability was explained as “if ICTY rules on aiding and abetting were applied 
in Syria, Barack Obama would be guilty of war crimes by arming Syrian rebels who committed 
atrocities.” See Matthew Weaver, “Radovan Karadžić’s Lawyer Expects Guilty Verdict over War 
Crimes,” The Guardian, March 18, 2016, www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/18/radovan-karadzic-
lawyer-war-crimes-trial-hague-appeal.  
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The ICTY’s provisions for command responsibility have generated excessively broad 
responsibility for superiors, constituting “vicarious liability.”178 The tribunal has gone beyond 
the existing doctrine by deciding that, according to the Kunarac judgment, “the criminal 
culpability of those leading others is higher than those who follow.”179 However, the tribunal has 
been reluctant to actually enforce harsher penalties for command responsibility on the basis of 
joint criminal enterprise, leading to sentencing that has not been consistent with this 
determination. In the most high-profile case of command responsibility that led to a conviction, 
Karadžić received a 40 year sentence for 10 counts, including one of genocide180—whereas some 
victims argued he should have received a life sentence.181 This compares to Duško Tadić’s 20 
year sentence for killing and torture as a prison camp guard.182 Former ICTY prosecutors Mark 
Harmon and Fergal Gaynor argue that sentencing for JCE at the tribunal has amounted to “a slap 
on the wrist” and therefore “a slap in the face of the victims.”183  
The tribunal’s problems with consistency and coherence in sentencing stem significantly 
from the lack of guidance provided by the UN secretary-general and the Security Council. While 
                                                
178 Kai Ambos, “Remarks on the General Part of International Criminal Law,” Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 4, no. 4 (2006): 671-2. 
179 Kunarac et al., Trial Judgement, para. 863. 
180 Karadžić, Trial Judgement, para. 6,070. 
181 Marlise Simons, “Radovan Karadzic, a Bosnian Serb, Is Convicted of Genocide,” The New York 
Times, March 24, 2016. It should also be noted that, as Karadžić is 70 years old, if his conviction is 
upheld he will spend the rest of his life in prison. In terms of consistency in sentencing for the mode of 
liability, this compares to the life sentence of Milan Lukić for the much lower level of command 
responsibility over a paramilitary group that committed murder and torture in Bosnia. See Lukić et al., 
Trial Judgement, case no. IT-98-32/1-T, July 20, 2009, para. 1,101, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_lukic_sredoje_lukic/tjug/en/090720_j.pdf; and Lukić et al., Appeals 
Judgement, case no. IT-98-32/1-A, December 4, 2012, para. 669, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_lukic_sredoje_lukic/acjug/en/121204_judgement.pdf. 
182 Tadić, Sentencing Judgement, case no. IT-94-1-T, July 14, 1997, para. 74, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-sj970714e.pdf. 
183 Mark B. Harmon and Fergal Gaynor, “Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes,” Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 5, no. 3 (2007): 683-712. 
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acute to the need to provide a specific framework on the substance of laws, they provided little 
guidance in relation to penalties. The lack of Cold War development of international criminal 
procedure led to weak agreement on sentencing within the Security Council, in contrast to the 
elaboration of international human rights and humanitarian law, which generated far greater 
agreement on the substance of crimes the ICTY should prosecute.  
This lack of prior development has arguably harmed the post-Cold War development of 
international criminal justice by permitting too great a discretion to judges, who have not 
developed a consistent structure of penalties, which makes claims of selective justice easier to 
sustain. As legal scholar Mark Drumbl states, “[i]n the end, although individualizing the penalty 
certainly is desirable, the benefits thereof dissipate when there is no coherent framework in 
which to predictably consider the factors germane to, or the goals of, sentencing,” which 
diminishes the legitimacy of the tribunal.184  
 
Defense parity indicator 1: Institutional support 
In this section, first the defense’s position within the court’s institutional structure vis-à-vis that 
of the prosecution is analyzed, as well as its implications for adequacy of defense representation. 
Second, the institutional support provided by the ICTY to prosecutors and defense counsel to 
investigate on-site through immunities and privileges is compared, as well as the investigatory 
support provided in relation to external actors. 
 
Structural parity 
                                                
184 Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, 59. 
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Structurally, the tribunal consists of three primary organs: Chambers (initially two trial chambers 
and an appeals chamber, with a president chosen from the appeals chamber); an Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP); and Registry.185 The latter is the tribunal’s administrative body, and provides 
support to the other two organs, as well as assistance to defense counsel, victims, and 
witnesses.186  
Before a restructuring of the OTP in 2008, its Investigations Division, now eliminated, 
conducted pre-trial investigations.187 The “muscle tissue” of the OTP, according to former chief 
prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, consists of “trial attorneys and jurists, forensic experts, police 
officers, and analysts of the history, culture, languages, and other aspects of the former 
Yugoslavia.”188 According to the tribunal, its researchers have mostly had “backgrounds in 
police work,” expertise aiding enormously in their task of collecting evidence, including through 
the identification and questioning of witnesses and conducting on-site investigations.189 The 
OTP’s Prosecution Division selects evidence and conducts first instance trials. See Figure 4.1 
below for the organizational structure of the court. 
 
  
                                                
185 ICTY statute, article 11. 
186 ICTY, About the ICTY, www.icty.org/en/about. 
187 The OTP maintains around 50 investigators within the Prosecution Division. See ICTY, Office of the 
Prosecutor: Investigations, www.icty.org/en/about/office-of-the-prosecutor/investigations. 
188 Carla Del Ponte and Chuck Sudetic, Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity’s Worst 
Criminals and the Culture of Impunity (New York: Other Press, 2008), 40. 
189 ICTY, Office of the Prosecutor: An Introduction, www.icty.org/en/content/office-prosecutor-
introduction. 
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Figure 4.1 Organizational structure of the ICTY 
Source: ICTY, Organisational Chart, October 2015, www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/organisational-chart. 
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The OTP’s Immediate Office also has functions that impinge upon the courtroom dynamic with 
the defense: including providing the prosecution with a voice in decision-making with the other 
organs of the court concerning rule changes; and liaising with states, which involves ensuring 
cooperation with investigations.  
In stark contrast to the position of the prosecution, the statute did not designate any official 
position within its structure for defense counsel. The structural position of the accused was 
largely overlooked in the construction of the court, as Registrar John Hocking acknowledged in 
2010: “In the early days of ICTY, support for defence counsel was rudimentary. The Statute did 
not foresee defence counsel as institutionally part of the Tribunal, and defence counsel were at 
times treated with mistrust. They were not allowed to freely access the ICTY building and had to 
be escorted to and from the courtrooms by security.”190 While the dissertation agrees with 
Hocking that the situation has improved since then, as the analysis below makes clear, defense 
counsel continue to lack an autonomous institutional position within the court, and the 
consequences of this structural imbalance for decision-making influence persist.  
 Defense counsel have always been considered independent of the ICTY, with their official 
representation occurring solely through the Registry. The primary liaison for defense is the 
Registry’s Office of Legal Aid and Defense (OLAD),191 whose defense responsibilities include 
                                                
190 John Hocking, “Legal Aid and Defence Support at the ICTY,” Address of Mr. John Hocking, 
Registrar, United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Meeting of 
Registrars of Final/Appellate, Regional and International Courts, Ottawa, Canada, April 14-16, 2010, 6, 
www.icty.org/x/file/Press/Statements%20and%20Speeches/Registrar/100414_reg_hocking_ottawa.pdf. 
191 The Office of Legal Aid and Defense is located within the Court Support Services Section of the 
Registry’s Division of Judicial Support Services. OLAD was previously known as the Office of Legal 
Aid and Detention Matters, and before that the Defence Counsel Unit. See ICTY, “Report of the 
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providing legal aid for accused unable to pay for their own defense,192 and determining which 
attorneys qualify to represent accused at the court and assigning counsel.193 The Registry is the 
only official organ of the court with authority in relation to defense issues, ostensibly 
representing its interests at the court—including in budgetary and rule-change decision-making 
forums. However, the Registry also represents the interests of the other major parties at the court: 
the Chambers, the prosecution, and victims and witnesses. It cannot effectively represent defense 
interests in intra-court communications and decision-making negotiations as it remains neutral as 
an administrative body for all major actors at the court. Frustration with lack of perceived 
support has led “some defence counsel [to] consider the Registry as their worst enemy.”194 
ICTY judge David Hunt has criticized the Registry for not requiring staff to have a legal 
background or experience representing criminal defendants in a domestic or international 
context, while it provides the sole communication and coordination mechanism for counsel 
                                                                                                                                                       
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” (twenty-second annual report), UN doc. A/70/226–
S/2015/585, July 31, 2015, para. 64, www.icty.org/en/documents/annual-reports. 
192 Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 50. Indigent defendants, which 
must rely on the court to supply financing for counsel, tend to have far fewer lawyers—often one or 
two—than privately funded defendants and than the prosecution that they must face at trial. This 
significantly impacts the ability of accused to investigate and so prepare an adequate defense. See Charles 
Chernor Jalloh and Amy DiBella, “Equality of Arms in International Criminal Law: Continuing 
Challenges,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives, 
ed. William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, and Niamh Hayes (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 266-7. A 
related issue is the poor level of remuneration of defense counsel compared to that available in most 
Western states. While this has improved since the 1990s, it has arguably impacted the ability of the court 
to attract talented and experienced defense counsel from the domestic level. Interview with Peter 
Robinson, ICTY defense counsel and former ADC Executive Board member, San Francisco, 27 August 
2015. As of December 2013, 121 of 133 accused had received full or partial legal aid through the office 
(81 received full aid, and 40 partial). See ICTY, About the ICTY: Legal Aid, 
www.icty.org/en/about/registry/legal-aid. During the most recent reporting period (July 2015–July 2016) 
OLAD provided financial aid to 18 of the 20 remaining defendants on trial or appeal and oversaw in 
excess of 170 defense attorneys and investigators. See ICTY, twenty-second annual report to the UN, 
para. 70. 
193 ICTY RPE, rules 44-5. 
194 Jarinde P.W. Temminck Tuinstra, Defence Counsel in International Criminal Law (The Hague: 
T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009), 78. 
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within the ICTY’s structure. He argued this was a result of a lack of understanding of the role 
and needs of counsel at the ICTY.195 Numerous instances of “abuse” of the Registry’s authority 
in regard to such defense issues as assigning counsel have been acknowledged, and occasionally 
rectified, by the court.196 
This imbalance between the position of the prosecution and defense in the structure of the 
ICTY is replicated in most international courts,197 and is an ongoing problem in international 
criminal justice.198According to Elise Groulx, a former honorary president of the International 
Criminal Bar (BPI-ICB), and head of the advisory board of the Business and Human Rights 
project of the American Bar Association Center for Human Rights, the defense constitutes a 
missing “third pillar” in the structure of international courts: 
In addition to an independent judiciary and prosecution, the international criminal justice 
system requires an independent legal profession (including both defence and victims’ 
counsel). The incorporation of a ‘third pillar’ will help to legitimize the new justice system 
                                                
195 Separate opinion of Judge David Hunt, in Milutinović et al., Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on 
Motion for Additional Funds, case no. IT-99-37-AR73.2, November 13, 2003, para. 41. 
196 For example, in Martić the trial chamber ordered the Registry to reassess its decision to deny a 
defendant counsel of his choice; counsel was subsequently affirmed. See Martić, Decision on Appeal 
against Decision of Registry, case no. IT-95-11-PT, August 2, 2002, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/martic/tdec/en/09122227.htm.  
197 The singular exception is the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, whose Defence Office is one of the four 
primary organs of the court—co-equal in status with the Office of the Prosecutor. See STL, Structure of 
the STL: Defence, www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl/structure-of-the-stl/defence-2. 
198 The UN Secretariat eventually acknowledged the negative impact on trial fairness of the structural 
weaknesses of the earlier tribunals the UN had established. It recognized the importance of greater 
institutional parity in relation to the proposed Special Tribunal for Lebanon: “[t]he need for a defence 
office to protect the rights of suspects and accused has evolved in the practice of United Nations-based 
tribunals as part of the need to ensure ‘equality of arms,’ where the prosecutor’s office is an organ of the 
tribunal and is financed in its entirety through the budget of the tribunal.” See UN Secretary-General, 
“Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon,” UN doc. 
S/2006/893, November 15, 2006, para. 30, www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/un-documents/un-secretary-
general-reports/256-report-of-the-secretary-general-on-the-establishment-of-a-special-tribunal-for-
lebanon. 
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and strengthen the rule of law by providing a formal voice for lawyers and enabling the 
protection of individual rights.199 
Cassese acknowledged in a 2006 report to the Special Court for Sierra Leone that the creation of 
the latter’s Defense Office “has proved successful by giving the various defence teams an 
institutional voice that is not present at the ICTY.”200 In 1997, for example, in order to cut costs 
the ICTY Registry decided to reduce the maximum number of hours counsel could bill for and 
reduce the number of investigators they could hire.201 Defense counsel had no institutional voice 
with which to resist such cuts, unlike the OTP.202 
In recognition of the need for a third pillar organization for the defense at the ICTY, 
providing them with such a voice, in September 2002 ICTY judges, working with defense 
counsel, created a bar association: the Association of Defence Counsel practising before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ADC-ICTY).203 It represents the 
collective interests of the accused and defense counsel at the court while remaining outside the 
court’s structure,204 and was “an effort to offset some of the disadvantages of the Defence not 
                                                
199 Elise Groulx, “‘Equality of Arms:’ Challenges Confronting the Legal Profession in the Emerging 
International Criminal Justice System,” Oxford University Comparative Law Forum 3 (2006), text before 
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202 Brianne McGonigle, “De Facto v. De Jure Equality in the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
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228 
being institutionally represented.”205 It took so long to create such an organization partly due to 
the decentralized nature of defense counsel. Unlike prosecutors, who live in the Hague area, 
working for the court full-time, many counsel are on a list of those the Registry (and now ADC) 
deems to be qualified to serve at the court, but many only live at the Hague when they have been 
assigned to a case. This provides counsel with far less cohesion, and institutional memory, even 
since the creation of the ADC.206 
The ICTY’s RPE was modified after the creation of the ADC to require that all defense 
counsel are in good standing with an association of counsel practicing at the tribunal recognized 
by the Registry—of which the ADC is the only one.207 The ICTY describes the ADC’s role as 
that of providing a voice for defense counsel within the tribunal’s committees and projects, 
including consultation on policies affecting them, such as those relating to legal aid.208  
The ADC president from 2013 to 2015, Colleen Rohan, claims that the organization has had 
a significant positive impact on accused and defense counsel at the tribunal. Changes include 
acquiring more substantive aid to facilitate defense, including through counsel training, which 
the ADC provides in relation to substantive and procedural international criminal law and 
                                                
205 John Hocking, “Legal Aid and Defence Support at the ICTY,” Address of Mr. John Hocking, 
Registrar, United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Meeting of 
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courtroom skills.209 According to former ADC Executive Board member and ICTY Rules 
Committee member Peter Robinson, the ADC’s effect has been “positive, but not significant”—
it has fought for increased resources and training for counsel, with mixed results.210  
The ADC sits on the Rules Committee and the Disciplinary Board and Disciplinary Panel,211 
which Rohan argues has given the organization a useful voice in policy-making, which it did not 
effectively have before 2002.212 Other positive changes include ADC amicus briefs213 being 
increasingly considered by the court, providing the organization with more of a role in aiding 
counsel in adequately representing their clients.214 Nevertheless, the organization has “had to 
struggle over the years to effectuate” its vision of a partnership with the court to create greater 
trial fairness, “and overcome resistance to it from those who did not understand the scope of the 
Defence function or the importance of a Defence voice in the development of the law and 
practices within the international courts.”215 There is also only limited evidence of ADC 
influence in decision-making. Robinson, for example, proposed three rule changes while serving 
as an ADC representative on the ICTY Rules Committee, none of which were accepted.216 
                                                
209 Interview with Colleen Rohan, Berkeley, Calif., November 12, 2015. 
210 Interview with Peter Robinson, San Francisco, Calif., August 27, 2015. 
211 Yvonne McDermott, “Rights in Reverse: A Critical Analysis of Fair Trial Rights under International 
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Amicus Curiae Briefs, UN doc. IT/122/Rev.1, February 16, 2015, 
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According to Gabrielle McIntyre, chef de cabinet, or most senior legal advisor, to four 
presidents of the ICTY, and current chef de cabinet of the MICT, significant advantages for the 
prosecution of having a permanent office are better dissemination of information through 
structural cohesion, and institutional memory. The OTP “employs hundreds of people to carry 
out investigations and gather evidence in relation to all sides of the conﬂict. As such, it has the 
beneﬁt of being a homogeneous body, in that material secured by it will be available to 
prosecutors concerned with other cases.”217 The OTP’s Military Analyst Team (MAT) and 
Leadership Research Team (LRT) are staffed by former military officers and regional specialists, 
respectively, and support requests for assistance from trial prosecutors.218 They have been 
especially importance sources of institutional memory for the prosecution in relation to local 
knowledge, expert witnesses, and identifying evidence.219 
This advantage especially applies in cases that relate to a situation already litigated at the 
court. Multiple cases repeating the same situation occur only infrequently in most domestic 
contexts, but is a common feature of ICTY prosecutions. Rohan confirms that while defending 
clients at the tribunal she has faced better prepared prosecutors due to prior experience with the 
facts of a case whose situation was previously litigated. Some prosecutors have read many of the 
relevant documents before the beginning of such a case, and have dealt with many of the same 
witnesses and experts before. In the process, the prosecution is honing its strategy, whereas a 
                                                                                                                                                       
written witness statements; and obtaining a review of (wrongful) conviction based on new facts. While all 
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defense lawyer for whom this is the first case dealing with a particular situation is at a distinct 
disadvantage in terms of familiarity with and knowledge of the documentary evidence.220 
In relation to the dual roles of prosecutors, Rohan feels that overall the chief prosecutors at 
the tribunal have not acted effectively as officers of justice, misusing their public profile to skew 
public perception against defendants. She feels it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to comment on 
the merits of a pending case in that way. For example, speaking about defendant Ramush 
Haradinaj221 during his trial, Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte stated in an interview with Der 
Spiegel that “there is no doubt about his guilt.”222 It is the task of the trial chamber to determine 
the guilt or innocence of a defendant—not that of the prosecution. The chief prosecutor was 
conflating her roles as an officer of the court—with a responsibility to ensure that justice is 
done—with her role as a competitor with the defense in an adversarial trial, arguable misusing 
her officer-of-the-court position, with its advantages of a high international profile, to make a 
public case.  
Rohan, who was counsel for Idriz Balaj during the Haradinaj et al. trial, filed a motion 
claiming that Del Ponte’s remarks were inappropriate, and in violation of the Standards of 
Professional Conduct for Prosecution Counsel at the ICTY.223 In its decision, the court was 
ambiguous about whether the prosecutor had breached the standards and her obligation for 
                                                
220 Interview with Colleen Rohan; and Sonja B. Starr, “Ensuring Defense Counsel Competence at 
International Criminal Tribunals,” UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 14, no. 1 
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221 See Haradinaj et al., Trial Judgement, case no. IT-04-84-T, April 3, 2008, 
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neutrality outside the court, denying the motion on the grounds that it could not be proven that 
the statement had negatively affected the trial.224  
This is an example of an issue which occurs in relation to many circumstances within 
international courts, and has been the subject of debate by the European Court of Human Rights: 
whether a breach of court standards that exist to protect the accused is sufficient to demand 
remedy, or whether actual harm needs to be proven.225 As discussed in Chapter 3, the dissertation 
adopts the more cautious approach, from the perspective of protecting the rights of defendants, of 
recognizing breaches of guarantees whether or not they have been determined by a court to have 
prejudiced a trial. 
 
Investigatory support and cooperation 
To enable effective investigations and evidence gathering, the statute provides “the judges, the 
Prosecutor and the Registrar…[with] the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities 
accorded to diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international law” and “[t]he staff of the 
Prosecutor and of the Registrar shall enjoy the privileges and immunities accorded to officials of 
the United Nations under articles V and VII”226 of the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations, including functional immunity and the right to use UN 
“laissez-passer” travel documents.227 Functional immunity provides prosecutors with immunity 
                                                
224 Haradinaj et al., Decision on Idriz Balaj’s Request for Evidentiary Hearing Regarding Interview of 
Carla Del Ponte, case no. IT-04-84-T, January 29, 2008, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/080129.pdf. 
225 See European Court of Human Rights, Lanz v. Austria, no. 24430/94, January 31, 2002, 58, and 
Kremzow v. Austria, Series A, no. 268-B, September 21, 1993, 75. 
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from local criminal jurisdictions in relation to actions performed in an official capacity—that is, 
while investigating crimes for the ICTY.228 UN laissez-passer travel documents facilitate faster 
acceptance of visa requests, faster travel, and access to diplomatic envoy facilities for 
prosecutors.  
Court provision of legal protections during pre-trial investigation can also be central to the 
ability of defense counsel to effectively defend their clients: “In the international criminal 
tribunals, where investigation occurs on the territory of states, but representation occurs in an 
international court, international law doctrines of privileges and immunities of actors in 
international organisations may well define the ability of defence counsel to prepare and present 
their clients’ cases.”229 Yet such protections were not directly afforded in the statute to defense 
counsel. Instead, more vaguely, the statute mentions that: “Other persons, including the accused, 
required at the seat of the International Tribunal shall be accorded such treatment as is necessary 
for the proper functioning of the International Tribunal.”230  
The meaning of this phrase for defense investigators only became an issue at the court when 
Croatian authorities filed an indictment against Marin Ivanović, a member of the Gotovina 
defense team, in November 2008, charging him with concealing archival documents,231 and in 
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December 2009 arresting him and several other members of the team on this charge.232 The 
ICTY appeals chamber later ruled in relation to the situation that functional immunity also 
applies to defense counsel and ordered Croatia to cease all criminal proceedings against those 
arrested.233 The tribunal therefore eventually settled the immunity issue on the basis of parity. 
The statute institutionalizes other investigative imbalances between prosecution and defense, 
including in terms of state cooperation. The statute requires states to cooperate “in the 
investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of 
international humanitarian law,” including in locating individuals and documentary evidence, 
and arresting suspects and transferring them to the tribunal.234  
Prosecutors and the chambers can apply diplomatic pressure to states to cooperate with 
investigations and can report lack of cooperation to the Security Council.235 These advantages 
privilege the prosecution’s cooperation with states and provide them with greater access to 
information. The prosecution is a primary organ of the court whose requests for assistance are 
considered the conduct of official court business, whereas defense counsel, as independently 
operating individuals, do not have their requests for assistance considered official court business 
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by external political and legal actors, such as states’ foreign offices and justice departments, with 
a consequently lower priority attached to those requests.236 
The statute also provides the chief prosecutor with a political role that has implications for 
his or her ability to acquire evidence. The chief prosecutor is nominated by the UN secretary-
general and appointed by the Security Council,237 and the latter has required the prosecutor to 
report on certain activities. For example, in resolution 1503 the council requested “the Presidents 
of the ICTY and the ICTR and their Prosecutors, in their annual reports to the Council, to explain 
their plans to implement the ICTY and ICTR Completion Strategies.”238 Chief Prosecutor Del 
Ponte addressed the council on this issue, also discussing progress on gaining cooperation from 
reluctant states, including Croatia.239 This political function provides a voice and a forum for 
encouraging cooperation and requesting assistance in investigations.  
The chief prosecutor also has a diplomatic role that has been used to urge states to cooperate. 
In May 1996, for example, Richard Goldstone met with top US officials—Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense William Perry, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff John Shalikashvili—to encourage them to use NATO troops to arrest Karadžić and 
Mladić.240 Goldstone also acknowledges that he secured changes to the tribunal’s RPE to aid him 
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in encouraging states to hand over confidential material during “personal visits” with top state 
officials.241  
In her official capacity, Del Ponte attended such major international political gatherings as 
the World Economic Forum in Davos, and met with the heads of NATO and the European 
Commission, as well as Western diplomats.242 In a meeting with US secretary of state Colin 
Powell, she encouraged him to condition US financial aid to Yugoslavia on its cooperation with 
her investigations. According to Del Ponte, in a secret meeting in March 2001, six months after 
Milošević’s ouster as president of Yugoslavia, the prime minister, Zoran Djondjić, 
acknowledged that the United States had threatened to cut off aid if it did not cooperate. At the 
meeting Del Ponte agreed to coordinate her requests to Yugoslavia in such a way as to bolster 
the prime minster’s political position vis-à-vis the new president, Vojislav Koštunica.243  
The lack of a comparable institutional voice, and diplomatic position, access, and influence 
for defense counsel creates enormous disparity in gaining assistance with investigations, 
including gathering documentary evidence and accessing witnesses.244 There are various other 
ways in which defense counsel are also structurally disadvantaged in conducting investigations. 
They are, for example, reliant upon the court for diplomatic or legal action to encourage or 
compel external assistance.245 This generates a significant inequality in official mechanisms for 
                                                
241 Richard Goldstone, “A View from the Prosecution,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 2, no. 2 
(2004): 381. 
242 Del Ponte and Sudetic, Madame Prosecutor, 99-101. 
243 Ibid., 102-6. 
244 Jalloh and DiBella, “Equality of Arms in International Criminal Law,” 264. 
245 Steven Kay and Bert Swart, “The Role of the Defence,” in The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 2, ed. Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John Jones (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 1,425.  
 
 
 
 
237 
gaining state cooperation,246 despite the fact that on-site investigations tend to be seen as 
essential by defense teams in order to obtain exculpatory evidence and to attempt to adequately 
refute the prosecution’s case by assessing the accuracy and validity of prosecution evidence.247 
As a practical matter, local authorities in states with a civil law system also expect a prosecutor 
to perform all investigations—not defense counsel—and so are unprepared for, and more 
resistant to, requests from defense investigators.248 
States outside the region are also reluctant to aid the defense of those that international media 
have already condemned. According to Henri Astier of the BBC, a news database search in 2000 
listed more than one thousand instances of the term “indicted war criminals” that year,249 one of 
which was by the BBC itself to refer to the Yugoslav defense minister at the time, Dragoljub 
Ojdanić. Astier warns that “[a] trainee on a local newspaper who referred to someone charged 
with selling crack cocaine as an ‘indicted drug dealer’ would get a rap over the knuckles from his 
editor and a stern lecture on the presumption of innocence. Yet major news organizations ignore 
this basic principle in reporting on war crimes cases.”250 This is typical, he argues, of 
international media coverage of the ICTY, which largely takes the perspective of the 
prosecution.  
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Similar attitudes towards cooperating with the tribunal as synonymous with cooperating 
solely with the prosecution are seen within states. During a US House of Representatives hearing 
on the ICTY and ICTR, an attorney from a major law firm called as a witness, was asked by a 
Congressman about US cooperation with the tribunals. He responded that “when we decide in 
the name of international justice to prosecute someone, we ought to have the backbone to stand 
behind that…There is no reason why we should be ashamed or afraid to have our witnesses go 
and testify…And if they have relevant information, it ought to be heard. And if we are not 
prepared to do that, then we should not be convicting these people.”251 A 2008 research 
monograph by an American IR scholar on cooperation between states and the ad hoc tribunals 
focuses exclusively on cooperation with prosecutions.252 Outside the ICTY, defense counsel are 
considered as non-official and almost peripheral actors, and “the accused is, oddly, the great 
forgotten figure of the international criminal trial.”253 
In the first 15 years of the tribunal’s operation, Serbia was extremely reluctant to cooperate, 
arguing that Serbs could not receive a fair trial there, leading to various fruitless complaints by 
the president of the court to the Security Council.254 This significantly worsened after President 
Slobodan Milošević was indicted by the tribunal in 1999.255 A letter from the Serbian minister of 
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justice, Petar Jojić, in May 2000, responding to the chief prosecutor’s request for cooperation in 
arresting a Serbian colonel, opened with “To the Whore Del Ponte, Self-Proclaimed Prosecutor, 
Criminal Hague Tribunal.”256 This attitude began to shift with changes of government and 
Milošević’s death in March 2006. International pressure, especially from the European Union, 
offering the possibility of accession talks,257 led to Serbia surrendering the last two remaining 
major ICTY indictees, Karadžić and Mladić, in 2008 and 2011, respectively.258 This is a 
particularly prominent example of the kind of significant political pressure that Western states 
have, selectively, applied to aid the court’s attempts to prosecute individuals, but that is rarely 
available to the defense.  
Initially there was reluctance from NATO and the Croatian government to cooperate with the 
prosecution at the tribunal. However, this declined in the late 1990s, leading to the majority of 
indictees being in the tribunal’s custody by 2001.259 Del Ponte acknowledged reluctance to 
investigate and indict NATO personnel in relation to the 1999 air campaign in Serbia: “If I went 
forward with an investigation of NATO…I would render my office incapable of continuing to 
investigate and prosecute the crimes committed by the local forces during the wars of the 1990s” 
due to the need for NATO intelligence and security on the ground during investigations.260 She 
                                                
256 Del Ponte and Sudetic, Madame Prosecutor, 57. 
257 Julie Kim, “Balkan Cooperation on War Crimes Issues,” Congressional Research Service: CRS Report 
for Congress, January 14, 2008, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22097.pdf; Ian Bancroft, “Can Serbia Now 
Deliver Mladic to The Hague?” The Guardian, July 22, 2008, 
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/jul/22/radovankaradzic.serbia; and Ian Traynor, “Ratko 
Mladic Arrested: What it Means for Serbia's EU Membership,” The Guardian, May 26, 2011, 
www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/26/ratko-mladic-serbia-eu-membership. 
258 Ian Traynor, “Radovan Karadzic to Appear Before War Crimes Judge in The Hague,” The Guardian, 
July 31, 2008, www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/31/radovankaradzic.warcrimes; and Marlise 
Simons, “Mladic Arrives in The Hague,” The New York Times, May 31, 2011. 
259 Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2011), 536. 
260 Del Ponte and Sudetic, Madame Prosecutor, 60. 
 
 
 
 
240 
consequently experienced a significant increase in cooperation with investigations a result of the 
NATO bombing campaign, with the United States, Britain, France, and Germany eager to 
provide information to aid in prosecutions of Yugoslav leaders.261 
Again the Croatian turnaround is substantially due to Western state pressure to prosecute 
indictees. President Franjo Tuđman initially resisted handing over Croatian general Tihomir 
Blaškić, who was indicted in November 1995,262 due to reluctance to cooperate with the court. 
Tuđman did not wish to appear to be aiding the court and thereby legitimizing its prosecutions.263 
However, after the United States put pressure on Croatia, by threatening to cut off aid, the 
general was handed over in April 1996.264 
In terms of cooperation with defendants, in the appeal of Tadić, the first individual convicted 
by the court, the appellant alleged “lack of cooperation” and “obstruction” by the government of 
Republika Srpska, contending that the resultant lack of ability to present evidence from relevant 
witnesses prejudiced the outcome of his trial.265 General Blaskić’s case also provides a 
particularly egregious example of state political motivations in decisions to release evidence to 
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the tribunal. At the trial stage, the Croatian government refused to release evidence requested.266 
However, days after Blaskić’s conviction by the tribunal the government handed over thousands 
of pages of documents which it claimed were exculpatory.267 Relying on this evidence, the 
defendant’s appeal experienced significant success, reducing the number of charges on which he 
was convicted from 19 to three, and his sentence from 45 years to nine.268 
When states have been unwilling to cooperate, the court has determined that it possesses the 
international legal authority to compel compliance with orders to provide witnesses or evidence 
from states and government officials.269 In 1999 this led to the adoption of an additional rule in 
the RPE, rule 54bis, which describes the right of the prosecution and defense to request that the 
tribunal order a state to cooperate in providing information to the parties. This right was slow in 
coming for the defense, vindicating Bassiouni’s assessment in 1993 that the accused’s right to 
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access information “is largely neglected even though its importance to a defense is 
immeasurable.”270 
According to ICTY and MICT chef de cabinet McIntyre, the prosecution has been able to 
utilize the court to compel cooperation much more effectively than has the defense.271 For the 
court to issue an order compelling a state to cooperate, the party requesting the information must 
establish that the documents contain evidence likely to be relevant to their case.272 They cannot 
conduct a “fishing expedition” in the hope of finding something relevant, in the words of Judge 
David Hunt.273 
In contrast, the prosecution’s mandate from the Security Council to investigate allegations of 
crimes within the court’s jurisdiction274 means that the OTP has much more latitude than defense 
counsel in terms of requests for state cooperation. Instead of an order, a prosecutor can request a 
warrant to seize documents in a state’s archives, which does not require demonstrating direct 
relevance. According to Judge Hunt, for the OTP this is “a very powerful weapon in its hands,” 
which additionally denies the defense direct access to that potential evidence—counsel can only 
later access that subset of documents acquired through a warrant by the OTP that the prosecution 
decides to disclose to the defense.275 This denies counsel the ability to search such documents for 
exculpatory material—they are reliant on the prosecution identifying such documents during 
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their examination, and then disclosing them in a timely manner. As discussed in the evidentiary 
procedures section below, timely disclosure of prosecution evidence to the defense has been a 
significant concern at the court.  
The ICTY has decided that as issues of non-cooperation by external actors with 
investigations by defense counsel are outside of its direct control they are not the tribunal’s 
responsibility to resolve.276 That is, if the court cannot directly ensure parity—in relation to 
assess to information, or other issues—it cannot be brought to the court as a matter for redress. 
Because of this, according to defense counsel and former ADC president Gregor Guy-Smith, 
lack of access to exculpatory material has significantly impacted the ability of counsel to mount 
an effective defense and thereby threatens to undermine the credibility of the proceedings.277  
The tribunal attitude towards defense problems outside of its direct control is concerning as it 
indicates that the court does not acknowledge that an actual disadvantage to a defendant in 
gathering evidence can be caused by their weaker institutional position within the court and the 
reluctance of states to cooperate.278 This approach is consistent with the position of the court that 
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the right to parity between the parties is only procedural and not substantive—if the procedures 
are followed but the defense is disadvantaged in their outcome it requires no action from the 
court to rectify.279 Therefore a poor ability to effectively exercise status procedural rights is not 
perceived by the court as a challenge to due process. According to McIntyre, this attitude is 
problematic for defense parity because procedural guarantees require institutional power to 
effectuate them: “In a practical sense…the institutional advantages of the Ofﬁce of the 
Prosecutor as an organ of the Tribunal with an independent budget means that there is a great 
disparity in identifying and locating evidence.”280 
Mechanisms for compelling external actor cooperation with international tribunals to ensure 
a reasonable parity of access to potential evidence remain inadequate,281 enabling states to 
exercise significant influence over evidence gathering: “While international law formally 
addresses the issue of state cooperation through the core legal instruments of international 
criminal law, trial practice is informally marked by the invisible state actor in the public 
gallery.”282 The multi-level governance structure of international criminal justice ensures that 
cooperation is dependent upon the political will and interests of external actors,283 but reluctance 
to cooperate seems to be a far greater problem for defendants than prosecutors. 
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A potential remedy, proposed by defense counsel interviewed, would be suspending 
proceedings until a state begins to cooperate with the defense by permitting access.284 Otherwise, 
if the defense is unable to investigate adequately to prepare for trial, there can be no adequate 
defense. Such problems should be the responsibility of the court to deal with, especially because 
they have capacities and resources that could ameliorate these problems, including a complaint to 
the Security Council.285 However, according to Robinson, Karadžić’s chief legal advisor, the 
court is reluctant to provide such aid as it does not want to be perceived as aiding the defense of 
those widely perceived before trial to be war criminals.286 
The prosecution is also able to rely on investigatory aid from the UN, NGOs, and individual 
states. Even before the creation of the tribunal, the UN commission of experts had conducted 
fact-finding missions. Its final report, in May 1994, detailed investigations and substantive 
findings concerning: an alleged genocide in Opština Prijedor, the siege of Sarajevo, detention 
facilities, sexual violence, mass graves, and the destruction of cultural property.287 The report led 
to the initiation of various investigations by the tribunal’s OTP. While some of the material was 
too general to be of direct use, it provided leads to more relevant evidence.288 According to 
Richard Goldstone, the work of his office was augmented by investigations by the ICRC, 
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Amnesty International, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,289 and Human Rights 
Watch.290 According to former ICTY prosecutor Eliott Behar, the latter organization interviewed 
a number of victims and witnesses to the Kosovo conflict, on the ground, in 1999. This greatly 
assisted the OTP’s access to information in the Kosovo case he helped to prosecute.291 Goldstone 
also remarked that his initial prosecution team was provided with training in international 
criminal law, paid for by the American Bar Association.292  
David Scheffer, senior advisor to Ambassador Albright, and later the first US ambassador-at-
large for war crimes issues, details significant investigatory aid to the OTP from the United 
States.293 Scheffer co-chaired an Interagency Working Group on War Crimes Evidence, created 
specifically to investigate crimes in the Balkans conflict, and which interviewed witnesses, 
including refugees, collected intelligence, and attempted to construct “a ‘paper trail’ tying 
atrocities to the military and civilian leaders at senior levels.”294 This amounts to an enormous 
volume of investigatory aid and support that states and NGOs are rarely willing to make 
available to defendants and counsel.  
 
Defense parity indicator 2: Evidentiary procedures 
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This section analyzes issues relating to the effect of documentary and witness evidence on the 
courtroom dynamic between prosecution and defense. The first section explores the problems 
created by the hybrid nature of the trial system at the tribunal and the large scope of international 
trials, and addresses the procedural defendant right of disclosure of prosecution evidence. The 
second section discusses witness procedures in the statute and rules before analyzing in more 
detail those permitting the introduction into the record of affidavits—written witness statements 
and transcripts in lieu of in-person testimony. These are a core feature of witness rules that affect 
the dynamic between prosecution and defense. 
The report of the secretary-general to the Security Council recommending the establishment 
of the tribunal acknowledged the need for international criminal justice to go far beyond the 
defense protection standards employed at Nuremberg and Tokyo. The tribunal’s first 
president,295 Antonio Cassese, was also aware of the necessity for the court to implement 
substantial rights for defendants in order to achieve both normative and sociological legitimacy: 
“Justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done.”296 The report also stated that “[i]t is 
                                                
295 According to the ICTY, its president is “elected by a majority of the votes of the permanent judges for 
a two-year term and is eligible for re-election once. The President presides over the proceedings of the 
Appeals Chamber and is also responsible for the assignment of judges to the Appeals Chamber and Trial 
Chambers. In addition, the President presides over all plenary meetings of the Tribunal, coordinates the 
work of the Chambers, supervises the activities of the Registry, and issues Practice Directions addressing 
detailed aspects of the conduct of proceedings before the Tribunal. The President performs diplomatic and 
political functions related to the work of the Tribunal and supervises the Registrar in his or her role as the 
Tribunal’s channel of communication. The President is required under the Statute to submit an annual 
report on the activities of the Tribunal to the General Assembly as well as biannual assessments to the 
Security Council, setting out in detail the progress made towards the implementation of the Tribunal’s 
Completion Strategy.” ICTY, Chambers, www.icty.org/en/about/chambers. 
296 Antonio Cassese, “Foreword by the former President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia,” International Review of the Red Cross 321 (1997): 601-2. 
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axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect internationally recognized standards 
regarding the rights of the accused.”297  
Nevertheless, the report was vague on procedural standards regarding core evidentiary issues, 
unwilling to establish procedures when there was no agreement on the specifics of these 
standards and how to implement them in international law.298 It made basic recommendations for 
guaranteeing due process, including the rights of the accused,299 in particular those found in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,300 and these were included in the court’s 
statute.301 These procedures were a hybrid of those found in the adversarial common law and 
inquisitorial civil law trial systems, with the former predominant, as the statute was largely 
drafted by common law tradition lawyers in the UN Department of Legal Affairs, with US 
assistance.302 
The Security Council made no changes to the statute as received in the report, perceiving 
such issues to be technical details best left to the court to decide for itself. That is, they were seen 
as peripheral, not as essential to the council in establishing the credibility and legitimacy of the 
court—as the rhetoric it used implied.303 During council debates on the court’s creation, states 
tended to express a concern that crimes be prosecuted, but not with careful trial deliberation to 
ascertain truth or that the rights of the accused be respected. That is, they focused on outcomes, 
not process, even though the latter is precisely what distinguishes genuine criminal justice from 
                                                
297 Secretary-general’s report, para. 106. 
298 Ibid., paras. 83-4 and 106-7. 
299 Ibid., paras. 99-107. 
300 ICCPR, article 14. 
301 ICTY statute, articles 18-21 and 23-28. 
302 Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 95. The drafters also 
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show trials. The US permanent representative to the UN at that time, Madeline Albright, for 
example, stated during a council meeting in May 1993 that her country “hope[d] to contribute to 
this critical process of developing the rules that the Tribunal can expeditiously adopt so that the 
Prosecutor will then be in a position to begin prosecuting cases without further delay.”304 Speed 
in prosecuting, not legal fairness, has always been the primary procedural focus of the Security 
Council in relation to the tribunal. 
The statute is consequently much more detailed on substantive than procedural law; 
providing the judges with the authority to decide upon rules of procedure and evidence 
themselves, which were adopted in February 1994,305 after the tribunal had received suggestions 
from states,306 as provided for by the Security Council.307 The most influential suggestions were 
from the United States, among the approximately 75 pages of material it submitted, which was a 
significant factor in the establishment of a largely adversarial trial model.308 A danger in 
authorizing the court’s judges to construct their own rules is that, as stated by Judge Wald, 
“ICTY Judges are chosen by the UN General Assembly, from countries across the globe, many 
of which have dubious records on human rights or observance of international humanitarian 
law.”309 This background could also lead to poor decision-making by trial and appeal chambers, 
yet, according to Wald, the judges have “faithfully [followed] the rules and procedures agreed 
                                                
304 Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3,217th Meeting, 15. 
305 See ICTY statute, article 15; and ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, February 11, 1994.  
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upon by the Court.”310 However, this attitude demonstrates no acknowledgment that this largely 
means following the rules that the judges themselves created. 
By 1997, within three years of the RPE’s creation, it had been amended several times, 
“which may give the impression of a certain amount of improvisation” by the judges.311 By July 
2015 it had been revised 50 times, and currently consists of 127 rules (and multiple sub-rules) 
covering a broad range of issues for all significant participants at the court in the pre-trial, trial, 
appeals, and post-appeal stages.312 Such amendments are not subject to any oversight by the 
Security Council or any other body.313 This is problematic in the light of some of the evidentiary 
procedural changes discussed below. 
 
Documentary evidence and disclosure 
The RPE contain extremely permissive evidentiary standards, especially by adversarial trial 
standards, allowing any material to be admitted as evidence in trial, by either party, which an 
ICTY chamber “deems to have probative value.”314 This standard was challenged by the defense 
in an early case before the court, arguing that it reflected an essentially civil law approach of 
permitting virtually any relevant information to be used as evidence, including hearsay.315 The 
                                                
310 Ibid. 
311 Tavernier, “The Experience of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for 
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defense argued that this standard was too lax and was inappropriate to the adversarial common 
law trial procedure utilized by the tribunal. Legal systems applying the adversarial model usually 
restrict what evidence can be introduced—especially hearsay.316  
The trial chamber rejected this argument, stating that the tribunal’s trial system conformed to 
neither trial model, but was instead “sui generis” and “moving towards a more hybrid system.”317 
This a problematic position from the perspective of protecting the rights of the accused because 
the ICTY’s trial procedure is actually largely adversarial, in that it consists of two competing 
parties independent of the bench,318 which present and challenge the evidence on behalf of their 
client—the defendant on one side, and the court, or arguably the Security Council, on the other. 
Clearly Prosecutor Del Ponte saw that she was representing a broad political constituency during 
trials. In commencing her opening statement at the beginning of the trial of the former president 
of Yugoslavia she stated: “I bring the accused, Milošević, before you to face the charges against 
him. I do so on behalf of the international community and in the name of all member-states of 
the United Nations.”319 
Scholars of international criminal justice have gradually moved away from conceptualizing 
the defining feature of the tribunals’ legal systems as a “clash of legal cultures”—conflict 
between arguably incompatible adversarial and inquisitorial systems—“to one which recognizes 
                                                
316 The purpose of such restrictions is to not permit the entry of evidence which might unduly sway a jury. 
However, civil law procedure usually relies of on judges as finders of fact rather than a jury. 
317 Blaškić, decision regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence. 
318 The largely adversarial nature of the tribunal’s trial approach partly reflects the increasing move 
towards adversarial structures in previously inquisitorial national systems at the domestic level, where it 
is “strongly gaining favor.” See Bassiouni, “Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice:” 266, inc. 
note 141. 
319 Del Ponte and Sudetic, Madame Prosecutor, 144. 
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the convergence of influences at play in developing a sui generis body of law.”320 However, that 
clash is still enormously significant for the parity achieved by defense counsel, as they struggle 
with the consequences of a system built on conflicting conceptualizations of the role of defense 
and the parity it is therefore deemed to require for trials to be considered fair. 
While the tribunal largely follows the adversarial model in its courtroom procedures, its rules 
of evidence, as mentioned above, are the more permissive ones associated with an inquisitorial 
system.321 This does arguably create a form of hybrid, but one poorly suited to preserving the 
trial rights of defendants, with neither the expectation of a neutral search for truth of an 
inquisitorial approach nor the extra protections provided for defendants in a competitive 
adversarial procedure. As stated by legal scholars Stephanos Bibas and William Burke-White on 
the problem of creating a hybrid legal system at the tribunal that adequately protects defendant 
rights: 
Fundamentally, adversarial and inquisitorial systems specify very different roles for judges, 
prosecutors, and even defendants. Adversarial judges are detached umpires, with prosecutors 
and defense counsel serving as zealous investigators and advocates for their clients. In 
contrast, inquisitorial judges and investigating magistrates are active truth-seekers, collecting 
and reviewing evidence to determine facts. 
Our argument is not that a pure adversarial or inquisitorial system is preferable. Our fear 
is that the mishmash of the two systems has abandoned some distinctive checks on which 
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each system depends. The lack of appropriate mental models for the role of judges, 
prosecutors, and defense counsel results in confusion and perhaps even systemic failure.322 
They provide the example of a French judge at the tribunal criticizing an American defense 
attorney for introducing procedural objections on behalf of his client—an expected and necessary 
right for counsel within an adversarial trial approach: “If the system is going to be 
adversarial…it needs to allow zealous adversarial testing of the evidence instead of censuring 
American lawyers for playing their roles. If, however, the system is going to be inquisitorial at 
root, it needs to retain more inquisitorial safeguards.”323 
A former ICTY prosecutor provided an account in a case he tried of defense counsel 
pursuing perhaps not the most effective tactical choices in the courtroom. Counsel tended to 
                                                
322 Stephanos Bibas and William W. Burke-White, “International Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-
Procedure Realism,” Duke Law Journal 59, no. 4 (2010): 695. 
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assume that the protection of parity between prosecution and defense exists to protect both parties. This 
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motion to demand presentation of defense witness statements, whereas in adversarial trial systems, such 
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the protection of the defense. See Tadić, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Production of Defence 
Witness Statements, case no. IT-94-1, November 27, 1996, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tdec/en/61127ws2.htm; and Tadić, Separate Opinion of Judge Vohrah on 
Prosecution Motion for Production of Defence Witness Statements, case no. IT-94-1, November 27, 
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Popović et al., in which she represented Milorad Trbić, a prosecutor responded to her request for 
exculpatory material by requesting her defense strategy—then the prosecution would know what sort of 
potentially exculpatory material to look for. She stated that no competent defense lawyer would ever give 
such information to the prosecution, and that the request came from a prosecutor trained in the civil law 
system who was unfamiliar with an adversarial trial dynamic between prosecution and defense. Another 
reason for such problems is that the lawyers are dealing with millions of pages of documents. This goes to 
an essential fact of international prosecutions: “The shear magnitude of the cases,” which become 
“ridiculous.” The defense, she argues, can never read all of the information that is disclosed to them. 
Interview with Colleen Rohan. See Popović et al., case no. IT-05-88. The cases for defendants Milorad 
Trbić and Vinko Pandurević were later separated from Popović et al. into Pandurević et al., case no. IT-
05-86.  
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deny facts and the occurrence of events which he says were difficult to disprove and did not need 
to be disproven to make the defense case. Another perhaps questionable choice was focusing 
attention on unrelated acts of violence committed by the victimized ethnic group, which may 
have given the appearance that counsel were trying to justify their client’s role in atrocities. 
Viewing the trial and acting through a broader ethnic lens also tends to occur much less 
frequently in domestic trials.324 
Judge Wald argues that the expansiveness of the court’s evidentiary standards is one of the 
most significant problems for defense protection at the tribunal. She rejects the argument that a 
panel of judges requires less guidance in examining evidence than a jury, stating that “It is 
simply not true, in my opinion, that only juries—not judges—need such restrictions. Donning a 
robe does not enshroud its occupant with a seventh sense of whether something written on paper 
is true or false. In that sense, the judge is on a par with the juror, who must rely on his or her 
human instincts in evaluating the person doing the testifying.”325  
Judge Bakone Moloto acknowledged the harm that dubious evidence can cause to judicial 
perceptions when he objected to the introduction of a certain book as evidence during trial: “we, 
the Chamber, cannot accept that we hear what you are going to say only to throw the book out 
later. The book might be out, but the mind—it’s still in the mind. And the purpose for 
admissibility is to make sure that the mind of the Chamber is not coloured by what might turn 
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out to be inadmissible.”326 The problem of hearsay evidence is also discussed in the witness 
testimony subsection below. 
In relation to the core due process procedural guarantee of the disclosure of prosecution 
evidence to the defense, the tribunal’s RPE requires all evidence presented in the indictment be 
made available within 30 days of the first pre-trial appearance of the accused in court.327 
Evidence that will be presented at trial—including archival materials and other documents, and 
witness statements—must be made available within a time period set by the pre-trial or trial 
chamber,328 and evidence discovered after the time limit must be handed over to the defense 
immediately.329 There is also an obligation on the prosecution to disclose any potentially 
exculpatory material in their possession.330 This last requirement is particularly important, as 
disclosure of “information that suggests actual innocence…is fundamental to notions of due 
process under…international law.”331 
There are, however, substantial limitations on disclosure imposed by the court. Most 
importantly, all documents from states or other third parties relied upon by the prosecution may 
only be released to the defense with the permission of the providing entity.332 This even applies 
                                                
326 Haradinaj et al., transcript of trial for Thursday August 18, 2011, case no. IT-04-84bis-T, 225, 
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327 ICTY RPE, rule 66.A.i.  
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331 Laura Moranchek, “Protecting National Security Evidence While Prosecuting War Crimes: Problems 
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to exculpatory material.333 To keep from defendants material that suggests their innocence is 
clearly an absurdity in any trial system with pretentions to fairness. Witnesses may also not be 
ordered to testify in relation to such evidence.  
This restriction was designed to protect sensitive information provided by states, and so to 
encourage them to hand over intelligence information that might be useful to the OTP.334 While 
the restriction no doubt achieved its aim, it was only ever designed to aid the prosecution—there 
is no parity in access to evidence through such rules. For the defense it means that information 
may not have been disclosed prior to trial, making it more difficult for counsel to provide an 
adequate response to the evidence against their clients—even leaving aside the issue of 
exculpatory material.335  
Much state confidential evidence has not been presented during ICTY trials—to maintain its 
confidentiality providing states have often required that such material only be used to lead the 
prosecution to other evidence. However, with a state’s permission such evidence can be 
presented in court, subject to the approval of the chambers, and the judges have been reluctant to 
exclude such information. In Brđanin, the defense moved for the exclusion of evidence obtained 
through phone conversation intercepts, arguing that electronic surveillance was illegal under 
Bosnia and Herzegovina state law and that it was in breach of the right to privacy in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human 
Rights.336 The judges ruled against the defendant,337 unwilling to expand defendant protections 
                                                
333 Ibid., rule 68 disclosure obligations come with the caveat that exculpatory material is “[s]ubject to the 
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through reliance on existing and international and state law as they had been willing to rely on it 
to expand the definition of crimes.338 This is one of several problems for the defense created by 
the necessary reliance of the court on external actors for evidence gathering. 
In terms of court practice, legal scholar Jenia Turner states that, in interviews with her, ICTY 
defense attorneys criticized prosecutors for tardiness in disclosing evidence, and reluctance to 
hand over exculpatory material.339 It was also one of the strongest criticisms of prosecution 
behavior made by counsel I interviewed. Defense attorneys claim especially that delays in 
releasing exculpatory material to defendants at the tribunal are an: 
ongoing problem…even though the prosecution’s obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence 
is essential to providing the accused with adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence. 
Timely disclosure of exculpatory evidence is also, as an ethical matter, prerequisite to the 
prosecution discharging its duty to assist the Trial Chamber in arriving at the truth and to 
providing ‘justice for the international community, victims and the accused.’340 
According to defense attorneys interviewed, this occurs mostly because the prosecution is 
overwhelmed with the sheer volume of evidence it has to deal with, and in that mammoth task, 
finding and handing over information to the defense is not a high priority.341 This is a 
prosecutorial resources issue that negatively impacts defense counsel. Therefore the situation is 
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not as simple as summed up by former chief prosecutor Goldstone when asked about resources at 
the court. He argues that the under-resourcing of the OTP that he experienced as chief prosecutor 
in 1994-6 was directly advantageous to defense counsel.342 
Counsel claim that disclosure has always been a major problem and has not improved.343 
While they sympathize with prosecutors as human beings who are reluctant to hand over 
evidence that might undermine the case they are trying to make, at the same time prosecutors are 
an arm of the international criminal justice system, tasked with finding justice, not just proving 
the accused guilty. One knowledgeable observer close to the court defended the OTP against 
accusations of tardiness in handing over evidence, arguing that the disclosure requirements at the 
court are very exacting, perhaps too much so considering the volume of evidence involved, and 
considerably higher than in the United States.344 Former prosecutor Behar, who had worked in 
this role in Canada before moving to The Hague, felt that, from his background as a Canadian 
prosecutor, disclosure standards were not excessive at the Hague—they were lower than those in 
Canada.345 
On occasion the court has strongly criticized prosecutors for disclosure violations. In 1998, a 
trial chamber censured prosecutors and issued a formal complaint to the OTP for “conduct close 
to negligence” relating to disclosure, listing numerous examples.346 However, it also noted that 
there was no code of conduct for prosecutors at the tribunal and that the chambers had no power 
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to discipline them; it also acknowledged that defense counsel were so bound and could be 
sanctioned.347 The court had in fact just prior to this determined that it had no power to even 
consider the issue of a code of conduct for the prosecution.348  
One of the most telling examples of lack of prosecutorial accountability occurred more 
recently, in 2012, when the court reprimanded a prosecutor—without professional or financial 
penalties—for purposeful failure to hand over information that might have discredited a 
prosecution witness.349 The appeals chamber reversed the censure, holding that only the OTP can 
be censured by the court, not individual prosecutors. Nevertheless, the court did not reprimand 
the office.350 Colleen Rohan, who was defense counsel in that case, has not heard of any 
sanctioning of prosecution for misconduct acknowledged by the court.351 She argues that this 
disparity in accountability for procedural violations between prosecution and defense is a serious 
problem as it disadvantages the latter through providing little incentive for prosecutors to comply 
with their disclosure obligations, and creates “a climate of impunity regarding disclosure 
violations.”352 
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Code of Conduct for Defense Counsel Appearing Before the International Tribunal, doc. no. IT/125, June 
12, 1997. 
348 Kovačević, Order on Defendant’s Motion for a Prosecutorial Code of Conduct, case. no. IT-97-24-PT, 
May 12, 1998, www.icty.org/x/cases/kovacevic/tord/en/80512MS2.htm. 
349 Haradinaj et al., Decision on Joint Defence Motion for Relief from Rule 68 Violations by the 
Prosecution and for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 68bis, case no. IT-04-84bis-T, October 12, 2011, paras. 
18, 46, and 48, www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/111012.pdf. 
350 Haradinaj et al., Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Reconsideration of Relief Ordered Pursuant to 
Rule 68bis with Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hall, case no. IT-04-84bis-T, March 27, 2012, Part 
V.i., www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/120327.pdf. 
351 Interview with Colleen Rohan. 
352 Ibid; and Rohan, “Protecting the Rights of the Accused in International Criminal Proceedings,” 296. 
The ICTY statute and RPE do not address prosecutorial misconduct. There is only a vague accountability 
mechanism in the RPE which may be argued to relate to the prosecution, by which the ICTY judges “may 
decide…on sanctions to be imposed on a party which fails to perform its disclosure obligations.” See 
 
 
 
 
 
260 
Some of the problems for defense rights caused by unreliable disclosure are a result of the 
broad scope of ICTY trials.353 The sheer volume of evidence presented by prosecutors at the trial 
due to the large number of charges often brought places a significant burden on the limited 
resources of the defense. There are thousands and sometimes millions of pages of documents 
disclosed, often with inadequate time for the defense to make adequate use of them: introduced 
immediately before the trial begins, during the trial, or immediately before closing arguments, 
for example.354 While some defense counsel argue that prosecutors purposefully time disclosure 
so as to disadvantage the defense,355 those I interviewed largely ascribed the problem to the 
scope of trials, as mentioned placing a disclosure burden on the prosecution that they have 
insufficient resources to adequately respond to.356  
Close court observers sympathetic to the prosecution also recognize that there have been 
problems with disclosure and agree that it is due to the overwhelming volume of material 
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gathered by the OTP for each trial. The problem may have been ameliorated by the introduction 
of an electronic system for storing documents, with many files text searchable.357 Former chief 
prosecutor Del Ponte has acknowledged, however, that many documents are often not uploaded 
to the system, leading to a continuation of disclosure problems due to the volume of evidence: 
“we did not even know whether the mounds of documents in our custody held exculpatory 
evidence.”358 
The scope of trials is an ongoing problem created not only by the nature of mass atrocity 
crimes, but also by prosecutorial charging decisions. According to Judge Wald: 
Judges have sometimes seemed perplexed and even irritated as to why particular indictments 
or particular suspects have been brought at particular times. This was especially true when 60 
or more separate counts were loaded in one indictment of a relatively low-level perpetrator. 
The ICTY Statute has been construed reasonably as allowing Judges to reject an indictment 
only if the evidence proferred [sic] by the Prosecutor does not make out a prima facie case, 
and not on grounds that the Judges think that a particular case is a waste of the Tribunal’s 
time.359 
One argument for the large number of charges is a politicization of the prosecutorial charging 
decision resulting from the international and political context within which ICTY trials occur.360 
With international media attention and pressure from victim groups to see justice done for them, 
prosecutors are argued to enlarge the scope of the charges brought against accused. A well-
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informed legal source has seen no evidence of charging decisions at the ICTY being affected by 
such political considerations.361 Former prosecutor Behar felt that there may well be perceived 
public or political pressure to pursue a broad range of charges, though he acknowledged that he 
had no direct experience with making such charging decisions. He also felt that there may be 
particular public attention paid to certain charging decisions—for example, in relation to crimes 
of sexual violence, given a current focus on these issues—but that ultimately the prosecution 
must be able to substantiate these charges with sufficient evidence to prove them in court.362  
The Karadžić trial provides a prominent illustration of the harm caused to adequacy of 
representation for defendants in relation to documentary evidence by the scope of international 
trials. According to Karadžić’s chief trial legal advisor, Peter Robinson, the defense received two 
million pages of evidence from the prosecution—of the nine million in the latter’s possession 
relating to the case.363 There was so much material that the prosecution was required to prepare a 
list of the evidence disclosed on a monthly basis.364 In February 2009 alone the prosecution 
reported handing over 6,016 items, totaling 68,668 pages.365 Disclosure at similar levels 
continued during Karadžić’s trial.366 
One of the reasons for the amount of evidence in his trial was the number of charges made by 
the prosecution—a total of 11. Of these, two were for genocide (Srebrenica and seven Bosnian 
municipalities), five for crimes against humanity (persecution, extermination, murder, 
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deportation, and inhuman acts), and four for war crimes (murder, terror, unlawful attacks on 
civilians, and taking hostages).367 His trial lasted 499 days, with 337 prosecution and 248 defense 
witnesses called.368 
Robinson argues that Karadžić’s notoriety, the political need for the court to secure a 
prosecution, and pressure from victim groups were factors leading prosecutors to charge him 
with an especially large number and scope of offenses.369 Academics are also not immune from 
media influence. European Society of International Law vice-president Marko Milanovic stated a 
week before the Karadžić verdict was announced: “Broadly speaking he got a fair trial, it was 
certainly fairer than he would have got anywhere else.” He does not seem to require a high 
standard of legal fairness, presumably arguing that the ICTY is fairer than a Bosnian court would 
have been. Milanovic then undermined his argument entirely by going on to say “there’s no way 
he can be acquitted.”370  
Former prosecutor Behar argues that international trials can have a strong historical narrative 
dimension. Pursuing that dimension may encourage the prosecution to introduce more witnesses 
and victims than necessary to tell their stories in court. However, this has to be balanced by 
competing pressures on the prosecution, such as the court’s concern with the length of the trial—
leading the judges to limit the number of witnesses both prosecution and defense can 
introduce.371  
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The trial of Milošević also suffered from the emphasis on the trial as a public political event, 
and the concern with narrative construction. During the accused’s first appearance at the court in 
July 2001 he rejected the right to have his indictment read out in court. Prosecutor Del Ponte 
later said that this was unfortunate, as “[t]his was an historic moment—the first trial of a head of 
state before the international tribunal. Reading the indictment aloud, live on television in Serbia, 
would have provided the public with a dramatic, definitive statement of the charges against the 
man who had once been their leader.”372 The chief prosecutor’s reasoning for this procedural 
trial preference relied on the political goal of delegitimizing the defendant at home by utilizing 
the trial to reshape the narrative of his time as president.  
Del Ponte was also critical of her prosecution team’s choice of the first witnesses presented 
at Milošević’s trial, fearing that his cross-examination (he acted as his own counsel), shown on 
television, was allowing him to “score political points in Serbia.” “‘This,’ I told them, ‘is not the 
trial we wanted to present to the world.’…I wanted to see insider witnesses. I wanted to see 
ranking diplomats and leaders from the international community who had dealt with Milošević 
during the war. I did not want to see evidence of shootings and rapes and other crimes.”373 There 
was no clear-cut separation between legal and political decision-making in relation to the 
prosecution’s presentation of its case, again challenging the claim that politics outside the ICTY 
courtroom have not affected the fairness of legal proceedings within it.374  
Del Ponte was attempting to use the trial to create political theater. Martti Koskenniemi 
argues that the prosecution’s decision-making during the Milošević trial was inherently political, 
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and could only be so when prosecuting a political leader: “To accept the terms in which the trial 
is conducted—what deeds are singled out, who is being accused—is to already accept one 
interpretation of the context among those between which the political struggle has been 
waged”—that is, between the West and Serbia.375 The prosecution strategy in Milošević can be 
interpreted as the theater of demonstrating the validity of a Western interpretation of the 
Yugoslavia conflict and combatting the alternative interpretation being offered by the accused. 
As Koskenniemi argues, the international trial of political leaders requires the examination of 
evidence relating to the broader political context of the conflict and the alleged atrocities in 
dispute: “This is where a trial becomes inevitably a history lesson, and the dispute at the heart of 
it a political debate about the plausibility of the historical ‘interpretations.’”376 
The trial goal of constructing a historical narrative of the Balkans conflict affected charging 
decisions by the OTP. Narrative construction for the conflict has required a comprehensive 
approach to the actions prosecuted at trial. The tribunal has constructed narratives of guilt in 
order to avoid the perception of impunity. This is especially problematic for accused with a high 
level of notoriety, such as Milošević, Karadžić, and Mladić. In such cases the court is eager to 
ensure the appearance of fairness to avoid the perception of a political trial of defeated leaders 
(and to avoid successful defense appeals), but at the same time there is public, political, and 
victim group pressure to ensure the conviction of the most notorious alleged war criminals from 
the conflict. In this inevitably politicized and highly public context, “when the interests of the 
criminal defendant and victims both vie for judicial attention, a point is soon reached beyond 
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which the desire to satisfy the victims’ interests begins to impinge on considerations of fairness 
toward the defendants.”377 
Returning to the issue of disclosure during the Karadžić trial, there was also information the 
defense requested that was not released. Robinson filed 101 disclosure violation motions with the 
judges for refusal to hand over relevant material, of which the judges found for the defense in 
85.378 The judges were nevertheless reluctant to allow a remedy because of the cost and time it 
would require.379 Robinson believes the court acknowledges the problem of poor prosecutorial 
disclosure but is not willing to effectively address the issue due to bureaucratic constraints—
unwilling or unable to provide the defense with more time and money. 
According to Colleen Rohan, who acted as legal consultant to Karadžić’s Standby Counsel 
Team,380 there were 38 prior related cases at the ICTY to the situations litigated in Karadžić—
that had either gone through a full trial, had a guilty plea, or were sent back to be tried locally—
so that material also needed to be looked at by the defense team for exculpatory material. She 
called this “an overwhelming task.”381 There were 10 prior cases in relation to Srebrenica 
alone.382 Without interns working for free for the Karadžić defense team—there were over 100 
altogether—Rohan believes that it would have been impossible to put together a defense: “Is that 
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the way we want to run a system of justice, based on essentially slave labor, with people who 
happen to be able to afford to work with you for three months?”383 
The incoherent hybrid nature of the tribunal’s trial system, combined with the huge scope of 
international mass atrocity prosecutions, have had a significant effect on the ability of the 
accused to present an adequate defense based upon access to the case against their clients. These 
problems are perhaps inevitable in the legal and political environment of an international 
criminal court. Such weaknesses in the ability to provide adequate protections for defendants call 
into question the appropriateness of such courts for handling such cases. 
 
Witnesses and defense cross-examination 
The statute includes the right for the defense to cross-examine prosecution witnesses,384 which 
effectuates the fundamental abstract right of a criminal defendant to challenge their accusers. 
Corollary rights which protect the effectiveness of the right of cross-examination are found in the 
RPE and include adequate prior notice of witness information and statements.385  
In 2000, the appeals chamber established in Kordić et al. that it had an “express preference 
for live, in-court testimony,”386 which is a core factor in the implementation of the right to cross-
examine. In person testimony by witnesses was in fact the usual approach for the first several 
years of the court’s existence.387 It is also in line with common law system practice to safeguard 
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385 See, for example, ICTY RPE, rules 66.A.ii and 71.C. 
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the rights of the accused by enabling testimony against them to be challenged. For example, in 
the US federal court system, witnesses are required to testify in person, under oath, and with the 
defense right to cross-examine, with only exceptional circumstances permitting deviation.388  
However, the length and cost of trials at the tribunal have led to pressure since the late 1990s 
to reduce both, with significant implications for defense parity through witness procedures, as 
explained below. The cost of the first trial was around $20 million,389 with the average cost of a 
trial throughout the ICTY’s existence estimated to be around $14 million.390 The tribunal’s 2014-
15 budget was $180 million—down from $286 million in 2010-11 as the court winds down, 
finishing existing trials and transferring others to local courts.391 The court’s total operating costs 
will have been around $2.7 billion by the time it closes.392 In terms of the speed of trials, in its 
first ten years each lasted on average nine months, with some running to two years.393 The more 
complex trial of Radovan Karadžić lasted six and a half years394—not including the appeal.395 
This does not compare poorly with the United States. A 2003 study of murder trials in eight 
Southern states by researchers at Iowa State University found an average cost of around $24 
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million, while trials for especially violent offenders cost of $150-160 million each.396 However, 
the United States has unusually high costs for domestic violent crime trials, and many defendants 
plea bargain, so many cases do not go to trial. In comparison, in the United Kingdom, according 
to the British Treasury, the total cost, per murder, to the criminal justice system and health 
services combined, is approximately $250,000.397  
International trials present particular challenges that slow down and increase the cost of 
proceedings, including the need to call a large number of witnesses from multiple countries, and 
in relation to various different events, especially when prosecuting for command responsibility. 
These witnesses’ preferences on timing need to be taken into account by the court as it can be 
difficult to compel them to appear. Investigations, including exhuming mass burial sites, can take 
years. Language is another complication: judges and other court officers often do not share one 
in common with witnesses, and documents have to be translated.398  
Furthermore, the vast majority of cases go to trial,399 whereas in most common law 
systems—whose trials take longer partly because of the reliance on oral testimony—many cases 
are plea bargained, as is typical in the United States. In contrast, few individuals are willing to 
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admit to committing mass atrocity crimes.400 There is also no provision in the ICTY statute or 
RPE for encouraging plea bargains between accused and prosecution, and the court is not bound 
by such agreements between the parties.401 The tribunal has also assumed costs usually borne by 
other aspects of the criminal justice system in a domestic context, such as investigators’ travel, 
and the detention of defendants before and during trial, in addition to legal aid for defendants. 
The latter cost alone accounts for 11 percent of the tribunal’s annual budget.402 
Responding to pressure from states to address concerns about the length and cost of ICTY 
trials,403 in 1998 the UN General Assembly requested the secretary-general to conduct a review 
“evaluating the effective operation and functioning” of the ICTY in order to improve 
efficiency.404 The report of the expert group assembled by the secretary-general recommended 
procedural changes to expedite trials, including through an increased reliance on written 
testimony, as live testimony takes up the most trial time—on average witnesses testify for one 
whole day.405 In its seventh annual report to the UN, the tribunal itself acknowledged the 
pressure to speed up proceedings, and that it came not only from the need to satisfy court actors, 
but from state and UN pressure, to satisfy “the ever growing expectations of the international 
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community.”406 As a result, since the late 1990s the Security Council has taken various actions to 
speed up trials as part of its “completion strategy” for the court.407 
Greater legitimacy might be argued to stem from the right of defendants to an expeditious 
trial, which is undermined when they spend years behind bars before a verdict is delivered. 
Rachel Kerr argues that a major political consideration in the Security Council’s push towards 
speedier trials was that successfully completed prosecutions—presumably with guilty verdicts—
would aid transitional justice within the region408—bringing swifter and therefore more credible 
justice to victims in order to aid in reconciliation and peacebuilding.409 The pressure also seems 
to have stemmed from assessments of the poor achievements of the tribunal, which relied 
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primarily on the number of total indictments and convictions—a measure of success appropriate 
more for show trials than genuine criminal justice.410  
Returning to the 2000 Kordić appeals chamber decision mentioned earlier—which reiterated 
the court’s early preference for oral testimony—trial judges reacted to the decision by changing 
the witness procedures in order to permit greater speed of trials through written testimony. Later 
that year, at the twenty-third plenary session of the tribunal’s Judicial Practices Working Group, 
it introduced a new rule to the RPE411 that has enabled a significantly greater reliance on written 
witness testimony since then,412 rule 92bis.413 In 2006 the court moved to increase the reliance on 
written testimony further by introducing rules 92ter and 92quater.  
Rule 92bis allows the introduction of a written statement or transcript in lieu of the witness’s 
appearance in court, as long as their testimony “goes to proof of a matter other than the acts and 
conduct of the accused”414—that is, to establishing historical background and other aspects of the 
context of the situation(s) examined in the case, known as the “crime base.”415 Rule 92ter 
permits such testimony to be introduced even when it goes to the acts and conduct of the 
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accused, as long as the witness is available in person for cross-examination. Rule 92quater 
allows written testimony which goes to their acts and conduct even if the witness is unable to 
appear before the court.416  
The introduction of these rules has led to a substantially increased reliance on written 
testimony.417 In the tribunal’s first trial,418 all evidence received from witnesses was oral except 
for statements contained in an expert report provided by a witness who was a member of the 
commission of experts established by the Security Council to investigate war crimes in the 
former Yugoslavia.419 Less than ten years later, in Krajišnik, the prosecution was permitted by 
the chamber to introduce 168 affidavit (92bis) witnesses vs. 101 oral:420 only 38 percent of 
witnesses provided live testimony. 
Court observers and former prosecutor Behar defend these rule changes, arguing that they 
have helped speed up proceedings while not negatively affecting defendants’ rights.421 They 
claim that 92bis witness statements are not problematic. Evidence admitted under this rule 
cannot relate to the acts and conduct of the accused. Furthermore, such evidence cannot be used 
as the sole basis to convict an accused. 
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In contrast, Judge Wald warned as early as 2004 that the increasing use of such testimony 
was a concern for justice, and that if the trend continued it would “seriously undermine the hard-
fought respect for [the tribunal’s] processes.”422 Permitting the introduction of testimony against 
a defendant without the ability to question the witness, she argued, “threatens to squander the 
ICTY’s most precious asset—its reputation for fairness and truth seeking.”423 In fact in its first 
annual report to the UN, in 1994, the tribunal acknowledged that cross-examination (in this case 
during depositions) of oral testimony was allowed “[i]n order to protect ‘equality of arms’ (and, 
in particular, the rights of the accused).”424  
This attitude changed, to the detriment of defendants, when the length and cost of 
international trials became apparent. In its sixth annual report to the UN, the ICTY had 
acknowledged the concern with the length of trials, but had also noted that it was nevertheless 
important to maintain the centrality of oral testimony, despite its contribution to the problem: 
“unlike the Nurnberg and Tokyo tribunals, a great deal of reliance is placed on the testimony of 
witnesses rather than on Affidavits [at the ICTY], and the tribunal is committed to ensuring that 
the rights of the accused are fully respected in accordance with contemporary human rights 
norms.”425 In its eighth report—in which the court noted the introduction of 92bis—only two 
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years later, “such declarations were notably absent.”426 The eighth report similarly only mentions 
a major change in the policy of the court towards written testimony in an endnote. This was the 
deletion of the rule stating a “preference for oral testimony” and replacing it with one “providing 
for the Chamber to receive the evidence of a witness in written form, where the interests of 
justice allow.”427 
A year after the introduction of 92bis, Judge Wald called the move “a 180 degree turn” from 
the preference for live testimony.428 In 2003 legal scholar Salvatore Zappalà expressed concern 
at the trend, noting that affidavits “present the same drawbacks as hearsay evidence, since they 
are out-of-court statements…Defendants are clearly not confronted with the source of evidence. 
Additionally, affidavits lack those elements of orality and direct examination that should 
characterize the presentation of evidence in adversarial trials.”429 Therefore the defense’s 
fundamental due process “right of confrontation” of one’s accusers is diminished. This is why 
such testimony tends to be forbidden or extremely limited in adversarial trials; such testimony is 
a feature instead commonly seen in inquisitorial trials.430 
In relation to 92bis, Gideon Boas, a former legal advisor to the ICTY trial chambers, 
acknowledges that the effective implementation of the constraint against using written testimony 
                                                
426 Fairlie, “Due Process Erosion:” 71. 
427 ICTY, eighth annual report, para. 51, note 1. See Fairlie, “Due Process Erosion:” 72. Rule 89.F 
replaced rule 90.A. 
428 Wald, “To ‘Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence:’” 544. 
429 Salvatore Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 137. 
430 Some states with inquisitorial systems permitting reliance on written testimony have shifted towards 
an adversarial model reliant on oral testimony precisely because of concerns with the rights of defendants 
in a non-oral setting. See, for example, the move in this direction by Mexico, due to be complete by 2016: 
Paul J. Zwier and Alexander Barney, “Moving to an Oral Adversarial System in Mexico: Jurisprudential, 
Criminal Procedure, Evidence Law, and Trial Advocacy Implications,” Emory International Law Review 
26, no. 1 (2012): 189-225. 
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for acts of the accused is dependent upon the highly subjective interpretation of the judges.431 In 
interviews counsel confirmed this concern, arguing that, despite prosecutors’ protestations to the 
contrary, some of them have interpreted the rule too liberally, putting together statements that 
breach the often fine line between background and direct relevance to the accused’s conduct.432 
Judge Wald argues that: 
In my time at the ICTY, I have seen countless statements made years earlier by a witness that 
the same witness repudiates, contradicts, or ignores in his or her courtroom testimony. There 
is no question in my mind that a very different aura surrounds a witness giving live testimony 
to the judges in front of the accused and cross-examined by defense counsel than in an 
interview with a prosecutor (or a defense) representative out of court, not subject to cross-
examination. I have grown suspicious of many out-of-court statements that are the product of 
a witness speaking one language to an interrogator speaking another who writes it down in 
the interrogator’s language and has it read back to the witness in the witness’s native tongue 
by a third party. There is much margin for error in such a system, and indeed in the 
courtroom years later, many witnesses say they were misunderstood or misquoted in the 
earlier statement. It is therefore essential, in my view, that any written statements truly be 
limited to non-incriminating evidence.433 
The shift towards written statements potentially harms defendants by eliminating the effect of 
live testimony on the judges—who decide cases—and often denies defense counsel the right to 
cross-examine witnesses, which constitutes a weakening of their trial right to confront their 
                                                
431 Gideon Boas, “Creating Laws of Evidence for International Criminal Law: The ICTY and the 
Principle of Flexibility,” Criminal Law Forum 12, no. 1 (2001): 82. 
432 Interviews with Colleen Rohan and Gregor Guy-Smith. 
433 Wald, “To ‘Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence:’” 545. 
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accusers. It also arguably undermines the principle of the presumption of innocence and the 
burden of proof lying with the prosecution. Despite these serious concerns, written witness 
testimony has been frequently and increasingly utilized at the court for incriminating evidence in 
order to speed up trials.434 As the court completes its final cases there has not been a slowing 
down, but rather a further “accelerated pace” in proceedings,435 attested to by defense counsel.436 
 
Conclusion 
The ICTY was the first international criminal tribunal created since the IMTFE. It faced a very 
different context of international criminal law to the postwar tribunals, which made its legality of 
crimes far less problematic. The agreement among powerful postwar states to create the IMT and 
IMTFE, and the broad state agreement during the Cold War leading to the creation of global and 
regional humanitarian and human rights legal instruments meant that the core crimes of the 
ICTY were relatively well established by the beginning of the court’s jurisdiction in 1991. 
The dissertation therefore disagrees with the assessment of William Schabas, who argues that 
“[a]lthough formally professing rigid adherence to the nullum crimen principle, in practice the 
judges at the ad hoc tribunals have taken a relatively relaxed approach, much in spirit to their 
predecessors at Nuremberg.”437 It instead argues that while the lack of any provisions in the 
statute protecting legality may have enabled some flexibility with interpreting crimes, the ICTY 
                                                
434 The court has itself acknowledged the weakness of written statements in noting discrepancies with oral 
testimony. See, for example, Limaj et al., Trial Judgment, para. 321. 
435 UN, “Accelerated Pace Palpable as Criminal Tribunals Strive to Conclude Caseload, Transfer Balance 
to Residual Mechanism, Security Council Hears in Briefings,” Security Council Meetings Coverage, UN 
doc. SC/11917, June 3, 2015. 
436 Interviews with Gregor Guy-Smith, Peter Robinson, and Colleen Rohan. 
437 William A. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 63. 
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did not breach legality by enforcing laws that had not existed before, which had happened at the 
IMT.438 
The tribunal has developed crimes from their treaty and customary origins through 
interpretations that have been positive from a broad human rights perspective of protecting 
individuals. The tribunal’s interpretations have sometimes been questionable, especially in 
relation to the context and underlying offenses of the crimes.439 The tribunal, however, generally 
evinces a relatively high level of legality of crimes, at least compared to the only two previous 
international tribunals.  
The legality of penalties, however, has been significantly more problematic than that of 
crimes. The UN was loath to compensate for the lack of Cold War development of international 
criminal procedure by directly breaching legality through creating specific punishments. This 
lacuna provided the tribunal with excessive leeway in creating its own sentencing practice, 
ineffectively guided by the few specifics the judges created in the RPE. Incoherent and 
inconsistent practice has generated little faith in the tribunal’s justice among victims. 
                                                
438 For a legal position largely in agreement with the conclusions drawn here see Gallant, Principle of 
Legality, 307-8. 
439 Arguably the strongest breach of legality at the ICTY involves a non-mass atrocity crime: “Contempt 
of the Tribunal.” The crime was not agreed by the Security Council or included in the ICTY’s statute. 
Instead it is found in the RPE (rule 77), which were created by the court’s judges. The court has directly 
addressed the issue of the legality of prosecuting contempt, arguing that while the crime did not exist in 
customary international law, it did in general principles of law, as a power of courts in most domestic 
legal systems, including the common and civil law systems that the ICTY’s procedures are based upon. 
See Aleksovski, Judgement on Appeal by Anto Nobilo against Finding of Contempt, case no. IT-95-14/1-
AR77, May 30, 2001, para. 38, www.icty.org/x/cases/contempt_nobilo/acjug/en/nob-aj010530e.pdf. 
Particularly problematic for legality is prosecutions of journalists for contempt. This has broadened the 
jurisdiction of the court from defendants, counsel, and witnesses to potentially any individual worldwide, 
regardless of territorial jurisdiction. See Gallant, Principle of Legality, 311. According to the RPE: “The 
Tribunal…may hold in contempt…any person who…discloses information relating to [its] proceedings” 
(rule 77.A.ii., emphasis added). While the declaration of the crime and its punishment (up to seven years 
in prison and 100,000 euros fine [rule 77.G.]) in the RPE arguably provide “fair notice” of its existence as 
a criminal offense to the applicable legal subjects—the world’s population—this does not provide an 
adequate legal justification and this remains a an arguably significant breach of legality by the court. 
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The legality of crimes and punishments was also shaped by the Security Council decision to 
create the tribunal through a Chapter VII resolution, as an attempt to provide a swift political 
response to armed conflict through legal means—or at least swift after the council finally 
decided to take action. Creation through a treaty, while more time-consuming, would have 
provided greater impetus towards generating clarity and specificity in relation to crimes and 
punishments, as was the case with the ICC’s Rome Statute in 1998—discussed in the following 
chapter. 
The factors that determine defense parity were understood by the Security Council mostly in 
terms of access to counsel and basic procedural guarantees, reflecting a lack of understanding of 
the role of defense in criminal trials, and a lack of concern due to the emphasis on prosecution, 
and on controlling the costs of the tribunal and the length of trials. This focus on basic 
procedures is to the detriment of an emphasis on the structural dynamic within the court. 
Structural parity is important to legal fairness because the institutional position of the defense in 
a criminal justice system has a significant effect on their ability to secure adequate resources and 
to maintain a voice in procedural policy reform. Structural parity therefore potentially shapes 
defense counsels’ entire ability to fairly represent their clients. The extreme structural imbalance 
at the tribunal, partially ameliorated by the creation of the Association of Defence Counsel, 
reflects poorly on the legal fairness towards defendants originally envisioned by Security 
Council members and practiced by the tribunal, and has shaped its ability to successfully address 
problems affecting the ability of counsel to provide adequate representation.  
Both the prosecution and defense have experienced significant state reluctance to cooperate 
with pre-trial investigations, resulting from the political concerns of external actors who are 
necessary for the court to function, and the weak ability of the tribunal to compel their 
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cooperation. Ultimately, however, the impact has been much greater on counsel’s ability to 
present an adequate defense than on the prosecution’s ability to build a case. The former lack the 
OTP’s advantages of institutional status and resources, and political and diplomatic contacts and 
influence which aid in encouraging and pressuring states to cooperate.  
Evidentiary procedure issues at the tribunal demonstrate the problems for defense parity 
caused especially by: the massive scope of international trials, particularly those of top leaders; 
the methods adopted to respond to UN and state pressure to speed up trial proceedings; the 
incoherent hybrid nature of procedures; and lack of concern with the defense function by the 
creators of the court. Evidentiary procedure issues are also impacted by broader concerns at the 
court that impinge upon parity, including the tribunal’s necessary reliance on external legal and 
political entities, and the relative accountability for prosecution and defense counsel provided for 
in the court’s rules. 
Pressures on the tribunal to decrease the cost and duration of trials have especially 
encouraged rule changes that have weakened due process protections for defendants. Among 
defense counsel practicing before the court there is “close to unanimous concern…that the 
current procedural rules are moving in a direction which, though it may result in quicker trials, 
will do so at the expense of providing fair trials.”440 Decreasing the duration of trials is of benefit 
to the accused by effectuating their right to an expeditious trial, and so ensuring that if they are 
innocent they will have spent less time incarcerated. However, the court has tended to press for 
speedier trials except when this would be explicitly in the interests of the accused. The court’s 
                                                
440 Rohan, “Protecting the Rights of the Accused in International Criminal Proceedings,” 290. 
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approach is characterized by “[t]he placing of expedience to the forefront in limited and 
inconsistent instances, while adopting a rather relaxed attitude in other circumstances.”441 
The dissertation agrees with the position of the court and the Security Council that speeding 
up trials would add to a perception of increased legitimacy from the perspective of efficacy. It 
disagrees with the court and council, however, that overall this decision adds to the legitimacy of 
the tribunal: there is a trade off between the—more obvious to casual observers—sociological 
legitimacy of increased perceived efficacy, and the far more complex normative legitimacy of 
decreased procedural fairness towards defendants. It is perhaps inevitable that a court created by 
political actors for largely political purposes would distort the underlying legal framework away 
from justice towards defendants towards broader perceptions of justice which focus on 
prosecution. It is inadequately appreciated by political actors that the legitimacy of the tribunal 
requires the fair legal treatment of a group traditionally scorned, if not despised: alleged war 
criminals.  
Defense protections at the ICTY have been harmed by various factors distinct to international 
trials: the political origins of the court, the large scope of trials and the political pressure to speed 
them up, the incoherent hybrid nature of the trial system, and the interference wrought by the 
political goals of narrative construction and delegitimization. Ultimately, as argued in the 
conclusion to the dissertation, an international criminal tribunal, created by states and dependent 
on external political support, may be a far from ideal forum for pursuing criminal justice while 
achieving a high degree of legitimacy through providing adequate protection for defendants. 
  
                                                
441 McDermott, “Rights in Reverse,” 175. 
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5 The International Criminal Court 
Chapter 5 examines the legal fairness of the International Criminal Court between its 
establishment in July 2002 and July 2016. It provides an analysis of fairness in relation to 
criminal defendants, and explores how that fairness has been shaped by political influences on 
judicial actors at the court, and by states, IGOs, and NGO actors. 
As the first permanent international criminal court, the ICC has been portrayed as 
representing an advancement in international criminal justice by human rights IR and legal 
scholars in terms of fair trial standards.1 Others laud the ICC’s claims to justice on the basis of 
prosecuting alleged war criminals and as a potential deterrent, while understating the 
significance of the rights of defendants in the rules and practice of the court, and giving scant 
notice to the idea that justice is not served if the rights of defendants are ignored and poorly 
                                                
1 International legal scholar and counsel Geoffrey Robertson rejects early US government criticisms of 
the ICC as “illogical, firstly because the model for it—the Hague tribunal—is painstakingly fair to the 
defence.” See Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, 2nd ed. 
(New York: The New Press, 2002), 391-2, emphasis added. Richard Goldstone, “The Crime Prevention 
Potential of the International Criminal Court Depends Upon its Credibility and the Support it Receives 
from Governments and Especially those of States Parties to the Rome Treaty,” in Contemporary Issues 
Facing the International Criminal Court, ed. Richard H. Steinberg (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2016), 
213-19. The chief prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, expresses a legalist perspective on the ICC, 
arguing that the court’s legal processes can remain immune from political influence: “It is my firm belief 
that recourse to justice should never be compromised by political expediency. The failure to uphold this 
sacrosanct requirement will not only pervert the cause of justice and weaken public confidence in it, but 
also exacerbate the immense suffering of the victims of mass atrocities.” She also stated that “the legal 
rules that apply are clear and decidedly not political under any circumstances,” making reference to 
“justice,” victims, and the public, but not to defendants. Justice is conceptualized here in terms of victims 
and peace—not the accused. See Fatou Bensouda, “The Truth about the ICC and Gaza,” The Guardian, 
29 August 2014. Other examples include human rights NGOs providing often premature assessments 
based on weak legal evidence: Human Rights Watch, “International Criminal Court a Reality,” press 
release, April 11, 2002, www.hrw.org/news/2002/04/11/international-criminal-court-reality; and Amnesty 
International, “The International Criminal Court: Fact Sheet 9—Fair Trial Guarantees,” doc. no. IOR 
40/09/00, July 31, 2000, www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior40/009/2000/en. 
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understood.2 Yet other commentators are critical of the legitimacy of the ICC, on grounds of the 
selectivity of cases prosecuted (currently confined to Africa);3 lack of autonomy of the court 
from states and the UN Security Council;4 as a poor deterrent to atrocities and providing 
insufficient justice to victims;5 and inefficiency in conducting trials.6  
In contrast, this chapter demonstrates that there are significant weaknesses in the fairness of 
trial standards and practice towards criminal defendants at the ICC. In doing so it highlights the 
dangers of IR scholars and other public commentators claiming that trials are fair without an 
                                                
2 Mark S. Ellis, “International Justice and the Rule of Law: Strengthening the ICC through Domestic 
Prosecutions,” The Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 74, no. 1 (2009): 79-86; David Bosco, Rough 
Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics (New York: Oxford university 
Press, 2014); Steven Ratner, Jason S. Abrams, and James L. Bischoff, Accountability for Human Rights 
Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 240-1; and David Scheffer, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 438-40. 
3 Mba Chidi Nmaju, “Relevance of the Law of International Organisations in Resolving International 
Disputes: A Review of the AU/ICC Impasse,” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 14, no. 1 (2014): 
155-85. For the position of the African Union see, for example, The Guardian, “African Union Members 
Back Kenyan Plan to Leave ICC,” February 1, 2016. For an analysis of critiques of the court in relation to 
Africa, see the various contributions to Gerhard Werle, Lovell Fernandez, and Moritz Vormbaum, eds., 
Africa and the International Criminal Court (T.M.C. Asser Press: The Hague, 2014). 
4 Rosa Aloisi, “A Tale of Two Institutions: The United Nations Security Council and the International 
Criminal Court,” International Criminal Law Review 13 (2013): 147-68; and Abhinav Chandrachud, 
“Diversity and the International Criminal Court: Does Geographic Background Impact Decision 
Making?” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 38, no. 2 (2013): 487-521. 
5 Kirsten Ainley, “The Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal Court,” International 
Affairs 91, no. 1 (2015): 37-54; Luke Moffett, “Elaborating Justice for Victims at the International 
Criminal Court: Beyond Rhetoric and The Hague,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 13 (2015): 
281-311; Elisabeth Baumgartner, “Aspects of Victim Participation in the Proceedings of the International 
Criminal Court,” International Review of the Red Cross 90, no. 870 (2008): 409-40; and Dawn L. Rothe 
and Victoria E. Collins, “The International Criminal Court: A Pipe Dream to End Impunity?” 
International Criminal Law Review 13 (2013): 191-209. 
6 Guénaël Mettraux, Dermot Groome, Shireen Fisher, Alex Whiting, Gabrielle McIntyre, Jérôme de 
Hemptinne, and Göran Sluiter, “Expert Initiative on Promoting Effectiveness at the International Criminal 
Court,” Expert Paper, December 2014, dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/Groome-ICC-Expert-
Report-Dec-2-2014.pdf; Stuart Ford, “How Much Money Does the ICC Need?” in The Law and Practice 
of the International Criminal Court: A Critical Account of Challenges and Achievement, ed. Carsten 
Stahn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 84-104; and Jonathan O’Donohue, “Financing the 
International Criminal Court,” International Criminal Law Review 13 (2013): 269-96. 
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adequate understanding of what fairness towards defendants consists of, and without effectively 
exploring these issues in relation to the ICC’s rules and practice. 
In regards to practice, this chapter necessarily provides a more provisional, forward-looking 
perspective on legal fairness legitimacy than that provided in Chapter 4. The ICTY has 
completed 102 trials, ending in 81 convictions, 19 acquittals, and two defendants to undergo 
retrial at the MICT.7 The ICC meanwhile had completed six trials by October 2016, with five 
convictions and one acquittal.8 There is therefore far less case law to draw upon to enable a firm 
assessment of the practice of the ICC in regards to both the legality of crimes and defense parity; 
and far fewer opportunities for the OTP and defense counsel to interact with external actors such 
as states and NGOs. The ICTY is also completing its last trials, encouraged by the Security 
Council’s Completion Strategy.9 In contrast, the ICC is a permanent court,10 and so the findings 
                                                
7 ICTY, Key Figures of the Case, www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases; data last updated April 19, 
2016. 
8 See ICC, homepage, www.icc-cpi.int. The four trials completed as of July 2016 were assessed in the 
research. Note that on September 27, 2016, after the end-period for the study, the ICC sentenced Ahmad 
al-Faqi al-Mahdi to nine years in the Mali situation. This was the first conviction by the court for the war 
crime of cultural destruction, and resulted from the first guilty plea before the court. See ICC, “ICC Trial 
Chamber VIII Declares Mr Al Mahdi Guilty of the War Crime of Attacking Historic and Religious 
Buildings in Timbuktu and Sentences Him to Nine Years’ Imprisonment,” press release, doc. no. ICC-
CPI-20160927-PR1242, September 27, 2016, www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=pr1242; and 
Marlise Simons, “Prison Sentence Over Smashing of Shrines in Timbuktu: 9 Years,” The New York 
Times, September 27, 2016. On October 19, 2016, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, 
Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu, and Narcisse Arido were found guilty of crimes 
against the administration of justice, in the first such trial before the court. See ICC, “Bemba et al. Case: 
ICC Trial Chamber VII Finds Five Accused Guilty of Offences Against the Administration of Justice, 
press release no. ICC-CPI-20161019-PR1245, October 19, 2016. 
9 In 2002 the Security Council accepted a completion strategy drawn up by the ICTY, which has been 
modified since then and has relied on speeding up trial proceedings (as discussed in Chapter 4), 
transferring some cases to national courts, and transferring retrials and appeals to the MICT). See, for 
example, UN Security-General, “Report on the Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia and the Prospects for Referring Certain Cases to National Courts,” UN doc. 
S/2002/678, June 19, 2002, www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2002/678. 
10 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, circulated as doc. no. A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, 
preamble and article 1. 
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here not only provide an assessment of its legal fairness legitimacy in the first 14 years of its 
operation, but also suggest the future trajectory of defendant protections at the court. 
The chapter begins with an examination of the dynamics during the negotiations which led to 
the creation of the court and their impact on fairness standards for defendants. Sections two and 
three analyze the principle of legality, focusing on the level of retroactivity in the mass atrocity 
crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, and the court’s sentencing guidelines and practices, 
respectively. The next two sections examine the dynamic between the prosecution and defense in 
the pre-trial and trial stages of proceedings. In section four, the impact of the court’s structure on 
this dynamic is analyzed, along with the effect of the court on defense teams’ ability to conduct 
investigations and acquire evidence. In section five, the procedures relating to evidence 
presentation and witnesses are examined in terms of how they impact parity during trial. 
The evidence relied upon in the research for this chapter includes the ICC’s Rome Statute, 
the Elements of Crimes (EC),11 Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE),12 the Regulations of the 
Court,13 and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal 
                                                
11 ICC, Elements of Crimes, doc. no. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, 2000, September 9, 2002, www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf. See 
Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, First Session, New York, September 3-10, 2002, doc. no. ICC-ASP/1/3, part II.B. 
12 ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, doc. no. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1, November 2, 2000, www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/legal-texts/RulesProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf. See Official Records of the Assembly 
of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, First session, New York, 
September 3-10, 2002, doc. no. ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1, part II.A. 
13 ICC, Regulations of the Court, doc. no. ICC-BD/01-01-04, May 26, 2004, www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B920AD62-DF49-4010-8907-
E0D8CC61EBA4/277527/Regulations_of_the_Court_170604EN.pdf. Six amendments to the regulations 
were subsequently adopted on December 18, 2007. See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 
Regulations of the Court, www.iccnow.org/?mod=regcourtwide. 
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Court;14 the court’s case law, including decisions and court judgments;15 court administrative 
documents and website data; participant memoires; interviews; and secondary legal, political, 
journalistic, and historical sources. Also relied upon is the case law of the ICTY, and 
occasionally that of other international courts, as they constitute the legal context within which 
the ICC operates for purposes of judicial interpretation of criminal law and procedural matters. 
 
Legal and political justice conflict in the creation of the ICC 
The UN International Law Commission produced a draft statute for a permanent international 
criminal tribunal in 1994,16 encouraged by a coalition of 16 Caribbean and Latin American states 
within the General Assembly.17 The draft was taken up as a starting point by an ad hoc group of 
mid-sized and smaller states, known as the “like-minded group,” eventually numbering over 60 
states.18 The group formed a prominent faction in the state negotiations leading to the creation of 
the court’s statute at the June and July 1998 Rome Conference. It consisted of various Western 
European and Latin American states, plus Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.  
                                                
14 ICC, Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court, UN Treaty 
Series vol. 2271, no. 40446, New York, September 9, 2002, legal.un.org/icc/apic/apic(e).pdf. 
15 Unlike at the ICTY, where each case was only related to individuals (or groups of individuals), at the 
ICC, cases—and case names—refer either to individuals or to “situations” under investigation by the 
court (e.g. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, case no. ICC-01/04). These situation cases 
may then lead to the prosecution of individuals (e.g. Lubanga, case no. ICC-01/04-01/06, which stemmed 
from the situation in the DRC, as reflected in the first part of the Lubanga case number). 
16 ILC, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, adopted at the ILC’s 46th session, 1994. Appears 
in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1994, vol. II (Part Two), with commentaries, 
legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_4_1994.pdf. 
17 Andrew Novak, The International Criminal Court: An Introduction (Basel: Springer, 2015), 18-19. See 
Chapter 3 of the dissertation for general details on the background to the creation of the ICC. The 
discussion in this chapter is confined to issues relating to legality and defense parity. 
18 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court,” Cornell International Law Journal 32, no. 3 (1999): 455. 
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Political scientist David Bosco argues that the like-minded group “conceived of themselves 
as depoliticized” in that they “lacked strong political interests and strategic entanglements,”19 
and “[b]ecause they were not global powers, they thought of themselves as more able to 
construct an international architecture that would be perceived as fair and legitimate by the rest 
of the world. The usually unstated corollary of this thesis was clear: powerful states with 
complex interests had limited ability to advance impartial international justice.”20 In the ICC 
negotiations, in distinction to those within the Security Council in relation to the ICTY, 
institutional power was exercised by less powerful states. This is considerably due to the 
resistance to the idea of a universal court by China and Russia, and also the United States.  
The significance of the like-minded group forms part of Bosco’s overarching argument in the 
book Rough Justice that great-power politics has played a less important role in the creation and 
working of the ICC than in most previous organizations established by states. His emphasis on 
the role of traditional notions of political power underplays an issue of central importance in the 
construction of the court: the inherent political bias towards successful prosecution—which is 
one of the most important goals of such courts—and the extent to which those in the like-minded 
group, and most other states at the Rome Conference, undervalued the importance of balance in 
the powers afforded to the prosecution and defense in the structure and operation of the ICC. 
There seems to have been a poor understanding among the conference participants that 
privileging the rights of victims may be detrimental to the rights of accused within the legal 
structure and processes constructed through the conference. Impartiality in international criminal 
                                                
19 Bosco, Rough Justice, 19. 
20 Ibid., 39. 
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justice requires looking beyond traditional state power interests to acknowledging the importance 
to its legitimacy of addressing the human rights bias towards successful prosecution. 
The UN General Assembly created two committees to generate a draft statute for the court: 
the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court worked 
throughout 1995, and this was replaced in December that year with the Preparatory Committee 
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (PrepCom).21 Cherif Bassiouni, the chair 
of the Drafting Committee of the Rome Conference, argues that by 1997 “only an unstructured 
and substantially unusable compilation of all governmental proposals” had come out of the 
PrepCom meetings, which was the preference of the P5 within the Security Council.22 A draft 
statute was then prepared by the committee in Zutphen, Netherlands, in January 1998.23 While 
this did not greatly advance the coherence and detail of the earlier proposals, it in turn led to a 
final draft in April,24 to be considered by the Rome Conference in June and July.25 
                                                
21 For the establishment of PrepCom after receiving the report of the ad hoc committee, see General 
Assembly resolution 50/46, December 18, 1995, 
www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/50/46. In January 1997 the assembly decided on 
meetings for PrepCom throughout 1997 and 1998, and agreed that a conference would be convened in the 
latter year to finalize the draft statute for a permanent court: General Assembly resolution 51/207, January 
16, 1997, www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/51/207. 
22 Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty of Rome:” 444. 
23 General Assembly, Zutphen Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, UN doc. 
A/AC.249/1998/L.13, Zutphen, Netherlands, February 4, 1998. 
24 General Assembly, “Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court: Draft Statute and Draft Final Act,” UN doc. A/Conf.183/2, April 14, 1998, 
legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/icc-1998/docs/english/vol3/a_conf_183_2.pdf. 
25 Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty of Rome:” 444. The Rome Conference’s official title is The United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court. 
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The statute was eventually signed by 120 states at the conference,26 and the court came into 
operation in 2002. The Assembly of States Parties (ASP) of the ICC consists of those states, 124 
as of July 2016, which have ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute, and provides oversight of 
the court, as well as acting as its legislative body.27 The Rome Conference created a Preparatory 
Commission of the International Criminal Court in 1999, through which the ASP created the 
subsidiary rules to structure the operation of the court, including the RPE and Elements of 
Crimes, which are discussed in relation to legality and defense parity throughout the chapter.28  
The limited understanding and appreciation of the centrality of the rights of the accused to a 
fair trial by the states negotiating the Rome Statute is demonstrated by the incoherent placement 
of these rights as agreed at Rome.29 Five of the 12 articles found in part III of the statute, General 
Principles of Criminal Law, delineate principles that establish core defendant rights, such as the 
non-retroactivity of crimes and punishment, and individual criminal responsibility.30 Other 
rights, such as ne bis in idem (no double jeopardy), the presumption of innocence, and a list of 
specific rights of accused, are found in other sections.  
While the research largely focuses on the role of states, institutional power over the ICC was 
also exercised by other actors involved in the Rome and pre-Rome negotiations. They similarly 
tended to exhibit a lack of appreciation for the importance of defendant rights, demonstrating an 
                                                
26 There were also seven votes against and 21 abstentions. The votes against were the United States, 
Israel, China, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Qatar. See Fanny Benedetti and John L. Washburn, “Drafting the 
International Criminal Court Treaty: Two Years to Rome and an Afterword on the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference,” Global Governance 5, no. 1 (1999): 27. 
27 The ASP meets once per year to discuss the operation of the court and also holds special sessions to 
decide ad hoc matters. See ICC, Assembly of States Parties, www.icc-cpi.int/asp. See also the ASP 
website, asp.icc-cpi.int. 
28 See UN, Law: ICC, www.un.org/law/icc/index.html. 
29 Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty of Rome:” 454. 
30 Rome Statute, articles 22-6. 
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understanding of human rights that focuses on victims while neglecting the centrality of 
defendant rights to the construction of a legitimate criminal justice institution characterized by 
liberal legal norms. 
Over 800 human rights NGOs were involved in the pre-Rome negotiations,31 with 238 
present at Rome, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Carter Center, the 
International Human Rights Law Institute, and the International Commission of Jurists.32 While 
this may be thought to bode well for the inclusion of rights for all participants in the statute, 
Geoffrey Robertson cautions that “what was truly ironic was [human rights NGOs’] zeal for a 
court so tough that it would actually violate the basic human rights of its defendants.”33 Amnesty 
International pushed for a prosecutor with the independence to be able to bring prosecutions even 
“where the evidence is extremely weak,” and called for the court to exclude the defense of duress 
and to significantly weaken that of self-defense.34  
Many human rights NGOs downplayed the rights of defendants due to an eagerness to create 
a strong court to prosecute atrocities and because of a lack of significant understanding of the 
importance of balancing the ability of the prosecution to present an adequate case and the 
accused to present an adequate defense. The broader implications for defendants of the positions 
and decisions taken at Rome are analyzed in the four sections below. 
 
Legality indicator 1: Non-retroactivity of crimes 
                                                
31 Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity, 347-8. 
32 Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty of Rome:” 455. 
33 Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity, 348. 
34 Amnesty International, “The International Criminal Court: Making the Right Choices,” Part I, January 
1997, 76-7, quoted in ibid. 
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This section provides an assessment of legality at the court by examining the nature and extent of 
the retroactive establishment and enforcement of the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. It 
begins by analyzing the debates surrounding legality during the process of creating the court. 
The contextual requirements and underlying offenses of the three mass atrocity crimes over 
which the court currently has jurisdiction are then examined: war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide.35 The analysis below includes the definition of the crime only if it is 
directly relevant to the analysis of legality and if it differs significantly from that in the ICTY 
statute, as the crime definitions were provided at the beginning of the discussion of the legality 
of each crime in Chapter 4. 
 
The principle of legality in the statute and Elements of Crimes 
The Rome Statute is the first founding legal document of an international criminal court to 
explicitly incorporate the non-retroactivity of crimes as a principle constraining the court’s 
ability to enforce law.36 First, as an international customary law principle, it is found in an article 
                                                
35 The ICC is the first international criminal court that only exercises jurisdiction in relation to acts 
committed after the court was established, and so there is no retroactive enforcement of crimes in that 
sense. After 2017 the ICC will have limited subject matter jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
(analogous to crimes against peace, prosecuted at the IMT and IMTFE), but as discussed in Chapter 1, it 
does not form part of this analysis. At the Kampala Review Conference, May 31–June 11, 2010, the ICC 
Assembly of States Parties agreed to expand the court’s jurisdiction, subject to ratification by state 
members. See ICC, Assembly of State Parties, Resolution RC/Res.6, doc. no. RC/11, June 11, 2010, 
asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf. 
36 While not utilized within the research as an indicator of legality, the statute also includes the non-
retroactivity of temporal jurisdiction (no prosecution for acts committed before the court came into 
existence. This is laudable from the perspective of legality and is characterized here as progress in terms 
of the rights of defendants. Robertson, however, assumes a typical international human rights approach to 
the standards of international courts when he condemns the ICC for the lack of retroactive jurisdiction: 
“This global cop-out is dressed up disingenuously as an application of the well-recognized rule against 
retroactive criminal prosecutions.” See Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity, 389. He ignores the court 
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titled “Applicable Law:” “The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must 
be consistent with internationally recognized human rights.”37 The statute goes further by listing 
the prohibition against retroactive law in its own article, constituting the first provision in its 
“General Principles of Criminal Law” section. This states that “[a] person shall not be criminally 
responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes 
place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court,” and requires that judges do not interpret legal 
provisions in ways inconsistent with legality.38 This provides a stronger protection against non-
retroactivity of crimes than that found in customary international law as it prohibits any penalties 
not previously written down in law—therefore ruling out expansion by judicial interpretation.39  
There is no direct reference to custom in the sources of applicable law found in the statute, 
which lists primarily the Rome Statute and associated documents, “applicable treaties and the 
principles and rules of international law,” and general principles of domestic law.40 Only the 
description of war crimes makes references to “laws and customs” of international and non-
international armed conflict.41 Therefore the ICC is much less subject than the ICTY to the 
criticism of breaching legality by relying on customary international law, whose application 
                                                                                                                                                       
jurisdiction issue entirely, arguing that prosecution at the ICC is legal because the crimes have already 
been established in international law. 
37 Rome Statute, article 21.3. 
38 Ibid., article 22.1. As stated in article 22.2, crime definitions must be “strictly construed” and avoid 
extension by analogy. 
39 Kenneth S. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 335. The article delineating the legality of crimes also 
contains the admonition to the judges that “[i]n case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in 
favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted,” providing an extra level of protection 
for defendants. See Rome Statute, article 22.2. 
40 Rome Statute, article 21. 
41 Ibid., articles 8.2.b and 8.2.e, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
293 
arguably weakens legality due to its imprecise and unwritten nature.42 Customary law is also less 
relevant to the legality of crimes at the ICC because the Rome Statute is a treaty, and is therefore 
binding on ratifying states, regardless of prior existing international law.43 
The Rome Statute and Elements of Crimes are significantly more detailed with regards to the 
definitions of the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction than was the statute of the ICTY, 
providing them with a relatively high level of clarity and specificity—the secondary 
requirements of the principle of legality of crimes. The Elements of Crimes was created after the 
statute due to significant disagreement at the Rome Conference among state delegations as to the 
details of each crime.44 Cherif Bassiouni argues that while the addition of later rules is usual in 
international law, the fact that detailed definitions of crimes were established outside of the legal 
document containing those crimes is “anomalous” in criminal law,45 and exemplifies the manner 
in which political compromises shaped the legality of the crimes at the court, as discussed in 
relation to each crime below. Nevertheless, he has elsewhere stated that the inclusion of non-
                                                
42 Susan Lamb, “Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal Law,” in The Rome 
Statute of International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 1, ed. Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and 
John R.W.D. Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 743; and Colin Warbrick and Dominic 
McGoldrick, “Extradition Law Aspects of Pinochet 3,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 48, 
no. 4 (1999): 958-65. A potentially serious breach of legality of crimes could occur when an individual 
not directly covered by the court’s jurisdiction was prosecuted—that is, when a situation is referred to the 
ICC by the Security Council involving a state or a state’s citizens not members of the Assembly of States 
Parties. Such prosecutions would not be retroactive as long as the crimes involved already constituted part 
of customary international law or were included in treaties ratified by the relevant state. See Gallant, 
Principle of Legality, 338-40. 
43 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 203. For the same reason he argues that the 
jurisprudence of prior courts may be of dubious legality for the ICC. Note that future short-form citations 
in this chapter to “Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity,” refer to this volume. Other volumes by the 
author with this title in the chapter include the subtitle in the short form. 
44 Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty of Rome:” 454. 
45 Ibid., 464. 
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retroactivity, and the delineation of crimes in the statute and Elements of Crimes, means that the 
ICC’s founding documents “satisfy the requirements of legality.”46 
International legal scholar Alain Pellet, in contrast, has criticized the high level of detail of 
crimes in the ICC rules as an “excess of codification…the result of a veritable brainwashing 
operation led by criminal lawyers, with the self-interested support of the United States” due to 
their concern to conform with the principle of legality of crimes.47 Pellet downplays the value of 
the principle to the legal fairness of a criminal court while arguing that greater specificity 
constrains the flexibility of judges to interpret the law in ways that may lead to the expansion of 
crime definitions. As discussed below, the desire to allow judges to create new law not only 
infringes on the separation of functions or powers in a legal system, but is a direct breach of 
legality.48 
The definitions of crimes in the statute are a product of diplomatic negotiations between state 
delegations at Rome—whose goal was consensus. This process led to a document described by 
Cherif Bassiouni as a “diplomatic mule” which was “seldom in full compliance with legal 
techniques and legal requirements.” For example, the political selection process for judges—via 
General Assembly vote—has led to few judges possessing the necessary understanding of and 
skills in international criminal law. Due to the paucity of ICC jurisprudence to date, however, 
                                                
46 Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 349.  
47 Alain Pellet, “Applicable Law,” in The Rome Statute of International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 
Vol. 2, ed. Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John R.W.D. Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 1,057. 
48 Pellet’s assertion that the high level of legal detail was intended to constrain the application of the law 
is also undermined by Bassiouni’s claim that the level of detail at the Rome Conference was partly driven 
by the preferences of the delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Bassiouni, 
“Negotiating the Treaty of Rome:” 455. 
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“the jury is still out” on how the court will deal with the interpretation of complex issues of 
crime definition in relation to each defendant.49 
 
War crimes 
The Rome Statute lays out the definition of war crimes and its underlying offenses,50 with even 
more detail provided in the Elements of Crimes and accompanying footnotes.51 Some of the 
offenses which constitute war crimes are described in greater detail in the statute than in previous 
court statutes and humanitarian treaties,52 providing a high level of clarity and specificity. 
In terms of the context requirements for the commission of war crimes, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, the ICTY in 1995 controversially expanded the traditional prohibitions on the conduct 
of armed conflict to non-international situations.53 State acceptance of this dramatic extension 
was swift, however, as demonstrated by the agreement to similarly expand war crimes at the 
Rome Conference in 1998. The statute also expanded the protections afforded in interstate armed 
                                                
49 Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 204. 
50 Rome Statute, article 8. 
51 Elements of Crimes, article 8. Most of the elements of war crimes in the statute derive from Geneva 
Conventions I-IV, Additional Protocols I and II, Hague Convention IV, and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child. See Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies 
in the Field, Geneva, August 22, 1864; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, Geneva, July 6, 1906; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949; Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 
1977; Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977; Hague Convention (IV) 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, October 18, 1907; and Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, UN General Assembly doc. 44/25, November 20, 1989. 
52 Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 125. 
53 ICTY, Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, case no. IT-94-
1-AR72, October 2, 1995, paras. 128-9, www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm. 
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conflict, as acknowledged by the ICC in 2007, discussed below.54 This contextual expansion 
represents a “progressive development” of law,55 as it was backed by broad state agreement and 
is delineated legislatively in the statute. The inclusion of a broader context for war crimes is 
therefore not subject to the criticism of breaching legality which Chapter 4 argued in relation to 
the ICTY, where judges retroactively created new law.56 
William Schabas notes the “excruciating detail” with which underlying offenses of war 
crimes are described.57 He also argues that there is a “dark side to detailed codification”—that 
“more loopholes exist for able defence arguments” and that states agreed to more detailed 
                                                
54 Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges, case no. ICC-01/04-01/06, January 29, 2007, 
para. 284, www.legal-tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/doc266175_02.pdf. 
55 Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 125. 
56 The other major contextual issue is that the court has jurisdiction over war crimes “in particular when 
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes” (Rome 
Statute, article 8.1). While a pre-trial chamber initially interpreted this as requiring a context of systemic 
or large-scale attacks (similar to crimes against humanity), later pre-trial and appeals chambers clarified 
that this is not a requirement. See, respectively, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58, case no. ICC-01/04-02/06-
20-Anx2, February 10, 2006, para. 47, www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2008_04250.PDF. See also 
Lubanga, Prosecutor’s Appeal against Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 10 February 2006 “Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58,” case no. ICC-01/04-01/06, February 14, 
2006, www.legal-tools.org/en/browse/record/821786; and Situation in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled 
“Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58,” case no. ICC-01/04-169, 
July 13, 2006, para. 70, www.legal-tools.org/en/browse/record/8c20eb; and Bemba, Decision Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, case no. ICC-01/05-01/08, June 15, 2009, para. 211, www.legal-
tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/doc699541_01.pdf. This does not effectively modify the existing contextual 
requirements of an armed conflict for the prosecution of war crimes. 
57 Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 125. He also argues that the judicial 
development of war crimes by the ICTY was concerning to many states, which in response created 
detailed crime definitions in the Rome Statute in order to provide less room for expansion via judicial 
interpretation. This is a case of state self-interest leading, inadvertently, to greater protection to 
defendants through a higher level of legality. Nevertheless, he also acknowledges that the relative lack of 
case law on grave breaches since 1945 means that some aspects included in the statute await clarification, 
including in the grave breach of “wilful killing”—the legal implications of the first word being unclear 
(Rome Statute, article 8.2.a.i). See ibid, 133. According to Bassiouni, the customary law offenses also 
suffer from the inclusion of vague language, especially inconsistent terms to refer to the mental element 
of crimes, such as “unlawful.” See Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty of Rome:” 463. 
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provisions not, as they claimed, to conform to legality, but in order to restrict judges from 
making “dynamic or evolutive interpretations.”58 The danger inherent in this interpretation of the 
drafters’ approach and attitude towards detailed legislation is that the purpose of the principle of 
legality is exactly to avoid the sort of judicial expansion of crimes that the author, and Alain 
Pellet, clearly favor. 
Schabas privileges the ability to expand protections for potential victims at the expense of 
defendants, and at the expense of a clear separation of powers in global legal governance, with a 
legislative body (the ICC’s ASP) creating the laws and the ICC’s judges interpreting them—but 
not permitted to expand on them. There is no reasonable legal argument for critiquing a clear and 
detailed legislative delineation of a crime—only a human rights one that ultimately privileges 
prosecution over trial fairness. As highlighted throughout the dissertation, this illustrates the 
tension between the legitimacy of international courts through the protection of victims’ rights to 
justice and promoting deterrence by enabling greater opportunities for prosecution, and the 
legitimacy of trial fairness through protecting the rights of the accused. 
Despite the contextual expansion of underlying offenses to non-international armed conflict, 
two groupings of offenses in the statute do not apply to this type of armed conflict: grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs of 
international armed conflict” (largely those known as “Hague Law”).59 The latter also contain 
some of the additions to the Geneva Conventions’ grave breaches prohibitions found in 
                                                
58 Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 126-7. 
59 Rome Statute, article 8.2.b and 8.2.c, respectively. While the grave breaches section does not 
specifically mention international armed conflict, this is made clear in the Elements of Crimes, article 
8.2.a.i.4. Hague Law consist primarily of regulations found in Hague Convention IV of 1907. 
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Additional Protocol I.60 According to Schabas, this expansion is legally questionable in that 
Additional Protocol I has not achieved the near universal level of support, and therefore 
acknowledged customary status, as the grave breaches prohibitions of the Geneva Conventions.61 
However, this position is undermined by the fact that the customary law status of underlying 
offenses within the Rome Statute is less important to establishing their legality than was the case 
with those within the ICTY statute. The latter was created by a small group of states—even if 
within the Security Council acting under Chapter VII—and imposed retroactively for those acts 
which occurred between the beginning of the ICTY’s jurisdiction, January 1991, and the 
statute’s creation in February 1993.62 The Rome Statute, in contrast, was signed by a majority of 
states, providing it with broad support, has now been ratified by approximately 60 percent of all 
states,63 and only applies to acts which occurred after the court’s founding in July 2002. 
There are also some new provisions within the laws and customs of war—ones not found in 
Hague Law or Additional Protocol I, and first codified in the Rome Statute. The prohibition on 
an occupying power transferring some of its own civilian population into occupied territory64 
was especially controversial at the statute drafting stage, with Israel voting against the Rome 
Statute because it felt it this provision was not consistent with customary law and had been 
                                                
60 Some aspects of the grave breaches expansion in the protocol were not included, such as “[a]cts or 
threats of violence” designed to “spread terror among the civilian population” (Additional Protocol I, 
article 51.2). See Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 134. 
61 Ibid., 136. 
62 The starting point was a neutral date chosen by the secretary-general instead of any particular 
declaration of independence or armed intervention so as not to entail any political judgments about the 
conflict. See Daphna Shraga and Ralph Zacklin, “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia,” European Journal of International Law 5, no. 3 (1994): 362-3. 
63 In June 2016, El Salvador became the 124th state party to the Rome Statute. See ICC, “ICC Welcomes 
El Salvador as a New State Party,” press release, doc. no. ICC-CPI-20160602-PR1218, June 2, 2016, 
asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/press%20releases/Pages/PR1218.aspx. 
64 Rome Statute, article 8.2.b.viii. 
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aimed at criticizing its own activities,65 and Arab states insisting on its inclusion for that very 
reason.66 However, the provision reflects a prohibition within the Geneva Conventions67 and so, 
while not previously considered a grave breach, the ICTY has determined that it constitutes a 
prohibition within international law under “other serious violations,” and so ICC prosecutions for 
the offense would not violate legality.68 
Another significant addition to the laws and customs of war offenses is that of causing 
damage to the natural environment. While laudable from a human rights and environmental 
perspective, the provision is written in a vague and open-ended manner.69 This is problematic for 
legality because its determination requires judges to assess future events from the perspective of 
the accused (whether they could have foreseen future environmental damage) and requires them 
to make “value judgments” about what is excessive.70 
Sexual war crimes in particular are delineated in significant detail in the statute,71 due to their 
inclusion in the ICTY statute and lobbying by women’s human rights NGOs before and during 
                                                
65 David J. Scheffer, “The International Criminal Court,” in Routledge Handbook of International 
Criminal Law, ed. William Schabas and Nadia Bernaz (London: Routledge, 2013), 68. While Israel later 
signed the Rome Statute, in December 2000, in August 2002 it requested that the UN secretary-general 
remove its name from the depository’s list of signees. See American Non-Governmental Organizations 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court (AMICC), Which Countries have Joined the ICC? note 1, 
www.amicc.org/icc/ratifications/#fn1. 
66 Bosco, Rough Justice, 48. 
67 Geneva Convention IV, article 49. 
68 ICTY, Tadić, Appeals Judgment, case no. IT-94-1-A, July 15, 1999, para. 92, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf. 
69 Rome Statute, article 8.2.b.iv. In relation to the environment, the text states: “Intentionally launching an 
attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause…widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall 
military advantage anticipated.” 
70 Kai Ambos, “Remarks on the General Part of International Criminal Law,” Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 4, no. 4 (2006): 670-1. 
71 Rome Statute, articles 8.2.b.xxii and 8.2.e.vi for international and non-international armed conflict, 
respectively. 
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the Rome Conference.72 Actions prohibited under the laws and customs of law in the statute 
include rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and enforced 
sterilization.73 The ICC’s first conviction for a sexual war crime, that of rape, was secured in the 
case of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, in March 2016.74 
Another violation of the laws and customs of war in the statute demonstrates the role of state 
self-interest in the institutional power exercised in relation to the establishment of the definition 
of crimes. The Rome Statute prohibits “[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of 
fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.”75 
The provision is based upon language in Additional Protocol I and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, which use the word “recruiting” instead.76 Those already existing prohibitions apply 
solely to states, so the restriction to “national” militaries was specifically included at Rome to 
allay Arab state fears that the provision could otherwise be used to prosecute for recruitment of 
Palestinian youth into the intifada.77  
                                                
72 Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 126. 
73 Rome Statute, article 8.2.b.xxii. Schabas argues that such specificity may be negative from the point of 
view of enabling prosecution by narrowing the scope of the “archaic yet potentially larger terms of 
Geneva Convention IV.” The convention states that: “Women shall be especially protected against any 
attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault” 
(Geneva Convention IV, article 27). See Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 
126. 
74 Bemba, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, case no. ICC-01/05-01/08, March 21, 2016, 
paras. 631-8, www.legal-tools.org/en/browse/record/edb0cf.  
75 Rome Statute, article 8.b.xxvi. 
76 Additional Protocol I, article 77.2; and Convention on the Rights of the Child, General Assembly doc. 
44/25, November 20, 1989, article 38.3. 
77 Herbert von Hebel and Daryl Robinson, “Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court,” in The 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute—Issues, Negotiations, and Results, ed. 
Roy S. Lee (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 118. 
 
 
 
 
301 
The first individual found guilty by the ICC, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, was convicted of 
recruiting child soldiers.78 The court decided that “conscripting or enlisting” equates to 
“recruiting” in the earlier conventions and includes voluntary recruitment.79 It also determined 
that a conviction in relation to children used indirectly to support soldiers had to involve their 
exposure to danger as a military target.80 
The incorporation into Rome of the broader conflict context created by the ICTY constitutes 
a significant improvement from the perspective of protecting human rights while also complying 
with the principle of legality. Some aspects of the legality of the expansion of underlying 
offenses remain unsettled, but the inclusion of sexual offenses similarly constitute human rights 
advances without compromising legality. The generally high level of detail in the definitions of 
underlying offenses of war crimes is also a significant improvement over prior international 
courts. The ICC’s case law has yet to significantly modify the interpretation of the court’s rules 
on war crimes. 
 
Crimes against humanity 
Crimes against humanity are described in the statute as various underlying acts committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population. This codified—at least for the 
purposes of the ICC—two developments in relation to the contextual requirements of the crime 
stemming from the practice of the ICTY discussed in Chapter 4. These are the removal of the 
                                                
78 Lubanga, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, case no. ICC-01/04-01/06, March 14, 2012, 
www.legal-tools.org/en/browse/record/677866. 
79 Ibid., para. 607. 
80 Ibid., para. 628. 
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requirement for an armed conflict,81 and that an attack only needs to be widespread or 
systematic, not both.82 However, the former issue is not settled, and arguably the armed conflict 
nexus is still a requirement under customary law. Several Arab, African, and Asian delegations 
to the Rome Conference, including China and India, objected to the removal of this contextual 
requirement, citing the statutes of the IMT, IMTFE, and ICTY.83 Meanwhile the majority of 
delegations rejected this position at the conference, arguing that it is not required by the 
Genocide Convention, the ICTR statute, and the practice of the ICTY.84 
There was also disagreement among delegates as to the contextual requirement of a 
widespread or systematic attack, as opposed to both.85 Before and during the Rome Conference, 
some Arab and Asian states, and the Security Council P5, were concerned at the breadth of 
application that such a lax requirement would permit. However, they eventually agreed to the 
removal of the double requirement, because the other element in the contextual requirement, of 
an “[a]ttack directed against any civilian population,” was defined in the statute so as to require 
an “organizational policy.”86  
                                                
81 ICTY, Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 140. The 
armed conflict requirement stemmed from the IMT statute. See the analysis of the legality at the IMT in 
Chapter 3. 
82 ICTY, Limaj et al., Trial Judgment, case no. IT-03-66-T, November 30, 2005, para. 181, 
www.refworld.org/docid/48ac17cc2.html. 
83 Beth Van Schaack, “The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence,” 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 37, no. 3 (1999): 848. 
84 Von Hebel and Robinson, “Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court,” 92. 
85 The Rome Statute does not define “widespread” or “systematic” with regard to crimes against 
humanity. Nonetheless, there is guidance from the practice of the ICTY that the ICC can draw upon to 
create clear, consistent contextual requirements. See especially ICTY, Kunarac et al., Appeals 
Judgement, case nos. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, June 12, 2002, para. 94, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf.  
86 Rome Statute, article 7.2.a. 
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Nevertheless, this arguably requires a systematic attack or plan, which Bassiouni has argued 
is essential to the definition of the crime—and for this reason he was critical of the ICTY 
decision to remove it.87 Human Rights NGOs at the Rome Conference encouraged states to 
remove the policy requirement in the statute’s definition of the crime. This position was a 
“dragnet definition” that would have permitted a broad range of individuals to be prosecuted.88 
The eventual compromise occurred on the agreement among states that “a State or organizational 
policy” is a lower threshold than “systematic,” therefore moving some way towards Bassiouni’s 
position.89  
The list of underlying offenses90 is the same as that in the ICTY statute91 (including murder, 
extermination, and enslavement, etc.), with two additions: enforced disappearance and 
apartheid.92 No offenses were defined in the earlier statute, whereas Rome contains brief 
                                                
87 Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 194-7. 
88 Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity, 357. 
89 Von Hebel and Robinson, “Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court,” 96-7. Crimes against 
humanity therefore does require a policy, with its wording arguably including that of non-state actors. 
Bassiouni argues that this position misinterprets the law, contending that the Rome Statute requires action 
by a state—which he claims is consistent with his insistence on a systematic policy requirement. See M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: Introduction, Analysis and 
Integrated Text, Vol. 1 (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2005), 151-2. The ICC has determined 
that such a policy does not require a state, only an organization which governs territory or has the 
“capability to commit a widespread or systematic attack.” See Katanga et al., Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, case no. ICC-01/04-01/07, September 30, 2008, para. 396, www.legal-
tools.org/en/browse/record/67a9ec. The removal of the state requirement—previously accepted as a 
contextual requirement in international law—mirrors the expansion of war crimes to non-international 
armed conflict discussed above, and again was facilitated by the practice of the ICTY. See M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), 
248-9; Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 111; and ICTY, Tadić, Opinion and 
Judgement, case no. IT-94-1-T, May 7, 1997, para. 654, www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-
tsj70507JT2-e.pdf. 
90 Rome Statute, article 7.1. 
91 ICTY statute, article 5. 
92 Rome Statute, articles 7.1.i and 7.1.j, respectively. 
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descriptions,93 and the Elements of Crimes elaborates much further on the nature of the acts and 
required mental state of the perpetrator.94 The listing and definition of the offenses in the statute 
significantly improves the specificity of crimes against humanity in international law.95  
In particular, sexual crimes, which were an innovation in the ICTY statute, with the single 
word offense of “rape,”96 are described in the Rome Statute as “[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity.”97 The Elements of Crimes then provides significant detail and clarity for 
each offense.98 The first conviction for the crime against humanity of rape at the ICC was that of 
Bemba in 2016.99 
Rome thereby considerably expanded the coverage of sexual offenses in international 
criminal law, and its offenses and definitions have now arguably also been incorporated into 
customary law. This expansion was encouraged at the Rome Conference by NGOs such as the 
Asian Centre for Women’s Human Rights.100 The inclusion of sexual offenses was not without 
controversy, however, with some states at the conference, including Saudi Arabia and Libya, 
concerned that the inclusion of forced pregnancy under crimes against humanity and war crimes 
                                                
93 Ibid., article 7.2. 
94 Elements of Crimes, article 7.1. 
95 Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, 202. 
96 ICTY statute, article 5.g. 
97 Rome Statute, article 7.1.g. 
98 Elements of Crimes, article 7.1.g. There is detail to the level of footnoting the word “invade” in the 
phrase “The perpetrator invaded the body of a person” in order to clarify that the term is considered 
gender-neutral, and so does not exclude sexual offenses against males. 
99 Bemba, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, paras. 631-8.  
100 Ms. Sajor (Observer for the Asian Centre for Women’s Human Rights), 8th Plenary Meeting, Thursday 
June 18, 1998 at 3:10pm, UN doc. A/CONF.183/SR.8, para. 83. Meeting record located within: UN, 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Official Records: Volume II—Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the 
Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, UN doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II), Rome, June 15–July 17, 
1998, 120, legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf. 
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might lead to the provision of abortion facilities for victims.101 This led to the compromise of 
including forced pregnancy but with the stipulation that the definition “shall not in any way be 
interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy.”102 This definitional bargaining 
illustrates the inherent politicization and cultural preference clashes at Rome, which are 
responsible for the extra-legal factors agreed within the crimes’ compromise definitions. 
Rome constitutes the first time that sexual slavery was directly prohibited by an international 
court statute.103 As sexual slavery is not defined in any prior international human rights or 
humanitarian treaty, this is arguably the legal creation of the states at the Rome Conference.104 
However, Antonio Cassese, relying on the jurisprudence of the ICTY, argues that sexual slavery 
was already prohibited before Rome by customary international law,105 although, as mentioned, 
there is dispute as to the legality of customary crimes.  
The most vague provision relating to the underlying offenses of any crime in the statute is the 
crimes against humanity offense of “other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally 
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.”106 In 2000 the 
ICTY expressed concern that the offense was so vague in its own statute—which is only slightly 
                                                
101 Mr. Madani (Saudi Arabia), 3rd Meeting, Wednesday June 17, 1998 at 10:25am, UN doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.3, para. 31 (see UN, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries, 
148); and Ms. Shahen (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 4th Meeting, June 17, 1998, at 3:20pm, UN doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4, para. 63 (see UN, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries, 
160). The other states which expressed a concern in the UN record were also Muslim: Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Morocco, and Senegal (meanwhile Jordan stated that “abortion is not the issue:” UN, United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries, 332).  
102 Rome Statute, article 7.2.f. 
103 Ibid., article 7.1.g. 
104 Diane Lupig, “Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes before the 
International Criminal Court,” Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 17, no. 2 (2009): 460. 
105 Antonio Cassese, “Crimes Against Humanity,” in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary, ed. Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John R.W.D. Jones (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 374-5. 
106 Rome Statute, article 7.1.k. 
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more vague than the Rome description—that it breached the legality of crimes.107 Kai Ambos 
has expressed similar concern in relation to the ICC.108 
The contextual element of a plan or policy arguably remains unsettled, as does its effect on 
legality. Similarly to war crimes, however, the level of detail of underlying offenses and the 
more comprehensive inclusion of sexual offenses constitute advances in human rights 
protections which are essentially consistent with legality.  
 
Genocide 
As in the ICTY statute, apart from the introductory phrase, the Rome definition of genocide is 
identical to that found in the Genocide Convention,109 indicating its uncontroversial customary 
law status. However, since its creation in 1948 there has been concern that the convention’s 
definition is too restrictive by excluding cultural acts of destruction, such as suppressing ethnic 
languages and education.110 This was also a controversial issue at the Rome Conference, with 
some states concerned about a push to prohibit such cultural suppression within the statute—
behavior which occurs at the national level in many states.111 In the end the definition was not 
broadened. Bassiouni sees the statute’s definition of genocide thereby as weakened by “shar[ing] 
the same gaps in the protected categories of victims as does the Convention.”112 The ICC 
                                                
107 ICTY, Kupreškić et al., Trial Judgement, case no. IT-95-16-T, January 14, 2000, para. 563, 
www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf 
108 Ambos, “Remarks on the General Part of International Criminal Law:” 670. 
109 Adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide 
Convention), and Text of the Convention, UN doc. A/RES/260 (III), December 9, 1948, article 2. 
110 Beth Van Schaack, “The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind 
Spot,” The Yale Law Journal 106, no. 7 (1997): 2,259-91; and Johannes Morsink, “Cultural Genocide, the 
Universal Declaration, and Minority Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 21, no. 4 (1999): 1,009-60. 
111 Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 102. 
112 Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty of Rome:” 461. 
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approach is arguably problematic from a human rights perspective: perpetuating previous legal 
limitations by failing to prohibit certain arguably genocidal actions. However, it is strong from a 
position of legality as the convention definition was established well before the creation of the 
Rome Statute, and is broadly agreed as establishing a universal obligation.113 
The definition of ethnic, national, and religious groups in the convention, as applied by 
international courts, has also been problematic. Instead of adopting objective criteria by which to 
decide if a persecuted group falls within one of the protected categories, courts have tended to 
adopt the subjective criteria of the perpetrator group’s perception of whether their victims 
constituted such a group.114 Nevertheless, while the statute’s definition of genocide is no clearer 
than that of earlier international legal instruments, the Elements of Crimes adds substantial detail 
to the underlying offenses.  
Importantly from a human rights perspective, this includes reference to sexual crimes, 
missing from prior definitions, within the underlying offense of causing serious bodily or mental 
harm.115 In fact the ICC is the first international criminal tribunal to specifically delineate sexual 
offenses for all three mass atrocity crimes in its founding documents.116 In this sense the Rome 
Statute “marks a victory for humankind in that it…acknowledges the criminality of several 
                                                
113 See ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), February 26, 2007, para. 161, 
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf; and ICTY, Krstić, Trial Judgment, case no. IT-98-33, August 
2, 2001, para. 541, www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf. 
114 The ICTR, for example, determined that the categories are essentially cultural, eroding the distinction 
created by the convention: the concept of protected group “enjoys no generally or internationally accepted 
definition, rather each concept must be assessed in the light of a particular political, social, historical and 
cultural context.” See ICTR, Kajelijeli, Judgment and Sentence, case no. ICTR-98-44A-T, December 1, 
2003, para. 811, unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-98-44a/trial-
judgements/en/031201.pdf. 
115 Elements of Crimes, Article 6.b.1, note 3: “This conduct may include, but is not necessarily restricted 
to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment.”  
116 Lupig, “Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes:” 452. 
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gender-based and sex-based crimes.”117 Sexual crimes (as underlying offenses of genocide) were 
highlighted by the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in a 2014 policy paper as “an integral 
component of the pattern of destruction inflicted upon a particular group of people, and in such 
circumstances, may be charged as genocide.”118 Rape was later referred to as an offense of 
genocide in the OTP’s request for an arrest warrant for President Al Bashir—the only ICC 
indictee who has to date been charged with genocide.119 
Lubanga was being prosecuted for genocide within the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) before the government agreed to transfer him to the Hague for prosecution for war crimes 
at the ICC. The court accepted “complementarity” as the reason for not charging the accused 
with genocide. Complementarity is a limitation of the court’s jurisdiction whereby it cannot open 
or continue a prosecution where there is also a domestic prosecution—the domestic jurisdiction 
supersedes that of the ICC, unless “unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out 
the investigation or prosecution.”120 Another likely factor was the OTP’s calculations concerning 
the difficulty of prosecuting for genocide, considering the “special intent” requirement which has 
                                                
117 Dorean M. Koenig and Kelly D. Askin, “International Criminal Law and the International Criminal 
Court Statute: Crimes Against Women,” in Women and International Human Rights Law, Vol. 2, ed. 
Kelly D. Askin and Dorean M. Koenig (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2000), 7. 
118 ICC OTP, “Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes,” June 2014, para. 31, www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy-Paper-on-Sexual-and-Gender-Based-Crimes--June-2014.pdf. 
119 Al Bashir, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir, case no. ICC-02/05-01/09, March 4, 2009, www.legal-
tools.org/en/browse/record/e26cf4. Genocide is referred to in paras. 110-208: out of the 95 pages in the 
decision on the arrest warrant, 40 relate to genocide charges (pp.39-79). Para. 54 refers to rape as an 
offense of genocide. 
120 Rome Statute, Article 17.1. 
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been a significant factor at the ICTY.121 A broader assessment of the court’s approach to defining 
and prosecuting genocide will have to await genocide trials. 
 
Legality indicator 2: Non-retroactivity of punishment 
This section analyzes sentencing procedures at the court. First its sentencing guidelines are 
examined, as laid out in the statute and RPE, and the impact of the Rome Conference debate. The 
specific issues of command responsibility as a mode of criminal liability, and the effect of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances on sentencing rules, are also analyzed. Second, an 
assessment of the limited sentencing practice to date is made in relation to these issues. 
 
Sentencing rules: The Rome Statute and RPE 
There was extensive agreement among states at the Rome Conference that the ICC’s sentencing 
guidelines should conform to the principle of legality of punishments, and that this required 
“penalties be defined in the draft statute of the ICC as precisely as possible.”122 The delegates 
argued that the principle was necessary to ensure predictability and equality before the law, 
which “may be an early sign that the positive justice dimension” of the principle “is being 
considered in the international context.”123 As discussed in Chapter 1, the non-retroactivity of 
punishment can be seen not only as a safeguard on basic defendant rights, but as promoting 
                                                
121 William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 460-1. 
122 General Assembly, “Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court,” UN doc. A/51/22, March–April and August 1996, para. 304, quoted in Shahram Dana, 
“Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice: A Theory on the Principle of Legality in International 
Criminal Sentencing,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 99, no. 4 (2009): 875. 
123 Dana, “Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice:” 876. 
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justice more broadly by encouraging consistency in sentencing, and protecting judicial autonomy 
by safeguarding the judiciary from political pressure to determine the sentence of individuals of 
executive concern, thereby also protecting the integrity of the legal system, as well as the public 
perception of justice.124 
The statute’s provision on punishment, while brief, provides a restriction on excessive 
punishments: “A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this 
Statute.”125 This prohibits the application of new punishments by the judges, and appears to 
conform to a strict version of legality by requiring the application solely of prior written law.126  
However, the standard is problematic because it does not prohibit the retroactive application 
of penalties later added to the statute by the ASP.127 It also makes the quality of the restriction on 
retroactivity contingent upon other provisions within the statute, and possibly the Elements of 
Crimes and RPE.128 This creates a “reverse dependency,” which is “an awkward and unfamiliar 
                                                
124 Ibid.: 860, 864. As Dana points out, this approach to sentencing—as a broad protection on the integrity 
of the legal system—is ignored by Schabas in his discussion of sentencing at international courts, which 
focuses purely on the issue of retroactivity narrowly defined. See William A. Schabas, “Sentencing by 
International Criminal Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach,” Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law 7, no. 2 (1997): 461-518. 
125 Rome Statute, article 23. 
126 This is the legal principle of nulla poena sine praevia lege scripta, which goes further than the 
standard legality of punishments provision (nulla poena sine lege) by excluding non-written sources of 
law, such as customary law, common-law system judicial development of the law, and civil-law system 
extension of law by analogy. See Susana Huerta Tocildo, “The European Principle of Criminal Legality,” 
in Europe of Rights: A Compendium on the European Convention of Human Rights, ed. Javier García 
Roca and Pablo Santolaya (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 317. 
127 Gallant, Principle of Legality, 341-2. 
128 The guidelines do not refer the court to national practices where the offenses occurred, unlike at the 
ICTY—although, as discussed in Chapter 4, the tribunal has rarely referred to national practice. Further 
sentencing practice at the ICC may illuminate its level of consistency. See Steven Glickman, “Victim’s 
Justice: Legitimizing the Sentencing Regime of the International Criminal Court,” Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 43, no. 1 (2004): 259.  
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position for a fundamental principle of criminal law, which is normally independent of 
subsequent rules.”129  
Arab states at the Rome Conference pushed for the ICC to apply the death penalty.130 This 
was rejected by a majority of delegates, who agreed that the maximum punishment that may be 
imposed is 30 years’ imprisonment, except for cases whose “extreme gravity” justifies life in 
prison.131 This provides a restriction on both the nature and severity of punishment,132 which is 
arguably consistent with legality as it provides clear limits.133 
In terms of command responsibility, the statute provides for liability for military and non-
military superiors.134 A military commander is criminally liable for the crimes of subordinates 
“under his or her effective command and control…as a result of his or her failure to exercise 
control properly over such forces,” as long as they were aware, or should have been aware, that 
their soldiers were committing or about to commit crimes and failed to take action to “prevent or 
repress” them or present the matter to legal authorities for criminal investigation.135 For 
conviction of non-military superiors it must to be proven that they “either knew, or consciously 
disregarded information which clearly indicated”136 their subordinates had committed or were 
about to commit such crimes.  
This creates a higher standard of proof for non-military superiors: not the possibility that they 
were aware (they should have known because they could have had such information in their 
                                                
129 Dana, “Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice:” 906. 
130 Bosco, Rough Justice, 48. 
131 Rome Statute, article 77.1. 
132 Dana, “Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice:” 906. 
133 Antonio Cassese contends, however, that this still provides the court “with a very broad margin of 
appreciation.” Cassese, International Criminal Law, 52. 
134 Rome Statute, articles 28.a and 28.b, respectively. 
135 Ibid., article 28. The quoted passages are from article 28.a and 28.a.ii. 
136 Ibid., article 28.b.i. 
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possession, for example), but the necessity to prove with certainty that they knew or deliberately 
ignored such information. Jamie Williamson, an ICRC legal advisor, has expressed concern that 
this standard, which is higher for such commanders than found at the ICTY, would make it more 
difficult to prosecute such individuals, while command responsibility has been a “particularly 
vital conduit for prosecutors at the international tribunals.”137 In contrast, legal scholar Kai 
Ambos argues that the Rome provisions on command responsibility are so broad that they may 
constitute “vicarious liability,” similar to criticism he leveled at the ICTY.138 To date, the effect 
of these standards on prosecutions is unclear, as only one completed trial has involved command 
responsibility at the ICC, that of Bemba, a military commander, discussed in the practice section 
below. 
The discussion now moves to the role of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in 
determining sentences within the court’s rules. In determining the exact sentence in each case the 
legality of punishments is arguably weakened by the open-ended provision for judges to “in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, take into account such factors as the 
gravity of the crime in determining penalties.”139 Such flexibility in relation to aggravating 
circumstances arguably provides the court with excessive sentencing discretion in a similar 
manner to the ICTY statute.140 Factors mentioned in the RPE include the number of victims and 
the harm caused by the offenses, the perpetrator’s degree of intent, prior convictions for similar 
                                                
137 See Jamie Allan Williamson, “Some Considerations on Command Responsibility and Criminal 
Liability,” International Review of the Red Cross 90, no. 870 (2008): 308. 
138 Ambos, “Remarks on the General Part of International Criminal Law:” 671-2. See Chapter 4 of the 
dissertation for Ambos’ analysis of command responsibility at the ICTY. 
139 Rome Statute, article 78.1. 
140 The ICTY statute permits the judges to “take into account such factors as the gravity of the offence and 
the individual circumstances of the convicted person” (article 24.2). 
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offenses, and abuse of power.141 The list of aggravating circumstances in the RPE is non-
exhaustive, providing additional discretion to the judges.142  
Another reason the aggravating circumstances rules provide weak guidance is because there 
is no indication as to the weight to assign to each factor, “an aspect of international sentencing 
that has remained murky since Nuremberg’s tendency to treat aggravating factors as implicit in 
the offense.”143 Similarly to the ICTY, the stated purposes of punishment at the ICC are vaguely 
expressed, including justice (crimes “must not go unpunished”), and deterrence (“put an end to 
impunity…and thus contribute to…prevention”).144 This does little to provide additional 
sentencing guidance,145 apparently a result of the lack of concern among state delegates at the 
Rome Conference with clarifying the purposes of punishment.146  
The RPE also allows for mitigating circumstances to be taken into account. The factors 
mentioned include reduced mental capacity, duress, acknowledgment of guilt and expressions of 
remorse, and cooperation with the ICC.147 Similarly to aggravating circumstances, the manner in 
which mitigating circumstances guidelines are to be applied, including the weight given to each, 
is not delineated. 
It should be noted that the statute also contains a procedure for strengthening the application 
of the legality of punishment, by requiring the court to review sentences after defendants have 
                                                
141 RPE, rules 145.1.c. and 145.2.b. 
142 The list of circumstances starts with the words “inter alia” (rule 145.1.c) and lists “Other 
circumstances which, although not enumerated above, by virtue of their nature are similar to those 
mentioned” (rule 145.2.b.vi). 
143 Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2007), 52. 
144 Rome Statute, preamble. 
145 Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, 52. 
146 Ralph Henham, “Some Issues for Sentencing in the International Criminal Court,” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2003): 85. 
147 RPE, rule 145.2.a. 
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served two thirds of their time to determine if it should be reduced—or for life sentences, a 
review after 25 years served.148 As Dana argues, this “extends the reach” of the principle of 
legality beyond the sentencing phase of a trial to the “execution of sentences.”149 Reviews have 
taken place in relation to two of the three convictions at the court; they are discussed below. 
 
Sentencing practice 
The ICC sentencing phase is separate from that of the main trial,150 as is the case in the US 
common law system, and was initially the practice at the ICTY, before a change to merging the 
phases, presumably to speed up proceedings. The ICC sentencing hearing allows for witness 
testimony and other evidence not presented during the trial which may be relevant to determining 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances.151 
As of July 2016 there have been three convictions by the court, with sentences ranging from 
12 to 18 years.152 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was convicted of war crimes in March 2012 in relation 
to the situation in the DRC and sentenced in July that year to 14 years.153 Germain Katanga was 
                                                
148 Rome Statute, article 110.3. The time limit before review includes time served in pre-trial detention. 
149 Dana, “Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice:” 916. 
150 Articles 74 and 76 of the Rome Statute require the chambers to provide, for the verdict and sentencing, 
respectively, a decision in writing and “contain[ing] a full and reasoned statement of the Trial Chamber’s 
findings on the evidence and conclusions.” 
151 Novak, The International Criminal Court, 89. 
152 As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, on September 27, 2016, after the end-period for the 
study, the ICC sentenced Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi to nine years in the Mali situation. On cursory 
examination, the verdict and sentence present no inconsistency with the assessment of legality presented 
in the chapter. On October 19, 2016, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques 
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu, and Narcisse Arido were found guilty of crimes against the 
administration of justice. As of November 28, 2016, no sentence has been handed down: a maximum term 
of five years is applicable for this, non-mass-atrocity, offense. 
153 Lubanga was convicted of the war crime of enlisting and recruiting child soldiers. See Lubanga, 
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute; and Lubanga, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 
of the Statute, case no. ICC-01/04-01/06, July 10, 2012, www.icc-
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convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity in relation to the situation in the DRC in 
March 2014, and sentenced to 12 years in May.154 Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo was convicted of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Central African Republic (CAR) in March 2016, 
and sentenced to 18 years in June.155 
These punishments are not excessive considering the guidelines and the gravity of the crimes, 
and do not suggest a wildly disproportionate or incoherent approach to sentencing by the judges. 
They may indicate a leniency in sentencing, especially in relation to command responsibility (in 
the Bemba case), that the ICTY has been accused of.156 However, Bemba’s conviction was also 
the first at the court for sexual and gender-base crimes: that the ICC’s first conviction for sexual 
offenses also received the longest sentence has been seen as significant from a human rights 
perspective.157  
Bemba is the first and so far only individual convicted by the court for command 
responsibility. This was in relation to actions by rebels under his authority in the CAR between 
                                                                                                                                                       
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_07409.PDF. In Lubanga’s sentencing appeal judgment all grounds of 
appeal by both the prosecution and Lubanga were rejected, confirming the prior sentence. See Lubanga, 
Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Against the “Decision on 
Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute” case no. ICC-01/04-01/06, December 1, 2014, www.legal-
tools.org/en/doc/a9bd07. 
154 Katanga was convicted of the war crimes of murder, an attack against civilians, pillaging, and 
destruction of property; and the crime against humanity of murder. He was found not guilty of rape, 
sexual slavery, and recruiting child soldiers. See Katanga, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 
case no. ICC-01/04-01/07, March 7, 2014, www.legal-tools.org/en/browse/record/f74b4f; and Katanga, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, case no. ICC-01/04-01/07, May 23, 2014, 
www.legal-tools.org/en/browse/record/5af172.  
155 Bemba was convicted on all charges: the war crimes of murder, rape, and pillaging; and the crimes 
against humanity of murder and rape. See Bemba, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute; and 
Bemba, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, case no. ICC-01-/05-01/08, June 21, 
2016, www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_04476.PDF. Bemba’s conviction is the first at the ICC that 
includes the use of rape as a weapon of war. 
156 Mark B. Harmon and Fergal Gaynor, “Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes,” Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 5, no. 3 (2007): 683-712. 
157 Dieneke de Vos, “Bemba: First Sentence for SGBV and Turning Point for the ICC,” Justice Hub, June 
22, 2016, justicehub.org/article/bemba-first-sentence-sgbv-and-turning-point-icc. 
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October 2002 and March 2003.158 The judges decided that Bemba was made aware of the illegal 
actions of his troops and of the aggravating circumstances surrounding the sexual offenses.159 
While little in the way of firm conclusions can be drawn from this single conviction for the 
responsibility of a military commander, it does not appear to have involved a tenuous 
relationship to the crimes: there was significant evidence that Bemba was aware of the 
allegations of his troops’ actions, and dismissed them as propaganda; he received regular 
communications from field commanders; and made on-the-ground visits.160 
Very little research has been conducted to date on the outcomes of these three trials in 
relation to aggravating and mitigating circumstances. A review of the trial and sentencing 
judgments shows that the court sentenced Lubanga to 14 years instead of the maximum of 30 
requested by the prosecution due to a lack of aggravating factors, and the mitigating factor of 
cooperation with the court, arguing that the maximum sentence should only apply where there 
are aggravating circumstances.161 In Katanga the court also did not find any aggravating 
factors.162 It did take into account two mitigating factors: his young age and family 
circumstances (given little weight), and participating in the troop demobilization process was 
considered, as was cooperation with the court (greater weight).163  
In Bemba’s sentence, the judges decided that two aggravating circumstances applied: that the 
rapes were committed against especially defenseless victims—including children as young as 
ten—and were committed “with particular cruelty”—including mass rapes and whole families 
                                                
158 Bemba, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76, para. 21. 
159 Bemba, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74, paras. 425, 576-8; and Bemba, Decision on Sentence 
Pursuant to Article 76, para. 26. 
160 Bemba, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74, paras. 419-26. 
161 Lubanga, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76, paras. 96-7. 
162 Katanga, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76, para. 144. 
163 Ibid. 
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brutalized, and that pillaging was also committed with cruelty. It found no mitigating 
circumstances.164 These judgments suggest that the trial chambers have been cautious in 
accepting witness testimony,165 and have in fact only relied on aggravating circumstances to 
determine sentences in one out of the three convictions so far. 
In terms of sentencing review, in September 2015, in Lubanga, the appeals chamber 
undertook its first examination, assessing factors such as cooperation with the court and conduct 
while in detention. It ruled that there were no grounds to reduce his sentence.166 Meanwhile, in 
November that year the sentence in the only other case to have undergone review, that of 
Katanga, was reduced by three years and eight months from the original 12 years.167 The court 
reduced Katanga’s sentence due to his cooperation with the court, his conduct within detention, 
and demonstrations of remorse. Interestingly, the court also considered the political factor that 
his early release “would give rise to some social instability in the DRC,” but in the end “found 
no evidence to suggest that it would be of a significant level.”168 This political consideration is 
not found in the list of relevant factors in the statute.169 With only two reviews to date it is too 
early to assess the extent to which this mechanism will provide an effective protection against 
excessive punishments.  
                                                
164 Bemba, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76, para. 93. 
165 For example, the court did not accept witness testimony that Bemba saw bodies outside the CAR 
presidential palace during a visit with his troops in November 2002. The testimony came from a witness 
(“P123”) which the defense had alleged was not credible. See Bemba, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74, 
para. 426. 
166 ICC, “ICC Judges Decline to Reduce Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’s Sentence,” press release, doc. no. 
ICC-CPI-20150922-PR1153, September 22, 2015, www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1153. 
167 ICC, “Germain Katanga’s Sentence Reduced and to be Completed on 18 January 2016,” press release, 
doc. no. ICC-CPI-20151113-PR1174, November 13, 2015, www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1174. 
168 Ibid. 
169 See Rome Statute, article 110. 
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Overall, the sentencing rules and practice do not provide cause for concern in relation to the 
legality of punishment. While there is ambiguity and arguably excessive leeway for judges this 
does not appear to have been detrimental to those found guilty by the court. 
 
Defense parity indicator 1: Institutional support 
In this section, first the position of the defense and prosecution within the ICC’s institutional 
structure is examined, as well as the implications of their structural dynamic for adequacy of 
defense representation before and during trial. Second, a comparison is made of the support the 
court provides to prosecutors and defense counsel to investigate on-site through immunities and 
privileges, and the support provided in relation to external actors is examined.  
Structural parity 
The court consists of four primary institutions or “organs:”170 the Presidency, the Judicial 
Divisions (pre-trial, trial, and appeals chambers), the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), and the 
Registry.171 The Presidency is responsible for the judicial administration of the court, except for 
that of the OTP, which operates autonomously.  
The Registry’s functions include the non-judicial administration of the court,172 dealt with 
through the Common Administrative Services Division, and providing judicial support through 
the Division of Court services, including the management of court records, maintaining a list of 
                                                
170 The term “organ” is not defined in the statute, but refers to the primary divisions of the court, which 
operate independently of each other (although they have interlocking functions), and have the highest 
level of decision-making authority. All lower divisions of the court are represented by one of the organs 
in negotiations concerning budgets and rule changes, etc. 
171 Rome Statute, articles 34, 38, 39, 42, and 43. 
172 This includes that of the OTP. However, the Registry is restricted in relation to administration of the 
OTP by the phrase “without prejudice to the functions and powers of the Prosecutor.” See Rome Statute, 
article 43.1. 
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qualified defense counsel, and managing the court’s external affairs.173 Defense and victim issues 
are dealt with by the Counsel Support Section (CSS), which incorporates the Office of Public 
Counsel for the Defence (OPCD) and the Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV), 
discussed below with defense and victims structural issues. See Figure 5.1 below for a structural 
chart of the ICC, including the subdivisions of the OTP and Registry. Note that the Registry 
Division of Victims and Counsel, shown in Figure 5.1, has been dissolved. The CSS, created in 
2009, is directly under the authority of the Office of the Registrar.174 
The OTP is an independent organ of the court, with “full authority” over the management 
and administration of its activities in the hands of the chief prosecutor, who is selected by the 
ASP for a nine-year term.175 The OTP receives referrals of situations from ICC state parties and 
the Security Council and conducts preliminary examinations. If it feels there is sufficient 
evidence to warrant a full criminal investigation, the OTP applies to a pre-trial chamber for this 
authority.176  
The OTP consists of three main departments. First, the Jurisdiction, Complementarity and 
Cooperation Division (JCCD) conducts preliminary investigations, provides the OTP with legal 
advice, and coordinates the external relationships of the office. This involves examining “the 
                                                
173 ICC, About: Registry, www.icc-cpi.int/about/registry. 
174 Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, “Gender 2010 Report Card on the International Criminal 
Court,” The Hague, November 2010, 38, www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/GRC10-WEB-11-10-v4_Final-
version-Dec.pdf. 
175 Rome Statute, article 42.4. An absolute majority of votes of members of the ASP is required in a secret 
ballot. 
176 Ibid., article 57. A pre-trial chamber may also authorize the OTP to initiate an investigation proprio 
motu—on its own initiative, without state or Security Council authorization. See Rome Statute, articles 
13.c, 15.1, and 53.1 on the OTP’s proprio motu power, and article 57.3.d on the role of the pre-trial 
chambers in exercising this power. 
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broader regional and international political context,”177 a political function distinct from the 
practice of prosecutor’s offices in most liberal legal systems.178 Second, the OTP’s Investigation 
Division conducts on-site criminal investigations and analysis of evidence. Third, the 
Prosecution Division conducts the courtroom prosecutions themselves, and prepares the 
prosecutorial strategy pursued at each trial.179  
 
  
                                                
177 Bosco, Rough Justice, 95. There was no comparable department in the ICTY’s OTP. It was perceived 
as necessary at the ICC by the first chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, due to the need to decide on 
territorial situations to investigate and coordinate with states in light of the complementarity of its 
jurisdiction. See ibid., 94. 
178 The OTP is constrained in its ability to decide on investigations by a pre-trial chamber and the Security 
Council. The chamber supervises the investigatory and prosecutorial activities of the OTP before trial, 
including “to guarantee the rights of suspects, victims and witnesses during the investigatory phase, and 
to ensure the integrity of the proceedings.” See ICC, “Understanding the International Criminal Court,” 
undated, para. 20, www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/Documents/UICCEng.pdf. In referring a situation to 
the OTP the Security Council may also limit the scope of an investigation, for example by excluding 
individuals from states not party to the Rome Statute. In referring the situation in Darfur, Sudan, in 2005, 
the Security Council “[d]ecides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing 
State outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out 
of or related to operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless 
such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing State.” See UN Security 
Council resolution 1593, March 31, 2005, para. 6, 
www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1593(2005). 
179 ICC, About: Office of the Prosecutor, www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp. 
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Figure 5.1 Organizational structure of the ICC 
Source: “Courting History: The Landmark International Criminal Court’s First Years,” 2008, 3, 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/icc0708webwcover.pdf. 
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In terms of the defense, according to Elise Groulx, the founder and former president of the 
International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association, the organization proposed that the statute 
include within the structure of the ICC an office with co-equal status to that of the OTP—that is, 
a defense office would be a primary organ of the court. However, this proposal was not taken up 
by the PrepCom or Rome Conference.180 This reflects both a lack of understanding and 
underappreciation of the function of the defense by the Rome delegates, and the bias towards 
prosecution in the establishment of the court, with the most attention paid to the prosecution 
function, secondarily victims—they were given their own office, established within the Registry, 
by the statute181—and thirdly the accused. 
Therefore, similarly to the ICTY, there is no official organ for the defense established by the 
Rome Statute—nor has one been created since by the ASP. Instead, defense issues at the court 
were initially dealt with solely through the Registry. It created the Counsel Support Section in 
2009, seven years after the court started operation. The CSS provides support to defendants in 
relation to such issues as field investigations and acquiring legal assistance,182 manages legal aid 
and the list of counsel eligible to practice before the ICC, and acts as an advocate for the defense 
in the pre-trial stage of investigations before suspects have been handed over to the court.183 The 
                                                
180 Elise Groulx, “‘Equality of Arms:’ Challenges Confronting the Legal Profession in the Emerging 
International Criminal Justice System,” Oxford University Comparative Law Forum 3 (2006), Section II, 
ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/groulx.shtml. Groulx is also a former honorary president of the International 
Criminal Bar (BPI-ICB), and head of the advisory board of the Business and Human Rights project of the 
American Bar Association Center for Human Rights. 
181 Rome Statute, Article 43.6. 
182 ICC, About: Defence, www.icc-cpi.int/about/defence. 
183 ICC, Regulations of the Court, article 76.1. For example, Pre-Trial Chamber I requested the Registry 
to appoint counsel to “represent and protect the general interests of the defence” while inviting amicus 
briefs on the possibility of investigating the situation in Darfur. See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Decision 
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CSS also advises the court on defense issues and may cooperate with state bar associations to 
encourage legal training in relation to the ICC’s procedures.184 The CSS was created after the 
statute: there is no mention of the defense in the Rome article describing the functions of the 
Registry—which nonetheless required the Registry to establish a Victims and Witnesses Unit.185 
The lack of structural parity between the prosecution and defense weakens the flexibility of 
defense teams in pursuing a trial as they are dependent upon remuneration by the Registry. After 
the end of oral submissions in the Lubanga trial the Registry informed the defense team that all 
remuneration would stop except to lead counsel. The court later reinstated remuneration on the 
grounds that the Registry’s action would have violated the defense’s right to full equality.186 The 
defense’s autonomy in conducting research is also diminished because of its need for permission 
from the Registry to investigate in the field.187 
A defense office was created in 2004 by the Preparatory Commission, as the Office of Public 
Counsel for the Defence.188 The OPCD operates as an independent body of the court, although it 
falls within the Registry for administrative purposes.189 However, it is not an organ of the 
court—its highest level of institutional body. Nevertheless, the OPCD does provide defendants 
with official institutional representation within the court’s structure.190 Its other functions include 
                                                                                                                                                       
Inviting Observations in Application of Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, case no. ICC-
02/05-10, July 24, 2006, 6, www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_01530.PDF. Note that “6’ refers to 
the page number—there are no paragraph numbers in this case document. 
184 RPE, rules 20.1.b-f. 
185 Rome Statute, article 43.6. 
186 Katanga et al., Oral Decision, case no. ICC-01/04-01/07T, June 18, 2012. 
187 Interview with close legal court observer. 
188 Regulations of the Court, regulation 77.1. 
189 Ibid., regulation 77.2. 
190 IBA, “Fairness at the International Criminal Court,” August 2011, 29, 
www.ibanet.org/ICC_ICL_Programme/Reports.aspx#2011. 
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providing support and assistance to defendants, such as legal advice, and support to defense 
counsel.191 
According to the ICC, the office “constitutes a major innovation in the judicial architecture 
of international criminal courts,” with a mandate to “represent and protect the rights of the 
Defence in order to reinforce the equality of arms and to enable a fair trial within the meaning of 
the Rome Statute.”192 More modestly, according to the International Bar Association (IBA) the 
OPCD’s role is similar to that of the OTP’s legal advisory section: it conducts legal research on 
behalf of defendants, responding to courtroom events to provide timely assistance with legal 
issues as they arise.193 The IBA has been critical of the “limited resources” provided to the 
OPCD to carry out this mandate, including suffering from inadequate staffing, which would 
mean that even two consecutive trials would “severely task” those resources.194 Xavier-Jean 
Keïta, the head of the OPCD, acknowledges that the office has coordinated with academic 
institutions and defense offices in other tribunals for legal research assistance in order to 
overcome problems of limited resources. Keïta claims that the OPCD does, however, provide the 
                                                
191 Ibid., 29. 
192 ICC, The Office of Public Counsel for the Defence, www.icc-cpi.int, 2015. This text was located on 
the ICC website in November 2015. It is not available on the revamped website as of June 2016 (the 
website was completely changed in early 2016 to coincide with the transfer of the court to new premises). 
193 International Bar Association, “First Challenges: An Examination of Recent Landmark Developments 
at the International Criminal Court,” doc. no. ICC-01/04-01/07-2153-AnxC, June 2009, 31, www.icc-
cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2010_03707.PDF. According to ICC judge Adrian Fulford, the mandate of the 
OPCD was intended to involve direct participation of its staff in trials, similar to a public defender’s 
office in the United States. See Adrian Fulford, “Reflections of a Trial Judge,” Criminal Law Forum 22, 
nos. 1-2 (2011): 215-23. This is contradicted by Xavier-Jean Keïta, the OPCD’s principal counsel, who 
argues that its current role, as an advocate outside the courtroom, providing advice and support to 
independent defense teams, is that originally anticipated. See Xavier-Jean Keïta, “Office of the Public 
Counsel for the Defence,” in ICC, “Behind The Scenes: The Registry of the International Criminal 
Court,” 2010, 69, qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/1974/7024/1/Behind%20the%20scenes.pdf. 
194 IBA, “First Challenges,” 31. 
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defense at the ICC with institutional memory relating to trial process and case law, for example, 
that has been lacking at the ICTY.195 
While official representation for the accused at the court initially occurred solely through the 
Registry it is a neutral administrative body. This continues to create a major obstacle for defense 
interests in gaining an adequate voice in budgeting issues and decision-making changes by the 
organs of the court.196  
Human Rights Watch argues that the establishment of the OPCD for judicial functions, and 
that of the CSS within the Registry for administrative functions, represents a “separation of 
administrative and substantive functions [that] is advantageous for the interests of the defense 
and reflects an important ‘lesson learned’ from the experience at other tribunals, like the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone.”197 However, at the ICTY, defendants are represented formally by their 
own body, the Association of Defence Counsel,198 while at the ICC defendants are represented in 
decision-making forums not by the OPCD but by the Registry. This provides them with unequal 
bargaining power in negotiations on internal rule changes due to the official neutrality of the 
Registry, not enabling it to act as an advocate for defense positions while it ostensibly represents 
their interests in negotiations on policy and other issues.  
However, there is direct representation in the context of changes to the RPE and Elements of 
Crimes. Negotiations take place within the Advisory Committee on Legal Texts, which consists 
                                                
195 Keïta, “Office of the Public Counsel for the Defence,” in ICC, “Behind The Scenes,” 70. 
196 The Registry is not able to take a position encouraging defense priorities. Charles Chernor Jalloh and 
Amy DiBella, “Equality of Arms in International Criminal Law: Continuing Challenges,” in The Ashgate 
Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives, ed. William A. Schabas, 
Yvonne McDermott, and Niamh Hayes (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 263. 
197 Human Rights Watch, “Courting History: The Landmark International Criminal Court’s First Years,” 
2008, 93-4, www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/icc0708webwcover.pdf. 
198 See the Structural Parity section of Chapter 4 for details on the effect of the ADC-ICTY on the 
prosecution–defense dynamic at the tribunal. 
 
 
 
 
326 
of three judges, one OTP representative, one Registry representative, and one counsel chosen 
from the list maintained by the Registry.199  
Important structural effects of the lack of authority of the OPCD include on cooperation, 
budgeting, and rules and regulations. The OPCD has no right to directly debate within the 
Committee of Budget and Finance (CBF), which makes budgetary recommendations to the 
ASP—only the Registry does.200 The OPCD has been advocating for structural parity within the 
ICC for years, but to no avail. While there is some agreement on the need for greater structural 
parity, there is an unwillingness at the court to request the ASP to provide this.201 
The final issue discussed is the structural and procedural implications of trial rights for 
victims. They can apply for assistance from the ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims,202 and for 
reparations after an individual has been convicted by the court;203 and they have a dedicated 
office within the Registry, the Office of Public Counsel for Victims.204 Before and during trial 
victims can also participate in proceedings by making presentations to: a pre-trial chamber 
                                                
199 See Regulations of the Court, regulation 4. 
200 Disparity in financial resources for conducting investigations have a significant impact on the ability of 
defense teams to acquire evidence. According to a knowledgeable observer close to the court, some 90 
percent of defendants use legal aid, which in 2014 was $3 million, in contrast to the OTP budget of $39 
million. Defendants are provided with $73,000 for the whole of their case, which, according to the same 
source, does not permit the hiring of even one dedicated investigator. Anonymous interview. It should 
also be noted, however, that the number of staff for investigations and prosecution is far lower at the OTP 
than that for domestic atrocities. For example, the OTP has stated—although this could be argued to be 
cherry-picking—that a typical investigation it conducts involves 30 personnel, vs. more than 2,600 
individuals for the investigation and prosecution over the Oklahoma City Bombing. See ICC ASP, “The 
Report of the Court on the Basic Size of the Office of the Prosecutor,” doc. no. ICC-ASP/14/21, 
September 17, 2015, para. 44, www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/b27d2a.  
201 The nature of the OPCD as an autonomous office that is not an organ of the court has other negative 
effects on its ability to adequately support defendants and their counsel. It is more difficult to retain staff 
as they do not receive the same benefits as official court employees. Also defense counsel do not receive 
an ICC email and Internet access, which they need for direct access to ICC documents—only the OPCD 
itself has this. Anonymous interview with close court observers. 
202 Rome Statute, article 79. 
203 Ibid., article 75. 
204 Ibid., article 43.6. 
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during an OTP request to be permitted to open an investigation;205 the court while the OTP is 
seeking a ruling on an issue of jurisdiction or admissibility;206 and “at stages of the proceedings 
determined to be appropriate by the Court” where victims’ personal interests may be affected.207 
Trial rights for victims at the ICC have been praised as constituting “a unique innovation” in 
global legal governance,208 which implements recommendations made by the UN in relation to 
the provision of assistance to victims.209 
Despite judicial instruction within the rules to give primacy to the rights of defendants, the 
lack of clarity in the victim participation rules in the statute and RPE, and in the hybrid 
procedural model utilized by the court, provide excessive leeway to judges to determine victims’ 
involvement, which risks infringing the rights of defendants.210 Their participation also arguably 
violates the presumption of innocence of the accused by assuming that the events and facts the 
prosecution is presenting at trial occurred—before this has been established by trial.211 This 
effectively means that victims do not simply play a passive role in proceedings, as is common in 
liberal criminal justice proceedings,212 but may constitute, according to the head of the OPCD, a 
                                                
205 Ibid., article 15.3. 
206 Ibid., article 19.3. 
207 Ibid., article 68.3. 
208 Lorraine Smith-van Lin, “Victims’ Participation at the International Criminal Court: Benefit or 
Burden?” in The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives, ed. 
William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, and Niamh Hayes (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 181-204. 
209 United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, “Handbook on Justice for Victims,” 
New York, 1999, www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/UNODC_Handbook_on_Justice_for_victims.pdf. 
210 Salvatore Zappalà, “The Rights of Victims v. the Rights of the Accused,” Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 8, no. 1 (2010): 137-64. 
211 Ibid., 145-6. 
212 Note in certain legal systems, such at the United States at the federal level, victims may play a more 
active role during the sentencing hearing. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title VII: Post-
Conviction Procedures, Rule 32: Sentencing and Judgment. See Cornell, Legal Information Institute, 
www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_32. 
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“second prosecutor,”213 by arguably crossing the line between being participants at the court and 
being parties to the adversarial conflict between the prosecution and defense.214 
Victim rights theoretically constitute a major step for the protection of human rights at 
international trials, and ones that arguably should be balanced against those of defendants. 
However, it should be kept in mind that “the rights of the accused are not ‘just’ human rights 
guarantees; they are part and parcel of the epistemological mechanism for fact finding in 
criminal proceedings.”215 Effectively establishing the truth and thereby determining the guilt or 
innocence of defendants requires the protection of their fundamental trial rights. An international 
trial may therefore not be the most appropriate forum for victim participation.216 
 
Investigatory support and cooperation 
The Rome Statute, and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International 
Criminal Court, the latter of which came into force in July 2004,217 divided those perceived to be 
                                                
213 Xavier-Jean Keïta, Melinda Taylor, and Mark Chadwick, “The Office of Public Counsel for the 
Defence & Challenges for the Defence Before the International Criminal Court,” presentation at 
“Ensuring Fair International Trials: Prospects and Challenges,” TMC Asser Institute, The Hague, 
Netherlands, November 30, 2011, www.iccnow.org/documents/OPCD_Asser_presentation.pdf. 
214 Lucia Catani, “Victims at the International Criminal Court: Some Lessons Learned from the Lubanga 
Case,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 10, no. 4 (2012): 912. In the Lubanga case, the court 
authorized 129 victims to participate, including via making opening and closing statements. See, for 
example, Lubanga, Opening Statements (transcript), case no. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-107, January 26, 2009, 
36-70, www.legal-tools.org/en/browse/record/bc5f5e; and Lubanga, Closing Statements (transcript), case 
no. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-356, August 25, 2011, 56-90, www.legal-tools.org/en/browse/record/01302c.  
215 Zappalà, “The Rights of Victims v. the Rights of the Accused:” 145. 
216 Christine Van den Wyngaert, “Victims Before International Criminal Courts: Some Views and 
Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 44, no. 1 (2011): 
475-96. 
217 ICC, Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court. All immunities 
and privileges are subject to waiver by other actors within the court (see Rome Statute, article 48.5). The 
agreement was finalized in September 2002, and came into force after ratification by ten states. See 
United Nations Treaty Collection, Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International 
 
 
 
 
 
329 
in need of international legal protection in the conduct of court business into four groups. The 
first consists of judges, prosecutors, deputy prosecutors, and the registrar.218 They were provided 
with the privileges and immunities provided to heads of diplomatic missions under the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations219—although limited to while conducting official court 
business within the territory of a state party.220  
According to Phakiso Mochochoko, head of the OTP’s Jurisdiction, Complementarity and 
Cooperation Division, and former chair of the Working Group on Privileges and Immunities, 
which created the agreement, “[t]he legal status of this class is thus the same as that of judges of 
the International Court of Justice as approved by General Assembly Resolution 90 of December 
11, 1946.”221 Mochochoko, and the ASP, which agreed to this categorization, privilege the first 
category as essential for the court’s functioning, including the chief prosecutor and deputies—
but not defense staff.  
The categories seem to indicate a descending order of perceived importance by the ASP to 
the essential functioning of the ICC. The other three groups, including defense counsel, are 
mentioned in the statute,222 but their rights in this regard are solely found within the agreement. 
The second group consists of “officials of the court”—deputy registrars and staff members of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Criminal Court, treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XVIII/XVIII-
13.en.pdf. 
218 Rome Statute, article 48.2, and ICC, Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities, article 15. 
219 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 
legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf. 
220 This therefore constitutes functional immunity (similar to consular staff) rather than the personal 
immunities associated with embassy staff. See United States Department of State, Office of Foreign 
Missions, “Diplomatic and Consular Immunity: Guidance for Law Enforcement and Judicial Authorities,” 
June 2015, www.state.gov/documents/organization/150546.pdf. 
221 Phakiso Mochochoko, “The Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal 
Court,” Fordham International Law Journal 25, no. 3 (2001): 651. 
222 Rome Statute, articles 48.3-4. 
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Registry and OTP. Their immunities and privileges, while not as extensive as those of category 
one, still provide them with functional immunity.223  
Defense counsel and investigators constitute the third category (in the statute lumped in 
together with the fourth category as a miscellaneous group of all others).224 During the drafting 
of the statute, some delegations argued, unsuccessfully, that equality of arms requires defense 
counsel to be provided with the same immunities and privileges in conducting official business 
as afforded to the prosecution.225 Nevertheless, their immunities and privileges are very similar 
to those in category two, except for certain financial advantages accruing to court officials, but 
not counsel. The fourth category is a catch-all consisting of witnesses, victims, experts, and other 
individuals whose presence at the court might be necessary—their immunities and privileges are 
very similar to those of category three.226 
According to Mochochoko, “[t]he Agreement represents a major innovative departure from 
previous ones in that it recognizes the important role of, amongst others, experts, witnesses, 
victims, and other persons required to be present at the seat of the Court.”227 While this is true, 
and while the details of defense counsel privileges are greater than those found in the ICTY RPE, 
the agreement creates a further institutional disparity between prosecution and defense. The chief 
officers of the OTP are treated as “high officials” of the court, while counsel are individuals 
necessary for “the good administration of justice.”228 The chief prosecutor is an officer of justice 
                                                
223 ICC, Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities, article 16. 
224 Ibid., article 18. The article mentions “Counsel and persons assisting defense counsel.” According to 
Mochochoko the question of how broadly this refers to individuals aiding the defense, such as secretaries 
and drivers, “has been left open.” See Mochochoko, “The Agreement on Privileges and Immunities:” 655. 
225 Mochochoko, “The Agreement on Privileges and Immunities:” 654. 
226 ICC, Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities, articles 19-22. 
227 Mochochoko, “The Agreement on Privileges and Immunities:” 641. 
228 Ibid., 652 and 656. 
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at the court and so this distinction in rights may seem appropriate from that perspective. 
However, the prosecutor is also the head of the OTP, which has the function of co-equal party in 
an adversarial trial system, whose competitor is defense counsel.229 
The ICC, as a product of treaty negotiations among states reluctant to surrender authority to 
the court, is provided with less investigatory power in relation to states than was the ICTY by the 
Security Council, defining their obligations more narrowly in terms of releasing evidence to the 
court, for example.230 States may deny a request for evidence on national security grounds, and 
the statute emphasizes “cooperative means” of resolving disputes rather than providing powers to 
the court to enforce compliance.231 
A situation may be referred to the ICC—enabling a preliminary examination by the OTP, and 
a full investigation with pre-trial chamber consent—in one of three ways: by a state party, by the 
Security Council, or by the chief prosecutor’s own initiative, known as proprio motu power.232 
An empirical analysis of situations before the court found that state cooperation with 
investigations “typically tracks the ways in which cases get to the ICC in the first place,” with 
state party referrals engendering more cooperation with the OTP.233 
                                                
229 The practical issue of implementation should also be kept in mind. For example, by 2006, two years 
after the ASP agreed these immunities protections, only “a few dozen” members had passed domestic 
implementing legislation. See Bosco, Rough Justice, 136. 
230 Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops and Robert R. Amsterdam, “The Duality of State Cooperation Within 
International and National Criminal Cases,” Fordham International Law Journal 30, no. 2 (2006): 275-7. 
231 Rome Statute, articles 72 and 93.4, quote at article 72.5. 
232 Ibid., article 13. 
233 Courtney Hillebrecht and Scott Straus, “Who Pursues the Perpetrators? State Cooperation with the 
ICC,” Human Rights Quarterly 39, no. 1 (2017, forthcoming), 3, 
courtneyhillebrecht.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/final_icc_cooperation_hillebrecht_straus.pdf. Note that 
page numbers refer to the initial online pdf and not the final article page numbering.  
 
 
 
 
332 
Of the ten situations currently under investigation by the OTP,234 five have been referred to 
the court by state parties.235 The situations for all three of those individuals convicted by the 
court were referred by state parties, and of the four ongoing cases (involving eight individuals), 
three relate to situations referred by state parties.236 This ratio looks set to change going forward, 
as, of the three cases awaiting the start of trial as of July 2016, one relates to a state referral 
situation, one to a Security Council referral, and one commenced with a proprio motu 
investigation.237 
The term “self-referral,” sometimes used in relation to states referring the situation in their 
territory to the court, would be more accurately described as “opposition-referrals” as their 
purpose is to remove political and military rivals.238 This has led to a dynamic where situations 
referred by state parties tend to have cooperation with the court heavily skewed towards the 
OTP, while those involving Security Council referrals and proprio motu investigations largely 
skewed against the OTP, making arrests and the gathering of evidence far more difficult in an 
                                                
234 These relate to situations where a pre-trial chamber has authorized the OTP to undertake a full criminal 
investigation after a preliminary examination by the OTP. Preliminary examinations are currently 
underway in relation to: Afghanistan; Burundi; Columbia; Guinea; Iraq/United Kingdom; Nigeria; 
Palestine; Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece, and Cambodia; and Ukraine. See ICC, Preliminary 
Examinations, www.icc-cpi.int/pages/preliminary-examinations.aspx. 
235 Uganda (opened 2004), DRC (2004), CAR I (2004), Mali (2012), and CAR II (2014) were referred by 
the state parties of the territory involved; Darfur, Sudan (2005), and Libya (2011) were referred by the 
Security Council; and Kenya (2010), Côte d’Ivoire (2011), and Georgia (2016) were opened proprio motu 
by the chief prosecutor. See ICC, Situations Under Investigation, www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx. 
236 The ongoing cases for situations referred by state parties are: Dominic Ongwen (Uganda); Aimé Kilolo 
Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido (CAR I, crimes 
against the administration of justice); and Bosco Ntaganda (DRC). The case of Laurent Gbagbo and Blé 
Goudé relates to Côte d’Ivoire (proprio motu). See ICC, Trial: Ongoing, www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/trial.aspx. 
Note that, as discussed earlier, the former situation was completed in October 2016, after the end of the 
research period analyzed.  
237 These are the cases of, respectively, Dominic Ongwen (Uganda situation), Abdallah Banda (Darfur, 
Sudan), and Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (Mali). See ICC, Trial Stage: In Preparation, www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/trial.aspx. 
238 Hillebrecht and Straus, “Who Pursues the Perpetrators?” 3. 
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institutional environment dependent upon external enforcement.239 The empirical analysis of 
cooperation with the OTP discussed above demonstrated a very close correlation between the 
targets of investigation and level of cooperation with the court—with government opposition 
figures as targets generating greater cooperation.240 
The primary advantage to an ICC referral by a state party is the political elimination and 
delegitimization of a rival—especially with a conviction, providing a significant incentive to 
cooperate with the OTP to obstruct defense investigations: “For state incumbents, a successful 
prosecution serves as a political windfall, one in which the state appears to be cooperating with 
international justice institutions, thereby earning reputation benefits, and removes and 
delegitimizes an immediate and likely persistent threat.”241  
The OTP is clearly aware of this dynamic, and has been more likely to open cases where it 
feels that state support for its investigation in a particular situation will be more forthcoming.242 
While it makes practical sense for the OTP to pursue cases where prosecutions are more likely to 
be successful due to access to evidence, it does mean that the nature of the ICC—dependent 
upon outside support for investigations—leads to the OTP choosing cases pragmatically in ways 
that likely privilege their access to evidence over that of defense counsel in trials before the 
court.243 
                                                
239 Courtney Hillebrecht, Domestic Politics and International Human Rights Tribunals: The Problem of 
Compliance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
240 Hillebrecht and Straus, “Who Pursues the Perpetrators?” 18, Table 2. 
241 Ibid., 9. 
242 Bosco, Rough Justice, 19. 
243 According to Hillebrecht and Scott, “facing extensive criticism, Court officials have a strong incentive 
to secure finished cases rather than open confrontations with states, thereby risking existing cases or 
engendering more paralysis. The Court’s desire to restore and buttress its legitimacy and mount 
successful cases intersects with state incumbents’ incentives to gain the benefits of cooperation while 
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There are, however, risks for states with cooperating with an OTP investigation as it might 
unearth evidence of government involvement in crimes. Referring state parties have therefore 
tended to encourage the investigation and prosecution of rivals before broader investigations on 
their territory, by engaging in differential cooperation in relation to access to information on 
opposition versus government actions.244 
The Bemba case illustrates this dynamic. In 2002 Bemba’s Congolese rebel force, the 
Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC), agreed to fight in the CAR on the side of then-
president Ange-Félix Patassé in a civil war against the former head of the CAR military, 
François Bozizé. When Bozizé won the war and became president he referred the conflict to the 
ICC.245 This encouraged the removal of Bemba as a potential rival for power, and sent a signal to 
international donors that Bozizé’s government would protect human rights and abide by the rule 
of law. The government subsequently handed the files of its own criminal investigation on 
Bemba to the OTP.246 
The CAR referral also interacted with that of the DRC. In the latter country, the fragile 
government of Joseph Kabila also stood to gain from delegitimizing military and political 
opponents. Bemba, a “millionaire businessman from a prominent [DRC] family,”247 returned 
home and became vice president of the DRC between 2003 and 2006. He lost the 2006 
presidential election to the incumbent Kabila. Pressure from the government led Bemba to flee 
                                                                                                                                                       
minimizing the risk of prosecution. The result is an intricate set of interactions that complicates the 
cooperation process.” See Hillebrecht and Straus, “Who Pursues the Perpetrators?” 14. 
244 Ibid., 11. 
245 Human Rights Watch, “State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses against Civilians,” volume 19, no. 
14(A), September 2007, www.hrw.org/reports/2007/car0907/car0907webwcover.pdf. 
246 Courtney Hillebrecht and Scott Straus, “Last Week, the International Criminal Court Convicted a War 
Criminal. And that Revealed One of the ICC’s Weaknesses,” The Washington Post, March 28, 2016. 
247 Marlise Simons, “Congolese Politician, Jean-Pierre Bemba, Is Convicted of War Crimes,” The New 
York Times, March 21, 2016. 
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the country in 2007, and he was arrested in Belgium and handed over to the ICC the following 
year.248 
Another reason for state parties to cooperate with the OTP is the pressure that can be brought 
to bear by IGOs and states keen to promote a human rights agenda.249 In March 2004, after 
months of consultations between the OTP and the government of the DRC, the latter announced 
that it was referring the conflict in the east of the country to the court. The referral had required 
“mild pressure” from the OTP—eager to begin investigations250—and more significant pressure 
from the European Union as a major donor to the DRC.251 
Such political influences on prosecutorial decision-making are inevitable for a court largely 
dependent upon external actors—state parties and the Security Council—to refer situations that 
enable the OTP to begin investigations.252 The OTP undertook diplomatic negotiations with the 
Ugandan government to encourage it to make the first referral. This included a meeting between 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the chief prosecutor of the ICC at the time, and President Yoweri 
Museveni of Uganda in London in January 2004, and culminated in a joint press conference 
where they announced the referral of the situation involving the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 
                                                
248 Joe Bavier, “Bemba Arrested for War Crimes,” The Independent, May 25, 2008, 
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/bemba-arrested-for-war-crimes-834383.html. 
249 David Richards, David Gelleny, and David Sacko, “Money with a Mean Streak? Foreign Economic 
Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing Countries,” International Studies 
Quarterly 45, no. 2 (2001): 219-39. 
250 Jo Stigen, The Relationship Between the International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions: The 
Principle of Complementarity (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), 246. 
251 Bosco, Rough Justice, 98-9. 
252 Of course, as discussed earlier, the chief prosecutor also possesses the power to begin an investigation 
proprio motu. Most recently, Prosecutor Bensouda was authorized by Pre-Trial Chamber I to open an 
investigation into the situation in South Ossetia, Georgia from July to October 2008. See ICC, “ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber I Authorises the Prosecutor to Open an Investigation into the Situation in Georgia,” press 
release, doc. no. ICC-CPI-20160127-PR1183, January 27, 2016, www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1183. 
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a major Ugandan rebel group.253 The chief prosecutor of the ICC later felt it necessary to clarify 
that it would not only be investigating LRA actions but also those of the government. He did not, 
however, make a similar statement of prosecutorial investigatory parity in relation to the 
Security’s Council’s referral of Darfur the following year.254 
In the case of both the DRC and Uganda the OTP stressed to the governments that it wished 
to complement and not undermine the ongoing peace processes, and in Uganda in particular the 
OTP coordinated its investigatory approach with the government.255 Uganda hoped to use the 
referral to increase support among ASP member states for its attempt to defeat the LRA.256 The 
government later suffered domestic criticism over the referral and the inability to seize indicted 
suspects or end the conflict, leading it to scale back its cooperation with the ICC.257 Similarly, 
political pressure from the UN encouraged the DRC government to arrest and hand Thomas 
Lubanga to the ICC after his forces were accused of attacking UN peacekeepers in February 
2005.258  
There is also the prominent counter-example of Kenya to the influence of the chief 
prosecutor. In 2010 the prosecutor opened a proprio motu investigation into crimes committed 
during post-election violence in 2007-8, including over 1,000 people killed, over 900 rapes, and 
350,000 people displaced.259 Defendants Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto became the 
                                                
253 Payam Akhavan, “The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First State Referral 
to the International Criminal Court,” The American Journal of International Law 99, no. 2 (2005): 403-
21.  
254 William A. Schabas, “Prosecutorial Discretion and Gravity,” in The Emerging Practice of the 
International Criminal Court, ed. Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 238. 
255 Ibid., 239. 
256 Bosco, Rough Justice, 129. 
257 Hillebrecht and Straus, “Who Pursues the Perpetrators?” 20. 
258 Bosco, Rough Justice, 124.  
259 ICC, “Kenya: Situation in the Republic of Kenya,” case no. ICC-01/09, www.icc-cpi.int/kenya. 
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president and vice president of Kenya, respectively, in 2013, leading to alleged obstruction with 
the OTP’s investigation, including, according to the court, “witness interference” and “political 
meddling.”260 The OTP reluctantly decided to close the cases against them.261 In 2009 the 
African Union also passed a resolution criticizing the actions of the Security Council and the 
ICC in regard to the referral of Sudan and the subsequent OTP investigation and indictments, and 
called on AU member states not to cooperate with the ICC’s arrest warrants.262  
However, these cases do not suggest a form of overall “balance,” and thereby parity, between 
prosecution and defense at the court, constituting an element of legal fairness. Where accused are 
in power they are highly unlikely to face prosecution at the ICC, whereas those in opposition to a 
state referring party are likely to be significantly disadvantaged at trial due to differential access 
to evidence by the state.263 Mechanisms for compelling external actor cooperation with defense 
                                                
260 Marlise Simons and Jeffrey Gettleman, “International Criminal Court Drops Case Against Kenya’s 
William Ruto,” The New York Times, April 5, 2016. 
261 The ICC vacated the charges in Ruto et al. and withdrew the charges in Kenyatta. See ICC, “Kenya: 
The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang,” case no. ICC-01/09-01/11, www.icc-
cpi.int/kenya/rutosang; and ICC, “Kenya: The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta,” case no. ICC-
01/09-02/11, www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/kenyatta. 
262 African Union, “Report of the African Union on Darfur (AUPD),” Peace and Security Council 207th 
Meeting at the Level of the Heads of State and Government, doc. no. PSC/AHG/2(CCVII), October 29, 
2009, Abuja, Nigeria. See also Gwen Barnes, “The International Criminal Court’s Ineffective 
Enforcement Mechanisms: The Indictment of President Omar Al Bashir,” Fordham International Law 
Journal 34, no. 6 (2011): 1,584-1,619. 
263 More broadly, Jalloh and DiBella argue that the lack of a comparable institutional voice, and the 
diplomatic position, access, and influence of the OPCD relative to defense counsel create significant 
sources of disparity in attaining assistance with investigations, including the gathering of documentary 
evidence and access to witnesses. See Jalloh and DiBella, “Equality of Arms in International Criminal 
Law,” 264. For example, the ICC signed cooperation agreements with the UN in 2004 and the EU in 
2006, which specify cooperation with the OTP. See, respectively, Negotiated Relationship Agreement 
Between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, doc. no. ICC-ASP/3/Res.1, October 4, 
2004, www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/916FC6A2-7846-4177-A5EA-
5AA9B6D1E96C/0/ICCASP3Res1_English.pdf; and Agreement Between the International Criminal 
Court and the European Union on Cooperation and Assistance, doc. no. ICC-PRES/01-01-06, April 10, 
2006, www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/6EB80CC1-D717-4284-9B5C-
03CA028E155B/140157/ICCPRES010106_English.pdf. Also, as discussed in Chapter 4 in relation to the 
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teams in gaining access to potential evidence are inadequate to address this problem.264 In 2008, 
in Lubanga, due to lack of defense access to evidence the ICC suspended proceedings.265 While 
this is very unusual, it could be a useful strategy to encourage state cooperation, as it did in this 
case. 
 
Defense parity indicator 2: Evidentiary procedures 
This section analyzes the effect of documentary and witness evidence on the courtroom dynamic 
between prosecution and defense at the ICC. The first section explores the procedural right of 
disclosure of prosecution evidence to the defense before trial, and the problems created by the 
reliance of the prosecution on external sources of information. The second section discusses 
witness procedures in the rules, focusing on rules affecting cross-examination and those 
permitting the introduction into the record of written witness statements.  
States and the UN demonstrated little concern with due process and the rights of accused 
through much of the negotiations to create the ICC. There were very few references to the 
protection of defendant rights in the early drafts of the statute, including the 1994 International 
Law Commission proposal, and the “Zutphen draft” agreed in February 1998.266 This only began 
to change in the months leading up to the Rome Conference, and resulted in a statute whose 
                                                                                                                                                       
ICTY, defense counsel may especially encounter resistance while investigating from states with a civil 
law system as in such systems this is not a task undertaken by defense teams. See Bert Swart, “General 
Problems,” in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 2, ed. Antonio 
Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 1,600. 
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Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, case no. ICC- ICC-01/04-01/06-
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procedures constitute a “veritable conglomeration of different legal processes,” due to the range 
of legal systems represented at the conference.267 Bassiouni argues that the predominance of 
common-law adversarial procedures in the statute reflects the desire of states to protect the rights 
of accused, though he criticizes the “excessive formalism” in delineating rules as “counter-
productive to the accused.”268 The dissertation takes issue with this position for two reasons. 
First, while the rights are laid out in far greater detail than those found in the ICTY statute, this is 
not a high bar, and they are not delineated in an “excessive manner” relative to those found in 
liberal democratic legal systems. Second, the formalism of detailed rules provides core features 
of a high level of the legality of criminal procedures: detailed and clear written rules. 
 
Documentary evidence and disclosure 
According to Schabas, the Rome Statute contains due process protections for the accused that 
“go somewhat beyond the minimum requirements found in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.”269 The covenant’s requirements consist of the following rights: to be 
informed of the charges; to an expeditious trial; to adequate resources and access to counsel 
(paid for by the court if necessary); to present witnesses and cross-examine those of the 
prosecution; and to not incriminate oneself.270  
Monroe Leigh, former US State Department legal advisor and former president of the 
American Society of International Law, has argued that the Rome Statute rights are more 
                                                
267 Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty of Rome:” 464. 
268 Ibid.: 464-5. 
269 Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 224.  
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extensive than those found in the US Bill of Rights.271 However, as Schabas recognizes, the 
rights delineated in the ICCPR—and the Bill of Rights, though Schabas does not refer to this—
by themselves constitute weak due process protections by contemporary liberal legal standards. 
He clarifies that there are additional rights in the Rome Statute—including rights during the 
investigation stage. Nevertheless, the central protection of disclosure as an obligation on the 
prosecution to release evidence is only loosely mentioned in the statute.272 
The Rome Statute makes reference to the obligation of disclosure only in relation to 
exculpatory material—and with significant restrictions, discussed below.273 The RPE includes a 
section with nine rules titled “Disclosure,” providing significantly more detail and clarity than 
found in the ICTY RPE (which does not include a dedicated disclosure section).274 This includes 
the prosecutorial obligation to disclose witness information (their names and any prior 
statements) and copies of physical material—objects, written documents, and photographs, 
                                                
271 Monroe Leigh, “The United States and the Statute of Rome,” The American Journal of International 
Law 95, no. 1 (2001): 130-1. 
272 Apart from vague references to an obligation to hand over material, the references to disclosure in the 
Rome Statute are largely those placing limitations on the obligation to hand over evidence when state 
parties handing over information wish it to be kept confidential. See discussion in documentary evidence 
section below. Schabas appears to recognize the relevance of disclosure to trial fairness, though not its 
centrality. See Schabas, Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 300-1. 
273 Rome Statute, article 67.2. Apart from this the statute makes only two vague references in relation to 
the functions of chambers. Rome Statute, article 64.3.c states that: “Subject to any other relevant 
provisions of this Statute, provide for disclosure of documents or information not previously disclosed, 
sufficiently in advance of the commencement of the trial to enable adequate preparation for trial.” Article 
61.3 makes a similar statement of function in relation to pre-trial chambers. All other references in the 
statute are aimed at restricting disclosure of confidential information. The statute also obliges ICC 
prosecutors to investigate exonerating as well as incriminating evidence (article 54.1.a), unlike at the 
ICTY. In the ICTY RPE, the prosecution must hand over exculpatory material they know to be in their 
possession (rule 68), but have no obligation to search for such material during investigations. According 
to Mark Ellis, this is aimed at balancing the advantage in investigative resources acknowledged to be held 
by the OTP. See Mark Ellis, In the Dock: Defence Rights at the ICC, documentary film directed by 
Liliana De Marco Coenen and Victor Fokke (International Bar Association, 2011), 
www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=4b9cd7f3-9185-4ebc-b40b-d54b8cc8d01e. 
274 RPE, rules 76-84. 
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etc.275 Also included are restrictions on disclosure, including those relating to confidential 
evidence.276  
While the ICTY’s disclosure procedures initially largely mirrored those of the US criminal 
justice system,277 according to Antonio Cassese et al. ICC procedures have somewhat tilted the 
international hybrid adversarial-inquisitorial trial model back towards the latter.278 This includes 
an obligation on the defense to disclose evidence to the prosecution, and aspects of the defense 
strategy.279 As discussed in Chapter 1, in an adversarial approach, the disclosure obligation tends 
to be placed solely on the prosecution, in acknowledgment of the defense’s disadvantage in 
gathering evidence in such a trial system.  
In the ICC’s Ruto et al. trial, in the Kenya situation, the defense team asked for a 
postponement of a date for disclosure to the prosecution on the grounds that it had too few 
resources to meet the disclosure deadline.280 The application was denied by the court, arguing 
that the defense was merely disorganized and that certain resources were not mandated by the 
                                                
275 Ibid., rules 76 and 77, respectively. No specific time-line is delineated, only “sufficiently in advance to 
enable the adequate preparation of the defense” in relation to witness information (rule 76.1) and nothing 
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276 Ibid., rules 81 and 82. 
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court to supply, so their lack was the defense’s problem to resolve on their own.281 Yet the court 
later granted an extension on the deadline for the confirmation of charges in the case at the 
Registrar’s request,282 suggesting time pressures are of greater concern to the court when only 
the defense is disadvantaged.283 
Most references to disclosure in the statute refer to limitations on the right of disclosure, by 
providing protections for external parties which have given information to the OTP so that it will 
not be released to the defense, even if it contains potentially exculpatory material.284 This is a 
reflection of the acknowledgment by the Rome Conference of the need for the ICC, unlike 
domestic courts, to rely on external cooperation, and of the desire by states to maintain control in 
any cooperation they choose to give.  
Without its own police, with limited investigatory resources, and lacking the legal authority 
to secure evidence from government agencies, the OTP is reliant upon states to provide evidence, 
including intelligence information that states would be unlikely to hand over without assurances 
that it would remain confidential. The restrictions on disclosure were also created to protect the 
identity of some victims and witnesses, generating a conflict between the necessity for their 
protection and the due process rights of the accused.  
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The head of the ICC’s Office of Public Counsel for the Defence argues that redactions from 
confidential documents that these rules have permitted have hampered the ability of defense 
teams to investigate, as well as having delayed proceedings.285 Lubanga provides a sobering 
example of the problems that can be caused for the ability to present an adequate defense by the 
confidentiality limitation. The United Nations in Congo had released a great deal of evidentiary 
material to the OTP to aid the prosecution in that case, but only on the agreement that it be used 
solely to generate further evidence which could be presented in court. The UN evidence itself 
could not be presented in court or shared at the ICC outside the OTP—not even with the 
judges.286 Some material was disclosed to the defense after heavy redaction, which counsel 
argued left them unable to effectively defend their client.287 The International Bar Association 
was also critical of the belated disclosure of redacted, possibly exculpatory evidence, which led 
to delays in the proceedings.288 Larry Johnson, a legal scholar and former UN assistant secretary-
general for legal affairs, argues that these problems with “the implementation of the cooperation 
regime with the United Nations…almost derailed the whole trial.” They exposed “the tensions 
between the two obligations—disclosure and confidentiality.”289  
                                                
285 Keïta, Taylor, and Chadwick, “The Office of Public Counsel for the Defence & Challenges for the 
Defence Before the International Criminal Court.” 
286 Human Rights Watch, “The Status of the ICC Trial of Thomas Lubanga,” November 12, 2008, 
www.hrw.org/news/2008/11/12/status-icc-trial-thomas-lubanga. See Rome Statute, article 54.3.e. 
287 Stephanie Hanson, “Africa and the International Criminal Court,” Council on Foreign Relations 
background paper, July 24, 2008, www.cfr.org/courts-and-tribunals/africa-international-criminal-
court/p12048. 
288 International Bar Association, “First Challenges,” 31.  
289 Larry D. Johnson, “The Lubanga Case and Cooperation between the UN and the ICC: Disclosure 
Obligation v. Confidentiality Obligation,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 10, no. 4 (2012): 887, 
888. 
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The OTP did not disclose to the Lubanga defense team over 200 confidential documents 
which the court also recognized contained “potentially exculpatory information.”290 The court 
further acknowledged the damage that nondisclosure can cause to the defense and ruled that it 
would only permit the admission of evidence that can be disclosed.291 It called the disclosure of 
exculpatory material “a fundamental aspect of the accused’s right to a fair trial,” censured the 
prosecution for misapplying confidentiality agreements to withhold information from the defense 
and the trial chamber, and consequently suspended the trial, on the basis that these factors 
“ruptured” the trial process “to such a degree that it is now impossible to piece together the 
constituent elements of a fair trial.”292 The court criticized the prosecution in particular for 
“routinely” misapplying the confidentiality restriction to disclosure, and criticized prosecutors 
for a “broad and incorrect interpretation of the statute’s confidentiality requirements.”293 
Accountability for lapses in relation to such important procedural matters may well aid 
compliance in the future. Nevertheless, a code of ethics for the OTP has only been in force since 
                                                
290 Lubanga, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of the Trial Chamber I 
Entitled “Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 
54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of the Accused Together with Certain 
Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008,” case no. ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, October 
21, 2008, para. 21, www.legal-tools.org/en/browse/record/e6a054. 
291 Lubanga, Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials, para. 92. This 
was upheld by the appeals chamber: Lubanga, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the 
Decision of the Trial Chamber I, paras. 96-7. 
292 Lubanga, Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials, paras. 92-3.  
293 Lubanga, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of the Trial Chamber I, para. 
22. The statute and agreements with outside bodies, such as the UN, do not permit the court to be shown 
confidential but possibly exculpatory material in camera—that is, privately within judges’ chambers and 
not appearing in the official record. This could have enabled the judges to determine whether the 
undisclosed information sheds sufficient doubt on the guilt of the accused to dismiss charges—a practice 
used in some domestic legal systems to balance confidentiality and disclosure. See Stephanos Bibas and 
William W. Burke-White, “International Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism,” Duke 
Law Journal 59, no. 4 (2010): 699. 
 
 
 
 
345 
September 2013—more than ten years after the opening of the court.294 It remains to be seen 
whether it will make a difference to the OPT’s compliance with its disclosure obligations.295  
In addition to arguable prosecutorial misconduct, a significant cause of the disclosure 
problems in Lubanga was the court’s structural weakness of a “disjointed defense system.”296 
The Registry appointed an ad hoc defense counsel for Lubanga during the investigatory phase, 
before his transfer to the court. Pre-Trial Chamber I decided to replace this counsel with 
representation through the OPCD, but refused to permit the OPCD to fulfill all the counsel’s 
functions, including gaining access to prosecution evidence.297 Lubanga provides an example of 
how lack of structural parity for the defense generates other parity weaknesses by limiting the 
court’s ability to respond to procedural problems. Considering the likely reliance of the OTP in 
future on information from states and IGOs, the tension between the obligations of disclosure to 
the defense and confidentiality towards sources “will become an issue for the court again.”298 
While there is insufficient space here to pursue other issues in depth, it should be noted that, 
similarly to the ICTY, another significant problem with disclosure to the defense has been the 
                                                
294 OTP, “Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor,” doc. no. OTP2013/024322, September 5, 
2013 (date of entry into force), www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/oj/otp-COC-Eng.PDF. 
295 As early as 2000, the International Criminal Defence Attorney’s Association had proposed that the 
ICC prosecution be held accountable by a code of conduct in the same way as defense counsel, but this 
was rejected by the court. See Jalloh and DiBella, “Equality of Arms in International Criminal Law:” 285. 
296 Rachel Katzman, “The Non-Disclosure of Confidential Exculpatory Evidence and the Lubanga 
Proceedings: How the ICC Defense System Affects the Accused’s Right to a Fair Trial,” Northwestern 
Journal of International Human Rights 8, no. 1 (2009): 100. 
297 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision on the Request by the OPCD for Access to 
Previous Filings, case no. ICC-01/04-389, September 11, 2007, paras. 6-7; and Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision on Request for leave to appeal the “Decision on the Requests of 
the OPCD on the Production of Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2)(e) of 
the Regulations of the Court and on the Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by the Prosecutor,” case no. 
ICC-01/04-438, January 23, 2008, www.legal-tools.org/en/browse/record/ca6330. 
298 Susana SáCouto and Katherine Cleary, “The Relationship Between the International Criminal Court 
and the United Nations,” American University Washington College of Law, War Crimes Research Office, 
Legal Analysis and Education Project, August 2009, 45, 
www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/icc_reports.cfm. 
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sheer volume of material handed over, due to the nature of the crimes and the international 
context. In Lubanga, for example, the prosecution notified the court that it possessed 27,500 
documents, comprising 92,500 pages of material, of which it intended to hand over 20,000 
documents (74,000 pages).299 
 
Witnesses and defense cross-examination 
According to legal scholar Christoph Safferling, the defense right to cross-examine prosecution 
witnesses “presupposes the oral presentation of the…evidence,” yet there is “no explicit norm 
stating that the trial be oral” at the ICC.300 Nevertheless, the statute expresses a preference for in-
person, oral testimony.301 This represents, according to former ADC-ICTY president Colleen 
Rohan, a “welcome return to the principle that witnesses should testify in person,” which has 
been undermined in the practice of the ICTY.302  
                                                
299 Kuczyńska, The Accusation Model Before the International Criminal Court, 235. 
300 Christoph Safferling, International Criminal Procedure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 401, 
402. 
301 Rome Statute, article 69.2. 
302 Colleen M. Rohan, Protecting the Rights of the Accused in International Criminal Proceedings: Lip 
Service or Affirmative Action?” in The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: 
Critical Perspectives, ed. William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, and Niamh Hayes (Farnham, UK: 
Ashgate, 2013), 303. See Witnesses and Defense Cross-Examination section in Chapter 4 for details on 
the decline in this standard at the ICTY. An improvement over the ICTY is that the defense has the right 
to be the last party to examine a witness, including therefore the right to examine their own witness after 
prosecution cross-examination (RPE, rule 140.2.d). The ICTY early on decided that “as a general rule the 
testimony of a witness ends with his re-examination, absent any new matter during re-examination… 
Thus, without something new, a party has the last word with his own witness.” See ICTY, Delalić et al., 
Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, Esad Landzo, case no. IT-96-21, 
May 1, 1997, para. 30, www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tdec/en/70501DE2.htm. According to legal scholar 
Masha Fedorova, this is a “notable departure” from the ad hoc tribunals which aids in safeguarding the 
principle of dubio pro reo—“when in doubt, for the accused,” which aids in protecting the primary 
democratic criminal justice principles of the presumption of innocence for the accused, and the conviction 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (RPE, rule 141.2). See Masha Fedorova, The Principle of 
Equality of Arms in International Criminal Proceedings (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012), 399. It is 
complemented by the defense right to always speak last in closing statements before the court. 
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Rohan argues that, to date, the ICC has largely sustained this preference, permitting the use 
of written witness statements in a far narrower range of circumstances than at the ICTY.303 The 
rights to an oral trial and to directly challenge one’s accusers tend to be less commonly applied 
in civil law inquisitorial trial systems,304 and so the inclusion of protections within the Rome 
Statute and RPE is indicative of the importance the Rome delegates and ASP placed on 
maintaining the extra defense protections that an adversarial model requires.305 
Safferling’s assessment agrees with Rohan’s position, arguing that the ICC has so far taken a 
“relatively cautious approach” of restricting the introduction of written testimony. He speculates 
that this may be due to the ICC not yet experiencing the high level of political pressure to speed 
up proceedings as experienced by the ad hoc tribunals, due to the “backlog” of cases the latter 
accumulated. He cautions against the ICC capitulating to similar pressure in the future in order to 
maintain fair trial standards.306 
                                                
303 The ICC circumstances include the presence of the witness in court to enable cross-examination, and 
providing background information that does not appear to be in dispute between the parties. See Lubanga, 
Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for the Admission of the Prior Recorded Statements of Two 
Witnesses, case no. ICC-01/04-01/06-1603, January 15, 2009, para. 24, www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?uri=618279. 
304 Alexander Zahar and Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 314. 
305 The RPE provide prosecution and defense with the right to cross-examine each others’ witnesses in 
order to, for example, challenge the reliability of their testimony and the credibility of the witness. See 
RPE, rule 140.2.b. The ICC case law has established guidelines for cross-examination: see Lubanga, 
Decision on Various Issues Related to Witness’ Testimony During Trial, case no. ICC-01/04-01/06-1140, 
January 29, 2008, para. 32, www.legal-tools.org/en/browse/record/8367f1; and Katanga et al., 
Corrigendum: Directions for the Conduct of Proceedings and Testimony in Accordance with Rule 140, 
case no. ICC-01/04-01/07, December 1, 2009, paras. 69-76, www.legal-
tools.org/en/browse/record/2bf038. These include protecting witnesses by prohibiting “assault[ing] the 
dignity or exploit[ing] the vulnerability of witnesses.” See Katanga et al., Corrigendum, para. 75. 
306 Safferling, International Criminal Procedure, 403. 
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However, there are signs that there is already a move in this direction by the court. In 2013 
the ASP amended307 an ICC procedural rule to enable a greater use of written witness 
statements,308 with a very similar content to rule changes at the ICTY in 2000 and 2006.309 The 
changes permit the introduction of a written transcript in lieu of oral testimony in situations 
where the witness is not present in court, but where the defense has had the opportunity to 
question the witness during the recording of their testimony; where the witness is present in court 
(though the testimony is not live), and there is the opportunity to cross-examine; where the 
witness has died since providing a written transcript; or where there has been witness 
intimidation. 
The International Bar Association supported the adoption of the changes, especially those 
aspects that maintain the right of cross-examination, while urging “a cautionary approach to 
[their] implementation…in recognition of fundamental fair trial guarantees.”310 The IBA “urges 
the Trial Chambers to exercise caution,” and argues that the changes permitting written 
                                                
307 All proposed changes to the RPE must be agreed to (with a two thirds majority) by the Assembly of 
State Parties, (in theory) making procedural change much more difficult than for the ICTY, where the 
judges have this role and also removing the conflict of interest between judges as modifiers of rules and 
implementers of those same rules. See Gallant, “Politics, Theory and Institutions:” 325. 
308 Rome Statute, rule 68, as amended by resolution ICC-ASP/12/Res.7. 
309 The ICTY RPE rules are 92bis and 92quater. Rule 92bis allows the introduction of a written statement 
as long as the testimony’s purpose is only to establish historical background and the context of the 
situation(s) examined in the case. Rule 92quater allows written testimony which goes directly to the acts 
and conduct of the accused (i.e. it is not just background information) even if the witnesses is unable to 
appear before the court. The issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
310 International Bar Association, “IBA ICC Programme Legal Opinion: Rule 68 Amendment Proposal,” 
January 2014, 1, www.ibanet.org. 
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testimony without the right of cross-examination “should be evidentiary mechanisms of last 
resort.”311 This development has led to increasing use of written testimony since 2014. 
The changes occurred due to ASP desire to facilitate faster and cheaper trials. Such pressure 
has resulted from the slow pace of trials so far. Only in March 2012—nearly ten years after the 
court’s establishment—did the ICC complete its first trial.312 As of June 2016 the court has 
completed four trials, with three convictions and one acquittal.313 Similarly to the ad hoc 
tribunals, this has been criticized in relation to the ICC by academic and media commentators.314 
The ASP, and in particular the wealthier member states that provide the majority of the court’s 
funding,315 have become increasingly concerned since 2004 about the costs associated with the 
                                                
311 Ibid., 5. The IBA also cautioned that the rules “should not be used as a ‘back-door’ substitution for 
victim and/or witness protection mechanisms,” as such protections already exist at the court (e.g. RPE 
rule 88.5). Ibid.  
312 This was of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who was transferred to The Hague in March 2006. He was 
sentenced to 14 years imprisonment for war crimes. 
313 The convictions are discussed above, under the legality of sentencing. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was 
acquitted in December 2012 of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and the verdict was upheld on 
appeal in February 2015. See Ngudjolo, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, case no. ICC-
01/04-02/12, December 18, 2012, www.legal-tools.org/en/browse/record/2c2cde; and Ngudjolo, 
Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Decision of Trial Chamber II Entitled “Judgment 
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” case no. ICC-01/04-02/12 A, February 27, 2015, www.legal-
tools.org/en/browse/record/1dce8f. As of June 2016 there are no appeals ongoing. See ICC, Appeals 
Stage, www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/appeal.aspx. 
314 See, for example, Antonio Cassese, “Is the ICC Still Having Teething Problems?” Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 4, no. 3 (2006): 440-1; Jean Galbraith, “The Pace of International Criminal 
Justice,” Michigan Journal of International Law 31 (2009): 138-42; Marlise Simons, “For International 
Criminal Court, Frustration and Missteps in its First Trial,” The New York Times, November 21, 2010; 
and Susana SáCouto and Katherine Cleary, “Expediting Proceedings at the International Criminal Court,” 
American University Washington College of Law, War Crimes Research Office, Legal Analysis and 
Education Project, June 2011, 35-45, www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/documents/1106report.pdf. 
315 Most funding is currently derived from the governments of Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
France. The scale of contributions is assessed using the formula for the UN regular budget, relying on 
relative wealth and population. See Rome Statute, article 117. In the 2015 budget, appropriations for the 
court totaled €130.67 million. See ASP, Resolution on the Programme Budget for 2015, the Working 
Capital Fund for 2015, Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of Expenses of the International 
Criminal Court, Financing Appropriations for 2015 and the Contingency Fund, doc. no. ICC-
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ICC.316 That year the ASP’s Committee on Budget and Finance explicitly expressed concern that 
the costs not spiral as they had at the ad hoc tribunals.317 By 2015 the ICC had spent a total of $1 
billion, with two convictions to show for it.318  
 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of the chapter it was noted that there has been insufficiently critical reflection 
on the promise of the ICC for the fairness of prosecution within global legal governance. The 
examination of the court’s rules and limited practice to date provide a cautionary assessment. 
The ICC arguably constitutes an advance for the fairness of global legal governance for 
defendants over the ad hoc tribunals, but with significant caveats. The legality of the court 
constitutes an advancement in terms of non-retroactive enforcement of law, and especially in 
terms of the clarity and specificity of legal prohibitions. There are, however, still concerns as to 
the implications of the sentencing rules, which provide significant flexibility to the judges. While 
the three convictions so far reveal no particular concerns, they provide a limited basis for an 
assessment of legality. 
Structurally there is more of an official inside voice for the accused at the ICC, but there is 
not the effective equivalent of the ADC-ICTY with an external voice in decision-making forums. 
                                                                                                                                                       
ASP/13/Res.1, December 17, 2014, asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ASP13/ICC-ASP-13-
Res1-ENG.pdf. 
316 Bosco, Rough Justice, 104-5. 
317 ICC Assembly of State Parties, “Report of the Committee on Budget and Finance,” doc. no. ICC-
ASP/3/18, August 13, 2004, para. 57, asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-3-18-
_CBF_report_English.pdf. 
318 Caroline Schmitt, “13 Years, 1 Billion Dollars, 2 Convictions: Is the International Criminal Court 
worth it?” Deutsche Welle, January 27, 2016, www.dw.com/en/13-years-1-billion-dollars-2-convictions-
is-the-international-criminal-court-worth-it/a-19006069. 
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The accused and their counsel are still far from attaining structural equality as it relates to the 
pre-trial and trial stages of proceedings.  
Investigatory access to information is arguably worse for the defense at the ICC than at the 
ICTY, due to: complementarity, whereby domestic court jurisdiction supersedes that of the ICC 
(the opposite to the situation at the ICTY); control of top-level decision-making by a large and 
unwieldy body with many competing political interests—the ASP; and the bias inherent in state 
referrals of situations. The ICC also has similar evidentiary problems to the ICTY due to the 
dependence of the court on external support and information. While it has not yet suffered from 
the same level of inducement to speed up proceedings, there are signs of nascent pressure and 
their impact on trials. This requires monitoring to ensure that rule changes do not weaken 
defense parity to the same extent as they have been argued to at the ICTY.319 
Two remaining major problems for prosecution within global legal governance are its 
prosecution bias, and the structure of the system. The first issue results from the traditional 
international human rights focus on victims being incorporated uncritically into the evolving 
structures and procedures of international prosecution. The inadequate understanding of the role 
and function of the accused and defense counsel by states, NGOs, judges, and external 
commentators320 is a major obstacle to the improvement of fair trial standards. 
                                                
319 The discussion here did not allow space for the analysis of another issue, which while not directly 
related to legality or defense parity as explored in the research is potentially of profound importance for 
trial fairness at the ICC. Regulations of the Court, regulation 55 permits the prosecutor to change the 
charges against a defendant during the proceedings—even after the end of the prosecution’s presentation 
of evidence. For an exploration of this issue see Susana SáCouto and Katherine Cleary, “Regulation 55 
and the Rights of the Accused at the International Criminal Court,” American University Washington 
College of Law, War Crimes Research Office, Legal Analysis and Education Project, October 2013, 
www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/documents/Report17.pdf. 
320 For example, David Bosco, in a recent and otherwise well researched book on the politics of the ICC 
throughout made little mention of defense counsel and their need for and ability to gain access to 
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On the second issue, Lubanga highlights the arguably inherent conflict between the utility to 
the OTP of information provided by outside sources for pursuing a prosecution, and the 
requirement of disclosure. This remains unresolved and is perhaps an inevitable consequence of 
an international court reliant on external cooperation. Problems with effectiveness and efficiency 
have led to questioning of whether the ICC suffers from a “credibility gap,” especially in 
comparison to liberal democratic state criminal justice systems.321 This may lead to pressure to 
increase effectiveness at the expense of trial fairness.  
A key obstacle to the legitimacy of the ICC is that while it is modeled on courts within liberal 
criminal justice systems, it is not embedded within the sort of broader criminal justice 
structures—such as a police force for investigations and arrests—that would enable it to be both 
more effective and provide more equitable treatment to defendants. This leads to weaker 
legitimacy in terms of both fair trials and efficacy. Significantly responsible for this is that the 
court and its procedural rules were the outcome of a bargaining process among states, reflecting 
compromises among state interests and understandings of criminal justice, and the institutional 
power dynamic between the like-minded group and powerful states. As suggested in Chapter 4, 
perhaps a fundamental weakness of prosecution within global legal governance as currently 
constituted, is that it does not provide the best method for maintaining fair trial standards while 
also effectively prosecuting those who may have committed mass atrocity crimes.  
  
                                                                                                                                                       
information, despite spending considerable effort on this issue in relation to the prosecution. See Bosco, 
Rough Justice. 
321 Makua W. Mutua, “Closing the ‘Impunity Gap’ and the Role of State Support of the ICC,” in 
Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, ed. Richard H. Steinberg (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2016), 104. 
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6 Conclusion: Politics and the legitimacy of global legal governance 
The narrative of the evolution of international human rights is generally told within IR as one of 
increasing protections through the development of international human rights and humanitarian 
law, the role of NGOs and civil society groups in promoting and protecting rights, the 
development of post-conflict justice mechanisms such as truth and reconciliation commissions, 
and the movement to end impunity for mass atrocities through international criminal justice.1  
In focusing on the rights of victims as heralding the achievement of greater justice through 
international prosecution, political scientists have tended to underappreciate the centrality of the 
rights of the accused to the legitimacy of global legal governance institutions. Consequently, the 
effect of political influences on legal processes that affect defendants is underexplored within IR. 
The dissertation has demonstrated that defendant rights are particularly difficult to protect in 
a judicial environment characterized by: 1) the institutional power of states through the shaping 
of the rules by which courts are structured and operate; 2) the reliance of courts, in the pre-trial 
stage in particular, on external actors, especially states and IGOs; 3) a concern for victim rights 
that has arguably generated a blind spot among states and IGOs with regards to the rights of 
defendants; and 4) conflict between the political and legal goals of states in relation to 
international prosecution. The influence of the political goals and preferences of state and IGO 
                                                
1 E.g. Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity’s Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Kathryn Sikkink, The 
Justice Cascade (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011); Wayne Sandholtz and Kendall Stiles, 
International Norms and Cycles of Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Ian Clark, 
Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Barry Buzan, From 
International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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actors on courts shapes the legal dynamic between the prosecution and defense, to the detriment 
of defendants’ rights to a fair trial. 
While defendants at mass-atrocity trials are frequently referred to in international media as 
war criminals, without maintaining strong standards of legal justice there is effectively no 
presumption of innocence, and the process is at risk of sinking into a political show trial with the 
purpose of vengeance, not justice. Nevertheless, many political and NGO actors advocate 
successful international prosecution while paying inadequate attention to the legal rights of 
defendants. In doing so they harm the human rights objectives of deterrence, recognition of 
victim suffering, and transitional justice through prosecution.  
As demonstrated in the research, weaknesses in legal legitimacy constitute miscarriages of 
justice. Justice has not been served when the structural and procedural flaws in defendant rights 
explored have failed to provide the accused with adequate opportunities to defend him- or 
herself. Occasionally the research has been able to demonstrate prejudicial outcomes, such as the 
wrongful conviction of Croatian general Tihomir Blaškić on most counts, as determined by the 
ICTY appeals chamber. A broader assessment of wrongful conviction through a systematic 
examination of appeals at the ICTY and ICC is outside of the scope of the dissertation and may 
serve as the basis for further research. The appeals examined in the research suggest that there 
are various examples of miscarriages of justice resulting from the interference of political factors 
in the legal process. 
The first two sections of the conclusion provide a summary of the legal fairness findings of 
the research. They lay out the manner in which fairness has been shaped by the institutional 
power of states, and courts’ political reliance on external actors. This includes how decision-
making in creating legal rules is shaped by states’ political goals, including a bias towards 
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prosecution, concern to contain costs, and an underappreciation of the necessity for an active role 
for defendants in criminal justice. In the final section, the chapter discusses the implications of 
the project for the future of global legal governance, focusing on the effect of the inconsistency 
between courts on the coherence of the international criminal justice system—indeed, whether a 
disparate group of courts can constitute a system at all, and what this means for the rights of 
defendants. It also examines the study’s implications for IR research. 
 
Legality and institutional power: Amelioration despite interference 
The level of adherence to the requirements of the legality of crimes and punishment has 
improved enormously since the IMT at Nuremberg, while various problems remain. The 
improvement is largely due to the expansion of international human rights and humanitarian 
treaty law since 1945, but also the increasing level of detail on crimes incorporated within court 
statutes, and the evolution of customary law. Particularly significant has been the inclusion of 
sexual offenses within all three mass atrocity crimes prosecuted at the tribunals analyzed—war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Sexual offenses were introduced to international 
criminal justice through the practice of the ICTY, and they were subsequently delineated in 
detail in the ICC statute. 
Problems remain in terms of the contextual requirements of these crimes and some 
underlying offenses, with court interpretations providing a mixed picture. While sometimes 
clarifying the law, and thereby enhancing legality, courts have also on occasion strayed into 
creating new law, and thereby have effectively retroactively created prohibitions. Definitions of 
crimes are also shaped by state political preferences—this was particularly evident in decision-
making at the Rome Conference of the ICC.  
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The legality of punishments has attained a lower level of adherence to that of crimes. Practice 
has tended to suffer from the enforcement of arguably retroactive penalties, due to insufficient 
clarity and specify in sentencing guidelines within courts’ statutory documents, enabling 
excessive judicial discretion. This has led at the ICTY to poor consistency in sentencing; at the 
ICC more convictions will be necessary to determine if it suffers from the same malady. Such 
weaknesses are a significant matter for the legitimacy of international courts as sentencing 
practice goes to the heart of one of the primary purposes of legal retribution—the appropriate 
punishment of offenders.  
Yet adherence to the principle of legality is overall significantly less problematic within 
international criminal justice than is the level of defense parity. A central reason is that there has 
been less of a role for political interests shaping legality. Partly because of the Cold War 
expansion of international law, there has been broader agreement as to the legal requirements 
surrounding mass atrocities among states, as well as greater acceptance of expert positions on the 
legality of crimes. In addition, since the early postwar period, the concept of legality has become 
established as a fundamental legal principle at the domestic and international levels. There has 
therefore been less flexibility in the no-longer-nascent fields of international humanitarian and 
human rights law for interference by political and judicial actors through retroactive creation of 
crimes. 
 
 
 
Defense parity and bias towards prosecution: Dependence on external support 
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Defense parity remains more problematic than does legality. This is partly due to the complex 
nature of criminal trials: the structures, procedures, and resources available to the accused 
interact in various ways, profoundly affecting the ability of the accused to experience a 
satisfactory defense. This remains inadequately appreciated by states, the Security Council, and 
other political actors involved in creating international courts.  
Structural inequality within the institutional design of courts has left the accused and their 
counsel with a weaker voice in decision-making over such issues as budgets and procedural rule 
changes. This in turn has limited their ability to gain access to resources, and to be able to resist 
political pressure to speed up trials in ways detrimental to the ability of the defense to challenge 
the case before them. Resistance from states and IGOs reluctant to aid suspects, especially where 
a state may gain from non-cooperation with the accused, weakens the ability of defense teams to 
adequately investigate and locate exculpatory material. 
There is little evidence of learning applied at the ICC to ameliorate the weaknesses in the 
structural position of the defense at the ICTY. The continued failure of international courts to 
incorporate the defense equally—along with the prosecution—into their institutional structure is 
problematic for their legitimacy and the evolution of international criminal justice as a whole. 
While states and IGOs have clearly seen that it is necessary to establish a separate institutional 
organ for the prosecution within courts, none created a similar office for defense counsel until 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2003, in a “novel,” “innovative,” and “unique” step.2 Only 
at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon—which has yet to try any suspects—is there a Defense 
                                                
2 Alison Thompson and Michelle Staggs, “The Defence Office at the Special Court for Sierra Leone: A 
Critical Perspective,” War Crimes Studies Center, University of California, Berkeley, April 2007, 53. 
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Office as an organ of the court with equal status to that of the Office of the Prosecutor.3 Without 
learning lessons on the need for robust adequacy of representation, subsequent international 
courts will not provide a high level of legal fairness, with all that entails for diminished 
legitimacy. 
The prosecution and defense counsel at all international courts are dependent upon the 
cooperation of external actors to enable them to conduct pre-trial investigations and gather 
evidence. States control the territory in which research is conducted and material gathered, and 
so the effectiveness of investigations is especially dependent upon their cooperation. Other 
important actors include such IGOs as the UN and NATO, and such NGOs as Human Rights 
Watch and Amnesty International, which may have access to witnesses and other sources of 
evidence.  
While both prosecution and defense have suffered from poor cooperation, defense teams 
have tended to be much more severely hampered, as they lack the advantages of institutional 
status and resources available to the prosecution; and chief prosecutors possess political and 
diplomatic contacts and influence denied to defense teams, which aid in encouraging and 
pressuring states to cooperate. In addition, states may perceive advantage to hindering the 
investigations of defendants who are prior military or political rivals. This especially applies to 
the ICC, where the mechanism of state referral of situations for investigation has been 
responsible for a considerable imbalance in investigatory support between the prosecution and 
defense. 
                                                
3 STL, About the STL: Defence Office, www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl/structure-of-the-
stl/defence/defence-office. 
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A major impediment to the legitimacy of international courts remains their creation as 
standalone institutions, rather than being embedded within an authority structure similar to that 
of the domestic criminal courts within liberal criminal justice systems that they are modeled on. 
Lacking territorial authority, international courts are unable to guarantee parity of access to 
evidence. The state creators of international courts have not provided them with adequate tools 
for encouraging external cooperation, and judges have tended to insufficiently recognize that an 
imbalance in access to evidence is a significant cause for concern and an issue that the courts 
themselves need to address. Especially considering the adversarial nature of international 
criminal trial procedure, the statutes and RPEs of existing courts do not adequately take into 
account the requirements of defense counsel to conduct an effective investigation for exculpatory 
material. 
In terms of evidentiary procedures, the ability of defendants to acquire evidence from the 
prosecution (the obligation of disclosure), and counsel’s ability to cross-examine prosecution 
witnesses suffer from significant, and in some cases growing, weaknesses. Disclosure has 
suffered from problems caused by the perhaps inevitably large scope of mass atrocity trials, 
especially those of political and military leaders. Cross-examination has been negatively 
impacted by the methods adopted to respond to UN and state pressure on courts to speed up trial 
proceedings, which have involved reducing the proportion of witnesses who testify in person, 
and therefore reducing opportunities to challenge the prosecution’s evidence. Cost and time 
pressures have impacted the ICTY since before the end of its first decade of operation, and 
similar pressures are appearing at the ICC.  
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The research acknowledges that due process protections for the accused have been a factor in 
the length and cost of trials at international courts, as they have been domestically.4 However, the 
diminished efficiency legitimacy of tribunals, due to the widespread perception of the excessive 
length of trials,5 has to be balanced against the necessity of maintaining adequate legal 
protections for defendants, as this is fundamental to the legitimacy of prosecution within global 
legal governance. 
IR scholars demonstrate limited understanding of the importance of institutional design to the 
quality of legal fairness within international criminal courts, reflecting an underappreciation of 
the role of defendants as active participants in criminal trials. There is consequently little 
awareness of how defendant rights are affected by the structure of a court and the level of 
cooperation forthcoming from external actors. With a similarly limited understanding of criminal 
procedure, IR scholars tend not to recognize how the rules established for a court, and the 
political influences on changes to those rules, may impact the ability of accused to present an 
adequate defense. They similarly tend not to appreciate how the distinct legal and political 
relationship of each court with external actors shapes the ability to protect defendant rights. Yet a 
recognition of the central place of criminal procedure in generating legal fairness, and how this is 
weakened by political influences, are essential to an assessment of the legitimacy of global legal 
governance that incorporates the role of the defendant, who is inadequately recognized as the key 
actor in criminal trials. 
                                                
4 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, “Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of 
Procedural Fairness,” Boston University Law Review 83 (2003): 485-552. 
5 See, e.g., The Economist, “Justice on Trial,” February 28, 2004, www.economist.com/node/2460574; 
Geoffrey Robertson, “Outstanding Questions,” Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY, ed. Richard H. 
Steinberg (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011), 18; and Rupert Skilbeck, “Funding Justice: 
The Price of War Crimes Trials,” Human Rights Brief 15, no. 3 (2008): 6-10. 
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The future of global legal governance and implications for IR research  
Arguably there is no international criminal justice system per se, only a disparate group of 
courts. International courts apply a reasonably coherent set of criminal laws, which has aided in 
the relative consistency of legality between them, but each court also has jurisdiction over the 
(somewhat differing) laws as laid down in its own statute and there is no agreement as to the 
value of precedent, which would facilitate consistency in interpretation. A hierarchy between 
courts, as tends to operate within domestic legal systems, would help towards achieving 
coherence by requiring adherence to common standards through acceptance of authoritative 
decisions from outside each court. 
The problem is much greater in relation to defense parity, as each court has established its 
own distinct set of structures and procedures for protecting the accused. There is no clear 
learning over time within and between courts which would indicate a move towards greater 
parity. Therefore there is no significant indication that standards are trending towards an 
improvement for defendants, and no guarantee that those defendants facing prosecution at 
different courts will achieve anything approaching equal treatment. Without a coherent justice 
system characterized by consistent structures and procedural standards, and the universal 
acceptance of precedent within a judicial hierarchy, there is also little prospect of an 
amelioration. 
At the domestic level, liberal criminal justice systems are embedded within a particular 
community and evolve according to its concerns. The operation of global legal governance 
assumes that common values are defended by the international community of states, justifying an 
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international duty to punish offenders.6 This position is undermined by the diverse 
understandings among states of the standards of justice to be applied by international courts, 
which is demonstrated throughout the research by the attitudes and actions of states in creating, 
maintaining, and cooperating with such courts. 
IR scholarship has not adequately explored defendant rights as a source of legitimacy within 
global legal governance. By analyzing these rights, this study complements the extensive and 
growing body of research on other sources of legitimacy for international law and institutions, 
including the content of laws; non-legal inputs, such as transparency and accountability; and 
institutional outputs such as the number of court decisions.7 
The project raises questions about the theoretical and empirical assumptions of IR research 
on global governance, and expands scholarship in the theoretical exploration of the legitimacy of 
international criminal justice institutions by demonstrating the value of applying legal theory to 
the analysis of legitimacy and incorporating an active role for defendants. While such institutions 
are extensively analyzed within IR, the study of legal justice is underdeveloped.  
The research highlights the dangers of IR scholars and other public commentators claiming 
that trials are fair without an adequate understanding of what fairness towards defendants 
consists of, and without effectively exploring these issues in relation to the rules and practice of 
                                                
6 Thomas Margueritte, “International Criminal Law and Human Rights,” in Routledge Handbook of 
International Criminal Law, ed. Schabas and Bernaz, 435. 
7 E.g. Jens Steffek, “The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach,” European 
Journal of International Relations 9, no. 2 (2003): 249-75; Jan Wouters and Nicolas Hachez, 
“Transitional Societies and the Rule of Law: A Benchmarks Approach,” Working Paper No. 47, Leuven 
Centre for Global Governance Studies, Catholic University Leuven, March 2010; and Jason Ralph, 
“Anarchy is What Criminal Lawyers and Other Actors Make of It: International Criminal Justice as an 
Institution of International and World Society,” in Governance, Order, and the International Criminal 
Court: Between Realpolitik and a Cosmopolitan Court, ed. Steven C. Roach (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 133-53. 
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tribunals. The study contributes to a more complete understanding of global legal governance by 
demonstrating that the legitimacy of legal institutions can only be understood if it is recognized 
that law is a distinctive social process, and that it is shaped at the international level by the 
influence of political actors on the principles underlying law’s legitimacy. 
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Appendix: List of interviews 
Behar, Eliott, former prosecutor, ICTY, San Francisco, Calif., January 30, 2016. 
Goldstone, Richard, former chief prosecutor, ICTY, New York, October 17, 2014. 
Guy-Smith, Gregor, defense attorney, ICTY, and former ADC-ICTY president, San Francisco, 
Calif., August 12, 2015. 
Robinson, Peter, defense attorney, ICTY and ICTR, and former ADC-ICTY Executive Board 
member, San Francisco, Calif., August 27, 2015.  
Rohan, Colleen, defense attorney, ICTY, and former ADC-ICTY president, Berkeley, Calif., 
November 12, 2015. 
Various former prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other anonymous legal experts who have 
either worked at or closely observed the ICTY and ICC, San Francisco, Calif., London, 
and The Hague, The Netherlands, August 2015–January 2016. 
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